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Cultural Property at the Crossroads: An Examination of  the Issue of  
the Restitution of  Cultural Property to Indigenous Peoples in Article 
11 of  the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples 
 
 
 
Summary: 
 
Over the past thirty years, Indigenous Peoples have turned to international 
human rights law (IHRL) to help secure the return of their cultural property.  In 
2007 the United Nations [U.N.] passed the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP] which offers at Article 11(2) that: “States shall 
provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, 
developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural 
… property ….”  
 
Using a discourse analysis that relies heavily on U.N. documentation, after 
exploring the inadequacies of the traditional framework for the protection of 
cultural property, this thesis traces Article 11 from its origins at Draft Article 12 
to its present form revealing that its contextualization in IHRL caused it to 
suffer a serious retrogression; a retrogression that allows it to step back and fit 
comfortably within existing IHRL thereby offering no real change regarding the 
restitution of cultural property.   
 
In turn, the remainder of this thesis focuses on what underpins this 
retrogression.  It posits that at the micro-level the retrogression of Article 11 
stemmed from links between cultural property and traditional property concepts 
and self-determination; while at the macro-level Article 11 suffered from the 
specter of sovereignty.  
 
In particular it concludes that as a consequence of this retrogression, the 
contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples in Article 11 in IHRL represents an irony in the use of 
international law while it more broadly concludes that this is the result of the 
structural incapacity of IHRL to support such a claim at present.   
 
However, ultimately not all is gloom and doom; a dialogical space exists at the 
international level which holds promise for the future of indigenous advocacy to 
secure such a sui generis right to the restitution of cultural property for Indigenous 
Peoples.  
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Doctoral Thesis  
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Chapter One 
An Introduction 
Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Property at the Crossroads 
 
If you desecrate a white grave, you go to jail.  If you desecrate an Indian grave, you get a PhD. 
--- Pawnee activist Walter Echo-Hawk1 
 
The close of the Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples is 
upon us.  Adopted on December 22, 2004 by United Nations [U.N.] General 
Assembly Resolution A/RES/59/174, it proclaimed that the goal of this decade: 
 
…shall be the further strengthening of international cooperation for the 
solution of problems faced by indigenous people in such areas as culture, 
education, health, human rights, the environment and social and economic 
development, by means of action-oriented programmes and specific projects, 
increased technical assistance and relevant standard-setting activities;2 
 
Fleshed out in more detail it offers the specific goals of:  
 
 Promoting non-discrimination and inclusion of indigenous peoples in 
the design, implementation and evaluation of international, regional and 
national processes regarding laws, policies, resources, programmes and 
projects;  
 Promoting full and effective participation of indigenous peoples in 
decisions which directly or indirectly affect their lifestyles, traditional 
lands and territories, their cultural integrity as indigenous peoples with 
collective rights or any other aspect of their lives, considering the 
principle of free, prior and informed consent;  
                                                 
1 Walter Echo-Hawk, Seattle Post Intelligence, March 11, 1996, at C1, reprinted in Karolina Kuprecht, Human 
Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation, Working Paper No. 2009/34, NCCR Trade Regulation, 
Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, 4 (2009), at http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&e
src=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphase1.nccrtrade.org%2Fimages%2Fsto
ries%2Fpublications%2FIP7%2FWorking%2520Paper%2520Kuprecht%252023062009.pdf&ei=fGz4VPHICe2t
7AbFvICwDw&usg=AFQjCNGjphJMl2XBTqLeKrgSBzqPsAFTvw&bvm=bv.87519884,d.ZGU 
2 U.N.G.A., Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2004: Second International Decade of the World’s 
Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. G.A. Res. A/RES/59/174 (24 February 2005).  This Second International Decade 
followed on the heels of the initial International Decade of World’s Indigenous Peoples to address what the latter 
had failed to produce; namely a declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. See U.N.G.A., International 
Decade of World’s Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/48/163 (21 December 1993); see infra ns. 8-9 (discussing 
the relevance of these agendas).  
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 Redefining development policies that depart from a vision of equity and 
that are culturally appropriate, including respect for the cultural and 
linguistic diversity of indigenous peoples;  
 Adopting targeted policies, programmes, projects and budgets for the 
development of indigenous peoples, including concrete benchmarks, and 
particular emphasis on indigenous women, children and youth;  
 Developing strong monitoring mechanisms and enhancing accountability 
at the international, regional and particularly the national level, regarding 
the implementation of legal, policy and operational frameworks for the 
protection of indigenous peoples and the improvement of their lives.3 
 
Now the close of the Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous 
People is upon us.  Now the close of the Millennium Development Goals as well is 
upon us;4 moving us into the dawn of The Post-2015 Development Agenda.5  Now 
is the time to step back, to take-stock of this decade and to see what it has offered 
Indigenous Peoples.  Indeed, this was this initial logic that fuelled the desire to 
undertake this thesis and in fact, many of these issues have been addressed.  
 
The general tone of the mid-term assessment of the Second International Decade 
was positive noting substantive advancements in relation to each of the five 
objectives though issues were duly noted particularly in relation to implementation.6  
The final report followed suit providing numerous examples worldwide where each 
goal has been achieved though it continues to note a substantial gap between formal 
recognition of Indigenous Peoples and implementation of policies on the ground.7   
 
                                                 
3 U.N.G.A., Draft Programme of Action for the Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. G.A. 
Res. A/60/270 (18 August 2005). 
4 See U.N., Millennium Development Goals and Beyond, at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (15 January 2015). 
5 See U.N. Forum on Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples and the Post-2015 Development Agenda, at 
http://undesadspd.org/IndigenousPeoples/Post2015Agenda.aspx (15 January 2015) (discussing Indigenous 
Peoples in the Post-2015 Development Agenda). 
6 See U.N.G.A., Midterm assessment of the progress made in the achievement of the goal and objectives of the Second International 
Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. G.A. Res. A/65/166 (23 July 2010). 
7 See U.N.G.A., Achievement of the goals and objective of the Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, 
Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/69/271 (6 August 2014). 
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In particular, the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
[UNDRIP or the Declaration],8 which was adopted during the Second 
International Decade and serves as the jewel in its crown that eluded the initial 
International Decade of World's Indigenous Peoples,9 provided the impetus to 
address many of these goals.  In turn, pushing this thesis ever towards 
refinement and precision, a process through which most bodies of work 
undergo, it witnessed a metamorphosis into a narrowed inquiry aimed at fleshing 
out more specifically the matter of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples in the Declaration.  Gradually even this investigation was 
further honed. This thesis now offers the following as its principal research aim: 
to provide a detailed academic commentary of Article 11 of the UNDRIP as it 
addresses the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples 
in international human rights law [IHRL] as it presently stands and in doing so 
offers the first specific and in-depth academic commentary of its kind regarding 
Article 11.  Specifically, Article 11 provides in full the following: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs.  This includes the right to maintain, protect and 
develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as 
archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies 
and visual and performing arts and literature. 
 
States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect 
to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without 
their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions 
and customs. 
 
The importance of this inquiry is two-fold.  First, as aforementioned hitherto 
such an investigation of Article 11 in its own right has not been undertaken and 
                                                 
8 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th 
plen mtg, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (13 September 2007). 
9 See U.N.G.A., International Decade of World’s Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/48/163 (21 December 1993). 
See also International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, First International Decade of World’s Indigenous Peoples, at 
http://www.iwgia.org/human-rights/un-mechanisms-and-processes/2nd-un-decade-on-indigenous-peoples/1st-
un-decade-on-indigenous-peoples (15 January 2015). 
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where it has been explored it has not been in-depth but rather frequently given 
short shrift in favor of other articles and concepts included in the Declaration 
such as self-determination, autonomy, the control and restitution of land and 
free prior and informed consent.10  More broadly than this, the further 
significance of this inquiry derives from the fact that Article 11 is part and parcel 
of the Declaration which is soft law that has been ascribed increased importance 
in recent years.  Soft law refers to rules that do not have legally binding force but 
at the same time do not completely lack legal significance.  In international law, 
frequently cited examples include codes of conduct and declarations especially 
those of the U.N. General Assembly such as the UNDRIP which is under 
consideration herein.11  Yet, simultaneously they are not directly enforceable 
unlike hard law, which includes customary international law and treaties.12  
Regardless,  literature in the area typically ascribes increasing importance to soft 
law as a tool in the arsenal of Indigenous Peoples in their campaign under 
international law to protect and increase their rights13 and given that in 1962 the 
Office of Legal Affairs of the U.N. clarified upon request of the Commission on 
Human Rights that a declaration “is a formal and solemn instrument ... resorted 
to only in very rare cases relating to matters of major and lasting importance 
where maximum compliance is expected.”14  Indeed, as past experience 
demonstrates principles of soft law included in U.N. declarations can become 
                                                 
10 This is not to suggest that the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under IHRL 
has not been explored, indeed this is at the heart of the Cultural Indigenism movement and serves as the impetus 
for the inclusion of the issue in the Declaration at Article 11. See infra n. 45.  However, this movement typically 
has looked at the issue more broadly rather than providing an in-depth analysis of Article 11 as presented in this 
thesis through the academic commentary herein. 
11 The exception here is that of General Assembly pronouncements on budget allocations to member states. 
Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 European 
Journal of International Law 121, 130 (2011). 
12 Indeed this lack of enforcement characteristic of the soft law of the Declaration and as such Article 11 at the 
heart of the aim of this research also shapes why the thesis does not address issues of enforcement in relation to 
the issues of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples.   
13 See generally M. Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 58 International And Comparative Law Quarterly 957 (2012) (exploring the 
practical advantages of using soft law for Indigenous Peoples’ rights arguing that it increased the value of the 
Declaration given the latter’s character and content as well as having important legal effect through it potential to 
develop into hard customary and/or treaty law).   
14 Wiessner, supra n. 11, at 130 [citation omitted]. 
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the fons et origo or the origins of international customary law; in essence the 
International Court of Justice has confirmed that they can crystallize into ‘hard’ 
or enforceable customary international law15 and hence is the second prong in 
the trident underpinning the importance of this thesis in exploring Article 11.  
Despite the inherent circularity in its logic that has generated numerous 
theoretical debates,16 in the most basic sense to constitute customary 
international law, a norm requires opinion juris, which is evidence that states 
consider themselves to be legally bound by the norm and also widespread and 
sustained state practice.17  As regards the Declaration, on its adoption, opinion 
was widely divided; some argued that the Declaration does not reflect customary 
international law while others suggested that a number of principles in the 
Declaration reflect customary international law.18 
 
Given this division amongst other concerns, the International Law Association 
[ILA] immediately after the passage of UNDRIP appointed an expert committee 
on the rights of Indigenous Peoples to provide an Expert Commentary which 
would offer an “authoritative clarification, elucidation and guidance in respect of 
the UNDRIP provisions, including their development, context and status in 
international law.” 19  It released its final report regarding this matter in 2012 
noting that in general it cannot yet be said on the whole that the Declaration can 
                                                 
15 Barelli, supra n. 13, at 967 citing Legality of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1996, 226, para. 70 
(“General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may … provide evidence important for establishing 
the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinion juris.”) Id. 
16 Tanya Evelyn George, Using Customary International Law to Identify “Fetishistic” Claims to Cultural 
Property, 80 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 1207, 1228- 30 (2005). 
17 See North Sea Continental Shelf, Germany v Denmark, Merits, Judgment, (1969) ICJ Rep 3, ICGJ 150 (ICJ 
1969), 20th February 1969, International Court of Justice [ICJ], paras. 73-74. 
18 See generally S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd ed. 2004); Siegfried Wiessner, 
Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 57 (1999). See also International Law Association, Rights of Indigenous Peoples: First 
Report, Rio de Janeiro Conference (2008) at p.6 [There are opinions, however, that consider a ‘Declaration’, 
especially one adopted by an overwhelming majority of states, as of some legal authority.  Those, however, who 
see the universe of ‘sources’ of international law as limited by Article 38(1)(a) through (c) of the ICJ Statute, have 
a problem locating such an instrument there.”]; Emmanuel Voyiakis, Voting in the General Assembly as Evidence of 
Customary International Law? in Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 209 (S. 
Allen and A. Xanthaki eds., 2011). 
19 International Law Association, Rights, First Report, supra n. 18 at 3. 
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be considered a statement of existing customary international law but that there 
are certain key provisions that can be considered as such.20  Amongst those 
indigenous rights that the committee identified as having achieved the status of 
customary international law are included: the right of self-determination,21 the 
right to autonomy or self-government,22 the right to the restitution of ancestral 
lands in order to fulfil the rights of Indigenous Peoples to their traditional lands 
and territories23 and finally the right to reparation and redress for wrongs they 
have suffered, including rights relating to lands taken or damaged without their 
free, prior and informed consent.24  It is apparent from this list with its inclusion 
twice-- both specifically and more broadly--the importance of land and its 
restitution to Indigenous Peoples.  Yet, interestingly the report did not identify 
so explicitly the right to the restitution of cultural property as a principle of 
customary international law.  However, it is arguable that it identified the 
restitution of cultural property as a principle of customary international law 
through its inclusion in the latter provision which could be considered a catch-
all; the right to reparation and redress for wrongs they have suffered, though it is 
not specifically mentioned whereas land again is singled out and repeated.  If this 
is the case, the importance of this thesis becomes imminent by clarifying the as 
yet untested scope of Article 11 as customary international law.  Yet, it is not 
explicitly clear in this report if the issue of the restitution of cultural property has 
reached the status of customary international law especially in comparison to the 
issue of the restitution of land despite the fact that the ILA Expert Commentary 
hoped that “the Commentary will reduce confusion and contention over the 
normative status of the UNDRIP provisions and indigenous rights in general.”25  
Indeed, the weight of historical state practice which has not offered the 
                                                 
20 International Law Association, Conclusions and Recommendation of The Committee on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Resolution No. 5/2012, para. 2 (2012).   
21 Id. at para. 4.  
22 Id. at para. 5. 
23 Id. at para. 7. 
24 Id. at para. 9. 
25 International Law Association, First Report, supra n. 18 at 3. 
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restitution of cultural property does not support such conclusion.  However 
regardless, as aforementioned the ICJ has confirmed that soft law in particular 
General Assembly resolutions gradually can develop into customary international 
law.  Moreover, principles from U.N. declarations also typically serve as the 
inspiration foundation for a future rights included within a legally binding 
international treaty with the most notable example being that of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR].26  Given the nearly unanimous adoption 
of the UNDRIP, it is therefore a possibility that Article 11 will be enforceable in 
the future through one if not both of these paths.  Moreover, in the meantime, 
like more broad IHRL instruments, UNDRIP will be standard setting and 
undoubtedly influence soft law and even national practice27 and so the continued 
importance of this thesis remains in clarifying the as yet untested scope of 
Article 11. 
 
With the research aim and its importance underscored, it is natural to turn to the 
question of the methodology of this thesis, which is one of discourse analysis 
that involves the examination of documents.  Given the research aim to provide 
a detailed academic commentary of Article 11 of the UNDRIP which addresses 
the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples in IHRL as 
it presently stands, the discourse analysis herein focuses on the leading 
documents in international law relevant though not necessarily specific to the 
issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples.  Largely it 
looks at documents within international law in the areas of the protection of 
cultural property, international human rights law and more specifically 
indigenous rights.  Moreover, where necessary to either compare or contrast 
                                                 
26 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
27 In 2007 the Supreme Court of Belize utilized the Declaration in determining the land rights of the Mayan 
peoples of Southern Belize.  See U.N.G.A., Achievement of the goals and objective of the Second International 
Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. A/69/271 (6 August 2014) at para. 20 citing Manuel Coy et al 
v The Attorney General of Belize et al, Supreme Court of Belize, Claims No. 171 and 172 (10 October 2007) paras. 
118-34. Moreover, both Bolivia and Ecuador have incorporated the UNDRIP into their constitutions.  
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given their similar and yet different nature, international documents related to 
the issues of the restitution of land and human remains to Indigenous Peoples 
also heavily feature.  However, it is worth noting that in particular in Chapter 
Three at its analysis of the contextualization of the issue the of restitution of 
cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under IHRL in Article 11, this thesis will 
examine exclusively for comparison  Article 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] which provides:   
 
[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.28 
 
This is not to suggest that other rights are not appropriate for this analysis.  Indeed, 
the right of all people to culture can be found within numerous documents in 
international law.  For instance, the United Nations Charter makes reference to 
participation in culture life at Articles 13, 55, 57 and 7329 as does the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] at Articles 27 which offers the right of 
everyone “freely to participate in the culture life of the community, to enjoy the arts 
and to share in scientific advancement in its benefits”.30  The UDHR also provides 
at Article 22 the right of everyone to the “realization of the economic, social and 
cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.”31  The right to culture life can also be found in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Articles 1,3,6 and 15 which 
                                                 
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
29 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 
1945. 
30 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra n. 26, at Art. 27. However, unlike Article 27 of the ICCPR 
which will be used herein, this UDHR right has been restricted to an individual rather than a collective right to 
culture as well as limited to negative protection. Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution: Ensuring Each Group’s 
Contribution to Humanity, 22 European Journal of International Law 17, 31 (2011).  In turn, it is less suitable for 
exploring the right to the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples than Article 27 of the ICCPR 
with its placement of both negative and positive obligations on states as well as making these obligations 
collective rather than individual in nature. See generally infra at Chapter 3 (discussing ICCPR Article 27).   
31 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra n. 26 at Art. 22. 
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include the right of  individuals to take part in cultural life, to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and to benefit from the protection of moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which s/he is 
the individual author32 while the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination offers such protection at Article 7.33  Yet Article 27 
of the ICCPR will serve as the focus in this thesis in its analysis of contextualization 
for reasons two-fold.  First, it has been the right through which the contours of the 
protection of indigenous cultural rights and integrity have been most extensively 
developed while by contrast the others have little to no jurisprudence to flesh out 
these core concepts to restitution at the heart of this thesis; and second it does just 
that: it pertains the contours of the protection of indigenous cultural rights and 
integrity.34  As Dr. Marco Odello notes: 
 
It can be notice that the definition of cultural rights in these documents was 
mainly associated to the idea of ‘high culture’, in the sense of scientific and 
artistic production, and to the protection of rights derived from the 
production of cultural goods mainly in the form of copyrights.  However, 
Article 27 of the ICCPR mentions rights that might have cultural dimensions 
not included [in these other documents] … These are the freedoms of 
minorities which take into account … the enjoyment of ‘their own culture’.35  
 
Aside from its examination of documents within international law in this discourse 
analysis, to a certain extent this thesis also involves an examination of documents in 
domestic law.  However, in this case it is limited to laws that are specifically 
designed for and pertain to the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples as this specificity provides the best comparison to the efforts 
                                                 
32 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, at Arts. 1, 3, 6, 15 entered into force January 3, 1976 
[hereinafter ICESCR]. 
33 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 
December 1965, G. A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, 660 U.N.T.S. 195,  at Art. 7 
(entered into force 4 January 1969) [hereinafter CERD]. 
34 ILO Convention 169 advances indigenous cultural rights through its recognition that indigenous culture is 
broader than the traditional meaning.  Yet as Dr. Alexandra Xanthaki notes, the references on cultural rights are 
too general. A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Cultural Rights in International Law, 2 European Journal of Law Reform 343, 
347 (2000). 
35 M. Odello, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Cultural Identity in the Inter-American Context, 16 International Journal of 
Human Rights25, 30 (2012).  
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under IHRL to produce a right to restitution in Article 11.  Given the subject at the 
heart of this thesis and the research question, it is not surprising that the views and 
practice of states with significant indigenous populations will feature prominently 
including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States (U.S.).36  However, 
in particular the most emphasis in domestic legislation will be placed on the 
legislation of the later for comparison and analysis.  This stems from the fact that 
the U.S. is the only jurisdiction that has comprehensive legislation providing for the 
repatriation and restitution of human remains and cultural property to Indigenous 
Peoples.  Known as the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
[NAGPRA],37 “NAGPRA’s codification of human rights in such an extensive 
cultural property act is a phenomenon which is singular worldwide.”38    
 
No other country has responded, to date, to indigenous peoples’ human 
rights claims for control over their old cultural property in a similarly 
encompassing legal, statutory act.  Activities have accrued in other states, like 
Canada, with a variety of programs and policy initiatives, yet they lack legal 
effect and are based upon ethical considerations or potential obligations.39  
 
Indeed, by contrast Canada has no comprehensive legislation governing indigenous 
cultural property which has been described as notable when compared with the 
comprehensive federal legislation that exists just below the border in the U.S.40 At 
best, a piecemeal approach has been developed provincially within Alberta offering 
the strongest legislation in the First Nations Sacred Ceremonial Objects 
Repatriation Act which offers repatriation upon request by indigenous groups but it 
                                                 
36 However, it is worth noting that Indigenous Peoples can be located in at least seventy-four countries 
worldwide and account for six percent of the world’s population. Lindsey L. Wiersma, Indigenous Lands as Cultural 
Property: A New Approach to Indigenous Land Claims, 54 Duke Law Journal 1061, 1063 (2005) [citation omitted].  See 
also  First Peoples Worldwide, Who Are Indigenous Peoples?, at http://www.firstpeoples.org/who-are-indigenous-
peoples (29 January 2015) (noting that Indigenous Peoples number around 400 million spanning over 90 
countries and consist of more than 5,000 distinct tribes). 
37 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013, 18 U.S.C. 1170.  
38 Karolina Kuprecht, The Concept of “Cultural Affiliation” in NAGPRA: Its Potential Limits in the Global Protection of 
Indigenous Cultural Property Rights, 19 International Journal of Cultural Property 33, 44 (2012) [citation omitted]. See 
also Tamara Kagan, Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at Common Law: A Contextual Approach, 63 U. Toronto 
Fac. L. Rev. 1 (2005) (NAGPRA ... is by far the most comprehensive and extensive domestic legislative approach 
to the repatriation of cultural property.) Id. 
39 Karolina Kuprecht, Cultural Affiliation, supra n. 38 at 44. 
40 Kagan, supra n. 38, at 10. 
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still may be denied where the relevant minister deems it inappropriate.41  Australian 
legislation offers even less.  The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Act is silent on matters of repatriation of cultural property offering no 
provision and emphasizing third party interests and ministerial discretion.42  In turn, 
with NAGPRA as such an “exceptional” piece of human rights statutory legislation 
offering a right to repatriation to Indigenous Peoples,43 it will serve as the principal 
domestic legislation under analysis and for comparison with Article 11 at the heart 
of this thesis.  Therefore, suffice it to say that this thesis also will not focus on the 
host of general laws across many domestic jurisdictions in both tort such as 
conversion, detinue or replevin and criminal law such as theft which could be used 
in repatriation efforts as again laws specific to the restitution of cultural property in 
states provide a better comparison as they most closely parallel the efforts in IHRL 
to provide Indigenous Peoples with a human right to restitution in Article 11.  
Regardless, in all the documents in this discourse analysis, heavy reliance has been 
placed on the collection and analysis of primary legal sources but secondary legal 
sources are explored where pertinent. 
 
Moreover, in discussing methodology it should be noted that the inner 
consummate lawyer drives this thesis.  However, it is the lex lata rather than the 
lex ferenda lawyer who casts her eyes over these aforementioned documents.  
Again, given the research aim to provide a detailed academic commentary of 
Article 11 of the UNDRIP which addresses the issue of the restitution of 
cultural property to Indigenous Peoples in IHRL as it presently stands, this thesis 
lends itself to a lex lata approach which by definition explores the law as it exists 
rather than a lex ferenda approach of exploring what the law should be.  Therefore, 
this thesis situates/views itself predominately not as one of critique and 
advocacy but rather as one of exposure of what the law is in Article 11 and 
                                                 
41 Id. at 11. 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 Karolina Kuprecht, Human Rights Aspects, supra n. 1 at 2. 
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surrounding the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous 
Peoples under IHRL.  It is the story of what has unfolded rather than what the 
law should be according to Indigenous Peoples and/or other advocates.  
Although it should be noted that advocacy for the inclusion of the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under IHRL, the issue 
which is at the center of this thesis, rests on the a prioi justification that this 
restitution is a good.44  However, again taking a lex lata approach this thesis does 
not explore the matter of whether or not the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples under IHRL is a good or a bad.45  Rather, it explores this 
advocacy to the extent of understanding how it resulted in this contextualization 
of the issue of restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under 
                                                 
44 Little literature explores if restitution is in fact a good intrinsically while an abundance exists in relation to 
arguing why it is good or bad in relation to its instrumental or secondary values. See infra at n. 45.  However, an 
excellent related discussion is had by Professor Sarah Harding who explores the value of culture heritage. See 
Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 Arizona State Law Journal 291 (1999).  Although 
Professor Harding seeks to understand the intrinsic value of cultural heritage rather than value of restitution her 
inquiry is premised on determining this value of cultural heritage in light of the fact that the trend is towards 
restitution and so it is necessary to understanding this first before assessing if restitution is a good. Id. at 293. See 
infra Chapter 4 at n. 240 (discussing Harding’s work in more detail).  
45 Although interesting, as noted this inquiry is outside the scope of this thesis and there is considerable literature 
dedicated to arguing why the restitution of cultural property principally to states under international law is 
instrumentally good or bad.  Indeed this is at the heart of the Cultural Nationalism and the Cultural 
Internationalism debate that characterized the discourse of the international protection of cultural property for 
many years. See J.H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 American Journal of International 
Law 831 (1986) [theorizing that there are two ways to think about cultural property and thus developing this 
dualist paradigm of cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism which are essence both state-centric]. See 
also Sarah Harding, supra n. 44 at 300 (noting that the debate between Cultural Nationalism and Cultural 
Internationalism is well documented in a whole array of literature that followed this dualist theorization on the 
appropriate disposition of cultural property and citing such examples of this myriad of literature).  Yet as 
Professor Franceso Francioni notes, while it is possible to reflect upon whether or not at the time Professor 
Merryman proposed this duality that it accurately reflected the spirit of the law and the policies, he notes that 
today this duality definitely cannot explain the law and in particular international law in relation to cultural 
property which has a much broader trajectory including that it is “an essential dimension of human rights, when 
it reflects the spiritual, religious and cultural specificity of minorities and groups.”  Francesco Francioni, The 
Human Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 European Journal of International Law 9, 
9-10 (2011).  Indeed, more recently there is a host of literature that advocates the restitution of cultural property 
to Indigenous Peoples under international law which assumes it is a good without exploring if it is a good; if it 
has intrinsic value.  This is at the heart of the most recent trend again in the discourse of the international 
protection of cultural property amongst others known as Cultural Indigenism that has driven the 
contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under IHRL. See infra 
Chapter 4 at Introduction (discussing Cultural Indigenism advocacy in a descriptive fashion to provide context for 
the lex lata analysis here in of the results of this advocacy).   
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IHRL46 and how it has unfolded but this thesis does not center itself as part of a 
broader indigenous advocacy project.47 
 
With this in mind, this thesis proceeds as follows.  Chapter Two discusses by way of 
background the present international legal framework for the protection of cultural 
property in which the broader repatriation debate is located and thereby provides 
the legal context in which the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples also initially found itself situated.  In doing so, it looks to 
answer why Article 11 was needed from an indigenous perspective and ultimately 
concludes that it was the result of numerous shortcomings at the heart of the 
international legal framework for the protection of cultural property but in 
particular  the limitation of the principle of non-retroactivity.  With this foundation 
in place, Chapter Three turns to exploring the contextualization of the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property under IHRL law as made manifest in Article 11 of 
the UNDRIP.  In essence, it explores its theoretical underpinnings to answer what 
is Article 11.  It does so through tracing it from its initial incarnation in Draft 
Article 12 through the drafting process to its final form.  Ultimately, it reveals that 
Article 11 experienced a retrogression that allows it to step back and fit comfortably 
within existing IHRL offering no real change on the issue of the restitution of 
cultural property to Indigenous Peoples.  More broadly, it demonstrates that this 
outcome is typical of the broader experiences of indigenous advocacy suggesting 
that there are limits to IHRL and its efforts to provide for the restitution of cultural 
property to Indigenous Peoples.  With these theoretical foundations intact, Chapter 
Four turns to exploring why Article 11 experienced this retrogression through a 
micro-level analysis.  Ultimately, it concludes that it experienced this retrogression 
as a result of its specific links with the concepts of property and self-determination, 
                                                 
46 See generally infra at Chapter 3 (discussing generally the contextualization of the issue of the restitution of 
cultural property).  
47 However, note that the post-script to this thesis does explore ways in which indigenous advocacy might move 
forward in light of this thesis. See infra at Chapter 7.  
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which is exacerbated by their association with collective rights, thereby locking it in 
a fatal triumvirate of concepts that face powerful opposition under IHRL ensuring 
its failure as a sui generis right.  More broadly, Chapter Four demonstrates that this 
retrogression on a narrower micro-level parallels the experience of the Declaration 
as a whole uncovered in a meso-level analysis by Professor Karen Engle in her 
seminal article On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in the Context of Human Rights.48  Chapter Five then offers a broader analysis 
than both by providing a macro-level analysis of the issue of the restitution of 
cultural property to Indigenous Peoples in Article 11 of the Declaration through 
exploring what explains the retrogression of Article 11 on a broader level in 
international law.  The chapter concludes at the root of this retrogression are state 
concerns with sovereignty, because worries over sovereignty ultimately lie at the 
heart of opposition to the right to self-determination and the disruption of third 
party property rights.  With this three-tiered analysis complete, Chapter Six reflects 
upon what the consequences are and what conclusions can be drawn from these 
analyses; exploring the structural incapacity and ironies of IHRL as well as its 
opportunities as a dialogical space.  Finally, Chapter 7 offers a post-script to this 
thesis taking a step back and exploring how Indigenous Peoples should approach 
advocacy for the restitution of cultural property in this Post-2015 Development 
Agenda in light of this thesis ultimately offering a two-pronged strategy. 
 
                                                 
48 Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples in the Context of  Human 
Rights, 22 European Journal of  International Law 141 (2011).  
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Chapter Two 
Who Owns the Past? 
 The International Legal Framework for the Protection 
and Return of Cultural Property  
 
"All The Rowboats" 
All the rowboats in the paintings 
They keep trying to row away 
And the captains’ worried faces 
Stay contorted and staring at the waves 
They’ll keep hanging in their gold frames 
For forever, forever and a day 
All the rowboats in the oil paintings 
They keep trying to row away, row away 
 
Hear them whispering French and German 
Dutch, Italian, and Latin 
When no one’s looking I touch a sculpture 
Marble, cold and soft as satin 
But the most special are the most lonely 
God, I pity the violins 
In glass coffins they keep coughing 
They’ve forgotten, forgotten how to sing, how to sing 
 
First there’s lights out, then there’s lock up 
Masterpieces serving maximum sentences 
It’s their own fault for being timeless 
There’s a price to pay and a consequence 
All the galleries, the museums 
Here’s your ticket, welcome to the tombs 
They’re just public mausoleums 
The living dead fill every room 
But the most special are the most lonely 
God, I pity the violins 
In glass coffins they keep coughing 
They’ve forgotten, forgotten how to sing 
 
They will stay there in their gold frames 
For forever, forever and a day 
All the rowboats in the oil paintings 
They keep trying to row away, row away 
 
First there’s lights out, then there’s lock up 
Masterpieces serving maximum sentences 
It’s their own fault for being timeless 
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There’s a price to pay and a consequence 
All the galleries, the museums 
They will stay there forever and a day 
All the rowboats in the oil paintings 
They keep trying to row away, row away 
All the rowboats in the oil paintings 
They keep trying to row away, row away  
--- Regina Spektor1 
 
Introduction 
 
Undoubtedly, cultural property and its protection and restitution have entered 
the public consciousness.  The importance of cultural property to humanity 
stems from concerns that are as many and varied as cultural property itself as it 
is simultaneously “a link to our past, an embodiment of our moral values and 
religion, a nourishment of our sense of community and a source of inspiration, 
wealth, science and information.”2  A vast amount of empirical evidence indeed 
suggests that these mixed motivations have produced a general concern for the 
protection of cultural property.3  Due to their necessarily global nature, 
international conventions perhaps serve as the most well-known examples 
among this empirical evidence.  The principal international conventions relating 
to the protection of cultural property in armed conflict and its aftermath include 
                                                 
1 Regina Spektor, All The Rowboats, Soviet Kitsch Music (2012), at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2CZ8oss
U4pc 
2 Dalia Osman, Occupier’s Title to Cultural Property: Nineteenth-Century Removal of Egyptian Artifacts, 37 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 969, 971 (1998-1999). 
3 See M. Catherine Vernon, Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention, 26 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of  International Law 435, 436 (1994) (noting the importance of cultural property has increased 
worldwide as evidenced by a myriad of agreements, treaties and conventions that have been developed to protect, 
preserve and share the world’s common cultural heritage.); John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural 
Property  in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law 98 (2000) (citing 
the following empirical evidence: “[t]he existence of thousands of museums; tens of thousands of dealers; 
hundreds of thousands of collectors; millions of museum visitors; brisk markets in art and antiquities; universities 
departments of art, archaeology, and ethnology; historic preservation laws; elaborate legislative schemes 
controlling cultural property…; public agencies with substantial budgets…; laws controlling archaeological 
excavations; laws limiting the export of cultural property….”). Moreover, a 2001 study by the Archaeological 
Institute of America revealed  that while only 23% of respondents were aware of the laws regarding the buying 
and selling of artifacts and only 28% knew of laws protecting archaeological sites there is at least significant 
public concern regarding the illicit trafficking and repatriation of cultural property; 96% of respondents agreed 
that there should be laws to protect historical and prehistoric archaeological sites while 90% agreed that there 
should be laws to protect the general public from importing artifacts from a country that does not want those 
artifacts exported. Nancy C. Wilkie, Public Opinion Regarding Cultural Property Policy, 19 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 97, 98 (2001).  
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The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict (1954 Hague Convention),4 the 1954 Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict (First Protocol)5 and finally the Second Protocol to the Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Second 
Protocol).6  Beyond situations of armed conflict, conventions for protection in 
times of peace include the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property (UNESCO Convention)7 and the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Convention on Stolen or Illegally 
Exported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT Convention).8   
 
Collectively, these conventions comprise the present foundation of the 
international legal framework for the protection of cultural property.9  However, 
                                                 
4 U.N., 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural  Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed 
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]. 
5 Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed May 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 
358. 
6 U.N., Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict, opened for signature Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769 [hereinafter Second Protocol]. Note, this 
Protocol also extends its protection of cultural property not just to situations of international armed conflict and 
its aftermath but to situations of non-international armed conflict as well. Id. at Article 22. 
7 UNESCO, Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]. 
8 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the 
Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects, done June 24, 1995, 34  I.L.M. 1326 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]. 
9 Indeed a myriad of laws exist with those mentioned in this thesis only representing a fraction of the whole yet 
for the purposes of this thesis and in particular this chapter the most relevant for the issue of the restitution of 
cultural property to Indigenous Peoples at the heart of this thesis is an exploration of the international legal 
framework.  Most notably, legal frameworks for the protection of cultural property exist also at the regional and 
often at the state level.  At the regional level, the American states took the lead in protecting cultural property 
with the Washington Treaty also known as the Roerich Pact which protected cultural property during armed 
conflict and was followed a year later the Pan American Treaty.  More recently, the Organization of American 
States [OAS] adopted the Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical and Artistic Heritage of 
the American Nations, Convention of San Salvador [1976] 16 June 1976 Res AG/Res. 210 (IV-O/76).  The 
Council of Europe followed suit with a whole host of such protections including: the European Cultural 
Convention [1954] 218 U.N.T.S. 140 (1955), the European Convention on Offenses Relating to Cultural 
Property [1985] 119 ETS 1985, 35 ILM 44 (1985), the Convention for the Protection of the Architectural 
Heritage of Europe [1985] 121 ETS (1985), and the European Convention for the Protection of the 
Archaeological Heritage of Europe (Revised) [1992] ETS No. 143.  The European Union also is bound by Article 
36 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on The Functioning of the European Union (ex Article 30 TEC)  
which serves as an exception to the free movement of goods between EU states as concerns “national treasures”, 
the European Regulation (EEC) No. 3911/92 which requires an export license for all cultural goods outside of 
the European Union and Council and Directive 93/7/ECC of 15 March 1993 on The Return of Cultural Objects 
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just like much of the cultural property that this framework seeks to protect, it 
has cracks that mar its foundation.  Namely, these cracks surround the issue of 
the repatriation debate that exists within the broader international legal 
framework for the protection of cultural property.  Indeed, it is within the 
repatriation debate which itself is within this international framework for the 
protection of cultural property that the issue of the restitution of cultural 
property to Indigenous Peoples finds itself located.  In turn, this chapter 
provides the foundations for this thesis and proceeds as follows.  First, it will 
explore the repatriation debate in which the issue of the restitution of cultural 
property to Indigenous Peoples finds itself located as well as exploring in brief 
the concept of cultural property before turning to the broader international legal 
framework for the protection of cultural property in which all these issues and 
concepts find themselves located.  Finally, it will explore the limits of this 
framework as concerns the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples that ultimately drove its contextualization in IHRL.  
 
Diagram 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State which requires the return of unlawfully removed 
cultural object to a requesting Member State of origin which was removed after 1 January 1993. In addition, as 
mentioned in the introduction some states have laws protecting their cultural property independent of these 
international and regional laws.  For instance, Malta protects much of its cultural property through its Cultural 
Heritage Act of 2002 while as mentioned at the outset and used herein this thesis the U.S. protects the cultural 
property of its Indigenous Peoples in the Native American Graves and Protection Act [NAGPRA] which will be 
explored further herein.  See infra Chapter 5 at Section II (discussing NAGPRA). 
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I. Art Wars: The Repatriation Debate 
“[R]epatriation is perhaps the most intractable and contentious part of the 
bitter art wars.”10--- Daniel Shapiro 
 
The issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples finds itself 
located within the broader repatriation debate.  Broadly speaking, repatriation 
can refer to any return of cultural property.  For instance, it can refer to the 
return of cultural property to a state after its illegal export while it can also refer 
to the return or more accurately the restitution of cultural property to its owner 
after theft.  In turn, simply stated at its core the repatriation debate concerns 
whether or not the cultural property of states and Indigenous Peoples that has 
been removed should be returned upon their requests by the current 
possessors11 of such property. 
 
In relation to the repatriation of cultural property the rationale for its repatriation 
is three-fold: restoration of the sacred link between people, land and cultural 
heritage, the amelioration or reversal of internationally wrongful acts, including 
discrimination and genocide and repatriation as “an essential components of a 
people’s ability to maintain, revitalise and develop their collective cultural 
identity.”12  In turn, the repatriation debate, which houses the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples, has both a prospective 
and a retroactive dimension.  The historical theft, the historical illicit trafficking 
                                                 
10 Daniel Shapiro, Repatriation: A Modest Proposal, 31 New York University Journal of International Law & Policy. 
95 (1998).  
11 The term possessor rather than owner is deliberate here as many states and Indigenous Peoples that desire 
repatriation do not see the would-be defendants as the legal owners of the property in any respect as they often 
claim a wrong was at the heart of their acquiring of the property.  See infra Chapter 6 at ns. 55-61 (discussing these 
wrongs).  In turn, at the core of the dispute is both the possession of cultural property and the concept of 
ownership.  In turn, the preferred word is possessor in the sense that the UNIDORIT Convention uses this 
word; to include any person against who a claim for restitution of an object should be brought.  
12 Ana Fillipa Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects, 299-30 (2006) as 
paraphrased by and reprinted in Karolina Kuprecht, Human Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation, 
Working Paper No. 2009/34, NCCR Trade Regulation, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, 15 
(2009), at http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url
=http%3A%2F%2Fphase1.nccrtrade.org%2Fimages%2Fstories%2Fpublications%2FIP7%2FWorking%2520Pa
per%2520Kuprecht%252023062009.pdf&ei=fGz4VPHICe2t7AbFvICwDw&usg=AFQjCNGjphJMl2XBTqLe
KrgSBzqPsAFTvw&bvm=bv.87519884,d.ZGU 
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or any other form of historical removal of cultural property typical from a source 
to a market state has generated the modern demands that fuel the repatriation 
debate in its retrospective application.  These requests by their retrospective 
nature typically are made many years after the initial removal of such property 
and with many suggesting that the initial removal occurred under dubious 
conditions at best both in times of armed conflict and peace typically as part of 
the circumstances and incidents of colonialism.  Further, these retrospective 
requests can be typified by the fact that the international framework for the 
protection of cultural property in which this debate is contained has an absence 
of any clear legal obligation to return such property.13  Beyond this retrospective 
dimension, to the extent that these problems continue they fuel the prospective 
dimension of the repatriation debate that the international framework discussed 
below seeks to address.  Indeed, the limitations of both forms are under 
consideration below as they affect the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples, which is at the heart of this thesis.  However, in particular 
the former is of serious concern as the bulk of indigenous cultural property was 
removed as part of the historical incidents of colonialism. 
 
II. Cultural Property at the Center of The Repatriation Debate 
 
At the center of the repatriation debate and in turn, the international framework 
for the protection of cultural property is just that: cultural property.  No 
universal14 definition of ‘cultural property’ exists despite both the extensive 
history15 of and efforts to define this elusive concept.  Indeed, “[t]he numerous 
                                                 
13 Ultimately, this issue stems from the fact that the current framework for the protection of such property 
relegates the issue of repatriation and more significantly limits it through the principle of non-retroactivity.  See 
infra Chapter 2, at Section IV. 
14 John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property 
(Part one) 27 Environmental Law & Policy Journal 349, 382 (2004) (stating no universally accepted definition of 
the term “cultural property.”)  
15 The modern concept of cultural property evolved with the development of nationalism in Europe at the end of 
the eighteenth century.  See Elazar Barkan & Ronald Bush eds., Claiming the Stones, Naming the Bones: Cultural 
Property and the Negotiation of National and Ethnic Identity 18 (2002) (outlining the history of both the 
concept of and concern for cultural property).  However, it should be noted that the concern for cultural 
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and varied definitions given to cultural property contribute to the lack of 
uniformity in cultural property protection laws.”16  As Professor Janet Blake 
notes: 
 
There exists a difficulty of interpretation of the core concepts of “Cultural 
heritage” (or “cultural property”) and “cultural heritage of mankind” and as 
yet no generally agreed definition of the content of these terms appears to 
exist.  The increasing global importance of cultural heritage instruments and 
the ever-expanding scope of the term and the areas in which it used require a 
workable definition of the nature of the cultural heritage.  Each such 
expansion introduces much more complex issues concerning the nature of 
cultural heritage and the construction of cultural identity than were apparent 
in earlier developments in this field.  The danger therefore exists of creating 
future international instruments which extend the range of the term without 
having settled on a clear understanding of its meaning as employed in existing 
texts.17 
 
However, even if it is not possible to pinpoint a general definition suitable for use 
in all contexts, a definition herein is nonetheless required as cultural property is at 
the heart of the reseach question of this thesis: to provide a detailed academic 
commentary of Article 11 of the UNDRIP as it addresses the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples in international human rights 
law [IHRL] as it presently stands and in doing so to offer the first specific and in-
depth academic commentary of its kind regarding Article 11.18  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
property can be traced back as far as the ancient Greeks with the historian Polybius, who first called for the 
protection of cultural art and artifacts from foreign claims and seizures.  J.H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking 
about Cultural Property, 80 American Journal of International Law 831, 833 n.7 (1986). 
16 Stephanie O. Forbes, Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Efforts to Protect Cultural Property, 9 Transnational Law 
235, 239 (1996).  
17 Janet Blake, On Defining The Cultural Heritage, 49 International & Comp. Law Quarterly 61, 63 (2000). 
18 The importance of defining cultural property is of course of more important than simply for the purposes of 
this thesis.  Understanding the term cultural property is significant as this term ultimately determines what objects 
receive special legal protection under the framework discussed herein.  See David N. Chang, Stealing Beauty: 
Stopping the Madness of Illicit Art Trafficking, 28 Houston Journal of International Law 829, 838 (2006) (noting that 
“the impact of laws and international agreements regarding cultural property depend in large part on the nature 
and scope of the definition of cultural property ... [a]ccordingly, the definition of cultural property significantly 
affects the legal and conceptual presumptions and subsequent application of regulations employing that term.”). 
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A frequently cited and general definition of cultural property provides that it 
comprises objects that possess, “artistic, archaeological,19 ethnological or 
historical value.”20  Professor Paul Bator added that it also includes “all objects 
that are in fact prized and collected, whether or not they were originally designed 
to be useful, and whether or not they possess ‘scientific’ as well as aesthetic 
value.”21  Undoubtedly, this definition adds another dimension to cultural 
property as it makes it possible to include objects of the everyday and indeed in 
many cases it is these objects that are of particular importance to Indigenous 
Peoples and are the subjects of their requests for the restitution of cultural 
property.  Therefore, on such a definition with every day that passes more 
objects in fact pass through the gates into the domain/realm of cultural property 
and subsequently legal protection.  However, it is the international legal 
framework for the protection of cultural property that provides the more 
detailed and predominate definition of such property and is the framework, 
which serves as the legal context in which the repatriation debate exists and so is 
most pertinent to issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous 
Peoples under IHRL. 
 
In this legal context, the term cultural property first appeared in the 1954 Hague 
Convention,22 followed sixteen years later by the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
                                                 
19 In his seminal work, The International Trade in Art, Professor Paul Bator suggested that he would ignore such 
technicalities to what is included as cultural property as concerns the difference between art and archaeological 
materials.  Paul Bator, The International Trade in Art 9 (1981).  Bator is able to ignore the technicalities as the 
rules governing their import and export at the heart of his research are very much the same and so by his own 
admission it would be “unwieldy and inconvenient to create a rigid and systematic distinction between these two 
topics.” Id.  However, it is worth noting that the difference between such materials in certain cases may indeed be 
relevant as archaeological materials can raise unique concerns that do not affect the fine arts.  Bator himself 
suggest that one potential difference would be that there are even more title problems in relation to 
archaeological materials. Id.  Kurt G. Siehr fleshes out this idea noting that archaeological objects can be 
distinguished from fine arts typically “in that the original owners of archaeological objects are unknown, states 
pass legislation to protect archaeological finds as state property of scientific interest, the objects’ context may be 
more important than the objects themselves and the ‘nationality’ of the object can be easily ascertained if the 
place of discovery is known.” Kurt G. Siehr, Globalization and National Culture: recent Trends Toward a Liberal 
Exchange of Cultural Objects, 38 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1067, 1077 (2005).  
20 John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 Michigan Law Review 1881, 1888 (1984-85).  
21 Paul Bator, International Trade in Art, supra n. 19, at 9.  
22 See Ian M. Goldrich, Comment, Balancing the Need for Repatriation of Illegally Removed cultural Property with the interests 
of Bona Fide Purchasers: Applying the UNIDROIT Convention to the Case of the Gold Phiale, 23 Fordham International 
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and most recently in the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.  Article 1 of the 
UNESCO Convention provides the most well-known and widely cited definition 
of cultural property as property that “is specifically designated by each State as being 
of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and 
which belongs to the following categories...”23  However, there are a number of 
criticisms of this definition which center on this state designation requirement.  
 
In terms of the repatriation debate and most relevant to this thesis, the state 
designation requirement forecloses the opportunity for sub-state entities such as 
individuals, minorities and Indigenous Peoples to participate in the designation 
of what is considered cultural property and thereby subject to the protections of 
this regime including any repatriation requirements.  
 
Not only do states designate what items comprise cultural property, they are 
the only entities competent to do so under the UNESCO Convention.  The 
definition does not contemplate the designation by Indigenous Peoples of 
objects sacred to them as cultural property.  The state-centric element is also 
apparent in that the cultural significance of objects is determined by 
“importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science,” 
not by importance to the cultural identity of a people or group.  The values 
stated are largely external to the cultural identity of a people or group.  Is the 
judgment that of a living people, defining for themselves their relationship to 
the world, or the judgment of external academic applying some sort of 
absolute criteria?24  
 
More broadly, this designation requirement fails to protect against the looting of 
previously undiscovered artifacts which in turn creates a heavy if not impossible 
burden for states in proving that undiscovered items fall within the this 
definition and so the UNESCO Convention’s protections again including its 
                                                                                                                                                    
Law Journal 118, 133 (1999)(noting that this was the first time the term had appeared in international law.)  See 
also, Manlio Frigo, Cultural property v. Cultural Heritage; A “battle of concepts” in International Law, 86 IRRC 367 (June 
2004) [citation omitted].; Lyndel Prott and Patrick J. O’Keefe, “Cultural Heritage” or “Cultural Property”?, 1 
International Journal of Cultural Property  307, 318 (1992); Roger O’ Keefe, The Meaning  of “Cultural Property” 
Under the 1954 Hague Convention, XLVI Netherlands International Law Review 26 (1999); Janet Blake, On Defining 
the Cultural Heritage, 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 61 (2000). 
23 UNESCO Convention, supra n. 7, at Art. 1 [emphasis added]. 
24 Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the “Cultural” and “Property” Aspects of Cultural Property Under 
International Law, 16 Fordham International Law Journal. 1033, 1042 (1993). 
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repatriation requirements 25 despite the fact that it has at its core the prevention 
of illicit trafficking.  Moreover, many argue that this unilateral designation is 
suspect because it lacks objectivity and that the real reason may have more to do 
with economics and hording than the protection of cultural property.  
 
[A] country’s historical artistic patrimony may act as the magnet that attracts 
tourists to a country.  Examples of this abound, such as the Lourve in Paris, 
the Pyramids in Egypt … and so on.  Tourists spend money and create major 
employment.  Thus by protecting these national cultural assets, everyone in 
the country, it is argued, benefits.26 
 
In response to especially this last critique of the state designation requirement, 
there is a second and more recent definition of cultural property provided by the 
other major convention for its protection in peacetime under international law: 
the UNIDROIT Convention.27  
 
Article 2 of the UNIDROIT Convention provides that it is “[t]hose which, on 
religious or secular grounds, are of importance for archaeology, prehistory, 
history, literature, art or science and belong to one of the categories listed in the 
                                                 
25 See Chang supra n. 18, at 838 (noting that “a definition that requires qualifying objects to be accordingly 
designated prior to theft would impede the restitution of ‘artefacts [sic] that have been removed from the country 
of origin before … officials have even been able to view, much less inventory or document, the objects.’  In such 
cases, a nation petitioning for repatriation may bear the unenviable legal burden of proving that the object’s 
provenance originates within its borders.”)[citation omitted].  The impact of this is significant given much 
cultural property in developing states remains largely unexcavated due to lack of expertise and/or funds.  See 
Goldrich, supra n. 22, at 138 n. 107 [citation omitted]. 
26 John O’Hagan and Clare McAndrew, Restricting International Trade in the National Artistic Patrimony: Economic 
Rationale and Policy Instruments, 10 International Journal of Cultural Property 32, 38 (2001).  See also Andrea 
Cunning, U.S. Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Export Restrictions on Cultural Property and Destructive Aspects of 
Retention Schemes, 26 Houston Journal of International Law 449, 465 (2003-04) (noting that such an approach 
allows states to unilaterally restrain trade and so therefore should be subject to international scrutiny; however  at 
present no such system exists.); Sarah Eagen, Preserving Cultural Property: Our Public Duty: A Look at How and Why 
We Must Create International Laws that Support International Action, 13 Pace International Law Review 407,428 (2001) 
(noting that a more effective system of protection would result if non-source nations could take part in 
designating particular pieces as cultural property that needs to be preserved. Under the Convention as it stands, 
the world risks losing its heritage to the poor judgment or, in most cases, the lack of financial and technological 
resources of host nations.)  Emmanuel Voyiakis, Voting in the General Assembly as Evidence of Customary International 
Law? in Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 209 (S. Allen and A. Xanthaki 
eds., 2011). 
27 Howard N. Spiegler & Lawrence M. Kaye, American Litigation to Recover Cultural Property: Obstacles, Options, and a 
Proposal in Trade in Illicit Antiquities: the Destruction of  the World’s Archaeological Heritage 127 (Neil Brodie et 
al. eds., 2001)(noting that problems with the UNESCO Convention lead to UNESCO proposing that 
UNIDROIT draft a convention addressing its issues). 
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Annex to this Convention.”28  Before looking at this Annex, there are two 
changes that this definition makes.  First, it eliminates the state designation 
requirement.  In turn, UNIDROIT’s definition of cultural property is broader as 
it does not leave states as the final arbiters of what is and is not considered such 
property which allows states to restrict but presumably not to expand the 
definition of cultural property subjectively.29  By eliminating this designation 
requirement, UNIDROIT frees the definition of cultural property in 
international law from the UNESCO Convention’s exclusive focus on the bond 
between states and cultural property, which as aforementioned precludes the 
opportunity for Indigenous Peoples and other sub-state entities to participate in 
the designation of cultural property.  Moreover, it is not just important in 
theoretical terms but in practical terms in that eliminating this state designation 
requirement UNIDROIT protects cultural property owned by private entities 
including Indigenous Peoples and furthermore allows these entities access to its 
mechanisms for repatriation.  Finally, the removal of this designation means that 
UNIDORIT protects not just discovered but undiscovered cultural property.  
This is particularly important given that many pieces of cultural property by their 
nature are undiscovered and so it protects such previously undiscovered artifacts 
that have been looted; it is this looting that is a major source of cultural property 
that enters the black market.30     
 
Aside from the elimination of the state designation requirement, the second 
change the UNIDROIT definition makes is it that it no longer uses the term 
cultural property but rather cultural objects.  However, international legal 
instruments continue to use the term cultural property.  Indeed, the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP] in Article 11, which 
is at the heart of this thesis, continues to use the term cultural property and so 
                                                 
28 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 2.  
29 Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the “Cultural” and “Property” Aspects of Cultural Property Under 
International Law, 16 Fordham International Law Journal 1033, 1040-41.  
30 See infra ns. 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing the looting of cultural property). 
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this thesis will continue to use the term cultural property.  In addition, there is a 
recognized inter-changeability of these terms cultural objects and cultural 
property stemming from the fact that the UNIDROIT Convention’s definition 
of cultural objects parallels in substance the definition of cultural property in the 
UNESCO Convention.   
 
The substance of both these definitions lies in the list that the UNESCO 
Convention refers to as mentioned above and the Annex that the UNIDROIT 
Convention mentions which are identical.  Specifically both Conventions list the 
following eleven categories of cultural property including: 
 
(a.) rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and 
objects of palaeontological interest;  
(b.) property relating to history, including the history of science and 
technology and military and social history, to the life of national leaders, 
thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of national importance;  
(c.) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and 
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; 
(d.) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which 
have been dismembered; 
(e.) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins 
and engraved seals;  
(f.) objects of ethnological interest; 
(g.) property of artistic interest, such as:  
i. pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any 
support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and 
manufactured articles decorated by hand); 
ii. original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material; 
iii. original engravings, prints and lithographs; 
iv. original artistic assemblages and montages in any material; 
(h.) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and  
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) 
singly or in collections; postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in 
collections; 
(i.) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives; 
(j.) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical 
instruments.31 
 
                                                 
31 UNESCO, supra n. 7, at Art. 1; UNIDORIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Annex. 
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As mentioned at the outset, a universal definition of cultural property has evaded 
both academics and practitioners alike.  Maybe this inability to define cultural 
property stems from the fact that as a general precept, “property eludes 
categorical or normative definition.”32  Or maybe more realistically and quite 
possibly cynically it stems from the fact that in the efforts to define cultural 
property, academics and practitioners have imbued it with a meaning that 
supports a preferred doctrinal perspective which has led to “numerous and 
varied definitions given to cultural property … [so that a] lack of uniformity…” 
necessarily pervades the associated literature.33  Indeed such an evasion seems 
inevitable given that each agreement and each author provides their own 
definition of this concept.  Some suggest that it will remain incomplete, as the 
concept of cultural property is necessarily dependent on disciplines outside of 
the law such as history, art, archaeology, ethnography etc. to help determine its 
content in more detail.34   
 
Conceptually these legal definitions all seem to share and confine cultural 
property to artifacts based on age, scholarly importance or uniqueness to their 
national histories.35  Indeed, the preceding list provides an outline of the broad 
contours of this concept that demonstrate its particular suitability for this thesis.  
Under international law cultural property is property that is religious and secular 
in nature as well as animate but more commonly inanimate.  Further, it is 
property that tends to be moveable as well as items that went from immovable 
to movable property through intentional destruction such as stelea.36  This is of 
particular relevance for this thesis as the focus is on the restitution of cultural 
                                                 
32 Claudia Caruthers, International Cultural Property: Another Tragedy of the Commons, 7 Pacific Rim Law and Policy 
Journal 143, 147. 
33 Forbes, supra n. 16, at 238. 
34 Frigo, supra n. 22, at n. 8, 376. 
35 Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 Columbia Law 
Review 377, 379(1995).   
36 Stelea are stone slabs typically adorned with pictures and hieroglyphs in religious ceremonial centers.  Given 
the size of these items, they cannot be removed by looters to enter the black market without undergoing a 
process known as being “thinned”; intentional destruction through sawing, hacking, splitting and smashing of 
these structures some as tall as forty feet.  See Paul Bator, International Trade in Art, supra n. 19, at 2. 
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property to Indigenous Peoples which necessitates that a significant feature of 
the item is in fact its ability to be moved.  Finally, implicit in this list is that 
cultural property only includes tangible items; also an important feature of 
cultural property for this thesis and often underscored yet it is the tangible 
nature of cultural property as objects that can be touched, seen and preserved 
and so “have the likelihood of becoming symbols with different layers of 
meaning to many different groups”37 that makes them capable of repatriation 
and hence at the center of the repatriation debate.   
 
Regardless however, such a project to further international scrutiny of the 
definition of cultural property, given its importance as a means to bestow legal 
protection and its susceptibility to politicization with potentially devastating 
consequences, is outside the scope of this thesis.  And so ultimately, the 
traditional term cultural property as understood by the UNESCO and 
UNIDROIT Conventions will be employed herein as it reflects the features that 
are significant to repatriation debate of being movable and tangible, the usage in 
international legal context for the protection of cultural property in which the 
repatriation debate exists as well as it continued use by UNDRIP and in 
particular Article 11 at the heart of this thesis. 
 
III. The International Framework for the Protection of Cultural 
Property 
 
A. Introduction: Peace Time Framework for the Protection of 
Cultural Property 
 
Prior to the UNDRIP under examination in this thesis, the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under international law 
                                                 
37 Joe Watkins, Cultural Nationalists, Internationalists and “Intra-nationalists”: Who’s Right and Whose  
Rights?, 12 International Journal of Cultural Property 78, 81 (2005). 
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found itself located within the broader framework for the international 
protection of cultural property.  As evident from the international conventions 
detailed at the outset of this chapter, the international framework for the 
protection of cultural property is comprised of both regimes for protection in 
times of armed conflict as well as in times of peace.  However the focus herein is 
on the peace time regime as the instances and circumstances of colonialism that 
resulted in the removal of much of the cultural property that Indigenous Peoples 
request for restitution and which is at heart of the of the research question of 
this thesis was looted, stolen, illegally exported or plundered as part of 
colonialism.  
 
The international framework for the protection of cultural property in times of 
peace emerged from the seminal 1969 article Illicit Traffic in Pre-Columbian 
Antiquities by Dr. Clemency Coggins.38  This article first shed light on the link 
between the international art market and the looting of cultural property.  
Specifically, Dr. Coggins exposed this link within the context of a case study in 
Pre-Columbian antiquities.  She began, “in the last ten years there has been an 
incalculable increase in the number of monuments systematically stolen, 
mutilated and illicitly exported from Guatemala and Mexico in order to feed the 
international art market.  Not since the sixteenth century has Latin America been 
so ruthlessly plundered.”39  She then proceeded to trace “a substantial portion of 
this stolen and mutilated art from the jungles of Central America into some of 
America’s most respectable museums.”40  Subsequent to the publication of her 
article and as a testimony to its significance as a watershed in the exposing the 
illicit trafficking in cultural property, a number of high profile investigations were 
                                                 
38 Clemency Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29 Art Journal 94 (1969). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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initiated which involved a number of American museums regarding their 
questionable acquisitions of art.41  
 
Indeed this is a link that continues to exist.42  Recent empirical studies continue 
to support this link that Dr. Coggins first revealed between looting and the 
international art trade either by demonstrating the correspondence of the looting 
of known archaeological sites with the surfacing of objects on the international 
market or by showing that very few objects arrive on this market with any proof 
of licit origin.43  In fact, it is estimated that the illicit trafficking of cultural 
property is now worth an estimated two to six billion USD annually ranking 
second behind the illegal international drug trade44 with some suggesting that the 
profit from this trade fuels the latter amongst other nefarious illegal activities.  
The U.S. National Central Bureau of  INTERPOL suggests that individuals 
                                                 
41 See Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 Stanford Law Review 275 (1982) (detailing the 
subsequent Italian investigation of the Boston Museum of Fine Art regarding it questionable purchase of a 
Raphael portrait) Id. at 280 n. 11 (and further detailing the investigation of the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
regarding it acquisition of a Greek vase called the Calyx.  Though in this situation the Italian authorities were not 
able to prove what they suspected: the Calyx was illegal excavated in Italy and sold to an American seller living in 
Rome.)  Id. at 280 n.12. 
42 See Id. at 277 (noting that Dr. Coggins’ article “represents an important milestone in the recent history of 
concern about illegal trade in art treasures.)  Further, Professor Bator credits her with first bringing to attention 
the fact that “national treasures, stolen and mutilated, could within a few years find their way into the halls of 
America’s most sumptuous museums.”  Id. at 291-2.  Interestingly, the journal denied her permission to publish 
the names of the buyers with the lists of stolen art, though she finally published this list independently the 
following year.  Id. at 280 n.8.   
43 See Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects, 16 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 197, 207-09 (2001) (citing the 1993 study of Drs. Christopher Chippendale and David Gill 
regarding the Cycladic figures; the 1999 study by Ricardo Elia of Boston University of undocumented Southern 
Italian vases; and the 1999 study by Elizabeth Gilgan tracing the movement of pre-Columbian materials from 
Belize to the U.S. art market.) 
44 See Ana Sljivic, Why Do You Think It’s Yours? An Exposition of  the Jurisprudence Underlying the Debate Between Cultural 
Nationalism and Cultural internationalism, 31 George Washington Journal of  International Law & Economics 393, 
396 n.22 (1998) (noting that the illicit trade in cultural properly ranks behind the $500 billion USD annual illegal 
international drug trade.); UNESCO, Elginism, Trafficking in Art Objects next only to Narcotics Trade, at 
http://www.elginism.com/20050907/197/#more-197 (September 7, 2005) (“Terming trafficking in cultural 
property a ‘seamless trade’ and pegging its value at US $6 billion annually, a high-profile United Nations 
Educational, Social and Cultural Organisation meeting here today revealed that it was next only to narcotics trade 
worth $7 billion.”) But see James A.R. Nafziger, International Penal Aspects of  Protecting Cultural Property, 19 
International Lawyer 835, 835 (1985) (noting that the scope of  stolen art and assertions thereabout lack any 
substantiation).  On a jaded view, Ricardo J. Elia notes that “people think that there is an illicit market and a 
legitimate market.  In fact, they are the same.”  David Lowenthal, Why Sanctions Seldom Work: Reflections on Cultural 
Property Internationalism, 12 International Journal of Cultural Property 393, 403 (2005).Indeed, exact figures are not 
available.  Aside from its illicit nature, The Stolen Works of  Art Unit at INTERPOL provides two reasons 
further for this including that “the theft is very often not discovered until the stolen objects are found on the 
official arts market … [and that] countries send very little information to INTERPOL and many do not keep 
statistics on this type of  criminality.”  INTERPOL, Stolen Works of  Art Unit, available at 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/WorkOfArt/Default.asp (last accessed 18 June 2010). 
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involved in the illicit trafficking of  cultural property run in “the same circles [as 
individuals] that deal in illegal drug, arms dealing, and other illegal transactions.  
It has also been found recently that many insurgent and terrorist groups fund 
their operations through the sales and trade of stolen Works of Art and Cultural 
Property.”45  Statistics suggest that in this illicit market only five to ten percent46 
of it is recovered and even when recovery succeeds it takes an average of 13.4 
years.47  Indeed, from the outset the principal convention of the peacetime 
regime, the UNESCO Convention, notes “it is incumbent upon every State to 
protect the cultural property existing within its territory against the dangers of 
theft, clandestine excavation and illegal export.”48  Therefore, for this 
convention, protection means quashing both the illicit trafficking and theft of 
such property.49  Consequently, the peacetime framework has at its heart 
obligations related to the return of cultural property.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 The U.S. National Central Bureau of INTERPOL, U.S. Department of Justice Website, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usncb/programs/cultural_property_program.php (last visited 18 June 2010).  See also 
Forbes, supra n. 16, at 238 n.9 [citation omitted] (comparing the futility of the war on drugs to that of the illicit 
trade in cultural property  which receives even less attention as there are few buyers and these buyers are more 
skilled at avoiding publicity than their drug using counterparts.); Charter of Courmayeur, June 25-27, 1992, 
available at  http://www.icomos.org/unesco/courmayeur.html (last visited 24 Nov. 2010) (stating that “[n]ot 
many people seemed to know... that [illicit trade in cultural property] ranked second in volume to illicit drug 
traffic” and linking illicit trade in cultural property with other transnational crimes including the illicit trade in 
drugs and arms).  
46 K.T. Burke, International Art Theft, 13 Loy. I.A. International & Community Law Journal 427 (1990). 
47 See Chang, supra n. 18, at 832 citing The Art Loss register, http://artloss.com/Default.asp (follow “Theft & 
Recovery” hyperlink; then follow “Recoveries” hyperlink) (last visited 9 Apr. 2006). 
48 UNESCO Convention, supra n. 7, at Preamble. 
49 However, Merryman argues that the UNESCO Convention is solely about retention and that the word 
protection as used in therein is really a euphemism.  Rather, it would be more accurate to speak of retention as at 
its core the protection contained in the UNESCO Convention is about the protection against the removal of 
cultural property from source states.  This is legitimized then through repeated use of the term illicit.  Merryman, 
Two Ways of Thinking, supra n. 15, at 844.  Moreover, “[s] imply enacting the UNESCO Convention domestically 
and returning stolen of illegally-exported cultural property does not truly preserve the national patrimony.”  
Cunning, supra n. 26, at 494.  Indeed, there is no predictable relationship between the concepts of protection and 
retention.  
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B. The UNESCO Convention  
 
Set up under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO)50, the 1970 UNESCO Convention51 makes 
clear from the outset that its principal aim is to create a framework under 
international law to stop the illicit trafficking in cultural property.52  After all, as 
the Preamble notes, “the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of 
cultural property is an obstacle to that understanding between nations which it is 
part of UNESCO’s mission to promote by recommending to interested States, 
international conventions to this end…”53 The UNESCO Convention then 
defines illicit trafficking as the “import, export, or transfer of ownership of 
cultural property effected contrary to the provisions adopted under this 
Convention by the States Parties…”54  In effect this allows each individual state 
party to the UNESCO Convention to determine what is and is not illicit within 
the confines of obligations of the Convention. This provision has been dubbed a 
“blank check” by Professor Bator who argues that it is undesirable.55  Therefore, 
Professor Merryman continues, by ratifying the UNESCO Convention, states 
agree to enforce the export laws of other states regardless of how they are drawn 
including the most restrictive export controls typical of source states seeking to 
                                                 
50 UNESCO is a specialized U.N. agency, created on November 16, 1945, to “promote international co-
operation among its 190 Member States and six Associate Members in the fields of education, science, culture 
and communication.” UNESCO Website, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=3328&URL_DO=DO
_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited 30 June 2010). 
51 Merryman identifies the following as the forerunners of this convention including: Resolution XIV, Protection 
of Movable Monuments, of the Seventh International Conference of American States of 1933, three draft 
conventions prepared by the League of Nations in 1933, 1936 and 1939 with the last one known as the Draft 
International Convention for the Protection of National Collections of Art and History and finally the UNESCO 
Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Export, Import and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property of 1964. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra n. 15, at 842 [citations 
omitted].  
52 According to UNESCO, the 1970 UNESCO Convention was “the first international legal instrument to tackle 
[illicit trade] issues…” UNESCO Website, The Fight Against Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Goods, http://portal.unesco
/culture/en/ev.phpURL_ID=1534&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited 30 June 
2010). 
53 UNESCO, supra n. 7, at Preamble. 
54 UNESCO, supra n. 7, at Art. 3. 
55 Paul Bator, An Essay on International Art Trade, supra n. 41, at 328-9.   
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retain their cultural property; in some cases even to the peril of such property.56  
Moreover, it denies to states the enforcement of their own national interests and 
creates overly broad prohibitions on legitimate export.57  Regardless, the 
convention places a whole host of timely, complex and expensive duties on state 
parties to achieve its end. 
 
Article 13(a) broadly lays out this obligation to prevent illicit trafficking 
indicating that states party to the Convention “undertake to prevent the transfer 
of ownership of cultural property that promotes the illicit import and export of 
such property”58 to be achieved through national protection measures.  
Particularly, the Convention includes five specific obligations that it places on 
state parties.  First, UNESCO requires States to set up proper national services, 
“where such services do not already exist, for the protection of the cultural 
heritage, with a qualified staff sufficient in number for the effective carrying out 
of [its] functions…”59 Second the UNESCO Convention requires States to raise 
public awareness through educational means.60  Third, it requires antique dealers 
to maintain a register recording the origin of cultural property and to inform the 
purchaser of such property of the export prohibition to which it may be 
                                                 
56 Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, supra n. 15, at 844-5.  
57 Paul Bator, An Essay on International Art Trade, supra n. 41, at 328-9.  Indeed, this provision is at the root of the 
ten year delay in the implementation of the convention by the U.S. in the 1983 Convention on Cultural Property 
Implementation Act. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, supra n. 15, at 844-5. 
58 UNESCO, supra n. 7, at Art. 13(a). 
59 UNESCO, supra n. 7, at Art. 5. These functions include: Drafting laws and regulations for the protection of 
cultural heritage and to prevent the illicit import, export and transfer of cultural property; Art. 5(a); Establishing 
and keeping up to date an inventory of protected property including especially such property whose export 
would contribute to an impoverishment of the national cultural heritage (b); promoting institutions for the 
presentation and preservation of cultural property (c); organizing the supervision of archaeological digs with a 
focus on the preservation of the context of cultural property (d); establishing ethical rules for curators, collectors 
and dealers in conformity with the ethical principles detailed in the Convention (e); educating the public to 
generate respect for cultural heritage and to inform them about the provisions of the Convention (f); and to 
publicize the disappearance of items of cultural property. (g).  UNESCO, supra n. 7, at Art. 5(b)-(g).  Some have 
criticized this article on the grounds that it does not provide enough detail on this national service nor on the 
exact measures to be taken and so argue that the convention requires an amendment to achieve such details.  See 
Cunning, supra n. 26, at 503. 
60 In addition to the aforementioned Article 5(f) obligation to educate the public to generate respect for cultural 
heritage and to inform them about the provisions of the Convention, Article 10(a) also requires states to restrict 
the movement of cultural property illegal removed from any state party to the Convention by education, 
information and vigilance while Article 10(b) requires states by educational means ‘to create and develop in the 
public mind a realization of the value of cultural property and the threat to cultural heritage created by theft, 
clandestine excavations and illicit exports.’ UNESCO, supra n. 7, at Art. 10(a) and (b).  
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subject.61  Fourth, it requires states to introduce local export controls for their 
cultural property through the creation of a system of export certificates which 
should accompany the item and make clear that its export is authorized.62  
Finally, the UNESCO Convention requires states to adopt legal measures to 
prevent the transfer of ownership of cultural property that promotes the illicit 
import and export of such property.  These legal measures include: the Article 
6(b) prohibition of the export of cultural property without an export certificate 
as created in Article 6(a); the Article 7(a) requirement that states take measures 
consistent with national legislation to prevent museums and similar institutions 
within their territories from importing cultural property removed from another 
state party to the Convention in violation of its export laws; and the Article 7(b) 
requirement that states prohibit the import of stolen cultural property from a 
museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution in 
another state Party to this Convention.  However, the last legal measure only 
applies provided that the property is documented as belonging to that institution 
in Article 7(b)(i).  Subsequently, it further requires the adoption of penalties or 
administrative sanctions for the violation of many of the aforementioned legal 
measures. 63   
 
C. Repatriation Under The UNESCO Convention  
 
Following from this understanding of the protection of cultural property to 
mean eliminating the illicit trafficking of such property, the focus of the 
UNESCO Convention thus far has been on the preventive phase rather than 
recovery.  However, the Convention also provides for obligations to facilitate the 
                                                 
61 Id. at Art. 10(a).  
62 Id. at Art. 6(a).  
63 For instance, Article 8 requires states to impose such penalties or administrative sanctions on individuals who 
violate Articles 6(b) and 7(b) which respectively require states to prohibit the export of cultural property with an 
export certificate and the importation of stolen property from a museum or public monument that is 
documented as belonging to that institution.  In addition, Article 10(a) also requires penal or administrative 
measures against antique dealers for failure both to maintain a register recording the origin of each piece of 
cultural property and to inform the purchasers of such property of any of its export restrictions.  
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recovery of cultural property in a number of different ways in a number of 
different articles including Articles 7, 9 and 13.  For instance, Article 13(d) 
provides for such facilitation by offering that states undertake “to recognize the 
indefeasible right of each State Party to this convention to classify and declare 
certain cultural property as inalienable which should therefore ipso facto not be 
exported, and facilitate recovery of such property by the State concerned in cases 
where it has been exported” while Article 9 facilitates the recovery of cultural 
property as part of the measures states can employ in emergency situations.64 
 
Aside from this facilitation, the UNESCO Convention specifically requires the 
repatriation of cultural property in two instances.  First, it requires states to take 
concrete measures to ensure the restitution of stolen but inventoried cultural 
property to its rightful owner by admitting such actions for recovery.  
Specifically Article 7(b)(ii) requires that:   
 
at the request of the State Party of origin, to take appropriate steps to recover 
and return any such cultural property  [meaning  7(b)(i) property: property 
stolen from  a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar 
institution … provided such property is documented as pertaining to the 
inventory  of that institution] imported after the entry into force of this 
Convention in both States concerned, provided  however, that the requesting 
State party shall pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser  or to a 
person who has valid title to that property. Request for recovery and return 
shall be made through diplomatic offices…65  
 
Indeed at the national level too most states are open to the return of stolen 
cultural property even in absence of the UNESCO Convention.  As Merryman 
notes: 
 
                                                 
64 “Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or 
ethnological materials may call upon other States Parties who are affected.  The States Parties to this Convention 
undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a concerted international effort to determine and to carry out 
the necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and imports and international commerce in the 
specific materials concerned.  Pending agreement each State concerned shall take provisional measures to the 
extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting State.” UNESCO 
Convention, supra n. 7, at Art. 9. 
65 UNESCO Convention, supra n. 7, at  Art. 7(b)(ii). 
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[i]n theory, repatriation should be easy.  Cultural property is, for most 
legal purposes, like other property: the owner can recovery it, subject to 
the possible rights of good faith purchasers.  The courts of all nations 
are open to such actions.  If X steals my painting and takes it to Mexico, 
I can sue in a Mexican court for its recovery.66  
 
Yet, such suits at the state level are typically plagued by a number of familiar 
problems common to repatriation cases including the “mysteries of law and fact 
surrounding title to many antiquities [that] made it unlikely that such litigation 
would be successful.”67  Moreover, there are issues of costs68 that will prevent 
many owners albeit states, individuals or Indigenous Peoples from pursuing such 
measures which are often lengthy due to these complex mysteries inherent in 
cases of the restitution of cultural property including evidentiary69 and 
jurisdictional and choice of law70 issues and most significantly issues concerning 
the statute of limitations.  
                                                 
66 J.H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, supra n. 20, at 1889 [citation omitted].  Elsewhere, Merryman 
continues and notes that “[t]he law concerning stolen art is straightforward … all national legal systems prohibit 
and punish theft.  The rule is unquestioned that courts will order the return of stolen cultural objects to their 
domestic or foreign owners.” J.H. Merryman et. al., Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts 141 (5th ed.2007).  Indeed, 
many owners have sued for the return of such property under national laws.  See e.g.  Winkworth v. Christie, 
Manson and Woods Ltd. [1980] All E.R. 1121; Kunstsammlugen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F. 2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) 
[hereinafter KWZ]. 
67 Paul Bator, The International Trade in Art, supra n. 19, at 13. 
68 Indeed, in some cases the cost of going to trial are more costly that the object at the heart of the dispute.  See 
Charter of Courmayeur, supra n. 45, at Art. 1. 
69 These issues stem from the fact cultural property typically travels both easily and frequently from state to state 
crisscrossing international boundaries with the initial removal many years ago and while the object itself may be 
hundreds of years old, all of which frequently result in making establishing title very difficult.  The case is all the 
more complex to establish title for archaeological and ethnographical materials looted directly from sites and so 
may have no documentation at all.  
70 The case of KWZ provides a good example of the complexities surrounding the choice of law in cultural 
property dispute.  At the heart of the dispute were two paintings by the Northern Renaissance painter Albrecht 
Dürer.  Originally in the hands of a family in Saxony-Weimar, the paintings passed to the state of Saxony-Weimar 
and then to the German government by legislation in 1918.  They were exhibited in Germany until 1943 when 
they were hidden in a castle to protect them from Allied bombing during the war.  In 1945 when the Allies 
entered the castle the paintings disappeared.  In 1946, Elicofon, a Brooklyn lawyer, bought the paintings from a 
former G.I. for $450 without knowing their real worth.  In 1966, Elicofon discovered that the paintings were 
worth $6 million USD.  An action to recover the paintings was not filed until 1969 in the U.S. by the then 
Federal Republic of Germany, the West German government and the only government recognized by the U.S.  
When the U.S. recognized the East German state of the German Democratic Republic the East German 
Museum Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar (KZW) was allowed to proceed with the suit.  All three parties to the 
interpleader action based their claims on a different choice of law adding to the complexity.  KZW based its 
claim on the law of the state of New York which did not allow a purchaser to obtain good title to property from 
a thief.  Elicofon based him claim on German law which allowed for the passage of good title from the custodian 
of the paintings in Germany to the G.I. while the Grand-Duchess based her claims on nineteenth century 
German dynastic law which made a distinction between personal and sovereign property.  Ultimately, the U.S. 
District Court of New York used New York state law to decide the case in favor of the museum as it found that 
the state has an interest in controlling the commercial standards which govern business and trade in the state.  See 
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Statutes of limitations are the grounds on which many states will refuse to hear 
cases concerning the theft of cultural property.  Statutes of limitations try to 
balance “the interests of the purchaser with those of the owner by preventing 
the success of old claims that are, with time, ever more difficult to prove.”71  In 
turn, statutes of limitations impose a maximum time after an event which a legal 
claim can be brought.  Even when courts do hear such cases, most typically in 
suits for individual recovery, the issue of the statute of limitations presents many 
complexities as different jurisdictions apply different rules, which aside from 
adding to the complexity and generating its own set of critics, also frustrates 
petitioners.  Indeed, even within the same state different jurisdictions can apply 
different rules.  For instance, normally the rule is that the statute of limitations 
begins to run or to toll when property has been stolen but this would allow 
thieves to gain good title by hiding the property until the time has tolled.  In 
turn, courts have developed a number of different doctrines in relation to the 
statutes of limitations to prevent this including both the discovery and the 
demand a refusal rule.  For instance, in the case of O’Keefe v. Snyder72 the rule of 
discovery was applied within the jurisdiction of New Jersey.  O’Keefe, involved 
the theft of three paintings by Georgia O’Keefe, an American twentieth century 
abstract artist, from a gallery owned by her husband.  The court had to 
determine the tolling of the statute of limitations in a case to quiet title 
concerning adversely possessed chattel.  The court’s decision rested on what 
constituted open and notorious possession of a painting by an innocent 
purchaser.  The court ruled that display in the private home of the purchaser did 
not constitution open and notorious possession and required more such as 
exhibition in a gallery.  The court justified its decision in the grounds that 
O’Keefe could not have discovered where the paintings were and who possessed 
                                                                                                                                                    
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F. 2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) reprinted in Merryman, Visual Arts, supra n. 66, 
at 143. 
71 Chang, supra n. 18, at 863. 
72 O’Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478 A.2d 862 (1980). 
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them without a more public display.  In this case, the statute of limitations was 
tolled when all the elements of adverse possession were met; so not until 1976 
when O’Keefe discovered the works in a New York gallery thirty years after they 
were originally stolen.  As the court noted in applying this discovery rule in New 
Jersey: 
 
The discovery rule will fulfil the purposes of a statute of limitations and 
accord greater protection to the innocent owner of personal property whose 
goods are lost or stolen...  By diligently pursuing their goods, owners may 
prevent the statute of limitations from running.  The meaning of due 
diligence will vary with the facts of each case … [but] [i]n practice, our ruling 
should contribute to more careful practices concerning the purchase of art.73  
 
By contrast, in KZW the New York District court applied the rule of demand a 
refusal which provides that time in an action against a good faith purchaser for a 
stolen chattel only begins to accrue/toll when the true owner makes a demand 
for the return of the chattel and the person in possession refuses to return the 
chattel; in this case then the statute was tolled until the demand was made for the 
return of the painting in 1966.74  In doing so the court rejected Elicofon’s claim 
                                                 
73 O’Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478 A.2d 862 (1980) reprinted in J.H. Merryman et. al., Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, 
supra n, 66, at 997.  This rule is not without its critics.  It is clear from this that applying this rule regarding the 
statute of limitations means the burden of proof is shifted to the plaintiff to prove that she exercised due 
diligence in searching for stolen property.  “The practical effect of this rule is to increase litigation costs by 
turning the exercise of due diligence into a fact issue that must be determined on an ad hoc basis.  Chang, supra n. 
18.  Moreover, what constitutes due diligence is not only different from state to state under international law but 
can even vary within different jurisdictions.  Under US law true owners are required to exercise due diligence in 
reporting art as well when purchasing art.  Inconsistent decisions make it impossible to know what and how to 
satisfy the standard.  JaneWarring, Underground Debates: the Fundamental Differences of Opinion that Thwart UNESCO’s 
Progress in Fighting the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 19 Emory International Law Review 227, 267 n. 215 
(2005)(“The excuse the court used in Guggenheim, which essentially forgave the plaintiff their obligations of due 
diligence in relation to the statute of limitation, is too uncertain … While what constituted due diligence in 
Autocephalous may be too arduous for many.”  The court in Autocephalous Greek Church, for example, urged the 
prudent buyer to “take steps such as a formal IFAR search; documents authenticity check by disinterested 
experts; a full background search of the seller and his claim of title; insurance protection and a contingency sales 
contract; and the like.”  At the same time the court held that the Church’s failure to report the theft to Interpol 
or IFAR was not fatal.). Id. [citations omitted].   
74 KZW at 1160-62.  The demand and refusal rule was also applied in the case of Menzel v. List which also 
involved art looted from the Second World War.  In applying this rule, the New York court allowed Ms. Menzel 
to recover her Chagall painting which was taken from her home by Hitler’s art collection unit, the Einsatzstab, in 
1941 before she fled to the U.S.  Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804, (1966).  In a case not involving art looted from 
the Second World War the demand and refusal rule was also applied.  In Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. 
Lubell, the plaintiff sought to recover a Chagall painting worth an estimated $200,000 USD believed to have been 
stolen by one of his employee in the late 1960s and then resold to the defendant’s well-known art gallery in 1967.  
In determining when the state’s three-year statute of limitations began to run, the court rejected a discovery rule 
and applied the demand and refusal rule.  Solomon R. Guggenheim foundation v. Lubell, 569 N.E. 2d 426 (1991).  
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that he should have title based on twenty years of uninterrupted good faith 
possession beginning with his 1946 purchase.75  
 
Regardless, this demonstrates the complexities of the statute of limitations just 
within one jurisdiction which are a response to, “[t]he difficulty of reconstructing 
ancient events and to the tendency of people to rely on the status quo [and 
further] [t]o allow old transactions to be questioned is to invite fraud and perjury 
and to unsettle the affairs of the present—hence what in the common law 
worlds are called statutes of limitations,’ and elsewhere referred to as rules of 
‘prescription’…”.76  In turn, statutes of limitations function to invalidate most 
claims for the restitution of cultural property.  As Merryman notes in the context 
of the Elign Marbles, that since the courts of most states are open to suits by 
owners for the return of their stolen property and that Greece has been in a 
position to sue for the return of the Marbles since 1828 and that they have not 
done despite the emotional pronouncement that “[i]f the British government 
refuses to return them we will take them to the courts.”77  In turn, “unless some 
unusual exception were made, it seems clear that the Greeks have lost any right 
of action they might have had for the recovery of the Marbles before an English 
court, where the applicable statute of limitations is six years.”78  In turn, at the 
domestic level source states and presumably Indigenous Peoples as well have 
allowed their rights to lapse under the concept of the statute of limitations as the 
removal of their traditional cultural property and human remains which have 
                                                 
75 This rule is more favorable to the true owner as they receive the protection from the statutory time periods 
while the innocent bona fide purchaser has the burden of proving that the property was not stolen and has the 
strictest results as concerns the length of time of possession.  See Lubell at 429 (noting that the rule is most 
favorable to the plaintiff and was influenced by the fact that New York enjoys a renowned reputation as a 
cultural and business center.)  Of course the good faith purchasers could always assert a laches defense against a 
true owner who has not exercised reasonable due diligence, but as in this case there is no guarantee.  See Ashton 
Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith 
Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 49, 51 (1995) cited in J.H. Merryman et. al., Law, Ethics and the Visual 
Arts, supra n, 66, at 999. 
76 J.H. Merryman, Elgin Marbles, supra n. 66, at 1900.  
77 Melina Mercouri, ARTNewsletter, May 31, 1983.   
78 J.H. Merryman, Elgin Marbles, supra n. 66, at 1900-01. 
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generated the requests for repatriation happened long ago as part and parcel of 
colonialism.79    
 
Indeed not the first one to find this a major hurdle, following Professor 
Tamara Kagan  following Professor Catherine Bell, notes in the context of 
indigenous claims for the restitution of cultural property that the statute of 
limitations has been identified as one of the major hurdles to successful 
restitution.80  Professor Merryman, though discussing in the context of state-
to-state repatriation, explains that since these events of removal which have 
generated the requests for repatriation happened long ago, source nations or 
in this case Indigenous Peoples have allowed their rights to lapse under the 
concept of the statute of limitations.  However, “in international law, of 
course, there is no statute of limitations, but the same considerations apply: 
witnesses die, memories fail, people rely on stable appearances, and so on.81   
 
Article 7(b)(ii)  in the context of the UNESCO Convention does little to address 
these issues amongst a host of others that prove relevant to the broader 
repatriation debate.  Issues continue to remain in terms of prohibitive costs.82  
Moreover, Article 7(b)(ii) only applies to a very limited category of stolen cultural 
property; property that owned by a public institution and has been documented 
                                                 
79 Specifically, it leaves all the works of art and antiquity that were taken from Indigenous Peoples as well as from 
states during the Age of Imperialism, which ‘extends from the Roman sack of Veii in 396 B.C., through 
Napoleon’s Northern, Italian and Egyptian campaigns and the U.S. suppression of American Indian cultures to 
the fall of the Third Reich at the end of World War II’ J.H.  Merryman, Introduction, Imperialism, Art And 
Restitution 1 (J.H.Merryman ed. 2006).  Although statutes of limitations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it is 
likely such claims would be time barred in most state jurisdictions unless some exception was created such as 
where states have created specific legislation that has the effect of providing a claim that overrides concerns with 
the statute of limitations in order to effect the potential return of cultural property and human remains such as 
the legislation in the U.S. known as the Native American Graves and Protection Act [NAGPRA] which will be 
explored further herein.  See infra Chapter 5 at Section II (discussing NAGPRA).  
80 Tamara Kagan, Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at Common Law: A Contextual Approach 63  
University Toronto Faculty Law Review 1, 24 (2005) [citation omitted]. 
81 J.H. Merryman, Elgin Marbles, supra n. 66, at 1900. 
82 UNESCO specifically developed the Fund of the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of 
Cultural Property to Its Countries of Origin or Its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation but at present it 
remains unfunded.  See U.N. Doc. 30 C/Res. 27.   
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as pertaining to this institution.83  Further, although it deals with the choice of 
law in that repatriation under the UNESCO Convention is rooted in public 
international law [State A submits a diplomatic request for the return of its 
cultural property to State B and State B then seizes the property from private 
holder C and aids with its return to State A through legal means],  in terms of the 
repatriation debate states still do not have access to national courts but are 
restricted to diplomatic channels and even further this restricts repatriation as it 
precludes individuals, Indigenous Peoples and other legal entities from making a 
request for the repatriation of stolen cultural property .  Indeed critics continue 
to roundly criticize this failure of Article 7 collectively to provide for the 
repatriation of privately owned cultural property.84  Even assuming their case it 
brought, it does nothing to address the complexities of the issue of the statute of 
limitations as there is no explicit time limit for this request.  Finally, if these 
conditions for restitution are fulfilled and the request is successful the requesting 
state party shall pay “just compensation” to the innocent purchaser or to a 
person who has valid title to that property; however the convention left very 
vague what made the purchaser innocent as to justify this just compensation.85   
 
The second type of repatriation that UNESCO Convention provides for is in 
Article 13(c) which requires that states undertake, consistent with their laws, “to 
admit actions for recovery of lost or stolen items of cultural property brought by 
or on behalf of the rightful owners.”86  Unlike above the request for the 
restitution of stolen and inventoried property at a public institution under Article 
                                                 
83 See Goldrich, supra n. 22, at 139 n. 12 (noting that the UNESCO Convention creates a loophole as it limits 
protection to public institutions) [citation omitted].  
84 See Goldrich, supra n. 22, at 138, n. 108(criticizing Article 7 for failing to address the restitution and recovery of 
privately –owned cultural property) [citation omitted].  Note, UNESCO does however provide for the creation 
of a private cause of action under Article 13(c) but there are significant limitations here.  See infra ns. 76-7 and 
accompanying text. 
85 This provision has been the most criticized provision of the entire UNESCO Convention and used as the 
reason by a number of countries for their failure or delay in ratifying it as they insist that their domestic 
legislation is not compatible with such protection for bona fide purchasers.  K.T. Burke, supra n. 46, at 439.  
Indeed, it does contrast with the general rule in U.S. jurisdiction which permits the owner to recover stolen 
property without paying just compensation. J.H. Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property in Thinking About 
the Elgin Marbles: Critical Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law 122, n. 25 130 (2000). 
86 UNESCO Convention, supra n. 7, at Art. 13(c).  
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7(b)(ii) , this request is for a more general class of stolen property and can be 
brought by individuals including Indigenous Peoples and/or a legal entity.  
However, such a request can only be made when admitted by the law of the state 
party.  In turn, it enables states to create a private cause of action but does not 
compel them to do so.  Consequently, it does not provide a uniform guiding 
framework for the creation of a private cause of action.  Moreover, even if states 
do admit these private actions for repatriation they will be limited by the fact that 
the property must be designated by the state as cultural property as required by 
the UNESCO Convention’s over-arching understanding of cultural property.87   
 
While the Convention provides for the repatriation of stolen cultural property 
albeit in limited circumstances discussed above, the recovery phase of the 
UNESCO Convention is generally considered not to have a mechanism for the 
repatriation of illegally exported cultural property.  As regards illegal exported 
cultural property, the UNESCO Convention provides in Article 7(a) that States 
 
…take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent 
museums and similar institutions within their territories from acquiring 
cultural property originating in another State Party which has been illegally 
exported after entry into force of this Convention, in the States concerned.88  
 
However, not renowned for its clarity,89 some academics have argued that this 
article does require the repatriation of illegally export objects through the 
mechanism in Article 7(b)(ii) in the same fashion as it requires the repatriation of 
cultural property under Article 7(b)(i); property stolen from  a museum or 
religious or secular public monument or similar institution … provided such 
property is documented as pertaining to the inventory  of that institution.90   
                                                 
87 See supra ns. 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing UNESCOs understanding of cultural property.) 
88 UNESCO Convention, supra n. 7, at Art. 7(a).  
89 As regards the UNESCO Convention, Professor Siehr notes that “too many cooks spoiled the broth and too 
many different meals were prepared at the same time.” Kurt Siehr, International Art Trade and the Law 211 
(1993) reprinted in Katja Lubina, Contested Cultural Property: The Return of Nazi Spoliated Art and Human 
Remains from Public Collections 107 n. 464 (2009). 
90 See Lubina, supra n. 89, at 107 n. 465 citing Siehr, supra n. 89, at 207-8.  
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Yet, a number of considerations have led to the prevailing view in the literature91 
that Article 7(a) does not require the return of illegally exported cultural 
property.  First, in interpreting this provision courts have found that it does not 
require the return of illegal exported cultural property.  In Kingdom of Spain v. 
Christie, Mason & Woods Ltd., and Another, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C 
states that although it is not his function to construe the UNESCO Convention 
and in particular Article 7, he does exactly this noting that “apparently [it] only 
provides for the return of goods which have been stolen from museums and 
other public places.  It does not seem to provide for the return of pictures which 
have been merely illicitly imported or exported.”92  Second, on its face Article 
7(a) only calls for states to do what is consistent with their national legislation to 
prevent museums from acquiring illegal exported cultural property.93  However, 
even if a literal interpretation on its face is not conclusive there are other aspects 
that suggest that it does not require the return of illegal exported objects.  For 
instance, the French and Spanish versions of the text which are also authoritative 
next to the English and Russian versions are much less ambiguous and speak 
exclusively of the requirement of repatriation in terms of cultural property that 
has been stolen and imported after entry into force of the Convention.94  
Moreover, a contextual/systemic analysis supports the view that it does not 
require return as Article 7 consists of two sections that are separated by the use 
of letters a) and b) and the obligation to return “any such property” is only 
situated in section b) suggesting that return only applies to stolen property 
imported after the Convention’s entry into force.95  Even further, the 
                                                 
91 See Lubina, supra n. 89, at 107 n. 466 (detailing numerous examples of this literature) [citations omitted].  
92 Kingdom of Spain v. Christie,Mason & Woods Ltd., and Another,Chancery Division [1986] 3 All ER 28, [1986] 1 
WLR 1120  reprinted in J.H. Merryman et. al., Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, supra n, 66, at 157. 
93 Lubina, supra n. 89, at 107 n. 467 (noting that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 provides 
that treaties are to be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of its object and purpose.” Art. 31(1)). 
94 Lubina, supra n. 89, at 107-8 n. 467. Article 7(b)(ii) in the French and Spanish versions respectively refer to 
“tout bien culture; ainsi volé et importé après l’entrée en vigueur de la présente Convention” and “todo bien 
cultural robado e importado despues de la entrada en vigor de la Convencion”. Id.  
95 Lubina, supra n. 89, at 108 n. 467.  
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preparatory instruments of the Convention also suggest a more limited 
repatriation provision which excludes Article 7(a).96  Finally, regardless this 
provision is moot in states such as the US,97 the UK, France, Germany and 
Switzerland amongst a host of others which adhere to the principle that the fact 
that an object has been illegally exported does not in itself bar it from lawful 
importation.98  Specifically, this principle is rooted in the general rule of 
international law of legislative extraterritoriality that provides that states will not 
enforce the public laws of other states.  For example, as Professor Merryman 
notes:  
 
Suppose X, the owner of a Titian painting in Genoa, sells it to a Swiss 
collector who hides it in his luggage and smuggles it out of Italy.  Under 
Italian law such a painting cannot legally be removed from Italy without a 
permit that, in the case of a work by Titian, would almost certainly not be 
granted … In such “illegal export” cases the legal situation differs 
significantly from that in theft cases.  Italy may wish to have the painting 
returned to Italy, but it is not the owner.  Accordingly, Italy would have no 
standing before a foreign court to recover the Titan.  X, the Genoese seller of 
the painting, obviously cannot recover it, since he sold it.99  
 
                                                 
96 Lubina, supra n. 89, at 108 n. 467 (“[T]he original draft for the 1970 UNESCO Convention was considered too 
all-encompassing for a number of State Parties, above all the United States.  The delegation of the latter had 
complemented its criticism with detailed suggestions to amend the proposal.  In particular, the circle of objects 
affected by the convention should be limited by introducing a clause according to which the convention should 
“prohibit the importation into one country of cultural property stolen from a museum or a similar institution in 
another country, and providing for the recovery or return of such property.”  It was this proposal that is reflected 
in the current form of Art. 7.”) Id. [citations omitted].  
97 Moreover, in the U.S., Article 7 as a whole is completely inapplicable to any museums and institutions that are 
not federal; adding a further level of complication. See J.H. Merryman, Elgin Marbles, supra n. 66, at 1892; Paul 
Bator, International Trade in Art, supra n. 19, at, 103-4. 
98 See Paul Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, supra n. 41, at 287 (noting that U.S. law will not disturb 
cultural property based on the claim of illegal exportation alone and that this is not unusual as in most art 
importing states like the U.K., France, Germany, and Switzerland the “fundamental general rule is clear: the fact 
that an art object has been illegally exported does not in itself bar it from lawful importation.)  A notable 
exception here is the 1972 U.S. statute passed in response to the crisis of the import of illegal Mayan artifacts.  See 
The Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture of Murals, Pub. L.No. 92-587, §§ 
201-205, 86 Stat. 1296, 1297-98 (1972) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1976)).  This statute prevents the 
importation of pre-Columbian artifacts in the absence of a certificate indicating that it did not violate the laws of 
the exporting country of origin.  
99 Merryman, Elgin Marbles, supra n. 66, at 1890 [citation omitted].  The British case of the Kingdom of Italy v. De 
Medici provides such an example.  This case centered on the family papers of the Medici which had been illegal 
exported from Italy.  The Italian government sought to enjoin their sale by Christies in London.  Although of 
historical interest to Italy, because the papers were not state owned papers and so not the property of the 
plaintiff, the court would not enjoin their sale.  J.H. Merryman, Retention of Cultural Property, supra n. 85, at 
129.  See also Kingdom of Italy v. De Medici, 34 T.L.R. 623 (Ch. 1918).   
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In effect, even if an export law of another state has been violated, as a domestic 
penal law it cannot be enforced beyond the respective boundary of the state thus 
rendering moot Article 7(a).  The case of Attorney- General of New Zealand v. 
Ortiz100 clearly demonstrates this principle within the context of cultural 
property.  The court noted: 
 
If any country should have legislation prohibiting export of works of art … 
then that falls into the category of “public laws” which will not be enforced 
by the courts of the country to which it is exported or any other country: 
because it is an act done in exercise of sovereign authority which will not be 
enforced outside its own territory.101  
 
Therefore, a convention requiring states to return illegally exported cultural 
property through their own domestic laws would contravene this rule of 
international law.  In turn, due to this contravention of international law the 
aforementioned states and host of other negotiating the UNESCO Convention 
vociferously opposed a requirement for the return of illegal exported cultural 
property in Article 7 and so regardless it remains moot in many states.102  
 
In sum then, the prevailing view is that Article 7(a) does not provide for the 
repatriation of illegal exported objects but rather that the recovery mechanisms 
of the UNESCO Convention are limited to that of stolen cultural property as 
detailed in Articles 7(b) and 13(c)103 and as regards illegal export the UNESCO 
Convention is limited to raising awareness.104  
                                                 
100 Attorney General of New Zealand v. Oritz, 3 W.L.R. 570 (1983), 3 All. E.R. 432 (1981).  
101 Id. at 459.  
102 In the alternative, Merryman argues that whether or not something is illicit should depend on international law 
and not on whether or not the source state has characterized it as such through their export controls which is the 
approach that the UNESCO Convention takes in Article 7(a).  Specifically, Merryman has suggested that illicit 
trade should consist of a more narrow trade in objects that are stolen and objects that are culturally immoveable. 
J.H. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical Essays 
on Cultural Property, Art and Law 29 (2000).   
103 In turn, the only way to view Article 7(a) as requiring the repatriation of cultural property is to the extent that 
in addition to the property being illegally exported it was also stolen.  However illegal export and theft are not 
necessarily the same thing.  As Bator notes, “[i]llegal export may, but does not necessarily, involve theft or other 
forms of illegal taking.  A smuggler may have perfectly lawful title.” Bator, The International Art Trade, supra n. 
19, at 10. See also supra n. 100. Ultimately then, only if the illegal export involves a second layer of illegality, that of 
theft constituting an independent criminal act, can the owner apply for damages or recovery of the object under 
subject to the restrictions of UNESCO Convention in either Articles 7(b(ii) or Article 13(c).   As Bator goes on 
 46 
 
Finally, the last provision in the recovery phase of the UNESCO Convention is 
Article 15 which provides that there is nothing in the convention which  
 
… shall prevent States Parties … from concluding special agreements among 
themselves or from continuing to implement agreements already concluded 
regarding the restitution of cultural property removed, whatever the reason, 
from its territory of origin, before entry into force of this Convention for the 
States concerned.105    
 
Thus, it offers states the possibility to create any other arrangement for the 
recovery of cultural property including presumably the repatriation of illegal 
exported cultural property.   
 
D. The UNIDROIT Convention 
 
The UNIDROIT Convention represents the other major peacetime convention 
for the protection of cultural property.  It emerged from a request by UNESCO 
in the 1980s to UNIDROIT106 to draft a treaty on the protection of cultural 
property that would gain support from more states than the UNESCO 
Convention could muster by addressing certain issues in the UNESCO 
                                                                                                                                                    
to note, “but if the smuggled object was stolen or unlawfully appropriated, a second level of illegality appears: 
The taking may have constituted an independent criminal act, and the true owner may have a right to damages 
and/or recovery of the object from the thief or a later possessor.” Bator, The International Trade in Art, supra n. 
19, at 10.  Ultimately, this explains in part why many source states in an effort to retain their cultural property 
have tried to turn illegal export into theft by enacting legislation that makes all cultural property state property as 
well as why theft is so narrowly defined in the UNESCO Convention.  
104 Lubina, supra n. 89, at 108.  Aside from Article 7(a), awareness about illegal export is also raised through 
Article 13(b) which provides that if consistent with the laws of each state “to ensure that their competent services 
co-operate in facilitating the earliest possible restitution of illicitly exported cultural property to its rightful 
owner.”  
105 UNESCO Convention, supra n. 7, at Art. 15. 
106 “The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is an independent 
Intergovernmental Organisation … Its purpose is to study needs and methods for modernising, harmonising and 
co-ordinating private and in particular commercial law as between States and groups of States … UNIDROIT’s 
63 member States are drawn from the five continents and represent a variety of different legal, economic and 
political systems as well as different cultural backgrounds.” The International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law Website, About Us, at http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284 (last visited 25 June 
2010).  Here the goal of the UNIDROIT Convention is to harmonize and coordinate the conflicting private law 
of states as well as public international law as related to the protection of cultural property through the adoption 
of uniform rules.  
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Convention.107  Like the UNESCO Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention 
also understands protection to mean preventing the illicit trafficking in cultural 
property and so also deals with theft and illegal export.  However, it draws an 
explicit distinction between theft and illegal export and each requires its own 
provisions to be met by the requesting party.108  At its preamble the UNIDROIT 
Convention states “that this Convention is intended to facilitate the restitution 
and return of cultural objects…”109  while Article 1 adds that this recovery 
applies to international claims for both the restitution of stolen cultural objects 
and the return of cultural property removed from the territory of a state party in 
violation of its export laws for the protection of its cultural heritage.110  To 
achieve these respective ends, UNIDROIT also places specific duties on states 
for repatriation in these two situations of theft and illegal export; these specific 
obligations are principally included respectively in Articles 3 and 4 for theft and 
Articles 5 and 6 for illegal export.    
 
i. The UNIDROIT Convention and the Restitution of Stolen 
Cultural Property  
 
The principal goal under this convention involves providing a framework under 
international law for the repatriation of stolen cultural property by providing 
                                                 
107 Howard N. Spiegler & Lawrence M. Kaye, American Litigation to Recover Cultural Property: Obstacles, Options, and a 
Proposal, Trade in Illicit Antiquities: the Destruction of  the World’s Archaeological Heritage 127 (Neil Brodie et 
al. eds., 2001)(noting that problems with the UNESCO Convention lead to UNESCO proposing that 
UNIDROIT draft a convention addressing its issues.)  These issues will be explored herein by highlighting the 
differences between the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions. See infra subsection E.   
108 This is an astute and important distinction as theft and illegal export are not necessarily the same thing. See 
supra n. 103 (discussing the difference between theft and illegal export).  Recognition of these distinct situations 
was crucial to the success of the Convention as this issue generates a number of both legal and theoretical 
problems in many countries.  As a delegate to the fourth meeting of the Government Experts on the Convention 
described it, “[i]n effect, all States were in agreement on the need to co-operate with a view to penalizing theft 
committed abroad as theft was universally considered to be a criminal act, whereas only a few States would, in 
the present state of the law, be prepared to undertake an obligation to sanction customs offenses abroad.”  
Lyndel V.Prott, Commentary on The Unidroit Convention on Stolen and Illegal Exported Cultural Objects 28 
(1997) [citations omitted].  Indeed, the drafters of the Convention recognized such a distinction, and only when 
the two conditions (stolen and illegally exported) are fulfilled can a claim be brought under the UNIDROIT 
Convention. Marina Schneider, Explanatory Report on the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International 
Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, Uniform Law Review 199 (1993). 
109 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n 8, at Preamble.  
110 See UNIDORIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 1.  
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legal entities, including individuals and so in turn Indigenous Peoples, direct 
access to domestic courts and private laws.  Articles 3 and 4 collectively deal with 
stolen cultural property.  The UNIDROIT Convention considers cultural 
property stolen in two different situations including when it “has been unlawfully 
excavated” and where it has been “…lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained 
when consistent with the law of the State where the excavation took place.”111  
The drafters of the convention abandoned the idea of providing an illustrative 
list of theft including “conversion, fraud, intentional misappropriation of lost 
property or any other culpable act assimilated thereto,” and adopted this more 
narrow definition in hopes that States party to the convention will adopt rules 
more favorable to the restitution of stolen cultural property.112  By contrast, the 
UNESCO Convention does not provide any sort of definition of theft but rather 
is silent on this point; yet like the UNESCO Convention the convention here 
also continues to remain silent on the issue of criminal punishment of violators 
and therefore does not affect the penal laws of signatories.   
 
Article 3(1) provides that “the possessor of a cultural object which has been 
stolen shall return it.”113  In requiring the restitution of any stolen piece of 
cultural property by the possessor this article creates a duty on the part of the 
possessor to return any stolen cultural property to the rightful owner be it an 
individual, a state or any other legal entity.  In turn, there is no bona fide 
acquisition of a stolen object and so in this way it aligns with common law 
countries.114  However, this broader blanket requirement of the restitution of all 
                                                 
111 UNIDROIT Convention, Art. 3(2). 
112 See Schneider supra n. 108. 
113 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 3(1). 
114 This does not necessarily mean that common law countries were happy with this provision.  As 
aforementioned, the UNESCO Convention’s requirement for the restitution of stolen cultural property 
contained in Article 7(b)(ii) is a very limited and narrow category of “property stolen from  a museum or religious 
or secular public monument or similar institution … provided such property is documented as pertaining to the 
inventory  of that institution.” UNESCO Convention, supra n. 7, at Art. 7(b)(ii).  It did not touch on or require 
the repatriation of objects stolen from private collections and institutions as well as excavation sites.  “In turn, 
some have suggested that this is the reason for even less support for this [the UNIDROIT] convention among 
market states.” Jane Warring, supra n. 73, at 256 n. 160 citing Brenna Adler, The International Art Auction Industry: 
Has Competition Tarnished Its Finish?, 23 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 433, 461 (2003) 
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stolen cultural property to its owner changes the rule in many civil law countries.  
In most civil jurisdictions “a purchaser of stolen property can gain good title if 
she does not know or learn about the object’s illicit removal from its rightful 
owner”115; hence even the person who acquires stolen property that is a bona 
fide purchaser116 gains good title to such property and so often it is not subject 
to return.117  Rather, this blanket requirement of restitution in the UNIDROIT 
Convention for such a broad class of stolen cultural property is premised on the 
common law principle of nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet; the 
principle that “no one can transfer better title than he himself possesses.”118  In 
turn, a person who receives a piece of stolen property even where they are a 
bona fide purchaser cannot gain good title to such property and so it must be 
returned.119  It was decided to adopt the common law approach as it was 
determined that this was the only real way to combat the trafficking in stolen 
                                                                                                                                                    
(accusing Britain of being particularly solicitous to the interests of it two great auction houses- Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s).  
115 Simon Halfin, The Legal Protection of Cultural Property in Britain: Past, Present and Future, 6 DePaul-LCA Journal of 
Art & Entertainment Law and Policy 1, 34 (2002).   
116 Lyndel V. Prott & P.J. O’Keefe define a bona fide purchaser as one who purchases property from the seller 
with the honest belief that the seller had the right to sell the property and absent any circumspect circumstances 
that would put the buyer on notice to the contrary. Lyndel V. Prott & P.J.  O’Keefe. Law and Cultural Heritage: 
Movement, 405 (1989).  
117 Monique Olivier, Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention: Attempting to Regulate the International Trade and Traffic of 
Cultural Property, 26 Golden Gate University Law Review  627, 637(1996) (noting that  in most civil law states the 
bona fide purchaser may gain legal title after a certain amount of time and she may have absolute protection.)  
The most extreme example is that of the Italian Code where the bona fide purchasers is given total protection. 
Lyndel V. Prott & P.J. O’Keefe, supra n. 116, at 405.  However, this civil law principle is not completely alien to 
common law jurisdictions.  Many common law systems have modified this rule that the original owner can always 
recover her stolen property by providing for some sort of protection for the good faith purchaser after a certain 
period of time.  However, how generous these time limits are and so how closely aligned they are with civil law 
states depends on the common law jurisdiction and widely vary.  See Lyndel V. Prott, Commentary, supra n 108, 
at 28 n. 2. (discussing the difference between the UK and New York). 
118 Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N.Y. 456,461 (1974). See also O’Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A. 2d 862, 867 (N.J. 1980) (a 
mere possessor cannot transfer good title); Menzel v. List 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 820 (1966)(It is of no moment that 
Perls Galleries may have been bona fide purchasers of the painting, in good faith and for value without 
knowledge of the saga of the Menzels.  No less is expected of an art gallery of distinction.  Throughout the 
course of human history, the perpetration of evil has inevitably resulted in the suffering of the innocent, and 
those who act in good faith.  And the principle has been basic in the law that a thief conveys no good title as 
against the true owner … “Provisions of law for the protection of purchasers in good faith which would defeat 
restitution [of Nazi confiscations] shall be disregarded). 
119 In common law jurisdictions, “the rightful owner can reclaim the object regardless of whether the purchaser 
knew she had bought a stolen object.”  Simon Halfin, supra n. 115,  at 63. See also Robin Morris Collin, The Law 
and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 Howard Law Journal 17, 21-27 (1993) (Common law jurisdiction such 
as the U.S. follows the principle of nemo dat quod non habet, meaning that no one can give better title than they 
have; therefore one who receives property from a thief cannot defeat the ownership claims of the rightful owner 
in an action for replevin).   
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cultural property and because of the non-fungible nature of cultural property.120  
However, as a concession to civil law jurisdictions, the UNIDROIT Convention 
provides for “fair and reasonable compensation” to the bona fide possessor of 
the item on restitution provided that the possessor can prove that they “neither 
knew nor ought reasonably to have known that the object was stolen and can 
provide that he exercised due diligence when acquiring the object.”121  In making 
this determination of due diligence, Art 4(4) requires the courts to look at all the 
circumstances of the acquisition.  These circumstances include an evaluation of 
the all circumstances of the original purchase including the character of the 
parties involved, the price paid, the agencies and/registers consulted if any and 
whether or not any in-depth research efforts were made to determine if the 
object was stolen.122  Moreover, to the extent that it is consistent with the law of 
the state where the action is brought, this compensation should be provided to 
the possessor by the individual that transferred the property or any prior 
transferor.123  Finally, the UNIDROIT Convention also mitigates this common 
law position of blanket restitution to the delight of civil law countries by making 
it subject to certain complex time restrictions.124  Unlike UNESCO, the 
UNIDORIT Convention proscribes a statute of limitations of, “three years from 
the time when the claimant knew the location of the cultural object and the 
identity of the possessor, and in any case within a period of fifty years from the 
time of the theft.”125  The third time period in the UNIDROIT Convention for 
                                                 
120 Lyndel V. Prott, Commentary, supra n. 108, at 29.  In turn, this change to the civil law rule was made over 
their protests that the application of their rule for protection of the subsequent purchaser promotes free 
commerce and avoids uncertainty in commercial transactions.  However, it was in fact a civil law lawyer that 
advocated the rejection of such a rule demonstrating that such a rule actually facilitated the entry of illicitly 
trafficked cultural property into the licit trade.  Indeed, Article 3(1) was based on this scholarship. Lyndel V. 
Prott, Commentary, supra n. 108, at 30-1. 
121 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 4(1).  Although the concept of compensation for the bona fide 
purchaser is new to common law countries like the U.S., it is not out of step with case law developments in these 
countries which have at their core the development of such a principle.  
122 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 4(4). 
123 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 4(2). 
124 See generally UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Arts. 3(3)- 3(5).  
125 Id. at art. 3(3).  Prott notes that this is more generous to the claimant the than measure from which time limits 
for claims begins to run in France and the UK but is less generous than the demand and refusal rules in New 
York; rather it reflects the approach taken in jurisdictions such as New Jersey and California which use the date 
of the discovery of the object. Lyndel V. Prott, Commentary, supra n. 108, at 35 [citations omitted]. 
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stolen property is exceptional in that there is no time limitation for objects which 
are at the very heart of a state’s cultural heritage; primarily those objects in a 
public collection which enjoy a special legal status in their state as well as objects 
forming an integral part of an identified monument or an archaeological site.126  
This also applies to “a claim for restitution of a sacred or communally important 
cultural object belonging to and used by a tribal or indigenous community in a 
Contracting State as part of that community’s traditional or ritual use”.127  The 
U.S. opposed this provision for public collections and preferred to have 
increased protection for private collections in the alternative as unlike most 
countries, in the U.S. over ninety percent of identified collections are held by 
private non-profit entities rather than in government controlled or financed 
institutions.128  As a concession to market states with such concerns, the 
UNIDROIT Convention goes on to provide that a state can declare that even 
this special cultural property is subject to a time limit of seventy-five years 
through national legislation.  If such an option is exercised, the state is bound to 
this rule in any claim it makes.129  
  
ii. UNIDROIT Convention and the Return of Illegal Exported 
Cultural Property  
 
To achieve its goal of establishing a framework for the repatriation of cultural 
property, the UNIDROIT also places obligations on states as regards the return 
of illegally exported cultural property in Articles 5 to 7.  Specifically it provides 
that a state may request the court of another state party to the UNIDROIT 
Convention to return cultural property illegal exported from the territory of the 
                                                 
126 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art 3(4).   
127 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art 3(8) 
128 Claudia Fox, The UNIDORIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World 
Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 9 American University Journal of  International Law & Policy 225, 257-60 
(1993).   
129 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 3(5). 
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requesting state.130  In essence, the requesting state is responsible for making the 
critical determination about whether or not the object was illegal exported 
according to its laws131 and the possessor state has the right to determine the 
terms of its return.  For the possessor state to order its return, the requesting 
state must further establish that the removal of the object significantly impairs 
one of the following including: “(a) the physical preservation of the object or its 
context; (b) the integrity of a complex object; (c) the preservation of information 
of, for example a scientific or historical character; (d) the traditional or ritual use 
of the object by a tribal or indigenous community, or establishes that the object 
is of significant cultural importance for the requesting State.”132  However, in 
absence of proof of one of the above then the default position is the basic rule 
of international law that an object that has been illegally exported does not in 
itself bar it from lawful importation.  Moreover, Article 7 even further reduces 
the circumstances where cultural object would need to be returned after illegal 
export as it does not require return where “(a) the export of a cultural object is 
no longer illegal at the time at which the return is requested or; (b) the object 
was exported during the lifetime of the person who created it or within a period 
of fifty years following the death of that person.”133  Subsection (b) was included 
so the living artists could develop an overseas market for their works and further 
encourage creative activity.134  However, an exception to subsection (b) was 
created in Article 7(2) which excludes objects “made by a member or members 
of a tribal or indigenous community for traditional or ritual use by that 
community…”135  As Prott notes, this exception to an exception in effect 
requires return as provided for in Article 5 and was intended to cover cases 
where the artist of the ethnographic object may not be known and because it is 
                                                 
130 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art 5.1 [emphasis added].  It can be argued that this is a different 
approach to the repatriation required for stolen objects as detailed in Art 3 which flatly provides that the object 
shall be returned. 
131 See UNIRDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 1(b).  
132 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 5.3.    
133 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 7(1)(a)-(b).   
134 Lyndel V. Prott, Commentary, supra n. 108, at 69. 
135 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 7(2). 
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not always easy to prove theft from the community yet the illicit trade may still 
have dramatic and detrimental impacts on the cultural life and cohesion of the 
indigenous community.136  
 
As with its provisions on stolen cultural property, the UNIDROIT Convention 
requires that it must be made within certain time limits.137  Furthermore, it also 
requires fair and reasonable compensation when the possessor “neither knew 
nor ought reasonably to have known at the time of acquisition that the object 
had been illegally exported;”138 thus again making a concession to civil law states 
by providing some measure of protection for the bona fide purchaser.  In 
making a determination about the status as bona fide purchaser, Article 6(2) 
provides that it involves “determining  whether the possessor knew or ought 
reasonably to have known that the cultural object had been illegally exported, 
regard shall be  had to the circumstances of the acquisition, including the 
absence of an export certificate…”139  However, unlike the provisions for stolen 
cultural objects, the determination of status as a bona fide purchaser in relation 
to illegal exported objects is not explicitly contingent upon the exercise of due 
diligence.140  Moreover here the bona fide purchaser can also seek alternate 
                                                 
136 Lyndel V. Prott, Commentary, supra n. 108, at 70. 
137 See UNIDROIT Convention at supra n. 108, at Art. 5(5).  The time limits for illegally exported cultural 
property are in alignment with those for stolen cultural property.  However, there is no exceptional extension as 
with stolen objects from monuments, public collections, and traditional and indigenous communities as 
contained in Articles 3(4)-(8). See n. 125-7. 
138 UNIDROIT Convention at supra n. 108, at Art. 6(1).  Again, this language reflects substantially that of Article 
4(1) in relation to the restitution of stolen property.  However, in this case payment will be made by the 
requesting state whereas this language was dropped from Article 4(1) in relation to stolen property. Lyndel V. 
Prott, Commentary, supra n. 108, at 63.  Note here, that only a person who has acquired the object after the date 
of its illegal export can receive compensation and that in no case an owner who knowingly arranges for the illegal 
export of cultural property receive compensation. Id.  
139 UNIDROIT Convention at supra n. 108, at Art. 6(2).    
140 Moreover, in making this determination Article 6(2) only provides that the judge should look at the absence of 
an export certificate.  Whereas in relation to stolen property the judge looks at a myriad of factors in Article 4(4). 
See supra n. 122 and accompanying text (discussing Article 4(4).  However, this does not preclude the judge from 
looking at the factors mentioned in Article 4(4) concerning the determination of status as a bona fide purchaser 
in relation to stolen property but it does suggest that in failing to mention them that the standard of care required 
in relation to stolen cultural property is higher than that expected in relation to illegal exported property.  Lyndel 
V. Prott, Commentary, supra n. 108, at 64. 
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remedies in lieu of compensation141 and the state requesting the return of illegally 
exported cultural property shall bear the costs of the restitution of such 
property;142 no similar provision exists for the stolen property under the 
convention in Article 4(1) but rather this should be taken into consideration by 
the judge in awarding fair and reasonable compensation to the bona fide 
purchaser.143   
 
E. Issues Addressed?  The Principal Differences between the 
UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions 
 
As aforementioned, the UNIDROIT Convention was drafted to address certain 
issues that remained after the UNESCO Convention and were viewed as the 
principal reason why the later did not receive support from market states.144  
Ultimately, these issues are reflected in the four principal differences between the 
conventions.  First, as already mentioned, in defining cultural property the 
UNIDROIT Convention eliminates the requirement that to receive protection 
under the convention that cultural property be designated as such by the state.  
The consequence is that the UNIDROIT Convention broadens what cultural 
property is protected to include property that is undiscovered as well as property 
that is publically and privately owned by individuals and other legal entities 
including in theory Indigenous Peoples.145  In turn, this convention necessarily 
expands the category of players that can make claims for the restitution of stolen 
cultural property.  Therefore, the UNIDROIT Convention is rooted in private 
                                                 
141 These include retaining the object or “to transfer ownership against payment or gratuitously to a person of its 
choice residing in the requesting State who provides the necessary guarantees.” UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 
8, at Art. 6(3).  This article grew out of the concern that in many states the penalty for illegal export is forfeiture 
of the object and so in essence in absence of this provision the UNIDROIT Convention would be endorsing the 
confiscation by the requesting state.  In turn, this article was inserted to allow the person returning the object to 
retain ownership; provided that it was not the person who illegal exported the object.  The consequence being 
that many states will have to examine the wording of their export law concerning forfeiture.  Lyndel V. Prott, 
Commentary, supra n. 108, at 43. 
142 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 6(4). 
143 Lyndel V. Prott, Commentary, supra n. 108, at 43.  
144 See supra n. 107 and accompanying text.  
145 See supra  ns. 29-20 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the elimination of this designation 
requirement).  
 55 
international law in that it explicitly creates a private cause of action; any owner 
A of stolen property and the state in the case of illegally exported property can 
sue holder B of the property in the courts of state C where the property is 
located and state C must provide a legal remedy.  This cause of action is not 
dependent on the laws of the state where the request is made and thus avoids 
issues of non-enforcement and really creates the possibility for a private cause of 
action with the language of “claimant”.146  This is in stark contrast to the 
UNESCO Convention which first does not provide for the return of illegal 
exported147 cultural property and second restricts the restitution of stolen 
cultural property to requests by states.  This stems from the fact that the 
UNESCO Convention is rooted in public international law; it operates through 
requests made by states and states alone through diplomatic channels and then 
the requested state undertakes the appropriate legal action to return.148  Flowing 
from this ability of individuals and other legal entities to make a claim for stolen 
property, the third change that the UNIDROIT Convention necessarily makes is 
that the stolen property subject to recovery here is broader than that under 
UNESCO Convention.  The UNESCO Convention restricts its recovery of 
stolen property at Article 7(b)(ii) to  property detailed in Article 7(b)(i): cultural 
property stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or 
similar institution provided that such property is documented as belonging to the 
inventory of that institution.149  By contrast, the UNIDROIT Convention simply 
provides a flat requirement that any stolen cultural property be returned and so 
                                                 
146 Harold S. Burman, Introduction to the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft 
UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 
1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322.  
147 Even if there is some debate over whether or not the UNESCO Convention requires the return of illegal 
exported cultural property, the prevailing view is that it does not require such return while it is clear that the 
UNIDROIT Convention explicitly requires the return of illegal exported cultural property at Article 5 
notwithstanding the laws of the state where the property is located but dependent upon certain conditions that 
the requesting state must meet. See supra ns. 88-104 and accompanying text (discussing the prevailing view that 
the UNESCO Convention does not require the return of illegally exported cultural property); See also supra ns. 
130-32 (discussing Article 5 of the UNIDROIT Convention).  
148 The UNESCO Convention does provide for the creation of a private cause of action but it does not compel 
the creation of this cause of action. See supra ns.  86-7 and accompanying text (discussing this limited possibility 
for the creation of a private cause of action for stolen cultural property in Article 13(c)).   
149 See supra n. 65 and accompanying text. 
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in this way protects and requires the return of even broader class of stolen 
cultural property even again bona fide purchasers.150  In turn, fourth and finally 
in its recovery phase the UNIDROIT Convention clears up confusion on a 
number of points.  First, it more clearly defines when a purchaser will be 
considered a bona fide or good faith purchaser by giving a test for the 
determination of such and thereby uniformly resolving any conflicts between the 
original owner and subsequent innocent purchasers.  In making this 
determination, as aforementioned Art 4(4) in relation to stolen property and 
Article 6(2) in relation to illegal exported cultural property requires the courts to 
look at the circumstances of the acquisition151 and in doing so provides much 
more detail that the vague requirement of the UNESCO Convention that 
innocent purchaser is entitled to just compensation leaving it to national law to 
settle.152  Finally, the UNIDROIT Convention clears up issues related to time 
limits for recovery153 claims unlike the UNESCO Convention which remains 
silent on the issue of the statute of limitations leaving it to the various states with 
all their complexities.154  
 
However, despite these differences between UNESCO and the changes that the 
UNDROIT Convention brought, it on the whole has been considered of little 
benefit to Indigenous Peoples.  As Karolina Kuprecht neatly sums up: 
 
The benefits to indigenous peoples from the Unidroit Convention 1995 
nevertheless remain insignificant.  The Convention does not surmount the 
key procedural hurdles in claims regarding stolen cultural property such as 
proof of ownership and proof that an object was “stolen”.  It provides no 
claim for repatriation of illegally exported goods on behalf of indigenous 
                                                 
150 See supra ns. 111-3 and accompanying text (discussing this requirement of flat return in Article 3(1)).  
151 See supra n. 122-3 and accompanying text (discussing these circumstances listed in Article 4(4)); See also and 
compare n. 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing these circumstances in Article 6(2)).  
152 See supra n. 85 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra ns. 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing these detailed time limitations in relation to stolen 
property at arts. 3(3) - 3(5)); See also n. 137 and accompanying text (discussing these detailed time limitations in 
relation to illegally exported property at art. 5(5)).  
154 See supra n. 71-81 and accompanying text (discussing the complexities of the statute of limitations).  
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peoples … Finally, only 29, and none of them important cultural property 
importing states, have ratified the Convention.155 
 
Yet, these and the other limitations mentioned throughout the exploration of 
the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions are limitations that assume that 
Indigenous Peoples potentially have a claim to the restitution of their cultural 
property; in essence they are prospective limitations on their claims.  
However, the international framework for the protection of cultural property 
need not rely on these prospective limitations to restrict the claims of 
Indigenous Peoples to the restitution of their cultural property.  Indeed, the 
most restrictive limitation of this framework in both these conventions is 
found in their non-retroactivity, which as a retrospective limitation precludes 
even the assertion of a claim by Indigenous Peoples for the bulk of their 
cultural property that is at the heart of the issue of the restitution of cultural 
property that was seized as part and parcel of colonialism.  
 
IV. Out of Time and Out of Luck:  The Retrospective Limitation on the 
Framework for the Protection of Cultural Property as Regards The 
Repatriation Debate  
 
A. Introduction 
 
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities notes in its resolution 1991/32 of 29 August 1991 that the 
international trafficking in the cultural property of Indigenous Peoples 
“undermines the ability of indigenous peoples to pursue their own political, 
economic, social, religious and cultural development in conditions of freedom 
                                                 
155 Karolina Kuprecht, Human Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation, Working Paper No. 2009/34, 
NCCR Trade Regulation, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, 14 (2009), at http://www.google.co
.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphase1.nccrt
rade.org%2Fimages%2Fstories%2Fpublications%2FIP7%2FWorking%2520Paper%2520Kuprecht%2520230620
09.pdf&ei=fGz4VPHICe2t7AbFvICwDw&usg=AFQjCNGjphJMl2XBTqLeKrgSBzqPsAFTvw&bvm=bv.8751
9884,d.ZGU 
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and dignity.”156  In turn, in the guidelines of her final report to the U.N. on the 
protection of the heritage of Indigenous Peoples, Special Rapporteur Daes 
suggests that the U.N. should “consider the possibility of drafting a convention 
to establish jurisdiction for the recovery of indigenous peoples’ heritage across 
national frontiers, before the end of the International Decade of the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples.”157   
 
However, such a convention has never come to fruition.  In turn, as 
aforementioned prior to the UNDRIP under examination in this thesis, the issue 
of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under international 
law found itself located within the aforementioned  broader framework for the 
international protection of cultural property; albeit marginally and with the 
serious prospective drawbacks detailed above.  Yet, in terms of the repatriation 
debate the most significant limitation is that of the retrospective limitation of the 
principle of non-retroactivity with the effect of thwarting the bulk of claims for 
the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples removed as part of the 
circumstances and incidents of colonialism.   
 
 
B. Non-Retroactivity 
“Sorry about that.  It’s something that happened in history.”158 --- Tony Blair 
 
Whereas the former prospective limitations at least have as their starting point 
that there is a claim though it may be time barred or suffer in a number of other 
                                                 
156 U.N, Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. Res. 
A/RES/ 1991/32 ( 29 August 1991) 
157 Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, [Annex 
“Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People”, at para. 60, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (1995). 
158 Former Prime Minister Tony Blair made this statement during a visit to China in 2003 when asked by Chinese 
supporters of the repatriation of their cultural property to justify the British Museum’s continued possession of 
approximately 23,000 relics from the Middle Kingdom looted from the Summer Palace in Beijing during a brief 
invasion by Anglo-French armies in 1860.  Not surprisingly, this statement enraged the Chinese supporters. 
Oliver August, China Relics Row Echoes Battle for Elgin Marbles, Times (London), Sept. 20, 2003, at A13 available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1161019.ece (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).  
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ways, here the starting point in the repatriation debate is that there is not claim 
due to the principle of non-retroactivity.  Necessary for a stable and predictable 
legal system, non-retroactivity is the idea that ‘[u]nless a different intention 
appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a 
party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased 
to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that 
party.’159  Aside from leaving the most famous requests by successor states in the 
broader repatriation debate without a claim,160 this fundamental norm of 
international treaty law also creates an insurmountable obstacle to the ever-
increasing requests by Indigenous Peoples for the repatriation of their traditional 
property at the international level as the vast bulk of this property left their 
possession as the victims of colonialism long before the UNESCO and 
UNIDROIT Conventions came into effect; respectively 1972 and 1998 or any 
later date of ratification of the conventions between the parties involved.161   
 
Despite the Mataaua Declaration which calls on the international community to 
recognize a cultural property regime that has retroactive coverage,162 it is “well 
documented that neither UNESCO 1970 nor UNIDROIT 1995 was ever 
intended to unlock the imperial trophy cases”163 as both conventions make this 
clear though their explicit non-retroactivity.  The former explicitly embodies this 
                                                 
159 U.N., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331; 8I.L.M. 679, 
entered into force January 27, 1980.  A different intention does not appear from these Conventions; the UNESCO 
Convention implicitly adheres to this principle while the UNIDROIT Convention’s adherence is made express. 
See UNESCO Convention, supra n. 7, at Art. 7; UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 10. 
160 Most notably it leaves frustrated the requests by the successor states of Greece for the return of the Elgin 
Marbles housed in the British Museum and of Egypt for the return of the Bust of Nefertiti from the Egyptian 
Museum in Berlin.  For an excellent account of the repatriation issue surrounding these pieces see respectively: 
J.H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, supra n. 20 and Kurt G. Siehr, The Beautiful One Has Come- To 
Return, in Imperialism, Art and Restitution 114 (John Merryman ed. 2006); Stephen K. Urice, The Beautiful One 
Has Come- To Stay, in Imperialism, Art and Restitution 135 (John Merryman ed. 2006). 
161 In turn, unlike the previous prospective limitations, the principal of non-retroactivity then could be viewed as 
not so much of a limitation but rather maybe more aptly as the source of the repatriation debate itself.   
162 The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Preamble, June 
1993 at para. 2.5. available at http:/www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/creative_heritage/indigenous/link0002.html 
163 Josh Shuart, Note, Is All “Pharaoh” in Love and War? The British Museum’s Title to the Rosetta Stone and the Sphinx’s 
Beard, 52 Kansas Law Review 667, 717 (2004) citing  Memorandum from Lyndel V. Prott, Director, International 
Standards Unit, Division of Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, to the Parliament Select Committee on Culture, Media 
and Sport, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmcumeds/37
1/371ap51.htm (last visited Feb 23, 2004). 
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idea in Article 7 which lays out its key obligations that state parties undertake as 
evidenced through the language of “after entry into force of this Convention”.  
Specifically, UNESCO makes clear that its limited repatriation obligations only 
apply to cultural property from another “State Party which has been illegally 
exported after entry into force of this Convention, in the States concerned”164 and to 
“cultural property stolen … in another State Party to this Convention after the 
entry into force of this Convention for the States concerned.”165  Moreover, states 
undertake “appropriate steps to recover and return any such cultural property 
imported after entry into force of this Convention in both States concerned …”166  
Although Article 15 of the UNESCO Convention does allow States Parties to 
negotiate their own terms regarding the repatriation of cultural property that was 
acquired before the Convention took effect; many states have not exercised this 
option.  This was most aptly demonstrated in the Canadian case of R. v. Heller.167  
 
Under the auspices of legislation implementing the UNESCO Convention 
known as the Cultural Property Export and Import Act, Canada prosecuted 
Issaka Zango and Ben Heller.  These dealers from New York imported a Nok 
terracotta sculpture into Canada without the appropriate export certificate from 
Nigeria, and so at the request of Nigeria were prosecuted in Canada.  Zango and 
Heller were arrested in Calgary in 1981 with the terracotta piece that Zango 
purchased in 1979 which was to be sold to Mobil Oil of Canada Ltd. for 
$650,000 USD and charged with illegal export under  §37 of the Cultural 
Property Export and Import Act.  Nigeria claimed the sculpture as a piece of 
cultural property which had been illegal exported, though it was part of a private 
collection in Paris from the 1950s until the 1970s when Zango, an innocent 
purchaser, acquired the item.  Although at the time of the import both the 
                                                 
164 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, at Article 7(a).  
165 Id. at Article 7(b)(i) . (emphasis added) 
166 Id. at Article 7(b)(ii). (emphasis added) 
167 R. V. Heller 27 Alberta Law Reports (2d) 346 (1983).  The following pertinent facts of the case for the 
purposes herein are succinctly laid out in: Robert K. Paterson, Case Notes: Bolivian Textiles in Canada, 2 
International Journal of Cultural Property 2 359 (1993). 
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requesting State of Nigeria and Canada were parties to the Convention, thus 
making both the Convention and so the Act applicable, counsel for the accused 
argued there was no evidence regarding when the objected had been illegally 
exported from Nigeria.  In making this determination, the judge reasoned that 
the Act needed to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the UNESCO 
Convention and in doing so relied on Article 7(a) to conclude that the Act can 
only apply to property “illegal exported after entry into force” of the Convention 
in the states concerned.168  As the prosecution failed to introduce evidence that 
the object had been exported from Nigeria after June 1978 when Canada became 
party to the Convention and Canada and Nigeria have not exercised the option 
under Article 15 concerning property acquired before the UNESCO Convention 
took effect, the accused was acquitted. 
 
The UNIDROIT Convention does not remedy this situation169 as it also 
explicitly includes a clause on non-retroactivity.  Article 10 states that the 
UNIDROIT Convention:  “[s]hall apply on in respect of a cultural object that is 
stolen after this Convention enters into force in respect of the State where the claim is 
brought … [and] shall apply on in respect of a cultural object that is illegally 
exported after this Convention enters into force for the requesting State as well as the 
State where the request is brought.”170  However, it does note in its preamble 
that in adoption this convention “in no way confers any approval or legitimacy 
                                                 
168 “O'Keefe and Prott cogently argue that Article 7(a) should have been irrelevant to the timing problem in 
Heller.  Article 7 involves the illegal export of objects stolen from museums or similar institutions and their 
subsequent purchase by such institutions in importing countries.  The prospective operation of Article 7 is made 
clear but the Canadian import control law seems based, instead, on Article 3 which provides: 'the import, export 
or transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the provisions adopted under this Convention 
by the states parties thereto, shall be illicit.’  O'Keefe and Prott contend that Article 3 places no time limit on the 
export of goods from their source country and it is permissible for states to leave the timing issue open.  The 
wording of the Canadian Act suggests that Canada has imposed a ban on the import of goods which have been 
illegally exported from reciprocating foreign states at any time.  Thus, while resort to the treaty to aid in the 
interpretation of domestic law in Heller was laudable it appears to have been misguided in that case.”  Robert K. 
Patterson, 2 International Journal of Cultural Property 2 359, 361 (1993) [citations omitted]. 
169 Lyndel V. Prott notes that “[f]rom the first meeting of the Study Group [for the UNIDROIT Convention] it 
was clear that, although there was a substantial amount of agreement among experts and States alike that 
something should be done to limit illicit traffic for the future, a draft which tried to deal with past issues would 
have little hope of success.”  Lyndel V. Prott, Commentary, supra n. 108, at 78.  
170 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Arts. 10(1)-(2).  
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upon illegal transactions whatever kind which may have taken place before the 
entry into force of this Convention”171  
 
Conclusions: Human Rights as a New Order 
 
The repatriation debate which houses the issue of the restitution of cultural 
property to Indigenous Peoples has both a prospective and a retroactive 
dimension.  The historical theft, the historical illicit trafficking or any other form 
of historical removal of cultural property has generated the modern demands 
that fuel the repatriation debate in its retrospective application.  These requests 
by their retrospective nature typically are made many years after the initial 
removal of such property and with many suggesting that the initial removal 
occurred under dubious conditions at best as part of the circumstances and 
incidents of colonialism.  Beyond this retrospective dimension, to the extent that 
these problems continue they fuel the prospective dimension of the repatriation 
debate.   
 
Indeed, prior to the UNDRIP under examination in this thesis, the repatriation 
debate which houses the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples under international law found itself located within the 
broader framework for the international protection of cultural property.  As 
evident from the international conventions detailed at the outset of this chapter, 
the international framework for the protection of cultural property is comprised 
of both regimes for protection in times of armed conflict as well as in times of 
peace.  However the focus herein has been on the peace time regime as the 
instances and circumstances of colonialism that resulted in the removal of much 
of the cultural property that Indigenous Peoples request for restitution and 
                                                 
171 UNIDROIT Convention, supra n. 8, at Preamble. 
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which is at heart of the of the research question of this thesis was looted, stolen, 
illegally exported or plundered as part of colonialism.  
 
In turn, what this exploration of the peace time regime revealed through its 
exploration of the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions is that there are 
serious limitations that impair the ability of Indigenous Peoples to make 
claims for the restitution of their cultural property using this framework 
including limitations related to evidence jurisdiction, choice of law, the statute 
of limitations, the nature of the designation of cultural property as well as 
even  who can make claims for the repatriation of such property.  Yet, in all 
these limitations with the exception of the latter, it is assumed that Indigenous 
Peoples potentially have a claim to the restitution of their cultural property; in 
essence they are prospective limitations on their claims.  However, the 
international framework for the protection of cultural property need not rely 
on these prospective limitations to restrict the claims of Indigenous Peoples to 
the restitution of their cultural property.  Indeed, the most restrictive 
limitation of this framework in both these conventions is found in their non-
retroactivity, which as a retrospective limitation precludes even the assertion 
of a claim by Indigenous Peoples for the bulk of their cultural property that is 
at the heart of the issue of the restitution of cultural property as it was seized 
historically as part and parcel of colonialism.  
 
With such an obstacle under the international law, where does this leave cultural 
property at the center of the repatriation debate?  In effect, “because formal 
mechanisms for resolving property rights in cultural objects—particularly those 
expropriated during periods of colonial rule or military occupation—are limited, 
repatriation claims tend to rely more on political fervor, moral arguments and 
emotional appeals rather than on substantive law.”172  After all, “[h]eritage is 
                                                 
172 Josh Shuart, supra n. 163, at 673.  
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both intensely personal and intensely political.  In effect, these two elements go 
hand in hand, as heritage is hotly contested because we each have our own views 
on what represents heritage, and what is worth conserving.”173  Without any 
meaningful legal claim available via the international framework for the 
protection of cultural property as a result of these prospective but in particular 
retrospective limitations, Indigenous Peoples have turned elsewhere.  
Specifically, Indigenous Peoples have turned to international human rights law 
[IHRL] to secure the restitution of their traditional cultural property.  Therefore, 
this thesis turns to the exploration of the contextualization of this issue within 
IHRL that serves as the principal research question of this thesis. 
                                                 
173 Joe Watkins, Cultural Nationalists, Internationalists and “Intra-nationalists”: Who’s Right and Whose rights?, 
12 International Journal of Cultural Property 78, 88 (2005) citing Graeme Aplin, Heritage Identification, Conservation, 
and Managements 358 (2002).  
 65 
Chapter Three  
The Contextualization of the Restitution of Cultural 
Property in International Human Rights Law  
Article 11 of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: One Step Forward One 
Step Back? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite the reality of non-retroactivity and the various other aforementioned 
shortcomings in mind, Indigenous Peoples have not abandoned international law 
as a mechanism for the restitution of their cultural property despite their 
historical and continued unsavory experiences with western legal constructs.1  
Briefly, “at the most basic level ‘indigenous peoples are best defined as … 
groups traditionally regarded, and self-defined as descendants of the original 
inhabitants of lands with which they share a strong spiritual bond … [and they] 
desire to be culturally, socially and/or economically distinct from the dominate 
groups in society.’”2  Under international law, efforts to define Indigenous 
Peoples have been lead by the International Labor Organization (ILO).  The 
definition includes two parts; though a group only needs to satisfy one part to be 
considered Indigenous Peoples for the purposes of the convention.3  The first 
part includes those ‘whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish 
them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is 
                                                 
1 This use of international law by Indigenous Peoples has not gone unnoticed.  H.P. Glenn writes about its use as 
an example of irony amongst others. See infra Chapter 6 at Section I(B) (discussing irony, international law and 
Indigenous Peoples). 
2
 S. Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis 12 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 57, 60 (1999). 
3
 See ILO, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, opened for signature 
June 27, 1989, 169 I.L.O. 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991 at Art. 1(1) [herein after ILO Convention 169].   
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regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws 
or regulations.’4  The second part includes those groups ‘descend[ed] from the 
populations which inhabited the country … at the time of conquest or 
colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, 
cultural and political institutions.’5 As for the efforts of the UN, the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations [WGIP] considered a working definition for 
the Declaration.6 Yet in the end the Declaration did not define the term 
Indigenous Peoples but rather incorporates the focus on self-identification in 
keeping with the trend in international law.  It provides that, “Indigenous 
Peoples have the right to determine their identity or membership in accordance 
to their customs and traditions.”7  This stems from the widely held sentiment 
that the concept of Indigenous Peoples “is not capable of a precise, inclusive 
definition which can be applied in the same manner to all regions of the world.”8  
 
Regardless, Indigenous Peoples and their advocates in particular have turned to 
IHRL to secure the repatriation of their cultural heritage which includes their 
cultural property.9  This effort is part of the broader claims of many Indigenous 
Peoples to secure “the right to practice their traditions and celebrate their culture 
and spirituality.”10  Aside from this claim, Professor Wiessner identifies four 
                                                 
4
 Id. at Art. 1(1)(a). 
5
 Id. at Art. 1(1)(b). 
6
 See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1983/22, at paras. 109-119. 
7
 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st sess 107th 
plen mtg, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (13 September 2007) at Art. 33(1) [hereinafter Declaration or UNDRIP].   
8
 Erica-Irene Daes, Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, on the concept of ‘indigenous people’, 
U.N. Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (10 June 1996) at paras. 9 and 72. Nonetheless, the UN also has 
attempted to set out a definition based on both object and subjective criteria.  The Cobo definition highlights 
objective features such as the historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies, distinctiveness 
from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, non-dominance in society, and the 
determination to preserve and develop their territories and their ethnic identity as well as subjective elements 
such as self-identification. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4.    
9 See infra Chapter 4 at Section II(D) (discussing cultural heritage as including cultural property). 
10 Wiessner, Rights and Status, supra n. 2, at 98. 
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other shared by many Indigenous Peoples as a result of the ‘tortured relationship 
between the conqueror and the conquered.”11  These include that:  
 
…traditional lands should be respected or restored, as a means to their 
physical, cultural and spiritual survival...; [that] they should have access to 
welfare, health, educational and social services; [that] conquering nations 
should respect and honor their treaty promises; and [that] indigenous nations 
should have the right to self-determination.12  
 
It is an effort borne from the fact that Indigenous Peoples did not benefit from 
the 1960’s process of decolonization as a result of what become known as the 
“blue water thesis” which provides that for a colonial territory to be eligible for 
the first step in the process of decolonization which involves requesting non-
self-governing status then it must be “geographically separate” from the 
colonizing state.13  Rather, Indigenous Peoples have been dealt with under in 
general under IHRL and in particular under the auspices of discrimination.14  
 
Hearing these voices, over the past thirty years the international community has 
grappled with this issue as part of a broader effort to increase the rights and 
protections of Indigenous Peoples under IHRL.15  Most prominent and recent of 
these efforts has been the nearly unanimous passage of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP or Declaration] 16 by 
the General Assembly in 2007.  In turn, this chapter analyses the 
contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property under IHRL 
in Article 11 of the Declaration in order to expose its theoretical underpinnings.  
                                                 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 98-9. 
13 See United Nations, Principles which should guide members in determining whether or nor an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Article 73e of the Charter, U.N.G.A. Res. 1541(XV) (15 December 1960). 
14 See e.g. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation XXIII: Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/51/misc 13/Rev 4 (1997), at para. 3 [hereinafter 
CERD General Recommendation 23].  Indeed, discrimination served as the platform within the human rights 
regime for the Declaration. See U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 & 
Adds 1-4.   
15 See Chapter 4, Introduction (discussing why IHRL has been the locus of such discussion). 
16 See Declaration, supra n. 7. 
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It first provides a brief background on UNDRIP and the drafting process in 
general before turning to an analysis of Article 11 in particular emerging from 
this drafting process and into IHRL exploring its nature as a cultural right and 
part of the norm of cultural integrity and then exploring the contours of these 
concepts  more broadly in IHRL.  With these general contours established, this 
chapter turns to analyzing what explains why Article 11 suffered a retrogression 
or a step back to fit comfortably within existing IHRL before concluding with a 
demonstration that this retrogression is usurping in light of trends in indigenous 
advocacy.  
 
I. The Long and Winding Road to the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples 
 
Established in 1982, the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
[WGIP], a working group of the then Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,17 began in 1985 the lengthy drafting 
of UNDRIP.  After eight years, the WGIP agreed on the final text of the Draft 
Declaration which was adopted by the Sub-Commission in 1994 and proceeded 
to the then Commission on Human Rights.18  As states did not actively 
participate in the WGIP, the Draft Declaration reflected the aspirations of 
Indigenous Peoples and so it was unsurprising that the Commission comprised 
of state representatives had serious concerns over issues related to self-
determination and control over natural resources in their traditional lands.  
Therefore, instead of agreeing a proposed text, the Commission on Human 
Rights urged the establishment of another working group to further detail the 
Declaration; the Working Group on the Draft Declaration [WGDD] as a 
                                                 
17 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, Annex II (27 August 1985).  In 1999 the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was renamed the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights. 
18 United Nations, Technical Review of the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/(26 August 1994). 
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mechanism to facilitate the meeting of states and Indigenous People to negotiate 
a text.19  Over ten years after its establishment, the WGDD adopted the 
Declaration and forwarded it to the newly established Human Rights Council, 
which replaced the commission on Human Rights which adopted the draft on 29 
June 2006 at its first session with thirty in favor, two against and twelve 
abstentions and then submitted it to the UN General Assembly.20  Given that 
the Human Rights Council offered its support for the draft of the Declaration, it 
was expected that it would be adopted by the General Assembly at the start of 
its 61st session in November 2006.  However, the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly (the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee) voted to 
defer action on the Declaration citing that it wanted to offer further time for 
consideration of the draft.21  Finally, however, the fruit of these efforts was 
borne out in the adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly in 
September 2007.  Of the states present, 143 voted in favor, eleven abstained and 
four votes against including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.S. 
 
The overarching agenda of the Declaration focuses on promoting and protecting 
the distinctiveness of Indigenous Peoples in light of the shared historical and on-
going wrongs that they have suffered at the hands of dominant society which are 
typically rooted in programs of discrimination and marginalization.22  In 
                                                 
19 United Nations Comm. Res. 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1995/32 (3 March 1995). 
20 United Nations, Human Rights Council Resolution 2006/2 (29 June 2006). 
21 This deferment came as a response to an amendment proposed by the African Group of States suggesting that 
the General Assembly “defer consideration and action on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples to allow time for further consultations thereon.” U.N. Doc. A/C.3/61/L.18/Rev.1 21 
November 2006, A/C.3/61/L.57/Rev.1 See infra Chapter 4 at Section III (discussing the African Group). 
22 Article 8 of the Declaration encapsulates many of these wrongs that Indigenous Peoples have and continue to 
suffer.  “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or 
destruction of their culture.  2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: (a) 
Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural 
values or ethnic identities; (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, 
territories or resources; (c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or 
undermining any of their rights; (d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration; (e) Any form of propaganda 
designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.” Declaration, supra n. 1, at 
Art. 8.  Sadly, these wrongs have shaped the identity of Indigenous Peoples.  As Ronald Niezen notes, 
“Indigenous peoples, like some ethnic groups, derive much of their identity from state-sponsored genocide, 
forced settlement, relocation, political marginalization, and various formal attempts at cultural destruction.” 
Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity 5 (2003). 
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addressing such wrongs and providing redress, it is emphasized that the 
Declaration is understood to represent the “minimum standards” necessary for 
the “survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world”23 
and therefore does not seek to privilege Indigenous Peoples but to ensure their 
equality with other peoples.24  Further, Dr. Mauro Barelli describes it as a 
mechanism “to fill a crucial gap” and “to guarantee coherence” to IHRL which 
is typified by different approaches to indigenous claims and rights.25       
 
It consists of 45 articles and can be roughly divided into the following topics 
including: self-determination; religious, cultural and linguistic rights; education 
and labor rights, rights to development and democracy and land and resource 
rights.  Under consideration here, Article 11(1) provides that: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions 
and customs.  This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, 
present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and 
historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and 
performing arts and literature. 
 
In order to fulfil this right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and 
customs, Article 11(2) subsequently imposes the procedural obligation that: 
 
States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect 
to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without 
their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions 
and customs. 
 
It is worth noting before going further, the redress that the Declaration offers 
for cultural property is part of  a broader scheme of  redress for the cultural 
heritage of  Indigenous Peoples.  In the final version of  the UNDRIP, Article 
                                                 
23 Declaration, supra n. 7, at Art. 43. 
24 Declaration, supra n. 7, at Preamble para. 2 
25 M. Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, 58 International And Comparative Law Quarterly 957, 959 (2012). 
 71 
12(1) provides that Indigenous Peoples have “the right to the repatriation of  
their human remains”26 and a “right to the use and control of  their ceremonial 
objects.”  Although there is not a right of  repatriation for the ceremonial objects, 
Article 12(2) further provides that states are required to “enable access and/or 
repatriation of  ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession.”  As 
regards the non-material cultural heritage of  Indigenous Peoples, Article 11(1) 
addresses designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and 
literature again offering that Indigenous Peoples have “the right to practice and 
revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.”  As with cultural property, 
Article 11(2) provides that in relation to this non-material cultural heritage that 
restitution is one possible means for fulfilling this right where the taking 
occurred without the free prior and informed consent of  Indigenous Peoples or 
“in violation of  their laws, traditions and customs.” 
 
II. Declaration Article 11: A Shadow of Draft Article 12 
 
To fully understand the present Article 11, it is necessary to look at the draft 
version originally included at Draft Article 12.  Draft Article 12 as produced by 
the WGIP in 1994 provided in full: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs.  This includes the right to maintain, protect and 
develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as 
                                                 
26 Interestingly, unlike cultural property the right to the repatriation of human remains survived from the draft 
text to the Declaration. See Chairperson-Luis-Enrique Chávez, Report of the working group established in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/32, United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sixtieth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/81 (7 January 2004); United 
Nations, Commission on Human Rights Sixty-first session, working group established in accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/32 Tenth session Geneva, 13 – 24 September 2004, Information 
provided by States Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Amended Text Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.1(2004) (4 
September 2006); Chairperson Luis-Enrique Chavez, Report of the working group established in accordance with 
Commission on Human rights resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its tenth session, United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/2 (1 September 
2005); Chairperson Luis-Enrique Chávez, Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human 
rights resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its tenth session, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human rights, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.1 (14 October 2004).See infra Chapter 4 at 
Section II(C) (discussing the significance of the survival of the repatriation of human remains in the Declaration). 
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archaeological and historical sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies 
and visual and performing arts and literature, as well as the right to the 
restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken 
without their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws, 
traditions and customs.27 
 
It explicitly included a substantive “right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual, 
religious and spiritual property taken without their free and informed consent or in 
violation of their laws, traditions and customs.”28  This draft article was based on 
the work of Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes that resulted in the 1993 
“Study on the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous 
peoples.”29  Special Rapporteur Daes noted in her preparatory work to this 
report in the 1991 “Working Paper on the question of the ownership and 
control of cultural property of Indigenous Peoples” that although restitution 
presented  a number of historical, political, legal and moral questions, “some of 
which are of a delicate and legally complicated nature”, that nonetheless 
repatriation of cultural objects, human remains and sacred materials remained 
important to Indigenous People in order to fulfil the “right to their own culture” 
and to “preserve their group identity”.30  However, the final version of the 
Declaration at Article 11(2) provides for the restitution of cultural property not 
as a substantive right but as one of a number of possible measures to be taken by 
states in order to fulfill the right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions 
and customs as included in Article 11(1).31   
                                                 
27 1994/45 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub2/1994/56 (1994). 
28 Id. 
29 The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities endorsed a study 
regarding the protection of the cultural and intellectual of Indigenous Peoples by Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-
Irene Daes. See EricaIrene Daes, Study on the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous peoples, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (1993). 
30 Erica-Irene Daes, Working Paper on the question of the ownership and control of cultural property of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/34, para 2 and 28 (1991). 
31 Arguably, Article 11(2) is not simply a remedy just to fulfil Article 11(1) in the Declaration but also to fulfil 
Article 31 as well which provides that “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their cultural  heritage…” as cultural property is part and parcel of cultural heritage.  See infra Chapter 4 
at Section II(D) (discussing the relationship between cultural heritage and cultural property]; See also infra  Chapter 
5 at Section II(E) (discussing Article 31 in more detail).  Regardless, Article 11(2) remains a possible discretionary 
remedy as a derivative of another right which steps back to comfortably fit within the practice under IHRL which 
does not guarantee restitution. 
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How did this downgrading of the repatriation of cultural property from a 
substantive right to a measure and moreover just one of a number of possible 
measures occur?  First, it emerged as a result of the recommendation in the Final 
Report of the “Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Protection of the 
Heritage of Indigenous Peoples” at the Annex entitled “Principles and 
Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People”, which the 
U.N. commissioned after Special Rapporteur Daes completed her 
aforementioned 1993 study on the protection of cultural property.  In the 
principles and guidelines at the annex, Special Rapporteur Daes introduced a 
tiered system of priority regarding repatriation in which human remains and 
associated funeral objects were designated as items that “must be returned” 
while movable cultural property was relegated to a status of “should be returned 
whenever possible” especially “if shown to be of significant cultural, religious or 
historical value to them.”32   
 
Human remains and associated funeral objects must be returned to their 
descendants and territories in a culturally appropriate manner, as determined 
by the indigenous peoples concerned … Moveable cultural property should be 
returned wherever possible to its traditional owners, particularly if shown to 
be of significant cultural, religious or historical value to them.  Moveable 
cultural property should only be retained by universities, museums, private 
institutions or individuals in accordance with the terms of a recorded 
agreement with the traditional owners for the sharing of the custody and 
interpretation of the property.33 
  
Moreover, a number of other proposals were made by states during the 
negotiations of the draft Declaration to alter the text of Draft Article 12.  The 
first principal proposal stems from the Compilation of Amendments Proposed 
                                                 
32 Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, [Annex 
“Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People”, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (1995) at paras, 21-22. 
33 Id. Even earlier that this final report, Daes suggested making such a downgrade regarding the restitution of 
cultural property. See Erica-Irene Daes, Preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, submitted in 
conformity with Sub-Commission resolution 1993/44 and decision 1994/105 of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.3/1994/31 (1994) at Annex: Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of 
Indigenous Peoples at paras. 21-22. 
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by Some States for Future Discussions Based on the Sub-Commission Text 
which provides that: 
 
1. Indigenous [peoples] have the right to practice and revitalize their 
cultural traditions and customs [in conformity with domestic laws].  
[Recognizing this right,] [States should/shall facilitate the efforts of 
indigenous [peoples]].  [This includes the right [as far as practicable] to 
maintain, protect and develop the [past, present and future] 
manifestations of [their] cultures, such as archaeological and historical 
sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and 
performing arts and literature. 
 
2. States should/shall [make [best] [appropriate] efforts], [to] [promote] 
[facilitate] the return to indigenous [peoples] of their cultural, [intellectual], 
and religious [and spiritual] property [taken without their free and 
informed consent] [after the present Declaration comes into effect], [or in 
violation of [their] laws, traditions and customs] [and] [or] [in violation 
of relevant laws and regulations].34 
 
The second principal proposal offered by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland reads: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalise their cultural 
traditions and customs.  This includes the right to maintain, protect and 
develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as 
archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies 
and visual and performing arts and literature., as well as the right to the 
restitution of States shall provide effective mechanisms for redress with 
respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken 
without their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws, 
traditions and customs.35 
 
At their core, both proposals eliminate from the original draft text the inclusion 
of the word “restitution” and moreover eliminate any other form of redress as a 
right in relation to cultural property.  The second proposal still provides 
                                                 
34 Mr. Luis-Enrique Chávez , Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2002/98 (2002), at Annex 1, p.25  [original draft text in bold].  See also Mr. 
Luis-Enrique Chávez, Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/85 (2001) Annex 1 at p. 30. 
35 Information provided by States: Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Amended Text, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.1(2004) at 7 
[additional text in bold]. 
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Indigenous Peoples with redress but it is not in the form of restitution and it is 
offered as a procedural obligation and not a substantive right. 
 
However, the Declaration is a product of negotiation with Indigenous Peoples 
and indeed, they opposed any change in the wording of Draft Article 12 given 
the importance of the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous 
Peoples.  They expressed  serious concerns with “the large number of brackets 
and qualifications proposed by States”36 while  the representative from the 
Indian Treaty Council wanted it put on record that her organization opposed any 
changes in the wording of Draft Article 12 as it was “an integral part of the 
draft.”37  Further, the observer from the Cordillera Peoples Alliance noted that 
Article 12 was important in light of the fact that national and international 
corporations sought to control their cultural expressions and so called for the 
adoption of the Draft Declaration as a whole without amendment.38  Beyond 
Indigenous Peoples, other organizations opposed any changed.  The observer 
for the Association Nouvelle de la Culture et des Arts Populaires noted that 
Draft Article 12 was of particular importance and therefore called for its 
adoption without change.39  
 
In particular, Indigenous Peoples opposed the first suggestion by states to 
include reference to “conformity with domestic laws” as this represented “an 
unacceptable weakening of the original text.  The declaration should set 
international standards with which domestic laws must be brought into line.”40  
Moreover, they opposed the inclusion of the language “as far as practicable” 
because they thought that most human rights standards had resource 
                                                 
36 E/CN.4/2001/ 85, supra n. 28, at para. 149. 
37 Mr. José Urrutia, Report of the Working Group on the draft United Nations declaration on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/102 (1996) at para. 88. 
38 Id. at para. 95. 
39 Id. at para. 101. 
40 E/CN.4/2001/85, supra n. 28, at para. 150.  Moreover, the proposal of “conformity with domestic laws” by 
states is an indication of what ultimately was at the root of the retrogression of Draft Article 12: sovereignty 
concerns. See generally infra Chapter 5 (discussing sovereignty). 
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implications and that was no reason to qualify any right in the declaration.”41  
Further, they objected to the redrafting presented in paragraph two as it would 
make the concept of a right to the restitution of cultural property meaningless.42 
 
They explained that cultural prohibitions were often entrenched in 
discriminatory domestic laws and therefore, they could not accept that their 
right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs should be 
limited in the draft declaration to those rights that were in conformity with 
domestic laws.  The effect of the proposed language would be to remove any 
obligation of States.43  
 
Indeed some indigenous groups went beyond this general opposition to changed 
wording and opposition to particular changes, and countered with their own 
proposal for an even stronger version of Draft Article 12 which read that:  
 
Article 12 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right and moral duty to preserve, practise and 
revitalize their cultural and intellectual heritage in accordance with 
international law. 
 
In accordance with this provision, aboriginal communities and indigenous 
peoples have the right to protect, safeguard and promote the constant 
development of past, present and future manifestations of their traditions, 
cultural values and artistic creations, such as archaeological and historical 
sites, ceremonies, works of art, sculpture, musical instruments, artefacts, 
designs, scientific knowledge, traditional technologies and literature, which 
have a universal value in historical, aesthetic and anthropological terms.44 
 
Further, they proposed an entirely new article to strengthen the right to 
restitution:  
 
New article (reparation and compensation) 
 
In accordance with the procedures established by international rules 
indigenous peoples have the right to full restitution of and reparation for 
cultural, artistic, religious and spiritual property, including the mortal remains 
                                                 
41 E/CN.4/2001/85, supra n. 28, at para. 150. 
42 Id. at para. 153. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at Annex III p. 37-8. 
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of their ancestors of which they have been deprived without their free 
consent and in violation of their customary law.  Indigenous peoples have the 
right to fair compensation for material and moral damage caused by the war 
of conquest and colonization.  
 
States shall agree to adopt appropriate measures to guarantee adequate 
protection of the cultural and intellectual heritage and compensation for the 
victims.45 
 
In 2005, the Chairperson of the WGDD, Luis-Enrique Chávez, took stock of 
these proposals and sought to find any commonality amongst them after ten 
years of negotiations and prepared a new version of the draft Declaration.  As 
regards Draft Article 12, he suggested eliminating reference to any form of 
redress as a right in relation to cultural property and in the alternative proposed 
that as regards cultural property any redress should be a matter of discretion on 
the part of states; i.e. included as one of a number of possible measures to fulfil 
the right to practice and revitalize cultural traditions and customs which survived 
from the draft text.46  However, he proposed reinserting the word restitution as 
included in the original draft text as one possible form of such redress.47  
Chairperson Chávez proposal is now Article 11(1) and 11(2) as included in the 
final Declaration. 
 
In sum, although Dr. Mauro Barelli’s assertion that Article 11 recognizes a less 
controversial right,48 exploring Draft Article 12 has revealed that this was not 
always the case until the final version included in the Declaration at Article 11 
was significantly watered-down and ultimately as will be demonstrated herein 
steps back to fit comfortably within existing IHRL offering no real change.  
Therefore, at least as concerns this particular article the political rhetoric 
                                                 
45 Id. at Annex III p. 38. 
46 Although it makes reference to restitution as simply one means of redress, in practice it will serve as the 
preferable and most sought after means redress in light of the special significance of cultural heritage Indigenous 
Peoples. See infra Chapter 4 at Section II(D) (discussing indigenous understanding and the importance of cultural 
heritage).  
47 Chairperson Luis-Enrique Chavez, Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human 
rights resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/2 (2005). 
48 M. Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, 58 International And Comparative Law Quarterly 957, 962 (2012). 
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surrounding the Declaration rings true; the UNDRIP does not create any new 
rights but as the U.N. Permanent Forum in Indigenous Issues [UNPFII] 
explained, “[r]ather, it provides a detailing or interpretation of the human rights 
enshrined in other international human rights instruments of universal 
resonance- as these apply to indigenous peoples and indigenous individuals.”49  
This is most aptly demonstrated by exploring the long-standing jurisprudence 
and commentary concerning Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights [ICCPR].  Indeed this article does not explicitly mention 
cultural property or its restitution.  Nor is any public comment or decision of the 
Human Rights Committee [HRC], the body charged with interpreting the rights 
included in the ICCPR when complaints are brought to it under the Optional 
Protocol, in relation to Article 27 available which discusses whether and to what 
extent the issues of cultural property and its restitution may fall under Article 
27.50  However, Article 27 captures the contours of Declaration Article 11 as 
both a cultural right and part of the norm of cultural integrity in the broader 
regime of IHRL as it relates to Indigenous Peoples.51  As Engle notes, 
 
…claims for rights to heritage, land, autonomy, and development—
particularly in their collective form—were more difficult to ground in 
traditional human rights corpus.  Rather than seeing culture and human rights 
in opposition, indigenous rights advocates began to call for a human right to 
culture to pursue these claims.52 
 
                                                 
49 United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, FAQs, (2012) at http://undesadspd.org/indigenouspeoples.a
spx. See also C. Mokhiber, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Declaration is a Historic Document, Out of a 
Historic Process (2007), Indigenous Peoples Caucus at http://www.ipcaucus.net/Mokhiber.html (stating that the 
Declaration does not call for the creation of any new human rights).  However, as will be detailed herein this is 
not to be seen as a positive as it is portrayed in these documents. 
50 Karolina Kuprecht, Human Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation, Working Paper No. 2009/34, 
NCCR Trade Regulation, Swiss National Centre of Competence in 
Research, 20 (2009), at http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC
QQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphase1.nccrtrade.org%2Fimages%2Fstories%2Fpublications%2FIP7%2FWor
king%2520Paper%2520Kuprecht%252023062009.pdf&ei=fGz4VPHICe2t7AbFvICwDw&usg=AFQjCNGjphJ
Ml2XBTqLeKrgSBzqPsAFTvw&bvm=bv.87519884,d.ZGU 
51 See also Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights 390 (2002) (suggesting generally that Draft 
Article 12 (Article 11) contains essentially two trains of though including an expansion of Article 27 of the 
ICCPR and a claim to restitution). 
52 Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy 101 (2010). 
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In turn, Article 27 ideally suited to demonstrate how IHRL would approach the 
restitution of cultural property.53 
 
III. Article 11: Cultural Rights and Cultural Integrity 
 
A. Nothing New Under the Sun: Locating Cultural Rights, Cultural 
Identity and Cultural Diversity in International Human Rights 
Law 
“How can we live without our lives?  How will we know it's us without our past?”  
--- John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath54 
 
Indigenous advocates describe repatriation as “only part of the unfinished 
agenda for Native peoples’ cultural and human rights.”55  Certainly, the cultural 
property of Indigenous Peoples is “an essential dimension of human rights.”56  
In particular, above all else Article 11 is a cultural right;57 indeed it is arguable 
                                                 
53 This is not to suggest that other rights could not be examined. See Introduction at ns. 28-35 and accompanying 
text (discussing the choice of Article 27 of the ICCPR as the basis for this analysis). 
54 J. Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath 114 (1976) reprinted in John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural 
Property in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law 94 (2000). 
55 Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA and the Problem of “Culturally Unidentifiable” Remains: The Argument for a Human Rights 
Framework, 44 Arizona State Law Journal 809, 842-3 (2012) citing Suzan Shown Harjo, Executive Director of the 
Morning Star Institute and long-time indigenous advocate. See Suzan Shown Harjo, Native Peoples’ Cultural and 
Human Rights: An Unfinished Agenda, 24 Arizona State Law Journal 321,327 (1992). 
56 Francesco Francioni, The Human Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 European 
Journal of International Law 9, 10 (2011).  He asserts that this connection to human rights was foreshadowed in 
the discourse of international cultural property law in the Preamble to the 1954 Hague Convention that refers to 
“the cultural heritage of mankind”. Id. at13. In particular, it has been borne out in the development of Cultural 
Heritage Studies and in International Humanitarian Law [IHL]. See generally Francesco Francioni, The Human 
Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 European Journal of International Law 9 (2011); 
See also infra Chapter 4 at Introduction [discussing Cultural Heritage Studies and the shift to human rights]; See also 
Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution: Ensuring Each Group’s Contribution to Humanity, 22 European Journal of 
International Law 17 [discussing the International Humanitarian Law dimension]. Specifically Professor Vrdoljak 
argues that the restitution of cultural property to persecuted groups was necessary to ensuring the contribution of 
certain groups to the cultural heritage of humankind and ensuing this contribution was proactively achieved by 
the protection of minorities under IHRL and reactively achieved by the development of the crime of genocide in 
IHL and its subsequent prohibition and prosecution. Id.  Ultimately, then Professor Francioni views the 
Declaration as the synthesis of these various different strands of the human rights dimensions of cultural heritage 
as the Declaration above all else seeks to preserve and develop the cultural identity of Indigenous Peoples. 
Francesco Francioni, The Human Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 European 
Journal of International Law 9, 15 (2011).     
57 Although outside the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting that the recognition more generally of cultural 
rights in the cannon of domestic and IHRL has generated the multiculturalism debate amongst political scientists.  
Multiculturalism refers to the policies that are developed to allow for a variety of cultural norms and thereby 
occur in the context of where multiple subcultures exist within the same jurisdiction. Within the multiculturalism 
dialogue, a variety exist through most tend to be rooted in liberal ideas. See generally C. Kukathas, Are There Any 
Cultural Rights?  20 Political Theory 105 (1992); W. Kmylicka, The Rights of Minority Cultures: A Reply to Kukathas, 20 
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that all the rights included in the Declaration are cultural rights.58  This is 
unsurprising given that, 
 
[c]ultural rights are the core of indigenous cosmology, ways of life and 
identity, and must therefore be safeguarded in a way that is consistent with 
the perspectives, needs and expectations of the specific indigenous peoples.59 
 
The denial of cultural rights is said to be “[o]ne of the most persistent forms of 
discrimination” against Indigenous Peoples,60 especially given the background of 
cultural domination at the hands of colonialism.61  UNESCO defines cultural 
rights as “the rights of creators and transmitters of culture, the rights of the 
people at large to contribute to and participate in cultural life, and the rights of 
peoples to cultural identity”62 and that the U.N. repeatedly has stressed are an 
integral part of the cannon of IHRL and like other rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent.63  Therefore, the state has an obligation to 
maintain and promote culture “to the maximum of its available resources.”64    
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Political Theory 140 (1992); W. Kmylicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, in The Rights 
of Minority Cultures (W. Kymlicka ed.,1995).  Further, the recognition of cultural rights has generated the debate  
between universal human rights and relativism. See generally J. Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human 
Rights, 6 Human Rights Quarterly 400 (1984).    
58 See Elsa Stamatopoulou, Taking Cultural Rights Seriously: The Vision of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in Reflections  on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 387 (S. Allen and A. Xanthaki 
eds., 2011) [“[I]n fact, one can find the cultural rights angle in each article of the Declaration…”] at 392. See also 
Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 European 
Journal of International Law 121 (2011) […culture is what has motivated the claims listed above [in UNDRIP]] 
at 129.  
59 International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, RESOLUTION No. 5/2012: 
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, at para. 6 (August 2012). 
60 Marina Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural Identities  of Indigenous 
Peoples Under International Law, 8 Chapman Law Review 201 (2005) citing Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Cultural Diversity in 
the Development of the Americas: Indigenous Peoples and States in Spanish America, Cultural Studies Series No. 11 Unit for 
Social Development Education and Culture, para. 32 available at http://www.oas.org/udse/studies/stavenhagen.
doc  
61 Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Cultural Values 31 Arizona 
State Law Journal 583 (1999) at 648 [citations omitted]. 
62 E. Stamatopoulou, supra n. 58, at 1citing Stephen Marks, UNESCO and Human Rights: The Implementation of Rights 
Relating to Education, Science, Culture and Communication, 13 Texas International Law Journal 1, 50 (1977). 
63 See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 21, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/21 (2009)(The full promotion and respect for cultural rights is essential for the maintenance of 
human dignity and positive social interaction between individuals and communities in a diverse and multicultural 
world.) Id. at para 1. 
64 Katja Ziegler, Cultural Heritage and Human Rights, Working Paper No 26/2007, University of 
Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series 10 (2007), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002620 
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In turn, the protection of cultural property as an incident of the protection of 
cultural rights is linked to the concept of cultural identity and as such ultimately 
serves to preserve cultural diversity.  Cultural diversity refers to “the manifold 
ways in which the cultures of groups and societies find expression”65 as it is 
“embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of identities of the groups and 
societies making up humankind”66 and which “is an ethical imperative, 
inseparable from respect for human dignity.”67  Indeed, the Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions notes as its 
purpose “to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions, … and to 
give recognition to the distinctive nature of cultural activities and goods as 
vehicles of identity, values and meaning.”68  Cultural identity has been referred to 
as “a treasure which revitalizes mankind’s possibilities for self fulfilment ... by 
encouraging every people and every group to seek nurture in the past ... and so 
to continue the process of their own creation.”69  In turn, cultural identity both 
on its own and bolstered by its links with cultural diversity has a close 
relationship with the concept of human dignity at the core of IHRL.70  
                                                 
65 U.N. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005, 
at art. 4(1) available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31038&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SE
CTION=201.html 
66 Id. at preamble para. 7. 
67 CESCR, General Comment No. 21, supra n. 63, at para. 40. See also Diversity Convention, supra n. 65, at art. 
2(3) [The protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions presuppose recognition of equal 
dignity of and respect for all cultures, including the cultures of persons belonging to minorities and indigenous 
peoples]. 
68 Diversity Convention, supra n. 65, at art. 1(a) and (g). 
69 Hadjioannou, Human Right to Culture, supra n 60, at 201 citing Janusz Symonides, Cultural Rights: A Neglected 
Category of Human Rights, 50 International Social Science Journal 559, 560 (1998).  Cultural identity at the level of 
the state includes “those elements of a national life which characterize a country and distinguish its attitudes, 
institution, behavior, [and] way of life from those of other countries.”  John O’Hagan & Clare Mc Andrew, 
Restricting international Trade in the National Artistic Patrimony: Economic Rationale and Policy Instruments, 10 International 
Journal of Cultural Property. 32, 35 (2001).  As of yet, it does not have a precise legal definition which makes its 
legal protection problematic.  Rather it is subject to meta-legal interpretations of culture and identity.  See generally 
M. Odello, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Cultural Identity in the Inter-American Context, 16 International Journal of 
Human Rights 25 (2012).  Yet this did not prevent UNESCO from declaring a right to cultural identity at the 
1982 World Conference in Cultural Policies. See A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Cultural Rights in International Law, 2 
European Journal of Law Reform 343, 345 (2000).  Further, it did not prevent cultural identity from serving as 
the lynchpin on which all the decisions in the IACtHRs have come to the conclusion that communal property 
requires restitution.  See generally infra, Chapter 6 at Section II(A) (discussing IACtHRs decisions in the context of 
the restitution of land). 
70 See UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights at Article 2 (Everyone has the right to 
respect for their dignity); The American Convention on Human Rights (1969), at Art. 11(1) (Everyone has the 
right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1981), at Art. 5 (Every individual  shall have the right to the respect of dignity inherent in a human being); 
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Therefore, cultural property is valued in relation to its importance to people both 
as a product of their endeavors as well as constitutive of their identity and 
diversity hence its inclusion in the cannon IHRL in the Declaration given 
connection of the latter concepts with dignity.71  Indeed, some definitions of 
cultural property make explicit this link: 
 
Cultural property can be defined as an evolving, irreplaceable resource that defines 
the existence of a group of peoples in a unique manner.  It provides the 
underpinning of group identity in a partial and temporal context … The 
preservation of cultural property rights is essential to give meaning to human 
existence and as a bond against enslaving a people by diminishing the definition of 
their existence.72 
     
Further, the UNESCO Charter of Courmayeur states “cultural patrimony is a 
crucial component of the identity and self-understanding of a people.”73  While 
not explicitly recognizing a right to cultural identity and diversity, UNDRIP 
recognizes independently the importance of both concepts; it recognizes the 
importance of identity at Articles 33, 34 and 35 while it notes the role of 
diversity in its preamble: “all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of 
civilizations and cultures.”74  Further, the International Law Association 
Resolution on Indigenous Peoples notes, “[s]tates are bound to recognize, 
respect, protect and fulfil indigenous peoples’ cultural identity (in all its elements, 
including cultural heritage) and to cooperate with them in good faith – through 
all possible means – in order to ensure its preservation and transmission to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at preamble., (… recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family…); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1976) at preamble […recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family us the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world].  In fact, cultural 
rights independent of identity and diversity are linked directly to dignity.  See Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, at art. 22., (Everyone, as a member of society … is entitled to the realization … of … cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity…”).  This myriad of references is unsurprising given that IHRL is premised on the 
idea of Kantian ethics that place its primary value on respect for persons in essence dignity. See Tsosie, “Culturally 
Unidentifiable” Remains, supra n. 55, at 845 [citations omitted].   
71 See Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution, supra n. 56, at 36 (drawing a similar conclusion in relation to her analysis of 
cultural property in IHL.) 
72 Sherry Hutt and C. Timothy McKeown, Control of Cultural Property as Human rights Law,  31 Arizona State Law 
Journal 363, 364 (1999). 
73 Charter of Courmayeur, June 25-27, 1992, at Art. 1, available at http://www.icomos.org/unesco/courmayeur.ht
ml (last visited 24 Nov. 2010). 
74 Declaration, supra n. 1, at Preamble para. 3. 
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future generations.”75  Moreover, cultural identity is the lynchpin on which all 
the decisions in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR] that 
benefit Indigenous Peoples in relation to the protection of their real property 
rests.76  Its protection is explicitly included in the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in 
Article 1 offering that states “shall protect the existence and the national or 
ethnic cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their 
respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that 
identity.”77  Further Article 2 of the International Labor Organization’s 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Country 
(ILO 169) provides that states must offer special protections for the cultural 
identity of Indigenous Peoples.78 
 
With the preservation of the cultural property of Indigenous Peoples hailed as 
crucial to the maintenance of their identity and so intimately linked with the 
emerging right to cultural identity79 and to the concept of cultural diversity, two 
concepts which have at their core dignity that goes to the heart of IHRL; the 
restitution aka control of cultural property also then becomes crucial to the 
maintenance of diversity, identity80 and ultimately part of the agenda of identity 
politics.  Identity politics at their core seek policies based on differentiation and 
are simultaneous hailed and reviled.  Elucidating this political nature in the 
context of cultural heritage generally, Professor Janet Blake’s observations 
equally apply to its subset of cultural property.  
 
                                                 
75 International Law Association, Conclusions and Recommendation of The Committee on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Resolution No. 5/1012, at para. 6. 
76 See infra Chapter 6 at Section II(A) (discussing IACtHR and specifically that identity is the basis for decisions 
that communal real property requires restitution). 
77 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. 
Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 210 U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992). 
78 ILO Convention 169, supra n. 3, at Art. 2. 
79 See generally, Y.M. Donders, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity (2002) (discussing the contours and the pros 
and cons of a right to cultural identity). 
80 See gii-dahl-guud-sliiay (Terry-Lynn Williams), Cultural Perpetuation: Repatriation of First Nations Cultural Heritage 
University of British Columbia Law Review, Special Issue 183, (1995).   
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One must recognise that the identification of cultural heritage is based on an 
active choice as to which elements of this broader “culture” are deemed 
worthy of preservation as an “inheritance” for the future.  Through this, the 
significance of cultural heritage as a symbolic of the culture and those aspects 
of it which a society (or group) views as valuable is recognised.  It is this role 
of cultural heritage which lends its powerful political dimension since the 
decision as to what is deemed worthy of protection and preservation is 
generally made by State authorities on national level and by 
intergovernmental organisations—comprising member States—on 
international level.  The national legislation and international law relating to 
cultural heritage are the formal expression of these political decisions and, as 
with most political questions, there is always room for controversy and 
competing claims.  Indeed, competing claims and conflict of interest on 
national and international level are endemic to any discussion of cultural 
heritage.  It is not simply that decisions concerning cultural heritage often 
have important political consequences which they clearly do, but also the 
more fundamental point that the identification of cultural heritage is in itself 
a political act given its symbolic relationship to culture and society in 
general.81  
 
In particular, the issue of the retention and restitution of cultural property is of a 
political nature.  
 
Consider the situation in source nations, where cultural property policy often 
has substantial political resonance.  Public figures routinely express devotion 
to and determination to protect the nation's cultural patrimony/heritage and 
to remedy specific cultural property grievances (e.g., Greece's demand for 
return of the Elgin Marbles), and cultural property questions often assume 
independent importance in the conduct of foreign affairs.  The possibility of 
effective participation in the internal politics of source nations by parties 
interested in encouraging an active trade in cultural objects is, however, 
remote.  The voice of cultural nationalism at home drowns out the voice of 
moderation abroad and silences internal advocacy for a licit traffic.82 
 
As regards the role of politics to drive the later:  
  
A Greek politician who could procure the return of the Elgin Marbles to Greece 
would be an immediate and enduring national hero.  The current movement for 
repatriation of cultural property to source nations probably derives most of its 
power from politics, although other terms are normally used in the public 
discussion.  The very term "repatriation" is political; it assumes that cultural objects 
have a patria, a national character and a national homeland.  Each nation makes a 
                                                 
81 Janet Blake, On Defining Cultural Heritage, 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 61, 68 (2000).  
82 J.H. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical Essays 
on Cultural Property, Art and Law 190 (2000). 
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special claim to cultural objects associated with its people or territory--to its 
"national cultural patrimony.83 
 
In turn, given this political nature of cultural property and its restitution which 
ultimately helps to both define and legitimate the state it can have a necessarily 
sinister side being employed as a weapon in the arsenal of nationalism84 and 
ultimately the balkanization of a society to exclude those on the fringes of the 
dominant society be it politically, economically or socially.  
 
We live in highly political and emotionally charged times, where groups, 
communities, and countries are increasingly asserting their right to their own 
identities and heritages.  Honoring repatriation claims can further the emphasis on 
cultural exclusivity, reinforce nationalism, and support hostility to ethnic and other 
forms of cultural differentiation.  In effect, acceding to repatriation can further the 
forces that lead to political and cultural conflict.85    
 
Though not necessarily as some suggest: 
 
Clearly, the development of society can be interpreted through cultural 
heritage which sheds light on the problems and difficulties facing us.  
Similarly, it can be used to legitimise social and political ambitions, which is 
not necessarily a good thing.  However, if used properly, the cultural heritage 
provides an identity and a measure of stability for ethnic societies in periods 
marked by mobility and rapid change.86  
 
Regardless, interestingly this link with identity to justify the restitution of 
cultural property was not developed upon its contextualization within 
IHRL for Indigenous Peoples claims.  Although its contextualization in 
IHRL makes this link patently clear as gleaned through a discourse 
                                                 
83 John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical 
Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law 107 (2000). 
84 “Nationalism in its broader meaning refers to the attitude which ascribes to national individuality a high place 
in the hierarchy of values.  In this sense it is a natural and indispensable condition and accompanying 
phenomenon of all national movements … On the other hand, the term nationalism also connoted a tendency to 
place a particularly excessive, exaggerate and exclusive emphasis on the value of the nation at the expense of 
other values, which leads to a vain and importunate overestimation of one’s own nation and thus to a detraction 
of others.” John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 Michigan Law Review 1881, 1915 (1984-85) 
quoting Boehm, Nationalism, in 11 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 231 (1933).  
85 D. Shapiro, Repatriation: A Modest Proposal 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Policy 
95, 103 (1998).  
86 Blake, supra n. 70, at74 citing the Swedish delegation’s statement at the 1995 Helsinki Conference. Aspects of 
Heritage and Education (Strasbourg, 1996), Doc. MPC-4(96) 15 p.3.     
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analysis, the origins of this link between restitution and identity precede is 
contextualization.  Indeed, in the initial discourse that dominated the 
international protection of cultural property for many years before the 
advent of Cultural Indigenism87 the discourse of Cultural Nationalism 
versus Cultural Internationalism, the theory of the former rested its 
central tenant of restitution on identity albeit in the context of restitution 
to the state and the identity of the nation.88   
 
Cultural Nationalism involves thinking about cultural property 
 
…as part of a national cultural heritage.  This gives nations a special interest, 
implies the attribution of national character to objects, independently of their 
location or ownership, and legitimizes national export controls and demands 
for the ‘repatriation’ of cultural property.89  
 
John Merryman reads evidence of Cultural Nationalism in the UNESCO 
Convention as reflecting this theoretical underpinning in the various 
provisions throughout its text.90  From the outset at the Preamble, it 
reflects the broad Cultural Nationalist sentiment of the importance of 
cultural property to individual states by noting in the preamble that, 
“[c]onsidering that cultural property constitutes one of the basic elements 
of civilization and national culture, and that its true value can be appreciated 
only in relation to the fullest possible information regarding its origin, 
history and traditional setting.”  Further, unlike the 1954 Hague Convention, 
the UNESCO Convention does not establish a system of universal 
jurisdiction but rather limits jurisdiction to the government of the 
offender at Article 8.  The UNESCO Convention continues to reflect the 
                                                 
87 See infra Chapter 4 at Introduction (discussing Cultural Indigenism). 
88 See supra Introduction, at n. 45 (introducing the concepts of Cultural Nationalism, Cultural International and 
Cultural Indigenism and their place in the literature). 
89 J.H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 American Journal of International Law 831, 832 
(1986). 
90 Merryman identifies the following various portions of the preambles and articles as reflecting this ideology. Id. 
at 833-42 [citations omitted]. 
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ideology of Cultural Nationalism according to Merryman through Article 
2 which emphasizes the link between the importance of cultural property 
and individual states noting that, “[t]he States Parties to this Convention 
recognize that the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of 
cultural property is one of the main causes of the impoverishment of the 
cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such property…” while Article 3 
expresses the sentiment that any trade in cultural property contrary to the 
law of the state of origin is illicit. Undoubtedly, the UNESCO Convention 
presses for the repatriation of cultural property to its country of origin as 
it expresses the underlying sentiments of Cultural Nationalism that the 
loss of “[o]bjects charged with cultural significance … deprive a culture of 
one of its dimensions.”91  In addition, Article 5 which requires states to 
put into place a legal regime to stop the illegal import, export and transfer 
of ownership of cultural property implicitly supports this ideology as it 
conveys the principle that an illicit trade in such property robs pieces of 
their cultural context while Article 13(d) instruct parties, “to recognize the 
indefeasible right of each State Party to this Convention to classify and 
declare certain cultural property as inalienable.”92 
 
This stands in sharp contrast to Cultural Internationalism which involves 
“thinking about cultural property … as components of a common human 
culture, whatever their places of origin or present location, independent of 
property rights or national jurisdiction.”93  Merryman94 reads evidence of 
Cultural Internationalism in the armed conflict regime reflected in the language 
of the 1954 Hague Convention at the very outset in the preamble95 which states:  
                                                 
91 Robert Browning, The Case for the Return of the Parthenon Marbles, 36 Museum 135 (1984).  
92 Indeed, the concept of the inalienability of cultural property is part and parcel of the cultural nationalism 
sentiment. See infra Chapter 4, at n. 195 (discussing the concept of inalienability). 
93 J.H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra n. 89, at 831. 
94 Merryman identifies the following portions of the preambles and articles as reflecting this ideology. Id. at 833-
42.    
95 Cultural nationalists accuse internationalists of hijacking the language of the 1954 Hague Convention included 
herein to support their position noting that the purpose of the Convention was to protect cultural property from 
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that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage 
to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the 
culture of the world … [and] that the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great 
importance for all peoples of the world… 
 
Moreover, Article 28 requires states party to the 1954 Hague Convention “to 
prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of 
whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach of the 
present Convention.”  This also reflects an internationalist underpinning by 
establishing “the idea of individual responsibility for offenses against cultural 
property”96 through the creation of a system of universal jurisdiction in relation 
to the prosecution of individuals who breach the sanctions that the Convention 
requires states to impose sanction on offenders.97  Finally, the 1954 Hague 
Convention also makes manifest its internationalist underpinnings in how it 
defines cultural property at Article 1 in that it refers to the fact that it, “shall 
cover, irrespective of origin or ownership… property of great importance to the 
cultural heritage of every people…”  
 
In turn, for Cultural Internationalists cultural property demands protection as a 
result of its development of common human culture and so should not be 
subject to the arbitrary boundaries of that state in which the artist produced the 
                                                                                                                                                    
the destruction associated with armed conflict and not to surrender cultural property to market states. Dalia 
Osman, Occupier’s Title to Cultural Property: Nineteenth-Century Removal of Egyptian Artifacts, 37 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 969, 989 (1998-1999).  Moreover, they note that the five original signatories to the 
Convention including Egypt, San Marino, Burma, Yugoslavia and Mexico are all source states “whose interests 
are aligned with cultural nationalism.” Id. 
96 Karen Goepfert, The Decapitation of Ramses II, 13 Boston University International Law Journal 503, 518 (1995). 
97 Critics of the 1954 Hague Convention however assert that although it does provide for a system of universal 
jurisdiction, it does not follow through with strong enforcement and punishment provisions but rather leaves 
these to “the framework of [the wronged state’s] ordinary criminal jurisdiction.” Id.  Moreover, aside from lacking 
a unified enforcement scheme, it also lacks any sort of supranational authority to oversee enforcement of its 
provisions. David N. Chang, Stealing Beauty: Stopping the Madness of Illicit Art Trafficking, 28 Houston Journal of 
International Law 829, 854 (2006).  In turn, the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention attempts to 
alleviate some of this criticism as it provides the specifics of sanctions that the state should impose by requiring 
that they ensure that the following are offenses under domestic law including: making property with enhanced 
protection the object of attack or using it or its surroundings in support of military action; destroying or 
appropriating protected cultural property; making such property the object of attack; and the theft, pillage, 
misappropriation of or acts of vandalism directed against protected cultural property. U.N., Second Protocol to 
the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, opened 
for signature Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769 at Article 15.  
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object but rather should be “celebrated as the cultural manifestation of a 
synoptic universalism, the product of the… artist-as-human simplicter.”98   
By contrast, the central tenant of Cultural Nationalism is its advocacy for the 
restitution of cultural property which is ultimately justified on the grounds of 
identity.99  At its core, it stems from the idea that cultural property belongs 
within the state or with the people of origin as it stresses the importance of the 
link between cultural property and the cultural identity of a people and ultimately 
repudiates ownership claims that would result in the (dis?)location of cultural 
property outside of its state of origin.  In an increasingly globalized world 
dominated by Western culture that threatens the eradication of different 
cultures/the other and even individuality, the sentiments of Cultural Nationalist 
are born; the fear of losing cultural identity.  In essence, Greek artifacts belong 
to Greece because their nature is inherently Greek; they are the very identity of 
“Greekness”.100  It is at the very root of calls for repatriation: 
 
The most obvious argument is that the Marbles belong in Greece because they are 
Greek.  They were created in Greece by Greek artists for the civic and religious 
purposes of the Athens of that time.  The appealing implication is that, being in this 
sense Greek, they belong among Greeks, in the place (the Acropolis of Athens) for 
which they were made.  This argument, which I will call the argument from cultural 
nationalism, requires careful examination, since it is basic to the Greek position and 
                                                 
98 Claudia Caruthers, International Cultural Property: Another Tragedy of the Commons, 7 Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal 143, 154.  However, it can be difficult to locate such an international attachment to all cultural property.  
See J.H. Merryman, The Public Interest, supra n. 83, at 97 ( noting among other examples, that while many 
Americans care about the Liberty Bell, most foreigners do not have such care).  In turn, Cultural Nationalists 
note that such a phenomenon points to the fact the value of culture property varies according to time and 
location and in particular the later justifies the repatriation of cultural property to states of origin.  However, the 
inherent difficulty here is in identifying what cultural property only has such a local or regional appeal from that 
which has the universal appeal that Cultural Internationalism has at its core.  Cultural Internationalists counter 
that despite some variations we can still locate such concern: “Jacques Maquet, quoting the generalization that 
‘Everyman is like all other men, like some other men, like no other man,’ states: ‘We may use the same 
framework for distinguishing in any . . . artifact a human, a cultural, and a singular component.’  This sensible 
idea supports the conclusion that an object valued by people in one culture may be valued by those in others who 
respond to the object's ‘human component,’ even though they are not drawn to its specific cultural value.  Thus, 
despite cultural variations, people in most (all?) places care in special ways about objects that evoke or embody or 
express their own and other people's cultures.” Id. at 98. 
99 This central premise of Cultural Nationalism regarding identity aligns closely with the work of Margaret Jane 
Radin who developed in property law the concept of the personality theory of ownership.  Tanya Evelyn George, 
Using Customary International Law to Identify “Fetishistic” Claims to Cultural Property, 80 New York University Law 
Review 1207, 1218 (2005).  See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stanford Law Review 957 
(1982).  In turn, many have built upon the work of Radin in the repatriation debate to justify the restitution of 
cultural property. See infra Chapter 4 at n. 195 (discussing the work of Radin and those building on her theory of 
property to support restitution of cultural property). 
100 J.H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, supra n. 84, at 1911.  
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because arguments like it are frequently made by other governments calling for the 
return of cultural property (and is strongly implied in their use of the term 
"repatriation")101   
 
The interest in identity stems from the fact that,  
 
…cultural objects, "tell[ ] us who we are and where we came from.”  The need for 
cultural identity, for a sense of significance, for reassurance about one's place in the 
scheme of things, for a "legible" past, for answers to the great existential questions 
about our nature and our fate-for all these things, cultural objects provide partial 
answers.  When war or natural disaster or vandalism destroys cultural objects, we 
feel a sense of loss.  What is lost is the opportunity to connect with others and to 
find our place in the grand design.102 
 
 However, this focus on identity can create some sticky situations.   
 
In the present cultural property debate, which appears content in assigning 
unequivocal cultural, if not necessarily legal ownership of artifacts to one particular 
“nation of origin,” objects are too narrowly defined as products of a single culture.  
This view ignores the role of inter-cultural borrowing and extra-cultural influence in 
the creation of an object, along with the possibility that the individual creator, locus 
of creation, materials, tools and subject matter of the object might not all 
conveniently belong to a single culture.  To illustrate further, consider the 
hypothetical case of “X,” a natural-born French painter, whose formative art 
education was in Italy and who then spent his career in Spain, where his artistry 
absorbed unmistakably Spanish elements.  “Y,” a German, commissions X to paint a 
portrait of “Z,” a Russian, using the pyramids of Egypt as a backdrop.  The painting 
then hangs in a museum in Belgium for five centuries.  While the legal ownership of 
this painting is easily settled, at present the law is incapable of resolving cultural 
ownership.  Of France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Russia, Egypt and Belgium, none 
could allege a unanimous cultural claim.103  
 
In addition to these issues related to the multicultural nature of many items of 
cultural property, necessarily there are issues in focusing on identity that flow 
from the broader multiculturalism characteristic of the modern state:  
 
In the contest of large, heterogeneous nation-states should we speak of 
multiple identities or a single one?  Is it valid to speak of ‘national’ identity as if 
all nations were the same?  Is national identity a fixed identity or a changing 
one?  These questions recall debates about the concept of ‘national character,’ 
long discredited in part because it ingrained stereotypical assumptions.  In the 
                                                 
101 Id. at 1911-12.  He continues to criticize such logic as “sentimentalist”.  Id. at 1911.  
102 J.H. Merryman, Public Interest, supra n. 83, at105 [citations omitted]. 
103 Josh Shuart, Is All “Pharaoh” in Love and War? The British Museum’s Title to the Rosetta Stone and the Sphinx’s Beard, 
52 University of Kansas Law Review 667, 697(2003-04).  In real life one only needs to think of the works of Van 
Gogh and El Greco amongst others. 
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past, national identity has usually been ascribed to a population coextensive 
with the geographic boundaries of a nation, and most European countries 
would consider themselves to have a distinct national identity, with the 
national artistic patrimony making a significant contribution to this.  However, 
many European countries are not monocultural but, owing to immigration 
over the last century, multicultural, France and Britain being good examples.  
Even disregarding immigration, countries such a Belgium, with its Flemish and 
French communities, and Switzerland, with its Italian-, German-, and French-
speaking groups, are also culturally divided.  The real danger of emphasizing 
national identity and common cultural heritage could be the exclusion of 
certain ethnic groups from the national cultural debate, as well as a resistance 
to change over time.104    
 
Aside from these issues that flow from the very nature of the concept of 
multiculturalism, which highlights that “culture is neither normally nor 
historically derived from a territory; rather culture develops from the societal 
traditions of people…”105, there is also the issue of whether the present group is 
sufficiently related to the past group to justify restitution on such grounds.  As 
Cultural Internationalist assert: 
 
The relics of earlier cultures in Egypt, China, Greece, Turkey, Italy and Mexico have 
little contemporary religious or ceremonial function.  People who live in those 
nations today may place a high value on such relics for other reasons, but even if 
they originally were made to serve some ceremonial or religious function, they no 
longer do so.  Most important, the specific cultural value of the relics — for 
example, as testimony of the way of life of a vanished people, as great works of art 
of a specific time and place, as evidence of the genius of a great artist or a great 
culture — is independent of location within the national territory.106 
 
Indeed, proponents of such a concept do concede “group scope eludes precise 
definition, even in a specific case.”107   
 
                                                 
104 John O’Hagan & Clare Mc Andrew, Restricting International Trade in the National Artistic Patrimony: 
Economic Rationale and Policy Instruments, 10 International Journal of Cultural Property 32, 35 (2001).  
105 M. Catherine Vernon, Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention, 26 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 435, 446 (1994). 
106 J.H. Merryman, Licit Trade, supra n. 82, at 23-4.  However, many of these states continue to assert that 
they are descended from and are a continuation of these cultures.  Indeed, this opens a can of worms as 
any resolution requires us and any hypothetical judge and jury to grapple with such timeless and complex 
issues as what defines culture and what constitutes continuing culture amongst others.  For instance, the 
U.S. legislation for restitution of cultural property and human remains to Indigenous Peoples has had to 
grapple with these issues of culture and continuation. See infra Chapter 5 at Section II(B (discussing 
NAGPRA and in particular cultural affiliation and culturally unidentifiable human remains).   
107 John Moustakas, Note, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1179, 
1194 (1989). 
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A cultural internationalist might wonder what it is about the average resident 
of modern Cairo—a person who writes in Arabic and not hieroglyphs, who 
worships Allah versus the sun-god Ra, who wears blue jeans and listens to 
American rock music, and whose ancestry might bear the influence of some 
150 generations of Libyan, Ethiopian, Persian, Assyrian, Macedonian, Greek, 
Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Mamluk, Turkish, French and British conquerors- 
that identifies him so intimately with the ancient creators of the Sphinx. 108   
 
Beyond these issues with identity related to multiculturalism and group 
definition, an even more poignant and modern critique of the entire logic of the 
cultural property including its discourse in relation to restitution has been 
articulated by Professor Naomi Mezey.  Mezey argues that the logic of cultural 
property is paradoxical in that it ultimately contributes to its own ineffectuality 
and is conceptual dearth.109  According to Mezey, this stems from the fact that 
within the discourse property has dominated culture to the point that there is 
little culture left within cultural property. 
 
What is left are collective property claims on the basis of something we continue to 
call culture, but which looks increasingly like a collection of things that we identify 
superficially with a group of people … [C]ultural property has popularized a logic 
that tends to forcefully align “cultures” with particular groups.  Within the logic of 
cultural property, each group possesses and controls (or ought to control) its own 
culture … This view of cultural property suggests a preservationist stance towards 
culture and sees culture as both static and good.110  
 
In turn, Mezey argues that such an approach which rests upon these 
assumptions is flawed as it does not recognize culture for what it is “as dynamic 
in its appropriations, hybridizations, and contaminations”111 and so thereby 
                                                 
108 Shuart, supra n. 103, at 10.  This stems from the recognition that “current national boundaries often have no 
connection of alignment with the people that inhabited the land in past centuries and left cultural clutter as 
evidence of their existence.  Culture is defined by linguistic, religious, or other criteria, not by an artificially placed 
boundary line.” Vernon, supra n. 105, at 446-7.   
109 Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 Columbia Law Review 2004, 2005 (2007). 
110 Id. at 2005-6.  Mezey draws an interesting parallel between this paradoxical logic of cultural property and that 
of Richard Ford’s “difference discourse” which “describes a constitutive relationship between social and ethnic 
groups and their identifiable cultures at the same time that it helps generate the very relationship it describes.” Id. 
at 2019 [citation omitted].  The results of this are then two-fold.  It is oppressive to those whose identity it 
purports to describe and protect by  being based on unspoken presumptions about the nature of who belongs, 
what membership should look like and how one in the group should act out one’s identity.  Further, it 
encourages a turn to the law to resolve cultural property disputes as by placing cultural property right in a 
particular group or community it empowers a version of the group to which it assigns the right. Id. at 2019-20. 
111 Id. at 2006. 
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ignores contact, power and plunder that have shaped culture and claims to 
culture.  In doing so, she places herself and this understanding of culture in stark 
contrast to an essentialist vision of culture which is at the heart of cultural 
property logic that produces this paradox and so by definition her critique is 
anti-essentialist, which has been summed up as follows: 
 
In the absence of fixed cultural identities, separated by sharp boundary lines and 
transgressed by clear vectors of causation or cultural influence, the basis for 
challenging “cultural imperialism” or forced assimilation becomes unclear.  By the 
same token, it become questionable which, if any, of the dynamic interactions that 
continually constitute and reconstitute a cultural group (or subgroup) should be 
singled out for defense.  The anti-essentialist view of culture, calls into question the 
very notion of cultural “influence.112  
 
Specifically within this anti-essentialist tradition she argues that as a 
corrective for this paradox of cultural property is the theory of cultural 
hybridity even despite its critics.113  Cultural hybridity refers to a mixing 
and what generally precedes hybridity is more hybridity; as Kwame 
Appiah puts it “[l]iving cultures do not, in any case, evolve from purity 
into contamination; change is more a gradual transformation from one 
mixture to a new mixture, a process that usually takes place at some 
distance from rules and rulers, in the conversations that occur across 
cultural boundaries.”114  Ultimately, what this interaction and instability 
creates is anxiety about cultural identity that particularly resonant in times 
of conflict, change or any other disruption and that cultural property law 
is “a way of distancing anxiety over identity and cultural change by making 
culture seem solid, of realigning it with clear identities and group 
membership.”115  In sum, then at its heart this is a critique of the 
continued rooting of cultural property its protection and its restitution in 
an essentialist view of culture that present culture as static and unchanging 
                                                 
112 Id. at 2039-40[citation omitted].  
113 Id. at 2043-4 (discussing these critiques of cultural hybridity that focus on the fact that it masks continuing 
inequalities). 
114 Id. 2040-1 [citation omitted]. 
115 Id. at 2041. 
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and demands by extension the same of identity for ownership, protection 
and restitution despite the fact that neither culture nor identity are static 
and unchanging but rather are dynamic and flexible hybrids that are ever-
changing. 
 
Yet, regardless of these critiques of justifying restitution and even the whole 
discourse of cultural property on the grounds of identity, Cultural Nationalist 
and eventually indigenous advocates and Cultural Indgenists began to suggest 
that the common heritage of mankind idea of Cultural Internationalism was just 
another colonial ploy at domination and that “like the physical well-being of its 
people and lands, the cultural identity of a nation [or in this case Indigenous 
Peoples] must be cherished and protected…”116  Eventually this was translated 
into the idea that denying restitution constituted a human rights violation that 
robs a people of the “shared identity and community” that develops through a 
connection with their history.117   
 
In its truest and best sense, cultural nationalism is based on the relationship between 
cultural property and cultural definition.  For a full life and a secure identity, people 
need exposure to their history, much of which is represented or illustrated by 
objects.  Such artifacts are important to cultural definition and expression, to shared 
identity and community.  They tell people who they are and where they come from.  
In helping to preserve the identity of specific cultures, they help the world preserve 
texture and diversity.  Works of art civilize and enrich life.  They generate art (it is a 
truism among art historians that art comes from art) and nourish artists.  Cultural 
property stimulates learning and scholarship.  A people deprived of its artifacts is 
culturally impoverished.118  
                                                 
116 O’Hagan & Mc Andrew, supra n. 104, at 35.  
117 Jeanette Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures 89 (1996).  See also Joe Watkins, Cultural Nationalists, 
Internationalists and “Intra-nationalists”: Who’s Right and Whose rights?, 12 International Journal of Cultural 
Property 78, 88 (2005) [citation omitted] (If “the heritage of every nation is projected on its own priceless objects 
and sites” how are Indigenous populations expected to retain their identity when their tangible objects are spread 
across the world in museums and collections?). 
118 J.H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, supra n. 78, at 1912-13. See also Vernon, supra n. 105, at 445 
(describing cultural property as “the testimony of the creative genius and history of peoples [and] a basic element 
of their identity.”).  There are two issues with this argument.  It ignores situations in which two groups could 
have competing claims rooted in such emotional attachment to the property.  Moreover, the issue that Cultural 
Internationalists highlight in relation to this argument is that it is difficult to see how cultural deprivation relates 
to the physical location of the property bar misrepresentation by the possessor of the origins of the objects. J.H. 
Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, supra n. 84, at 1913.  Yet, Merryman does recognize that there is an 
appeal to such an argument in that it taps into something beyond emotion something almost mystical akin to the 
concept of mana or the idea that the identity of a group is embodied in the object and so return of the object is 
crucial to the well-being if not the survival of the group. Id. At 1914.  However, he argues that such beliefs can be 
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Ultimately such a claim stems from the idea that cultural property is a 
“great communicator and something of unique value … Certain objects 
tell a people who they are and what they have in common.”119  In turn, 
cultural property both develops and satisfies the need for identity.120  
Indeed, IHRL began [slowly] to respond to this idea of linking identity to 
a human rights violation more broadly.  For instance, in 1997 in Hopu and 
Bessert v. France the HRC of the ICCPR found that where a hotel 
development would disturb the remains of the authors’ ancestors who 
were buried on sacred land, that this breached their Article 17 right to 
privacy.  In reaching this decision, it was crucial that the authors’ 
relationship with these ancestors constituted an essential part of their 
identity.121  
 
In turn, with a history of scholarly justification of restitution on the grounds of 
identity and the slow move of Cultural Nationalism, indigenous advocates and 
Cultural Indigenism towards human rights, it is unsurprising that the eventual 
contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples in IHRL continues to be linked with the concept of identity; 
especially given the rising ascendency of cultural diversity and in particular 
cultural identity and identity politics.122  Indeed this contextualization in IHRL at 
Article 11 as a cultural right repeats this essentialist logic of the cultural property 
                                                                                                                                                    
respected and their self-fulfilling tendencies recognized without accepting them as the basis for the allocation or 
rather reallocation of cultural property. Id.  Interestingly, Merryman later further developed this idea noting that 
in certain cases restitution could be justified on the grounds of identity as long as certain conditions were met 
known as a test of essential propinquity and so in these instances restitution would not fall prey to, what he calls 
these above arguments , Byronistic appeals. See infra Chapter Six at n. 231 and accompanying text (discussing 
Merryman’s test of essential propinquity). 
119 Lawerence J.Persick, The Continuing Development of United States Policy Concerning the International Movement of 
Cultural Property, 4 Dickson Journal of International Law 89, 92 (1985-86). 
120 Id.  
121 See Hopu and Bessert v. France, Communication No. 549/1993 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1. 
(1997). 
122 Indeed to a certain extent the claims of Indigenous Peoples and thus Cultural Indigenism are rooted in that of 
Cultural Nationalists: “a means of asserting a unique political and cultural identity founded on a relationship with 
important aspects of their past”.  Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims, supra n. 61, at 652. 
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discourse for better or worse123 but is now embedded in and overlaid with 
additional human rights obligations, concepts and norms including aside from 
cultural identity and cultural diversity concepts such as cultural integrity and self-
determination.124 
 
                                                 
123 This for better or for worse inquiry is outside of the scope of this thesis.  Yet it is worth noting, although this 
inquiry of whether or not rooting restitution in identity is problematic is at the center of many of the critiques of 
Cultural Nationalism by Cultural Internationalists as demonstrated above, it has been marginalized in much of 
the literature in relation to the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples despite the fact that as 
shown such restitution in IHRL continues to be premised on the links between cultural property and identity.  In 
the relevant literature regarding the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples, it is either not 
addressed or it is assumed as a good and any problematics remain under or unexplored.  However, the literature 
is not completely bereft of such inquiries.  Standing out amongst these, David Lowenthal questions and criticizes 
this link between restitution and identity.  He argues that “[e]quating heritage with identity justifies every group’s 
claim to the bones, the belongings, the riddles and the refuse of every forebear back into the mists of time.  All 
that stands in the way of everyone’s reunion with all their ancestors and ancestral things is its utter impossibility.” 
David Lowenthal, Why Sanctions Seldom Work: Reflections on Cultural Property Internationalism, 12 International Journal 
of Cultural Property 393, 405 (2005).  In turn, “cultural property conflicts based on identity and descent are 
unavoidably decided by arbitrary fiat, not by natural justice.” Id. at 407.  He bases his critique on the fact that 
rooting claims to restitution in identity is an essentialist approach that flies in the face of reality as there are “no 
well-attested, or long-enduring, or pure, or unchanged social or cultural entities.  Contrary to such fictions, 
invented or embellished by romantic chroniclers and philologists, every people are hybrid, every legacy multiple, 
every society heterogeneous, every tradition as much recent as ancient.” Id. at 405.  Like European disregard of 
this historical reality, Indigenous Peoples have been picked up on this essentialism arguing that “we are the same 
people we have always been, our values unchanged since time immemorial” despite the fact that this  view of 
“indigenes unaltered by history and untouched by mainstream ways have long been consigned to  
the scholarly dustbin.” Id. at 406.  In particular, it is used for rhetorical positioning in political and legal disputes 
and exacerbates problems of restitution by perpetuating a persisting delusion that is “flawed in logic, untenable in 
fact, lethally divisive in practice.  Yet … shap[es] every aspect of heritage how it is identified, interpreted, 
stewarded, altered, purloined, and scuttled.” Id. 410.  See also Alexander Bauer et al., When Theory, Practice and Policy 
Collide or Why do Archaeologists Support Cultural Property Claims?  in Archaeology and Capitalism: From Ethics to 
Politics 47 (Yannis Hamilakis and Philip Duke eds., 2007) (also noting that this essentialism in anthropological 
thinking has been long critiqued and that it is particularly problematic that it is not applied in cases regarding 
non- Western culture as this further suggests  that other cultures are  less resilient than Western ones and replaces 
one form of paternalism for another).  Moreover, in the aforementioned critique by Mezey of the logic of cultural 
property as paradoxical in its essentialism which thereby leaves it conceptually poor, Mezey explicitly formulates 
her anti-essentialist argument and demonstrates this conceptual poverty in relation to indigenous cultural 
property issues by exploring the issue of the use of Native American mascots at sporting events in the U.S.  As 
Mezey notes, “…cultural property is like mascots themselves—a product of imperialist nostalgia.  It is often 
involved to salvage a past to a culture by those who has a hand in destroying the past.  The paradoxes of playing 
Indian is that we kill off the Indian so that we can make better use of the idea of the Indian.  The paradox of 
cultural property is that it kills off a robust notion of culture in order to make culture into a more usable 
commodity.” Mezey, supra n. 103, at 2036.  Ultimately, “to invoke cultural property as an argument against the 
use of Indian mascots is to seriously distort the notion of culture, undermine its use in more applicable cases, and 
even contribute to uses of culture that have the potential to do real harm to other kinds of Native American 
claims. Id. at 2038.  Therefore, she concludes that relying on cultural property to give Naive American exclusive 
use over  tribal names and images “is often a nostalgic refusal to accept cultural change and its inevitable 
hybridities.” Id. at 2046. See generally id; see also supra n 102-108 and accompanying text (discussing Mezey’s 
argument in detail). 
124 See infra Chapter 3 at Section III(B) (discussing cultural integrity]); Chapter 4 Section I (discussing self-
determination).  Interestingly, it has been pointed out that this shift to asserting restitution rooted in identity 
under IHRL is ironic given that it parallels a shift in the anthropological community to redefine culture from 
what was also a traditionally essentialist model of “common values, institutions and regular social interactions” to 
a more flexible and more indigenous friendly perspective model of “practices and discourses created through 
historical process of contestation over signs and means.” Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims, supra n. 55 at 647 
[citations omitted].  However, now Indigenous Peoples are not  interested in negotiating their cultures. Id. at 646 
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i. The General Contours of Cultural Rights under Article 27  
 
Article 27 of the ICCPR is perhaps the most well-known of all cultural rights 
and has been the mechanism through which the contours of the protection of 
indigenous cultural rights and integrity have been developed in the most detail 
albeit in a highly qualified manner.  Again, it provides: 
 
[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.125 
 
As aforementioned, the text does not make explicit reference to cultural property 
and nor do the cases and commentary of the HRC regarding Article 27.  In turn, 
it is not patently clear whether claims to cultural property for Indigenous Peoples 
fall under this article and if so what measures are expected from states to fulfil 
any claims here by Indigenous Peoples.  However, two factors point to the 
applicability of this right to the issues of cultural property and its restitution.  In 
general, Article 27 protects the right to participate in cultural life which as a 
concept is even broader than that of cultural property and heritage and so 
necessarily incorporates these concepts.126  Cultural life is defined as 
 
The totality of the knowledge and practices both intellectual and material, of 
each of the particular groups of a society, and—at a certain level—of a 
society itself as a whole.  From food to dress, from household techniques to 
                                                 
125 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, at Art. 27 (hereinafter ICCPR).  
Although a minority right, the HRC, treats Indigenous Peoples as a minority for the purposes of the application 
of Article 27.  The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights General Comment No. 23 (50) on 
Article 27, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994) at paras. 3.2 and 7 [hereinafter 
General Comment 23].  However, some Indigenous Peoples oppose being equated with minorities as part of an 
effort to establish a separate legal regime for themselves with greater entitlements. See S. James Anaya, 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law 133-4 (2nd ed. 2004).  Indeed, the short-lived Draft Article 12 and its 
creation of a sui generis right to the restitution of cultural property for Indigenous Peoples sought to achieve this 
very end.  However, as this Chapter demonstrates this effort was not successful and Article 11 was watered down 
and so steps back to fit comfortably within the existing cannon of cultural rights in IHRL.   
120 Ziegler, supra n. 64, at 9 (identifying more generally the inclusion of cultural property and heritage within the 
protection of cultural life).  
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industrial techniques, from forms of politeness to mass media, from work 
rhythm to the learning of family rules, all human practice, all invented and 
manufactured materials are concerned and constitute, in their relationship 
and their totality “culture”.127 
 
Moreover, in particular, the General Comment Number 23 which expounds on 
the implementation of Article 27 provides a good indication of both the 
applicability of this right to the issue of cultural property and its restitution.  In 
discussing the substantive content of what is protected under Article 27, it 
provides that: 
 
…culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 
associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of 
indigenous peoples.  That right may include such traditional activities as 
fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law.  The 
enjoyment of those rights may require positive legal measures of protection 
and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of minority 
communities in decisions which affect them the protection of these rights is 
directed to ensure the survival and continued development of cultural 
identity, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole.128 
 
In light of this comment, it is not difficult to see how Article 27 could easily 
understand culture to include also a particular way of life associated with the use 
of not just land but also cultural property in the case of Indigenous Peoples and 
that such a right to cultural may include a multitude of traditional activities 
dependent on cultural property such as religious practices, sacred ceremonies, 
education amongst others and therefore the enjoyment of those rights may 
require positive legal measures of protection such as the restitution of cultural 
property.129  For instance, many Indigenous Peoples consider cultural property 
to be “vital to their survival as a people” such as medicine bags for Crow Indian 
                                                 
127 Ziegler, supra n., 64, at 9 [citation omitted].   
128 General Comment 23, supra n. 125, at para. 7.   
129 Although important differences exist, the land and cultural property of Indigenous Peoples share significant 
overlapping qualities making it easy to see how the protection of land that has been extended to Indigenous 
Peoples under Article 27 could easily apply to their cultural property making this right ideally suited for this 
analysis. See infra Chapter 6 at Section D (discussing these similarities in more depth). 
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and the Yei B’Chei or the ceremonial dance masks of the Navajo Nation which 
are considered “living gods.”130 
 
Indeed, although Article 27 is expressed as negative obligations of states not to 
deny members of minority groups the right to enjoy their own culture, to 
practice their own religion or to use their own language, legal commentary and 
jurisprudence confirms that it requires positive obligations.131  General Comment 
Number 23 provides:   
 
Although article 27 is expressed in negative terms, that article, nevertheless, 
does recognize the existence of a "right" and requires that it shall not be 
denied.  Consequently, a State party is under an obligation to ensure that the 
existence and the exercise of this right are protected against their denial or 
violation.  Positive measures of protection are, therefore, required not only 
against the acts of the State party itself, whether through its legislative, 
judicial or administrative authorities, but also against the acts of other 
persons within the State party. 
 
Although the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, they 
depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture, 
language or religion.  Accordingly, positive measures by States may also be 
necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members 
to enjoy and develop their culture and language to practise their religion, in 
community with other members of the group…132   
 
Turning to the jurisprudence of Article 27 in the HRC as regards cultural rights, 
in the Ominayak133 the Committee had to contend with cultural rights and 
differing development needs; the needs of the state for economic development 
and the cultural rights of Indigenous Peoples to use their traditional lands for 
their survival and the maintenance and development of their culture via 
                                                 
130 Steven J. Gunn, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act at Twenty: Reaching the Limits of Our 
National Consensus, 36 William Mitchell Law Review 503, 505-6 (2010) [citations omitted]. 
131 Early commentary concerning Article 27 suggested that it was an example of “restrictive toleration” of 
minorities and did not require any positive action by the state. Thornberry, supra n. 51, at 160 [citation omitted].  
This interpretation stemmed from state comments during the drafting process and the rejection of drafts that 
explicitly called for state action.  However, this understanding gradually changed and it is now accepted that it 
requires positive action. See id. at 160-2. 
132 General Comment 23, supra n.125, at paras 6.1 and 6.2 (emphasis added). 
133 Ominayak v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990) 
[hereinafter Ominayak]. 
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economic and social activities.  It found that when Canada allowed the Province 
of Alberta to expropriate land for the purposes of private oil, gas, and timber 
exploration to which an indigenous group had a strong affiliation, that in light 
of historical inequities these concessions ‘threaten[ed] the way of life and 
culture of the Lubicon Lake Band and [so] constitute[d] a violation of Article 27 
so long as they continue[d].’134  Although the HRC agreed that Canada rectified 
the situation by providing compensation for the loss of land,135 elsewhere, the 
Committee also has indicated that: 
  
…[r]elocation and compensation may not be appropriate in order comply 
with Article 27 of the Covenant.  Therefore, when planning actions that 
affect members of indigenous communities, the State party must pay 
primary attention to the sustainability of the indigenous culture and way of 
life and to the participation of indigenous communities in decisions that 
affect them.136 
 
If it was implicit in Ominayak that economic activities on traditional indigenous 
land can constitute cultural rights protected under Article 27, then it was made 
explicit in the following case.  Specifically, in Poma Poma,137 the case was brought 
by an alpaca famer belonging to the Aymara community of Peru located in the 
Tacna region.  The complainant alleged that the State, which had authorized the 
construction of a number of wells in the area for the purpose of diverting water 
to the Pacific coast to supply the city of Tacna138, had caused serious degradation 
to the Aymara pasture land resulting in the death of large quantities of livestock 
and ultimately depriving members of the community with their means of 
subsistence, their identity and way of life in violation of Articles 1(2) and 17 of 
the ICCPR.  However, the HRC admitted the case on the grounds of Article 
27.139    
                                                 
134 Id. at para. 33.   
135 Id. 
136 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Chile, 65th Sess., [para. 22], U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (1999). 
137 Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru, Communication No. 1457/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (2009). 
138 Id. at paras. 2.9-13. 
139 Id. at para. 6.4 
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In the present case, the question is whether the consequences of the water 
diversion authorized by the State party as far as llama-raising is concerned 
are such as to have a substantive negative impact on the author's enjoyment 
of her right to enjoy the cultural life of the community to which she 
belongs.  In this connection the Committee takes note of the author's 
allegations that thousands of head of livestock died because of the 
degradation of 10,000 hectares of Aymara pasture land - degradation caused 
as a direct result of the implementation of the Special Tacna Project during 
the 1990s - and that it has ruined her way of life and the economy of the 
community, forcing its members to abandon their land and their traditional 
economic activity.  The Committee observes that those statements have not 
been challenged by the State party, which has done no more than justify the 
alleged legality of the construction of the Special Tacna Project wells.140 
 
In turn, the HRC ultimately again found a violation of the Article 27 cultural 
rights of Indigenous Peoples over the broader interests of the state. 
 
Yet, in both cases the HRC noted that such a result in favour of Indigenous 
Peoples under Article 27 is not a foregone conclusion.  In Ominayak the dissent 
noted that ‘the right to enjoy one’s own culture should not be understood to 
imply that Band’s traditional way of life must be preserved at all costs.’141  The 
HRC maintained this position in its more recent decision in Poma Poma noting 
that: 
 
The Committee recognizes that a State may legitimately take steps to 
promote its economic development.  Nevertheless, it recalls that economic 
development may not undermine the rights protected by article 27.  Thus 
the leeway the State has in this area should be commensurate with the 
obligations it must assume under article 27.  The Committee also points out 
that measures whose impact amounts to a denial of the right of a 
community to enjoy its own culture are incompatible with article 27, whereas 
measures with only a limited impact on the way of life and livelihood of persons belonging 
to that community would not necessarily amount to a denial of the rights under article 
27.142 
 
In turn, the HRC has stressed that rights of cultural integrity like Article 27 are 
not absolute; they can be limited by the interests of broader society as it did in 
                                                 
140 Id. at para 7.5. 
141 Ominayak, supra n. 133, at Appendix 1. 
142 Poma Poma, supra n. 137, at para 7.4 [emphasis added]. 
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Länsman I. 143  In Länsman I, the HRC again had to contend with the needs of the 
state for economic development and the needs of Indigenous Peoples to use 
their traditional lands for the maintenance and development of their culture.  
Länsman and forty-seven other members of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s 
Committee claimed that the state violated their Article 27 right to enjoy their 
culture when the Central Forestry Board in Finland authorized stone quarrying 
in their traditional lands which disturbed their traditional reindeer-herding 
practices.  In the same vein as Ominayak and confirmed more recently in Poma 
Poma that economic activities can constitute cultural rights under Article 27, the 
HRC here agreed and noted that reindeer husbandry is an essential element of 
Sami culture and so comes within the purview of Article 27.144  Moreover, the 
HRC has built on this view that traditional economic activity is protected noting 
that  
 
[the] right to enjoy one’s culture cannot be determined in abstracto but has to 
be placed in context.  In this connection, the Committee observes that 
article 27 does not only protect traditional means of livelihood of national 
minorities … Therefore, that the authors have adapted  their methods of 
reindeer herding over the years and practice it with the help of modern 
technology does not prevent them from invoking article 27 of the 
Covenant.145  
 
This recognition is important as it reflects the reality of the continuously 
changing nature of culture and identities.  This is particularly important for 
Indigenous Peoples as there is a danger as aforementioned of romanticizing the 
indigenous, for as indigenous academic Linda Smith notes there is no “authentic, 
essentialist, deeply  spiritual” other.146 
 
                                                 
143 Länsman et al v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994). [hereinafter Länsman 1].   
144 Id. at para. 9.2. 
145 Id. at para. 9.3. 
146 Linda Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (1999) reprinted in Shayna Plaut, 
‘Cooperation is the story’- Best Practices of Transnational Indigenous Activism in the North,16 The International Journal of 
Human Rights 193, 195 (2012).  
 103 
However, unlike Ominayak and Poma Poma, here in Länsman I the HRC followed 
through on it warning and quashed the Article 27 claims of the Sami minority 
noting that “measures that have a certain limited impact on the way of life and 
the livelihood of persons belonging to a minority will not necessarily amount to 
a denial of the rights under Article 27.”147  In making this determination, the 
HRC balanced the interests of the Sami in reindeer herding as a cultural activity 
with the interests of the State in encouraging development and economic activity 
and as regards the later these interests must be considered in light of the 
obligations of the state under Article 27.148  Of importance to the HRC in 
making this determination was the evidence presented by the state 
demonstrating that it only permitted quarrying which would minimize the impact 
on these activities through such measures as only allowing quarrying to occur 
outside of reindeer-herding season149 and on the relatively small size of the 
quarry site and the amount removed.150  In turn, the HRC noted that reindeer 
herding in the area did not appear to have been negatively affected.151   
 
Moreover, of importance to the Committee was the fact that the Sami were 
consulted and their views were taken into consideration in the proceedings 
leading up to the decision to issue the permit in line with paragraph 7 of General 
Comment 23 on Article 27.152  By contrast, in both Ominayak and Poma Poma the 
relevant communities were not consulted which was relevant to the HRC in 
finding a violation.  Specifically, the HRC noted in the latter: 
 
In the present case, the Committee observes that neither the author nor the 
community to which she belongs was consulted at any time by the State 
party concerning the construction of the wells.  Moreover, the State did not 
                                                 
147 Länsman 1, supra n. 143, at para. 9.4. 
148 The Committee explicitly rejected the European doctrine of margin of appreciation in making this 
determination.  Rather, whether or not the activities of the state constitute a violation of Article 27 will be 
assessed by reference to the obligations of the state under this article. Id. 
149 Id. at para. 7.4. 
150 Id. at paras. 7.5 and 7.9. 
151 Id. at para. 9.6. 
152 Id. at para. 9.5. 
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require studies to be undertaken by a competent independent body in order 
to determine the impact that the construction of the wells would have on 
traditional economic activity, nor did it take measures to minimize the 
negative consequences and repair the harm done.  The Committee also 
observes that the author has been unable to continue benefiting from her 
traditional economic activity owing to the drying out of the land and loss of 
her livestock.  The Committee therefore considers that the State's action has 
substantively compromised the way of life and culture of the author, as a 
member of her community.  The Committee concludes that the activities 
carried out by the State party violate the right of the author to enjoy her 
own culture together with the other members of her group, in accordance 
with article 27 of the Covenant.153 
 
As concerned the future activities of the state here in Länsman I, the HRC noted 
if the quarrying was to be expanded significantly then it might constitute an 
Article 27 violation and therefore “[t]he State party is under a duty to bear this in 
mind when either extending existing contracts or granting new ones.”154   
 
Moreover, Article 27 can be limited not just by the broader interests of society 
but also by the countervailing human rights of others which includes the 
individual rights of members of the same minority; this stems from the fact that 
the norm of cultural integrity developed within the IHRL and so it is bound by 
this framework.155  Indeed, the language of Article 27 makes it clear that it is a 
right that affords protection to the individual as it is “for persons belonging to 
national minorities” and so is to be exercised as an individual right.156  However, 
its language also makes clear that it has a collective aspect as it is to be enjoyed 
‘in community with other members of the group.’  In Lovelace, the HRC first 
made clear this collective aspect noting that the article includes necessity “to 
preserve the identity of the tribe”.157  Moreover, this collective aspect is the basis 
upon which the HRC has found that Indigenous Peoples deserve special 
                                                 
153 Poma Poma, supra n. 137, at para 7.7. 
154 Länsman I, supra n. 143, at para. 9.8. 
155 Anaya, International Law, supra n. 125, at 133. 
156 See Thornberry, supra n.51, at 157 n38 (tracing this careful use of language during the drafting process). 
157 Thornberry, , supra n.51, at 157. See generally Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R.6/24 (29 
December 1977) U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) (1981) [hereinafter Lovelace].; R.L. v. Canada No. 358/1989, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/358/1989 (1991).  See also General Comment 23, supra n. 125, at para. 9 (“The 
protection of these rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, 
religious and social identity of the minorities concerned”). 
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measures.158  The following cases aside from demonstrating the limitations of 
Article 27 also demonstrate this inherent tension in IHRL of individual versus 
collective rights which is aptly played out in Article 27.159  
 
Kitok160 provides such a case of the possibility of the clash between rights; in this 
particular case the conflict between the minority rights of the individual and the 
minority rights of the group both secured in Article 27.  In Kitok, the claim 
before the HRC was that the Swedish Reindeer Husbandry Act which reserved 
reindeer hunting for members of the Sami violated Article 27 of the ICCPR.  
Ivan Kitok was born a member of a Sami family with more than 100 years of 
reindeer herding experience.  However, he lost his membership in his ancestral 
village under this law as he had engaged in another profession for more than 
three years and was denied readmission by the village.161  He argued that the law 
denied him his “immemorial rights granted to the Sami community, in particular, 
the right to membership of the Sami community and the right to carry out 
reindeer husbandry.”162  However, according to the state: 
 
The ratio legis for this legislation is to improve the living conditions for the 
Sami who have reindeer husbandry as the primary income, and to make the 
existence of reindeer husbandry safe for the future … From the legislative 
history it appears that it was considered … of general importance that 
reindeer husbandry be made more profitable.  Reindeer husbandry was 
considered necessary to protect and preserve the whole culture of the 
Sami.163 
 
Although the HRC had some doubts over whether certain provisions of the act 
were compatible with Article 27,164 in this case they found that Kitok’s individual 
Article 27 right to participate in Sami cultural life had not been violated thereby 
                                                 
158 General Comment No. 23, supra n.125, at para. 6.2. 
159 See infra at Section V (discussing this inherent tension). 
160 Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988) [hereinafter Kitok]. 
161 Id. at para 2.1. 
162 Id. at para. 9.1. 
163 Id. at para. 4.2. 
164 Id. at para 9.6. 
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accepting the State’s argument that the law was a measure for the preservation of 
the Sami minority.   
 
Similarly, in Mahuika165 the Article 27 minority rights of the individual were 
trumped by the countervailing rights of the collective minority.  The authors 
were nineteen Maoris belonging to different tribes who all asserted that their 
traditional fishing rights had been breached by New Zealand through the Treaty 
of Waitangi (Fisheries claims) Settlement Act of 1992.  After years of 
negotiations between the government of New Zealand and Maori negotiators in 
the 1980s and 1990s concerning the extent of Maori rights over commercial and 
non-commercial fishing,  the two sides struck a compromise in the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fisheries claims) Settlement Act of 1992.  It granted the Maori forty 
percent of New Zealand’s commercial fishing quota with non-commercial 
fishing to be controlled by regulations to be passed after further Maori 
consultation.  It represented a final settlement regarding all commercial and non-
commercial fishing and thus extinguished all claims concerning traditional 
fishing rights in court.  The authors in this case were members of tribes that 
opposed this settlement made with the consent of Maori negotiators.  As regards 
their Article 27 complaint, they argued that the actions of the government 
threatened their way of life and culture arguing “fishing is one of the main 
elements of their traditional culture, that they have present-day fishing interests 
and the strong desire to manifest their culture through fishing to the fullest 
extent of their traditional territories.”166  Again, the HRC found for the State.  
They noted the attention the legislation paid to ensuring the sustainability of 
Maori fishing activities.167  Moreover, of importance here was again the 
consultation process that the state engaged in with the Maori in the passage of 
this legislation and the fact that special attention in these consultations was paid 
                                                 
165 Mahuika v New Zealand, Communication No 547/1993,Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993  (27 October 2000) [hereinafter Mahuika]. 
166 Id. at para. 6.2. 
167 Id. at para. 9.8. 
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to the religious and cultural significance of fishing to Maoris again in line with 
General Comment 23 on Article 27.168  Finally, the HRC warned that in order to 
continue to comply with Article 27, implementation of the settlement must 
continue to consider the cultural and religious significance of fishing to the 
Maori to ensure that they continue “to enjoy their culture, and profess and 
practice their religion in community with other members of the group.”169   
 
B. Locating Cultural Integrity  in International Human Rights Law: 
Non-Discrimination, Equality and Special Measures 
 
Aside from locating Article 11 of the Declaration within in IHRL as a cultural 
right and all the aforesaid that this entails, Article 11 promotes the integrity of 
Indigenous Peoples and more specifically it promotes cultural integrity.  It is 
clear that the norm of cultural integrity embraces Article 11 which as a reminder 
provides for Indigenous Peoples “the right to practice and revitalize their 
cultural traditions and customs”, when what is widely recognized as the best 
expression of what the norm of cultural integrity entails and what it obliges 
states to do includes: 
 
(a) Recognize and respect indigenous distinct culture, history, language and 
way of life as an enrichment of the State's cultural identity and to promote 
its preservation; 
(b) Ensure that members of indigenous peoples are free and equal in 
dignity and rights and free from any discrimination, in particular that based 
on indigenous origin or identity; 
(c) Provide indigenous peoples with conditions allowing for a sustainable 
economic and social development compatible with their cultural 
characteristics; 
(d) Ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in 
respect of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly 
relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed 
consent; 
                                                 
168 Id.; See also General Comment 23, supra n. 125, at para. 7 at n. 30. 
169 Mahuika, supra n. 165, at para. 9.9. 
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(e) Ensure that indigenous communities can exercise their rights to practise and 
revitalize their cultural traditions and customs and to preserve and to practise their 
languages.170 
 
Article 11 does not stand alone in encompassing the norm of cultural integrity.  
Other articles within the Declaration that embrace this norm include: Article 7 
[the collective right to live in peace, free from acts of genocide and other forms 
of violence], Article 8 [the right individually to be free from forced assimilation 
or destruction of culture and redress for any such violations], Article 35 [the 
right to determine their own identity and membership and to determine the 
responsibilities of individuals to their communities], Article 9 [the right belong to 
an indigenous community or nation and no discrimination of any kind directed 
against them] and Article 31 [ the right to cultural heritage, traditional knowledge 
and cultural expressions]. 
 
This norm extends to Indigenous Peoples that same respect for cultural integrity 
that has developed elsewhere within international law.171  In particular, cultural 
rights as well as the norms of non-discrimination and equality that allow for 
special measures under IHRL are crucial to securing the integrity of Indigenous 
Peoples.  As the International Labour Organization notes, states as well as 
Indigenous Peoples have a responsibility to protect the rights of the latter and to 
guarantee respect for their integrity which includes such special measures as: 
 
(a) ensuring that members of these peoples benefit on an equal footing 
from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant 
to other members of the population; 
(b) promoting the full realization of the social, economic and cultural 
rights of these peoples with respect for their social and cultural identity, 
their customs and traditions and their institutions; 
                                                 
170 CERD General Recommendation 23, supra n. 14, para. 4 [emphasis added].  Aside from cultural rights, the 
patchwork of special protection for Indigenous Peoples that has developed under IHRL has been through the 
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and its emphasis on non-discrimination 
and equality.  For Engle, this recommendation also demonstrates how indigenous advocacy under IHRL has 
developed and promoted three different understandings of culture; culture as heritage, cultural as land and 
culture as development. Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n. 52, at 120. 
171 Anaya, International Law, supra n. 125, at 131. 
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(c) assisting the members of the peoples concerned to eliminate socio-
economic gaps that may exist between indigenous and other members of 
the national community, in a manner compatible with their aspirations and 
ways of life.172 
 
Special measures are commonly referred to by a number of different names in 
international law including: remedial measures, positive measures, positive 
action, affirmative action, and affirmative measures.  In terms of IHRL, this 
remedial nature does not pose a problem.  In fact, it explicitly recognizes that 
such remedial measures are acceptable and may be necessary in two different 
situations; situations where the measures are aimed at overcoming impediments 
to the equal enjoyment of human rights by all groups or individuals and where 
the measures are aimed at helping ‘the right to enjoy one’s distinct cultural 
identity’;173 two situations particularly applicable to Indigenous Peoples.  
Moreover, remedial measures fall within the broader concept in IHRL of 
continuing violations.  Stamatopoulou expounds on this concept as a solution 
developed by international law addressing: “… injustice that stems from far 
back, but the effects of which still continue in the present, by promoting positive 
measures to deal with  past discrimination, by developing concepts of truth 
commissions and transitional justice, and, of course by establishing 
imprescriptibility for crimes against humanity and gross and systemic violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law”174 from which she concludes that cultural 
rights in particular have a key role to play in addressing such injustices.175  In 
particular, it is argued that such redress in relation to cultural heritage is 
                                                 
172 International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 1989, C169, at 
art. 2. 
173 William Jonas and Margaret Donaldson, The Legitimacy of Special Measures in Indigenous Human Rights 12 (Sam 
Garkawe, Loretta Kelly and Warwick Fisher eds., 2001). 
174 Stamatopoulou, supra n. 52, at 167.  Potentially, it is the nature of Article 11 as part of the norm of cultural 
integrity that highlights how contextualizing the repatriation of cultural property within IHRL overcomes the 
issue of non-retroactivity that thwarts Indigenous efforts under the cultural property regimes. See supra Chapter 2 
at Section IV(B).  See also Chapter 6 at Section I(B)(i) (discussing issues with the concept of continuing violations 
to overcome non-retroactivity).    
175 Stamatopoulou, supra n. 58, at 169. 
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important as it is an effective tool in fighting discrimination and marginalization 
for groups whose cultures and very identity are under threat.176  
 
The basis for remedial or special measures first developed within IHRL in the 
context of racial discrimination and as aforementioned is founded on two 
fundamental norms which underpin all human rights: equality and non-
discrimination.  Equality has two dimensions: formal equality and substantive 
equality.  Formal equality refers to the obligation of states both to treat all 
individuals the same before the law and to confer on these individuals the equal 
protection of the law.  However, equality before the law and equal protection 
only secure abstract equality as they do not address the disadvantages suffered by 
particular groups; inequality of circumstances which in practice create real 
inequality.  Enter the concept of substantive or de facto equality.  Substantive 
equality refers to equality in the enjoyment and exercise of human rights and 
involves treating as equal those who are equal and treating different those who 
are different.177  It is the foundation of multiculturalist policies which highlight 
that the 
 
[m]ulti-nation state which accords universal rights to all citizens, regardless 
of group membership, may appear ‘neutral’ between the various national 
groups.  But in fact it can (and often does) systematically privilege the 
majority nation in certain fundamental ways … All of these decisions can 
dramatically reduce the … cultural viability of a national minority, while 
enhancing that of the majority culture.178  
 
                                                 
176 Id. at 207.  
177 This combination underpins the concept of equality formulated in the context of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination[CERD Convention]. See International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination General Recommendation No.32 on The Meaning and 
Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Racial 
Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32 (2009) at para. 6 [hereinafter CERD General Recommendation 
32].  The ICCPR includes an understanding of equality in line with CERD combined with non-discrimination in 
a broad formula found in Articles 2, 3 and 26. See Thornberry, supra n. 51, at 130. 
178 W. Kmylicka, Multicultural Citizenship, supra n. 57, at 52.  
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As regards the norm of non-discrimination, it protects the enjoyment on an 
equal footing of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals.179  
In particular, it guards against two forms of discrimination: direct and indirect 
discrimination.  Direct discrimination refers to provisions with an intentional 
discriminatory purpose and is based on an unjustifiable distinction while indirect 
discrimination or discrimination in effect refers to provisions that though 
formally equal have a disparate impacts on different groups and are based on an 
unjustifiable preference.180   
 
Emerging from the norms of non-discrimination and equality, special measures 
are designed to ensure equality of outcomes for disadvantaged groups and work 
in two different ways: as an exception to discrimination or through positive 
obligations.  As regards the former, this is secured in IHRL in Article 1(4) of 
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD] 
which provides: 
 
Special measures, taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate 
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such 
protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or 
individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that 
such measures do not as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate 
rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after 
the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.181   
 
The thrust of this provision is that special measure will not be considered racial 
discrimination themselves as long as they are temporary and do not lead to the 
maintenance of separate rights.   
 
                                                 
179 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 
21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, art. 1(1) (entered into force 4 January 1969) [hereinafter CERD]. 
180 CERD General Recommendation 32, supra n. 177, at para. 7. 
181 CERD Convention, supra n. 179, at Art. 1(4).  See also Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, Permanent 
Court of International Justice Series  A/B, No. 64 (1935) (explaining the rationale for minority protection as 
rooted in the principle of non-discrimination and a positive duty on states to ensure minority development). 
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As regards the latter, Article 2(2) of CERD provides: 
 
State parties shall, when circumstances so warrant, take, in the social, 
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure 
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or 
individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full 
and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  These 
measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of 
unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for 
which they were taken have been achieved.182   
 
The thrust of this provision is that states have positive obligations to take special 
measures to make sure that all individuals are guaranteed the full and equal 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms; again as long as they 
don’t lead to the maintenance of separate rights. 
 
In turn, special measures should be distinguished from both the general positive 
obligations of states under IHRL to secure human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on a non-discriminatory basis183 and from the permanent rights of 
specific groups secured in IHRL such as the rights of women and minority rights 
as secured in Article 27 of the ICCPR discussed in the preceding section. 
 
Principles of equality and non-discrimination permit the taking of special 
temporary measures.  Such measures are mandatory when the conditions 
for their application are satisfied.  Special measures or affirmative action 
should be used, for instance, as a means for Governments to recognize the 
existence of structural discrimination and to combat it.  The case of special 
measures or affirmative action should not be confused with minority or 
indigenous rights to existence and identity that subsist as long as the 
individuals and communities concerned desire the continued application of 
these rights.184 
 
                                                 
182 CERD Convention, supra n. 179, at Art. 2(2). 
183 “The obligation to take special measures is distinct from the general positive obligation of States parties to the 
Convention to secure human rights and fundamental freedoms on a non-discriminatory basis to persons and 
groups subject to their jurisdiction; this is a general obligation flowing from the provisions of the Convention as 
a whole and integral to all parts of the Convention.” CERD Recommendation 32, supra n. 177, at para. 14. 
184 Human Rights Council Recommendations of the Forum on Minority Issues on Rights to Education, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/10/11/Add.1 (2009) at para. 12. 
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However, minorities and Indigenous Peoples are entitled to enjoy both special 
measures and specific permanent rights.185  Indeed, Thornberry offers the fact 
that these groups require specific permanent rights suggests that they could also 
benefit from special measures.186  Thornberry further has suggested that there is 
an independent legitimacy for special measures for Indigenous Peoples 
altogether outside of this CERD framework.187  
 
Regardless of its nature as either a specific permanent right or a special measure, 
stemming from its overriding concern with addressing historical and on-going 
injustices suffered by Indigenous Peoples, it is not surprising then that the 
Declaration on the whole and Article 11(1) in particular as part and parcel of the 
norm of cultural integrity incorporates this remedial idea at 11(2) by requiring 
states to 
 
… provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect 
                                                 
185 Id. at para. 15. Prior to this statement,  Thornberry noted that “[i]indigenous groups and minorities enjoy their 
own rights in international law which stand independently of any case for special measures, though some State 
policies for such groups may be brought within this framework. The Committee [CERD Committee] does not 
necessarily distinguish cases of ‘recognition of specific minority/indigenous rights’ from ‘special measures’ but 
recommendations to States Parties concerning indigenous groups may be made within and without special 
measures paradigm.” Thornberry, supra n. 51, at 26.  However, this has now explicitly been confirmed in IHRL 
by CERD General Recommendation 32.  See CERD General Recommendation 32, supra n. 177, at para.15. 
186 CERD General Recommendation 32, supra n. 177, at para.15.; see also Thornberry, supra n. 51, at 26. 
187 General Comment No. 23 on Article 27 stresses that affirmative measures for minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples may not violate principles of equality and discrimination. “[I]t has to be observed that such positive 
measures must respect the provisions of articles 2.1 and 26 [on equality and non-discrimination] of the 
[ICCPR]Covenant both as regards the treatment between different minorities and the treatment between the 
persons belonging to them and the remaining part of the population.  However, as long as those measures are 
aimed at correcting conditions which prevent or impair the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under article 27, 
they may constitute a legitimate differentiation under the Covenant, provided that they are based on reasonable 
and objective criteria.” General Comment No. 23, supra n. 125, at  para. 6.2. Interestingly, there is no time limit 
on these measures where they are aimed at correcting discriminatory conditions for the minority group whereas 
CERD explicitly places such limits on its special measures.  Moreover, there has been some suggestion that there 
is a contradiction between Article 2 and Article 26 and Article 27 with “the former obliging State parties to afford 
a degree of preferential treatment to national minorities and the latter asserting equality before the law 
irrespective of national origin.” See CCPR/C/SR.1418, para. 25(1995).  However the HRC did not agree with this 
observation by the state representative for the Ukraine noting these articles “should be read as complementary.” 
Id. at para. 53.  Further, in discussing the relationship between Article 2 and Article 27 in the Fourth Period 
Report of Norway, the Norwegian representative stressed that the policy of affirmative action for the Sami was 
not a contradiction; these measures and the norms of the ICCPR were in harmony as the position of the Sami 
could not be reduced to one of non-discrimination.  See CCPR/C/SR.1786, para. 5 (1999).  Based on these 
collective observations, Thornberry suggests that this indicates an independent legitimacy for special measures 
under Article 27 for minorities because they are minorities. Thornberry, supra n. 51, at 132.   
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to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without 
their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, 
traditions and customs. 
 
Yet, cultural integrity  goes beyond ensuring that Indigenous individuals are 
accorded the same civil and political rights and have access to the same social 
welfare programs as others within the State, it also sustains the ‘right of 
indigenous groups to maintain and freely develop their cultural identity in co-
existence with other sectors of humanity.’188  In turn, implicit in this 
understanding of culture integrity as promoted by indigenous advocates is the 
privileging of the concept of culture developed by social anthropologists who 
view cultural not simply as a means of interpreting the world but as a tool for 
survival.  Robert Murphy explains, 
 
Culture means the total body of  tradition borne by a society and 
transmitted from generation to generation.  It thus refers to norms, values, 
standards by which people act, and it includes the ways distinctive in each 
society of  ordering the world and rendering it intelligible.  Culture is … a 
set of  mechanisms for survival, but it provides us also with a definition of  
reality.  It is the matrix into which we are born, it is the anvil upon which 
our persons and destinations are forged.189 
 
In turn, to the extent that Article 11 promotes cultural integrity it offers a view 
of ‘culture as survival’, that is most closely in alignment with an indigenous 
understanding of ‘cultural as a way of life’ that hitherto has been scarce in 
international law; albeit as demonstrated herein even this alignment was not 
enough to secure the restitution of cultural property absent a sui generis right.  As 
Dr. Alexandra Xanthaki notes, hitherto international law typically has not 
offered an understanding of culture that aligns with indigenous views therefore 
                                                 
188 Anaya, International Law, supra n. 125, at 131.  In this way, it is again possible to see that as part of the norm 
of cultural integrity Article 11 is at its core rooted in the concept of identity which places it firmly within the tools 
of identity politics and essentialist logic.  
189 Robert Murphy, Culture and Social Anthropology: An Overture 14 (2nd ed. 1986).  Interestingly,  ‘culture’, has 
not been defined at the international level though a number of definitions have been proposed. See  CESCR 
General Comment 21, supra n. 63, at paras. 10-13 [exploring how culture has been understood in international 
law].   
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affording the appropriate protection.190  Rather international law has offered 
views of cultural that are indifferent if not contrary to an indigenous 
understandings including ‘culture as capital’ and ‘culture as creativity’.191  The 
inadequacy of these understanding comes down to two factors: a major 
difference in terms of reference used by Indigenous Peoples and that of existing 
international law and the latter’s omission of non-state actors as beneficiaries of 
existing provisions.192  Rather, Indigenous Peoples understand ‘culture as a way 
of life’ which is: 
 
The sum total of  the material and spiritual activities and products of  a given 
social group which distinguishes it from other similar groups […] a 
coherent self-contained system of  values, and symbol as well as a set of  
practices that a specific cultural group reproduces over time and which 
provides individuals with the required signposts and meanings from 
behaviour and social relationships in everyday life.193   
 
Xanthaki argues that this holistic understanding of  culture is slowly being 
recognized under international law especially in instruments that recognize 
collective cultural rights for minorities and Indigenous Peoples such as Article 27 
of  the ICCPR.194  Indeed, Article 11 as a collective cultural right and more 
specifically as a right promoting the norm of  cultural integrity with its implicit 
support for a view of  ‘culture as survival’ incorporates an understanding of  
culture that most closely aligns with indigenous views: culture as a way of  life.  
However, it is worth noting that there is criticism of  this view of  culture as a 
way of  life.  Professor Sarah Harding offers that it is a “limited notion of  culture 
                                                 
190 See generally A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Cultural Rights, supra n. 69, 343.   
191 Id. at 349-55 (2000).  Interestingly, regarding these views of culture as capital and creativity,  Xanthaki 
identifies these in many of rights that were rejected at the Introduction of this thesis for the analysis of the 
contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples. See supra Introduction 
at ns. 28-35 and accompanying text.  Further, she identifies culture as capital and creativity in many of the 
provisions  of the conventions  discussed  in Chapter 2 regarding the international framework for the protection 
of cultural property that were there demonstrated not to meet the demands of Indigenous Peoples for the 
restitution of the bulk of their cultural property. See generally Chapter 2. 
192 Xanthaki, Indigenous Cultural Rights, supra n. 69, at 348.   
193 Id. at 355.  
194 In her identification Article 27 of the ICCPR as such a right, this reinforces its selection herein as the chosen 
right for the analysis of the contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous 
Peoples. Id. at 357. 
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that fails to grasp its fluid and inventive qualities.”195  She continues that rather 
culture is not just this way of  life which is “integration of  essential aspects of  
our being, nor it is simply the lens through which we interpret and give meaning 
to our experiences … it is not simply ‘backward looking traditionalism’” but 
rather is a “forward looking, non-static phenomenon [that] must always remain 
in some sense elusive and yet utterly indispensable”.196  In essence, she argues 
that as a definition it is essentialist in its approach to culture.  However, Article 
11 even though it failed to provide a sui generis right as aforementioned it 
continues to be rooted in essentialist logic to justify restitution and so it is 
unsurprising that the definition of  culture it promotes is essentialist in its 
understanding. 
 
i. The Contours of Cultural Integrity under Article 27 
 
The concept of cultural integrity with its remedial flavor detailed above that has 
been extended to Indigenous Peoples in the Declaration in a number of articles, 
including Article 11, first developed within IHRL in the context of protection 
for minorities197 and so finds expression in Article 27 as the minority right of the 
ICCPR.  The IACHR confirmed the legitimacy and importance of remedial 
measures under Article 27 in a case concerning the Yanomami of Brazil who 
suffered as a result of a series of incursion into their ancestral lands by the state 
and others including garimperios or gold prospectors after the discovery of mineral 
resources and a highway construction project.  The impacts of these incursions 
that triggered the petition by a group of NGOs included death, disease and the 
displacement of entire villages.  Aside from violations of the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man including rights to life, liberty, 
                                                 
195 Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 Arizona State Law Journal 291 (1999) at 334. 
196 Id. at 334 [citations omitted]. 
197 Anaya, International Law, supra n. 119, at 131. See also Minority Schools in Albania Advisory Opinion, 1935 
Permanent Court of International Justice (Ser. A/B) No. 64 at 17; Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSSCE, June29, 1990, at Art. 32; Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, November 10, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 351 (1995). 
 117 
residence, movement and health, the IACHR found that these incursions also 
threatened the culture and traditions of the Yanomami under Article 27 of the 
ICCPR.198  It held that “international law in its present state … recognizes the 
right of ethnic groups to special protection on their use of their own language, 
for the practice of their own religion, and, in general, for all those characteristics 
necessary for the preservation of their cultural identity.”199  In turn, this required 
Brazil to protect the Yanomami and to demarcate the boundaries of Yanomami 
land.200  Subsequent to this decision, the Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Brazil noted little improvement in the situation of the Yanomani.  It continued 
with the Commission reaffirming its support for special protections for 
Indigenous Peoples noting that existing measure were inadequate in light of “the 
ever-continuing usurpation of their possessions and rights.”201   
 
The IACHR again confirmed the application of ‘special legal protections’ arising 
from Article 27 of the ICCPR in the Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a 
Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin; in this particular case for the 
preservation of their cultural identity.202  Here, the Miskito, Suma and Rama 
Indians of the Atlantic coast in Nicaragua found themselves in the crosshairs of 
a conflict between the Sandinista government and armed Somocista guerillas 
infiltrating Nicaragua from its northern neighbor Honduras.  The former 
accused the Miskitos of aiding the latter in a counter-revolutionary effort in 
                                                 
192 Inter-Am. Commission Res. No. 12/85 (Mar. 5, 1985), Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, 1984-1985, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc 10, rev. 1, at 24, 31 (1985).   
199 Anaya, International Law, supra n. 125, at 134. 
200 According to Anaya, this invocation of Article 27 of the ICCPR is also significant in that Brazil was not party 
to the treaty suggesting the possible development of this norm into customary international law. Anaya, 
International Law, supra n. 125, at 134.  According to Allen, this would be an example of how indigenous 
advocates like Anaya and other play fast and loose with customary international law engaging in double counting 
amongst other techniques that he terms ‘radicalisation’ of customary international law. See Stephen Allen, Limits of 
the International Legal Project in Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 233-5 
(Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011).See also supra  Introduction, at ns. 15-17 (discussing generally 
customary international law).  Regardless, it is again an example of the important  dialogical space that the Inter 
American system has served as in relation to indigenous land issues. See infra Chapter 6 at Section II(A)(discussing 
IACtHRs decisions as a dialogical space). 
201 Report on the Human Rights Situation in Brazil (1997), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.97, Doc. 29 rev. 1 at 111 para. C. 
202 Case 7964 (Nicaragua), Inter-Am. Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin and Resolution on the Friendly Settlement 
Procedure Regarding the Human Rights Situation , O.A.S. Doc. EA/ser.L/V/n.62, doc. 26 at 77 (1984). 
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order to secede.  As a response, the petitioners here alleged that the government 
subjected them to a sustained campaign of violence, forced relocation, and 
ethnocide.203  Aside from discussing rights included in the American Declaration, 
the Committee also noted that Nicaragua was a party to the ICCPR and as such 
had obligations under Article 27 ‘which reaffirmed the need to protect ethnic 
groups.”204  In discussing the special measures to protect indigenous culture 
under Article 27, the IACHR explained that it is, ‘[b]ased on the principle of 
equality … [and so] [t]he protection of minorities, therefore, requires affirmative 
action to safeguard the rights of minorities whenever the people in question … 
wish to maintain their distinction of language and culture.’205  In this particular 
case, the special measures required Nicaragua to establish an institutional order 
to preserve cultural identity and were extended to “the aspects linked to 
productive organization, which includes, among other things, the issue of 
ancestral and communal lands.”206  The Commission further noted that in order 
to carry out the measures and fulfill their purpose they must be “designed in the 
context of broad consultation, and carried out with the direct participation of the 
ethnic minorities of Nicaragua, through their freely chosen representatives.”207    
 
Moreover, the IACHR also consistently has emphasized the need for special 
measures in relation to Indigenous Peoples in its reports.  For example, in the 
Commission’s 1997 Report on Ecuador it noted that: 
 
Within international law generally, and inter-American law specifically, 
special protections for indigenous peoples may be required for them to 
exercise their rights fully and equally with the rest of the population.  
Additionally, special protections for indigenous peoples may be required to 
ensure their physical and cultural survival -- a right protected in a range of 
international instruments and conventions.208 
                                                 
203 Id. at 13. 
204 Id. at 76. 
205 Id. at 77. 
206 Id. at 81. 
207 Id. at 82. 
208 Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ecuador (1997), Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.96.Doc.10 rev. 1 at 115. See 
also Fifth Report on the Human Rights Situation in Guatemala (2001); Third Report on the Human Rights 
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IV.  Article 11 and International Human Rights Law   
 
A. One Step Forward One Step Back: A Sui Generis Right Gained, A 
Sui Generis Right Lost 
 
Sui generis rights are not rights derived from a positive legal system but rather in 
the case of Indigenous Peoples “arise sui generis from the historical condition of 
indigenous peoples as distinctive societies with the aspiration to survive as 
such.”209  At their core, arguments for sui generis rights emphasize not the positive 
legal nature of the right and consequences but rather its social consequences.  In 
particular, “disenfranchised groups have traditionally benefitted from asserting 
their legal rights.  By asserting legal rights, minority groups gain inclusion and 
power within a legal system that has historically excluded and oppressed 
them.”210  The right to the restitution of cultural property as included in the 
Draft Declaration Article 12 presented just such a sui generis right; the 
development of an approach specific to Indigenous Peoples  regarding cultural 
property which provided for its restitution as a right.   
 
This comes despite claims from the indigenous corner that that there are no new 
rights in the Declaration.  In theory, the creation of new human rights should 
appeal to Indigenous Peoples as it brings them within the ambit of the rights 
discourse which hitherto they have been denied access thereby internationalizing 
their struggle and moving them from objects to subjects of the international 
                                                                                                                                                    
Situation in Paraguay (2001); Second Report on the Human Rights Situation in Peru (2000); Third Report on the 
Human Rights Situation in Colombia (1999); Report on the Human Rights Situation in Mexico (1998); Report on 
the Human Rights Situation in Brazil (1997); Second Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia (1993); 
Fourth Report on the Human Rights Situation in Guatemala (1993); Second Report on the Human Rights 
Situation in Suriname (1985). 
209 H. Berman, Are Indigenous Populations Entitled to International Juridical Personality?’, 79 American Society of 
International Law Proc. (1989) p. 193 reprinted in  J. Gilbert, Indigenous Rights in the Making: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of indigenous Peoples, International Journal on Minority and Groups Rights 14 (2007), 207, 
210.   
210 Rebecca Tsosie, supra n. 61, at 661. 
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community.211  Yet, as aforementioned, the U.N. Permanent Forum in 
Indigenous Issues [UNPFII] explained, “[r]ather, it provides a detailing or 
interpretation of the human rights enshrined in other international human rights 
instruments of universal resonance- as these apply to indigenous peoples and 
indigenous individuals.”212  Further, Les Malezer, Chairperson of the Global 
Indigenous Caucus, on the adoption of the Declaration noted that “[i]t 
contained no new provisions of human rights.  It was based on rights that had 
been approved by the United Nations system but which had somehow, over the 
years, been denied to indigenous peoples.”213  Similarly, Professor Anaya early 
after the adoption of the Declaration stated that: 
 
[t]he Declaration does not affirm or create special rights separate from 
fundamental human rights that are deemed of universal application, but 
rather elaborates upon fundamental rights in the specific cultural, historical, 
social and economic circumstances of indigenous peoples.  These include 
the basic norms of equality and non-discrimination, as well as other 
generally applicable human rights in areas such as culture, health or property 
which are recognized in other international instruments and are universally 
applicable.214 
 
As Professor Allen notes, this approach of ‘no new rights’ serves an 
interpretative function in that it makes the Declaration an interpretative lens 
through which to view and apply fundamental human rights in either customary 
or treaty international law in the indigenous context.  In turn, this achieves the 
result that it no longer matters if the Declaration is not hard law because as soft 
                                                 
211 Allen, supra n. 200, at 235-6 
212 See supra n. 49. 
213 Les Malzer, Statement, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm.  Malezer reaffirmed 
his commitment to this position with the author in discussions at the Institute for Commonwealth Studies 
Conference in September 2013. Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of 
London, ICWS Conference, September 2013 [notes on file with author].   
214 Anaya, The Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Light of the New Declaration, and the Challenge of Making Them 
Operative , Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous peoples, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9,5 at para 38 (August 2008). See also M. Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in 
the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 58 International 
And Comparative Law Quarterly 957, 972 (2012) (“First, the Declaration may be regarded as evidence of existing 
law.”) Id. 
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law it can achieve the same ends.215  Moreover, this seems more a politically 
savvy indigenous advocacy strategy to gain state support rather than reflective of 
reality.  Generally speaking, rights and in particular human rights work to trump 
politics and utilitarian and realist assessments regarding good.216  They mask the 
subjectivity of claims through their objective presentation ultimately 
transforming political desires into the lingua franca of human rights.217  Typically, 
when making a new human rights claim there are two stages put forward by the 
claimant.218  First, the claimant emphasizes the new right at least in part 
embodies the broader general characteristics of human rights such as respect for 
dignity and equality.  The claimant then advocates the new right’s unique and 
particular component.  Indigenous advocates in their denial of sui generis rights 
replicate the first stage of this process but ignore that second relying rather on 
the interpretative lens mechanism that allows indigenous rights to be viewed as 
part of general human rights.219  In doing so, advocates achieve two political 
advantages.  First, this approach allows indigenous advocates to stress that 
“universal, unhistorical and unpolitical nature of the rights contained in the 
Declaration, thus hiding their particular, temporal and political characteristics.”220  
Second, this approach allows indigenous advocates to avoid “stirring up identity 
politics.”221  This avoidance of identity politics is possible as the interpretative 
argument is not open to minorities.  Yet foreclosing the interpretative argument 
to minorities is only possible if the concept of indigenous sovereignty is 
                                                 
215 Stephen Allen, supra n. 200, at 231.  As Allen further notes, of course the success of this strategy depends  the 
extent to which decision makers including state, court or other institutions are persuaded by this approach 
leaving the operationalize of the Declaration on fragile grounds. Id. at 231.  Hence, advocates also have taken the 
second strategy of asserting that the Declaration merely reflects existing international customary law. See supra 
Introduction at ns. 15-17 (discussing generally customary international law). 
216 Stephen Allen, supra n. 200, at. 235 citing M. Koskenniemi, The Effect of Rights on Political Culture in The EU 
and Human Rights 101 (P. Alston ed., 1999).  
217 Id.  
218 Allen, supra n. 200, at 236 as identified by K. Gunther, The Legacies of Injustice and Fear: A European Approach to 
Human Rights and their Effects on Political Culture  in The EU and Human Rights 136 (P. Alston ed., 1999). 
219 Allen, supra n. 200, at 236. 
220 Id. at 236. 
221 Yet, as aforementioned Article 11 necessarily stirs up identity politics by its contextualization in IHRL 
regardless of whether or not it presents a sui generis right to the extent that Indigenous Peoples will pursue 
restitution as the only appropriate remedy.  See supra ns. 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing identity 
politics).  
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embraced.222  At its core, the historical sovereignty argument posits that 
Indigenous Peoples have sovereignty  that pre-dates to some extent the 
sovereignty of states hence the rhetoric of many indigenous advocates of the 
notion of indigenous nationhood.  Advocates recognize that this line of 
argument regarding the sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples is not on par with 
that of state sovereignty but nonetheless it offers a powerful rhetoric and 
symbolism for Indigenous Peoples as a way to regain some sovereignty via 
IHRL, to separate indigenous claims from minority claims and to highlight the 
remedial purpose of their claims.223  In turn, this approach of denying the sui 
generis nature of the rights in the Declaration is a political strategy rooted in the 
implicit acknowledgement that such claims would have endangered the adoption 
of the Declaration.224  In turn, as part and parcel of this denial of sui generis rights, 
Article 11 is also a claim rooted in the rhetoric of historical sovereignty. 
 
Yet despite these claims, in reality Draft Article 12 would have provided 
Indigenous Peoples with a sui generis right to the restitution of cultural 
property.225  Indeed, the U.S. representative during the drafting process was 
careful to stress that although there was overall support for the basic idea of 
Draft Article 12, the article was overbroad in relation to the open-ended 
obligation of the restitution of cultural property as it was not a rule of 
international law.226  In addition, as aforementioned, the ILA has recognized that 
as a whole the UNDRIP is aspirational and  cannot be considered as a statement 
of existing customary law in relation to Indigenous Peoples though it asserts that 
certain provisions have attained the status of customary international law; 
                                                 
222 Id. at 237. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 236.  If the remedial purpose was rooted in the idea of ‘cultural difference’ which underpins sui generis 
claims,  then entitlement should be limited by a temporal dimension hence why some advocates have in the long 
run often avoided reference to labelling a right sui generis. Id. at 238-9. 
225 In this respect, the fact that the Declaration does not provide any new rights should make this statement of 
reassuring the status quo worthy not of praise but rather disappointment from an indigenous perspective for as 
will be demonstrated Article 11 steps back to fit comfortably within existing IHRL which does not secure 
restitution. 
226 See Urrutia, supra n. 37, at para. 90. 
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however it does not identify restitution of cultural property as such a 
provision.227   
 
Although in theory it is possible that the restitution of cultural property could 
occur through exiting IHRL under the auspices of Article 27 of the ICCPR, the 
specificity of Article 11 as it existed in the draft version providing for a right to 
the restitution of cultural property was preferable for Indigenous Peoples.  
Namely, securing such a specific right would have been a step forwards in the 
development of IHRL as it provided a sui generis right to the restitution of 
cultural property for Indigenous Peoples that does not exist at present and seems 
unlikely to occur through existing broader IHRL under the auspices of Article 27 
of the ICCPR.   
 
i. Article 27 and its Limits 
 
Indeed, the importance of this sui generis right is compounded by fact that the 
restitution of cultural property in the existing IHRL regime does not seem likely 
at present as Article 27 and its legal commentary and jurisprudence demonstrate 
a number of limits to achieve such an end; despite the fact that as part of the 
norm of cultural integrity such remedial measures are intrinsic.  Indeed, the 
intrinsic nature of remedial measures for the right to culture flowing from 
cultural integrity suggests that Article 27 of the ICCPR is ripe for the restitution 
of cultural property.  Although it is possible that the restitution of cultural 
property could occur through exiting IHRL under the auspices of Article 27, a 
number of limitations make any such restitution unlikely.   
 
First, General Comment No. 23 on Article 27 makes clear that the protection of 
culture it offers does not trump other human rights provided in the ICCPR.  
                                                 
227 See generally International Law Association, Conclusions and Recommendation of The Committee on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Resolution No. 5/2012. 
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“The Committee observes that none of the rights protected under article 27 of 
the Covenant may be legitimately exercised in a manner or to an extent 
inconsistent with the other provisions of the Covenant.”228  As aforementioned, 
General Comment 23 on Article 27: 
 
In this connection, it has to be observed that such positive measures must 
respect the provisions of articles 2.1 and 26 [on discrimination] of the 
Covenant both as regards the treatment between different minorities and 
the treatment between the persons belonging to them and the remaining 
part of the population.  However, as long as those measures are aimed at 
correcting conditions which prevent or impair the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under 
article 27, they may constitute a legitimate differentiation under the 
Covenant, provided that they are based on reasonable and objective criteria.229 
 
In the absence of these correcting conditions and reasonable and objective 
criteria, positive measures to protect culture under Article 27 will not prevail.  
This test of reasonable and objective criteria was first developed by the HRC in 
Lovelace where the Committee provided that: 
 
… the Committee is of the view that statutory restrictions affecting the 
right to residence on a reserve of a person belonging to the minority 
concerned, must have both a reasonable and objective justification and be consistent 
with the other provisions of the Covenant, read as a whole.”230 
 
It has been used consistently by the HRC in subsequent cases in assessing 
positive measures to protect the right to culture in Article 27.    
 
Even when these positive measures to protect the collective right to culture 
prevail, they can still limit the individual right to culture under Article 27 held by 
members of  the minority as aforementioned.  Returning to Kitok,231 the HRC 
noted that in such cases where there is a conflict between the rights of  the 
minority as a whole and that of  an individual member of  the minority including 
                                                 
228 General Comment No. 23, supra n. 125, at para. 8. 
229 General Comment No. 23, supra n. 125, at para. 6.2 [emphasis added]. 
230 Lovelace v. Canada, supra n. 157, at para. 16 [emphasis added].   
231 See supra ns. 160-64 and accompanying text (discussing Kitok). 
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their individual minority right to culture that any such restriction “must be 
shown to have a reasonable and objective justification and to be necessary for 
the continued viability and welfare of  the minority as a whole.”232  Here, the 
HRC noted that although Sweden’s Reindeer Husbandry Act restricted Mr. 
Kitok’s participation, the state demonstrated that it was a necessary means to 
ensure the welfare of  the Sami as a whole.  Moreover, they noted that although 
he had lost his full membership in the Sami community he was not barred from 
moving back to the community and participating in reindeer herding activities 
just not as a matter of  right.233  Again, in Mahuika234 in finding for the state 
regarding the Treaty of  Waitangi (Fisheries claims) Settlement Act of  1992, the 
HRC began by noting the test when there is a conflict between the rights of  the 
individual to enjoy their culture and their rights of  the other members of  the 
minority group and/or the minority as a whole; whether the limitation is based 
on reasonable and objective justification in its application to the individual and 
whether it is in the interests of  the minority as a whole.235  In applying the test 
here, the HRC again found for the State and in doing so endorsed its view; the 
raison d’être  of  the legislation was to secure for the Maori the right to engage in 
fishing which is central to the enjoyment of  their culture.236  By contrast, in 
Lovelace the HRC found a violation.  In Lovelace, the issue was the right of  the 
individual not to be denied membership in an indigenous group with which she 
self-identified and on objective grounds belonged to as a matter of  ethnicity.  
Sandra Lovelace was born into the Maliseet Indian band on the Tobique Reserve 
in Canada and brought a challenge to the Indian Act and in particular Section 
12(1)(b) which denied Indian status and benefits to any Indian woman married 
to a non-Indian.  However, the provision did not act upon men.  In 1970, 
Lovelace had married a non-Indian man and as a result lost her membership and 
                                                 
232 Kitok., supra n. 160, at para. 9.8. 
233 Id. 
234 See supra ns. 165-69 and accompanying text (discussing Mahuika). 
235 Mahuika, supra n. 165, at  para. 9.6. 
236 Id. at para. 7.1. 
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residency on the reservation by right though she moved back to the reserve and 
lived with her parents after her divorce.  Aside from bringing a claim for 
discrimination based on sex, Lovelace brought a claim under Article 27 which 
the HRC found the most applicable to her situation.  Canada argued that the law 
was necessary to preserve the indigenous group and in particular the state had 
taken into consideration that traditionally patriarchal relationships determined 
legal claims.237  In ruling in her favor, the HRC noted that to access her native 
language and culture she had to be in community with other members of  the 
group and that the law interfered and continued to interfere with this right as 
there is nowhere outside of  the reserve in which such a community existed.238  
Further the HRC noted: 
 
The case of Sandra Lovelace should be considered in light of the fact that 
her marriage to a non-Indian has broken up.  It is natural that in such a 
situation she wishes to return to the environment in which she was born, 
particularly as after the dissolution of her marriage her main cultural 
attachment again was to the Maliseet band.  Whatever may be the merits of 
the Indian Act in other respects, it does not seem to the Committee that to 
deny Sandra Lovelace the right to reside on the reserve is reasonable or 
necessary to preserve the identity of the tribe.  The Committee therefore 
concludes that to prevent her recognition as belonging to the band is an 
unjustifiable denial of her rights under Article 27 of the Covenant, read in 
the context of the other provisions referred to.239 
 
The difference between Lovelace and Kitok and Mahuika is that the former 
emphasized the right of  the individual to culture while the later cases 
emphasized the right of  the group to culture can take priority.  Regardless, both 
demonstrate that the right to culture protected in Article 27 is not absolute. 
 
Moreover, as aforementioned, Article 27 cultural rights are limited by the 
interests of  broader society.  Specifically, the interests of  broader society limit 
Article 27 rights when the Committee finds that the state ensures that laws or 
                                                 
237 Lovelace, supra n. 157, at para. 5. 
238 Lovelace, supra n. 157, at para. 13.1. See infra Chapter 6 at Section I(B)(i) (discussing continuing violations). 
239 Lovelace, supra n. 157, at para. 17. 
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practices to achieve these interests are proportional.  HRC jurisprudence reveals 
that proportionality depends on findings and interpretations of  facts rather than 
on the strict application of  law which stems from the fact that the HRC 
examines evidence in writing and so is not well placed to make independent 
findings of  fact when faced with conflicting evidence or interpretations of  
evidence.  Therefore the HRC tends to uphold the facts as found by the 
domestic court in the state party to the case which thereby explains why it has 
found few violations of  Article 27 limiting the broader interests of  society with 
the exception of  Ominayak240and more recently  Poma Poma as detailed above.241  
For instance, in Länsman II242, based on the warnings of  the HRC in the 
conclusion of  the aforementioned case of  Länsman I243 regarding the future 
activities of  the state, the Sami brought a complaint concerning the approval of  
a logging and the construction of  roads by the Finnish Central Forestry 
Commission in an area of  the winter herding grounds of  the Muotkatunturi 
Herdsmen’s Committee.  The HRC took the same approach as it did before in 
Länsman I regarding the balancing of  the needs of  the state for economic 
development and the needs of  Indigenous Peoples to use their traditional lands 
for the maintenance and development of  their culture.  Again, the HRC noted 
that the activity, in this case logging, did not amount to a violation and again 
minimization of  activities as well as the consultation with the Sami were crucial 
to this decision.244  The HRC further developed its view that “[t]he Committee 
deems it important to point out that the State party must bear in mind when 
                                                 
240 S. Joseph, Human Rights Committee: Recent Cases, 2 Human Rights Law Review 287, 297-98 (2000).  Recognizing 
this issue, Indigenous Peoples took a different strategy in Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi.  As Scheinin notes, here the 
Sami not only brought a claim under Article 27 but under Article 14 right to a fair trial.  After finding a violation 
of Article 14, the HRC said it did not have enough information to draw a conclusion about the factual 
importance of the lands at the heart of the dispute to reindeer husbandry and the long-term impacts on its 
sustainability as a cultural activity under Article 27.  However, when addressing the Article 14 violation of the 
right to a fair trial and an effective remedy the HRC called on Finland to reconsider the Article 27 claim on the 
domestic level. M. Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 
International Law and Indigenous Peoples 8 (J. Castellino and N. Walsh eds., 2005).   
241 See supra ns. 133-36, 141 and 137-42, 53 and accompanying text (discussing respectively Ominayak and Poma 
Poma). 
242 Länsman et al v Finalnd, Communication No. 671/1995, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1996) [hereinafter Länsman II]. 
243 See supra ns. 143-54 and accompanying text (discussing Länsman I). 
244 Id. at paras. 1.5-10.6. 
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taking steps affecting Article 27, that though different activities in themselves 
may not constitute a violation of  this Article, such activities, taken together, may 
erode the rights of  Sami people to enjoy their own culture.”245  Similarly, in 
Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi,246 the HRC again found in favour of  Finland regarding 
logging activities in Sami reindeer-herding areas placing importance on 
minimization and consultation.247   
 
Finally and perhaps most significant, the HRC in its tendency to uphold the facts 
as found by the domestic court in the state party to the case has also resulted in 
jurisprudence that refused to examine issues of  restitution to Indigenous 
Peoples; albeit land rather than cultural property yet again the similarity between 
the two make such a refusal relevant.  Specifically, in Jonassen v Norway248 the 
complaints were again members of  the Sami engaged in reindeer breeding and 
herding; an essential part of  Sami culture.  The complainants alleged that the 
State’s failure to recognize and protect their traditional land rights to let their 
cattle graze on their traditional lands was a violation of  Article 27 and further 
that it was a violation of  Article 26 concerning discrimination as the Norwegian 
Supreme Court in making such a ruling based its decision on the facts made in 
the 19th century when the Samis were discriminated against and Norwegian land 
owners private property rights were favored.249  Ultimately, the HRC found for 
the State dismissing the Article 26 discrimination claim on the grounds that it 
was not for the HRC to re-examine facts as found by domestic courts even from 
the 19th century rife with discrimination.   
 
In respect of articles 26 and 27, the Committee notes the authors' 
arguments that the Supreme Court in the "Aursunden Case 1997" attached 
importance to the Supreme Court decision in 1897, and that the latter 
                                                 
245 Id. at para. 10.7. 
246 Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi v Finalnd, Communication No. 779/197, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (2001) [hereinafter Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi]. 
247 Id. at para. 7.6. 
248 Mr. Jarle Jonassen v. Norway, Communication No. 942/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/881/1999 (2002). 
249 Id. at para. 3.1. 
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decision was based upon discriminatory views of the Samis.  However, the 
authors have not provided information which would call into doubt the 
finding of the Supreme Court in the "Aursunden Case 1997" that the 
Supreme Court in 1897 was not biased against the Samis.  It is not for the 
Committee to re-evaluate the facts that have been considered by the 
Supreme Court in the "Aursunden Case 1997".  The Committee is of the 
opinion that the authors have failed to substantiate this part of their claim, 
for the purposes of admissibility, and it is therefore inadmissible under 
article 2 of the Optional Protocol…250 
 
In essence, the HRC refused to look behind the decision of the Norwegian 
Supreme Court despite evidence of previous discrimination.  Moreover, the 
HRC then found the Article 27 claim inadmissible.  
 
The Committee considers that the amendment of  the Reindeer Husbandry 
Act and the subsequent negotiations aiming at providing a remedy for the 
authors, provide a reasonable explanation for the length of  the examination 
of  the authors' claim.  It cannot conclude that the Norwegian legislation, 
obliging the authors to follow the procedure of  settling their claims with the 
landowners before bringing a claim of  expropriation, is unreasonable.  The 
Committee also notes that while the authors have been subjected to one 
case of  a criminal charge for illegal use of  the disputed land for which they 
have been acquitted, they have been able to continue their reindeer herding 
to the same extent as before the relevant Supreme Court judgements.  The 
Committee therefore cannot conclude that the application of  domestic 
remedies has been unduly prolonged.  The authors' claim under article 27 is 
inadmissible for the non-exhaustion of  domestic remedies, under article 5, 
paragraph 2 (b) of  the Optional Protocol.251 
 
After this decision, in 2004 Professor Martin Scheinin, then a member of  the 
HRC, noted that “somewhat paradoxically, the ICCPR which is a human rights 
treaty with neither a property clause nor a lands right clause—nor, for that 
matter, any explicit reference to ‘indigenouness,’ has become one of  the main 
tools in positive human rights treaty law for indigenous peoples’ land rights 
claims.”252  Indeed, the HRC has protected some land rights through the cultural 
attachments that Indigenous Peoples have to their lands so as to secure 
                                                 
250 Mr. Jarle Jonassen v. Norway, Communication No. 942/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/881/1999 (2002) 
para 8.3. 
251 Id. at para. 8.9. 
252 M. Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under the International Covenant on civil and Political Rights, 
reprinted in Engle, supra n. 52, at 115. 
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traditional economic activities.253  However, the decision in Jonassen casts doubt 
upon the ability of  the HRC to remedy historical injustices against indigenous 
peoples concerning their land including through restitution.  Indeed, the refusal 
of  the HRC to act as a court of  fourth instance and so to uphold the facts as 
found by the domestic court in the state party,  
 
…does not bode well for future land-rights claims before the HRC, as such 
claims often involve the questioning of  local court judgments on complex 
issues of  fact, law and local history.  Consistent deferral by the HRC to such 
judgments may thwart the effective use of  article 27 to uphold or restore 
important rights, indigenous land rights, that the guarantee was intended to 
protect.254  
 
This in particular does not bode well for claims for the restitution of cultural 
property under Article 27.  Indeed, jurisprudence from the HRC reveals that 
Ominayak and Poma Poma remain the only cases where the HRC has found a 
violation of Article 27 when competing against the needs of the state.  The 
specific difference in Länsman I and Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi seems to lie in the 
participation of Indigenous Peoples through consultation;255 again this stems 
from the fact that it is easier for the HRC to assess objectively the process rather 
than the consequences and so has been incorporated into its decision making 
process.256  The issue with this approach is that it places emphasis on the 
decision-making process rather than on the substantive issues of the cultural 
impact of these activities on Indigenous Peoples.   
 
In sum, collectively these limitations do not bode well for the restitution of 
cultural property under Article 27 in practice; though in theory as part of the 
norm of cultural integrity such remedial measures are intrinsic.  These limitations 
                                                 
253 See supra ns. 133-36, 141 and 137-42, 53 and accompanying text (discussing respectively Ominayak and Poma 
Poma). 
254 S. Joseph et. al., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary 
788 (2nd ed. 2005). 
255 See supra ns.152-4 and 247 [discussing respectively consultation in Länsman I and Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi]. See 
also supra n. 37, General Comment 23, supra n. 125, at paragraph 7 (emphasizing the importance of consultation 
with Indigenous Peoples). 
256 S. Joseph, supra n. 240, at 297-98.   
 131 
on the Article 27 right to culture paint a portrait of a right, like most rights, that 
is not absolute but is in particular highly qualified.  Therefore Article 11, in its 
present and diluted form which sees the restitution of cultural property not a 
right in itself but rather a possible discretionary remedy as a derivative of another 
right, steps back to comfortably fit within the practice under Article 27 under 
IHRL which does not guarantee restitution. 
 
V. One Step Forwards One Steps Back 
 
In her seminal article, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights,257 Engle details the relationship 
between Indigenous Peoples and their advocacy strategies and IHRL.  Ultimately 
these strategies ensured that the Declaration as a whole was watered down from 
its original form—just as Article 11 was watered down and took one step back to 
fit comfortably within existing IHRL.258   
 
Initially, IHRL was not the obvious forum for Indigenous Peoples to pursue 
their grievances as it was considered a tool of colonialism or neo-colonialism and 
so was often perceived rather as simply a site of resistance.259  Therefore, in the 
1970s and early 1980s Indigenous Peoples on the whole rejected human rights 
and pursued strategies of advocacy that focused on self-determination.260  This 
form of advocacy reinforced the idea of self-determination as political right 
                                                 
257 Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples in the Context of  Human 
Rights, 22 European Journal of  International Law 141 (2011).  
258 See infra Chapter 4 at Section III (discussing Engle’s meso-level analysis of the Declaration as a whole 
demonstrating how it was watered down thus paralleling the retrogression that Article 11 specifically experienced 
as demonstrated above). 
259 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra. 257, at 151.   
260 Id. at151.  Engle refines this concept and notes that typically in the global North indigenous groups advocated 
self-determination while in the global south advocacy focused on cultural rights.  However, such a divide was not 
strict and absolute.  Different models were tried in different placed with a cross-fertilization of ideas and 
strategies.  Yet in all a self-determination discourse was present. Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous 
Development, 71-72.  See generally, K. Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n. 52, at Chapter 2 (detailing indigenous 
advocacy in the 1970s).  
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accompanying the incidents of statehood and so included the possibility of 
secession or independence261 and reigned supreme until the mid-1980s.262   
 
In the mid-1980s and early 1990s a noticeable shift occurred; specifically, 
advocates began to abandon their commitment to strong forms of self-
determination in favor of a weaker version articulated as autonomy within the 
context of IHRL.263  This internal modality of self-determination remains alive 
and well today264 and finds expression specifically within the Declaration and 
more broadly within IHRL.265  At the same time, their strategies also began to 
focus on IHRL much to the concern of many commentators who identified two 
principal problems with IHRL for Indigenous Peoples:  its failure to address and 
even rejection of a political concept of self-determination for Indigenous 
Peoples and its focus on individual rights at the expense of collective rights.266   
 
As a corollary of this shift in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, indigenous 
advocacy strategies underwent a two-fold transformation.  First, indigenous 
advocates softened their stance towards self-determination and began to support 
an internal modality.267  Specifically, this approach emerged as a result of the 
failure by international instruments and the bodies that interpret them to 
recognize external forms of self-determination for Indigenous Peoples leaving 
only a weaker version often articulated as internal self-determination within the 
                                                 
261 See infra Chapter 4 at I(A)- (C)(discussing the evolution of self-determination as a political concept and a legal 
right under international law and finally as a right under IHRL). 
262 See generally, K. Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n. 52, at Chapter 3 (detailing indigenous advocacy in the 1980s].  
In turn, this was the dominate approach of indigenous advocates in the initial sessions of the WGIP charged with 
drafting the Declaration.  In response to this approach, in these early WGIP session  to the extent that states 
participated those that did largely opposed the inclusion of the term completely or sought its precise definition as 
a means to limit its application. See id., at 79-91. 
263 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 257, at 152.   
264 Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n. 52, at 72.  
265 See generally Chapter 4 [discussing internal self-determination in IHRL and the Declaration.] 
266 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 257, at 152.    
267 Id.  See also Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n. 52, at Chapter 4. 
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IHRL framework.268  Second, indigenous advocates began undertaking efforts to 
broaden IHRL so as to incorporate a collective right to culture.269  In turn, given 
this broader advocacy strategy it is unsurprising that the contextualization of the 
issue of the restitution of cultural property as a human right was located in the 
cannon of cultural rights.270  Yet, as regards this approach Engle notes that it has 
largely failed.  Since the early 1990s, international instrument and the bodies that 
interpret them have been open to claims by Indigenous Peoples under the right 
of a human right to culture but almost exclusively a right to culture based on 
individual claims rather than collective claims;271 ultimately then reading out 
many indigenous claims through the concepts of the “repugnancy clause” and 
ultimately the “invisible asterisk.”272  As aforementioned, Article 27 and its legal 
commentary and jurisprudence demonstrate that cultural rights and the norm of 
cultural integrity are not absolute; rather cultural rights are subject to numerous 
limitations and in particular as demonstrated the powerful countervailing human 
rights of others which includes the individual rights of members of the same 
minority.  Indeed, as aforementioned General Comment No. 23 on Article 27 
makes clear that the protection of culture it offers does not trump other human 
rights provided in the ICCPR: “The Committee observes that none of the rights 
protected under article 27 of the Covenant may be legitimately exercised in a 
manner or to an extent inconsistent with the other provisions of the 
                                                 
268 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 257, at 157. See infra Chapter 4 at Section I(C) (tracing self-
determination from external to an internal modality as made applicable to Indigenous Peoples under IHRL 
thereby confirming Engle’s findings regarding indigenous advocacy.)  
269 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 257, at 152. See also Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n.52, at Chapter 4. 
270 Robbins and Stamatopoulou  point out the irony in the use of this ‘strategic essentialism’ by indigenous 
activists  just at a time when concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ are being deconstructed by academics. Bauer et 
al., supra n. 123, at 55 [citation omitted].  
271 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 257, at 157-8. 
272 See infra at ns. 269-72 and accompanying text (discussing these concept).  She further argues to the extent that 
these claims have been successful in penetrating IHRL, they are still limited in terms of the indigenous 
subjectivities that they cover and what they permit. Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 257, at 161.  She 
refers to these limits as the dark side or unintended consequences of protection in IHRL and notes that to the 
extent that cultural heritage is protected by IHRL it has suffered from such limitations. See generally Engle, The 
Elusive Promise, supra n. 52, at 148-61 (discussing generally the dark side of unintended consequences of cultural 
as heritage). See also Chapter 5 at Section 2(F) (discussing the dark side of unintended consequences of cultural as 
heritage within in this thesis). 
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Covenant.”273  In general, this boils down to the tension between individual 
rights on the one hand and collective rights on the other hand within the cannon 
of IHRL.  In particular, when the conflict is with the individual right of members 
of the same minority to their culture, this boils down to the inherent tension in 
Article 27 that includes both a collective and an individual right to culture.  As 
Engle notes, “[e]ven some of the strongest advocates of the right to culture have 
proposed, or at least accepted, restraints on that right.  Those restraints generally 
find their source in the language of human rights.”274   
 
To describe this limitation on cultural rights, Engle borrows the concept 
developed by Elizabeth Povinelli of the “invisible asterisk.”  This concept allows 
for deference to indigenous customary law yet it is based on “an invisible 
asterisk, a proviso, [that] hovers above every enunciation of indigenous 
customary law: ‘(provided [they]… are not so repugnant).”275  Leon Sheleff 
identifies this concept as stemming from colonial legacy as a means by which to 
measure non-compliance with the values of western culture.  Yet despite its 
ethnocentrism, it emerged as the means through which legal pluralism276 was 
allowed to develop noting that it was not presented “merely, or even mainly, as 
being some sort of compromise between conflicting value systems and their 
normative rulings, but as being an expression of minimum standards being 
applied as a qualification to the toleration being accorded (by recognition) to the 
basically unacceptable norms of ‘backward’ communities.”277  In turn, the 
invisible or the not so invisible asterisk as Engle notes  “generally limits the right 
to culture the moment that a cultural practice violates “universal,” often 
individual, human rights.”278  Indeed, it is this approach under IHRL that has 
                                                 
273 General Comment No. 23, supra n. 125, at para. 8. 
274 Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n. 52, at 133.  
275 Id. [citation omitted]. 
276 See infra Chapter 5 at Section II(A) (discussing legal pluralism generally and within the U.S. legislation of the 
Native American Graves Protection Act in particular).  
277 Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n. 52, at 134 [citation omitted]. 
278 Id. 
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been identified in the cases above; a right to culture that privileges individual 
over collective rights which have ultimately resulted in reading out the 
indigneousness in these claims through the concepts of the “repugnancy clause” 
and ultimately the “invisible asterisk” and into which Article 11 has stepped back 
into for a comfortable fit.   
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explored the contextualization of the issue of the restitution of 
cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under IHRL in order to grasp its 
theoretical underpinnings.  It has revealed that Article 11 has its roots principally 
in cultural rights and the norm of cultural integrity which embraces remedial 
measures.  Moreover, it is rooted in the related concepts of cultural identity, 
cultural diversity, and identity politics all of which can be viewed as a wave of 
emerging rights and/or norms that seek to regulate to a certain extent identity.  
In turn, Article 11 and the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous peoples was born into a dialogue that comes down to one not so 
much about ownership but about who controls the presentation of identity.   
 
More broadly this chapter has demonstrated that the issue of the restitution of 
cultural property found itself located in indigenous advocacy strategies that 
pushed for its contextualization in the cannon of IHRL as a right to culture.  
Yet, in particular, it has demonstrated that it was this contextualization that 
meant that the issue of restitution of cultural property experienced a 
retrogression; as the sui generis right to restitution secured in Draft Article 12 of 
the Declaration did not survive the drafting process to emerge in Article 11 but 
rather what is offered steps back to fit comfortably within the existing cannon of 
IHRL and specifically cultural rights which in theory can provide for the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples but in practice given its 
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limitations does not make such restitution likely. Therefore, at present IHRL 
does not secure for Indigenous Peoples a right to the restitution of cultural 
property and in this respect the Declaration failed to fulfill the aspirations of 
Indigenous Peoples to secure such a right.  
 
Diagram 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yet this is not the full story.  The failure of IHRL and so the Declaration to 
provide for a right to the restitution of cultural property by securing its 
retrogression was not simply fuelled by it contextualization as a cultural right and 
all this entails; this retrogression was further underpinned by its specific links 
with the concepts of self-determination and property thereby locking it in a fatal 
triumvirate of concepts that face powerful opposition under IHRL ensuring its 
failure as a sui generis right.  It is to these two latter concepts to which this thesis 
now turns to explore through a micro-level analysis of Article 11. 
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Chapter Four 
Exploring the Limits of Contextualization: 
A Micro-Level Analysis of the Failure of Article 11 to 
Accommodate a Right to the Restitution of Cultural 
Property for Indigenous Peoples 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples as a human rights issue in general is unsurprising given that 
IHRL is the predominate moral paradigm of the late 20th and early 21st centuries; 
the “lingua franca of both states and social movements, from left to the right … 
[leaving] few legal and discursive spaces wholly outside the human rights 
framework.”1  Indeed as Professor Prott notes, claims for the repatriation of 
cultural property to Indigenous Peoples are now receiving serious attention; 
attention that they have not really received since the heyday of decolonization 
and the 1960s for two reasons: first an advancement in anthropological thinking 
which insists on respect for diverse cultures and which values all contributions to 
the human experience and second the development of human rights 
philosophies “which have given these peoples a basis of claim legitimate even in 
legal systems which have hitherto denied their rights to their own cultural 
materials.”2  Moreover, it also parallels the changing strands of thought within 
not only the disciplines of Anthropology and Law but Archaeology that 
advocates the return of cultural property on the grounds of moral reasons to 
                                                 
1 Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples in the Context of  Human 
Rights, 22 European Journal of  International Law 141, 158 (2011).  
2 Lyndel Prott, Repatriation of Cultural Property, University of British Columbia Law Review, Special Issue 229, 
(1995).  
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make amends for past injustices committed in the name of colonialism and 
imperialism.3  As Elezar Barkan notes: “[c]ontrol of one’s patrimony is seen as a 
mark of equality and has become a privileged right in today’s world.  Restitution 
of cultural property, therefore, occupies a middle ground that can provide the 
necessary space in which to negotiate identities and a mechanism to mediate 
between the histories of perpetrators and victims.”4  Unsurprisingly, it also 
reflects the changing strands of thought within Cultural Heritage Studies which 
are multidisciplinary studies drawing on the aforementioned fields of 
Anthropology, Archaeology and Law amongst others.  CHS studies explore the 
impact of heritage on present and future approaches to heritage in relation to its 
complexities and challenges with a focus on new holistic avenues.5  Specifically, 
Loulanski identifies within these studies a perceptible shift along three different 
axes “1) from monuments to people; 2) from objects to functions; and thus 3) 
from preservation per se to purposeful preservation, sustainable use, and 
development.”6  At their core, these shifts all demonstrate a move towards a 
“people-centered, functional, approach in regard to heritage.”7   
 
From these developments, within the discourse of international cultural property 
law a new approach has emerged known as Cultural Indigenism which has 
produced a surge of literature which advocates for indigenous values and 
perspectives in relation to cultural property8 and so presents a new way of 
                                                 
3 Alexander Bauer et al., When Theory, Practice and Policy Collide or Why do Archaeologists Support Cultural Property 
Claims? in Archaeology and Capitalism: From Ethics to Politics 45 (Yannis Hamilakis and Philip Duke eds., 
2007). 
4 E. Barkan, Amending Historical Injustices: The Restitution of Cultural Property- An Overview in Claiming the 
Stones/Naming the Bones: Cultural Property and the Negotiating of National and Ethnic Identity (E. Barkan 
and R. Bush eds.) reprinted in Bauer, supra n.3, at 45.  However, Bauer et al. are careful to note that this position 
rests on assumptions and analyzed in light of contemporary thinking about culture and cultural rights argues 
against blind blanket support for repatriation even on moral grounds but rather cautions careful analysis on a 
case by case basis that includes an assessment of the requesting state’s own commitment to its indigenous groups. 
See generally Bauer, supra n. 3, at 45. 
5 Tolina Loulanski, Revising the Concept for Cultural Heritage: the Argument for a Functional Approach, 13 International 
Journal of Cultural Property 207, 208 (2006). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 212. 
8 Karolina Kuprecht, Human Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation, Working Paper No. 2009/34, 
NCCR Trade Regulation, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, 8 (2009), at http://www.google.co.
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thinking about restitution from the traditional aforementioned theories of 
Cultural Nationalism and Cultural Internationalism which have dominated the 
international cultural property discourse.  Kuprecht identifies as prominent 
among these the writings of Elazar Barkan, Ana Filipa Vrdoljak9, Catherine Bell 
and Robert K. Patterson who both constitute and define this approach which 
has a “better understanding of indigenous cultures … [and] a newly defined 
respect for their diversity…”10  As the Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity notes: 
 
The defence [sic] of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable 
from respect for human dignity.  It implies a commitment to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, in particular the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities and those of indigenous peoples.11 
 
In turn, at their core these are all human-centered approaches and a human-
centered approach aligns with the ethos of IHRL; and so in conjunction with the 
aforementioned advocacy strategies of Indigenous Peoples focused on pursuing 
a right to culture in IHRL12, the inclusion of the issue of restitution in relation to 
cultural property in the Declaration13 and even the Declaration itself is 
unsurprising as a synergy of these efforts.   
                                                                                                                                                    
uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphase1.nccrtr
ade.org%2Fimages%2Fstories%2Fpublications%2FIP7%2FWorking%2520Paper%2520Kuprecht%2520230620
09.pdf&ei=fGz4VPHICe2t7AbFvICwDw&usg=AFQjCNGjphJMl2XBTqLeKrgSBzqPsAFTvw&bvm=bv.8751
9884,d.ZGU.  Within Cultural Indigenism it would be possible to identify a further sub-set of advocates know as 
Cultural Intra-nationalists.  Cultural Intra-nationalists are indigenous groups “attempting to exercise control over 
their cultural heritage they recognize as their own” Joe Watkins, Cultural Nationalists, Internationalists and 
“Intra-nationalists”: Who’s Right and Whose rights?, 12 International Journal of Cultural Property 78, 79 (2005).  
9 Vrdoljak  notes that this understanding of cultural heritage as integral to the enjoyment of human rights and 
cultural diversity also resulted in a  recalibration of the underlying rationale for the protection of cultural property 
in International Humanitarian Law from one of  exceptionalism requiring protection as a result of its “perceived 
significance to humanity through its advancement of the arts and sciences, and knowledge”, to one based  not on 
such on exclusivity but rather “its intrinsic importance to people and individuals, to their identity, and their 
enjoyment of their human rights.” Ana Fillipa Vrdoljak, Cultural Heritage in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 250 (Orna Ben- Naftali ed., 2011).  
10 Karolina Kuprecht, supra n. 8, at 8-9.   
11 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, Nov. 2, 2001 UNESCO Rec. of Gen. Conf., 31st Sess, Art. 4. 
Reprinted in Marina Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural 
Identities of Indigenous Peoples Under International Law, 8 Chapman Law Review 201 (2005).  
12 See supra Chapter 3 at SectionV. 
13 Kuprecht describes the Declaration as a response the regulatory lacuna regarding the issue of the restitution of 
the cultural property of indigenous s peoples  that exits within both international framework for the protection of 
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Yet as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the contextualization of the issue 
of the restitution of cultural property in IHRL through Article 11 failed to 
advance the aspiration of Indigenous Peoples in relation to securing a sui generis 
right the restitution of such property.  In fact, as illustrated it steps back to fit 
comfortably within existing IHRL.  In turn this chapter explores what underpins 
the retrogression which has played out in Article 11 in the Declaration.  It posits 
that the failure of IHRL and so the Declaration to provide for a right to the 
restitution of cultural property by securing its retrogression was not simply 
fuelled by it contextualization as a cultural right; this retrogression was further 
underpinned by the continuing concerns on the part of states over its specific 
links with the concepts of self-determination and property which is exacerbated 
by their association with collective rights thereby locking ultimately locking  it in 
a fatal triumvirate of concepts assuring that a sui generis right to restitution would 
not come to fruition.  In turn, this chapter explores the contextualization of the 
issue of the restitution of cultural property at the micro-level by offering an 
analysis concentrating specifically on one article within the Declaration; Article 
11 and its failure to address the needs and secure the demands of Indigenous 
Peoples in relation to the restitution of cultural property.  It does so by first 
exploring the issue of self-determination and its links with cultural property and 
the related concepts of culture, cultural heritage and in particular the restitution 
of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples; and next by exploring the link with 
traditional property concepts ultimately demonstrating that these further 
connections secured the retrogression of Article 11.  It ultimately concludes by 
looking at the work of Professor Karen Engle who provides a meso-level of the 
Declaration itself noting that the micro-level analysis herein parallels what she 
has uncovered at the through her analysis of the Declaration.   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
cultural property and IHRL already explored respectively in Chapters Two and Three. Karolina Kuprecht, supra 
n. 8, 20. 
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I. Self-Determination as a Limitation on Article 11 and the 
Restitution of Cultural Property 
 
A. Self-Determination: From a Political Concept to a Legal Right  
under International Law 
 
As a political concept, it is widely recognized that self-determination achieved its 
clearest expression at the end of the First World War.14  U.S. President Wilson 
declared in 1918 that “peoples may not be dominated and governed only by their 
consent.  ‘Self-determination’ is not a mere phrase.  It is an imperative principle 
of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”15  Although 
cementing its association with Western thought and liberal democracy, self-
determination need not be confined to such exclusivity given its philosophical 
underpinning in equality.16  Indeed, Lenin and Stalin employed self-
determination in conjunction with Marxists principles of class liberation.17  
However, its real momentum came in the wake of the Second World War within 
the context of decolonization which saw the transformation of self-
determination from a political concept into a legal right which had as its focus a 
right to political power that accompanies statehood.18   
 
                                                 
14 Yet self-determination did emerge prior to World War I.  In fact, it was used to justify both the American and 
French revolutions—i.e. the inalienable right to organize their government.  In the 19th century it found 
expression in two different strands of thought.  The first notion of self-determination was bound up with 
another emergent concept, nationalism, and consisted of the idea that the nation/people and the state should be 
congruent while the second conceived of self-determination as a form of representative self-government with the 
ultimate aim of promoting individual liberty. Matthew Craven, Statehood, Self-Determination, and Recognition 
in International Law 230 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3rd ed. 2010).  Despite these differences, at their core both 
presented a challenge to the sovereign authority of the state and echoed the language of change and reform. Id. at 
231. 
15 W. Wilson, War Aims of Germany and Austria (1918) reprinted in  Dixon et al (eds.) Cases & Materials on 
International Law 220 (5th ed. 2011).  Ultimately, it served as the foundation for the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. 
16 S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 98-9 (2nd ed. 2004). 
17 Id.  
18 Self-determination is both a legal right and a principle.  See A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and UN Standards 
155-157 (2007) (discussing self-determination as both a right and a principle).  The validity of self-determination 
as a right within IHRL does not negate its validly as a principle. Id. at 155.  However, the focus herein is on self- 
determination as a legal right in IHRL.  At its core, as a legal right it has been linked to political power and has 
been divided into either an external or internal aspect. Id. at 157. 
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Self-determination was explicitly applied to colonial territories through the 
General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and General Assembly Resolution 
1541 (XV)196019; at their core they linked a colonial states obligations detailed in 
Article 73 of the United Nations Charter and its obligations to protect the right 
of self-determination making them inseparable.20  In the Namibia Opinion, The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared that in relation to Namibia that “the 
subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing 
territories as enshrined in the UN Charter made the principle of self-
determination applicable to all of them”21; in essence the right of self-
determination was a rule of customary international law at least in relation to the 
colonial context.  This has been confirmed by numerous cases in this context 
including the Western Sahara Case22 and more recently the East Timor Case 
(Portugal v. Australia) where the court noted that self-determination was “one of 
the essential principles of contemporary international law”.23  In essence, Article 
73 of the United Nations Charter as confirmed by the ICJ placed self-
determination as a legal right within the context of decolonization. 
 
More specifically, within the context of colonialism the exercise of self-
determination took the form of an external exercise: secession or independence.  
General Recommendation 21 issued by Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
                                                 
19 See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960.  It grants independence to colonial countries and peoples and 
affirms the desire to end of colonialism in all its manifestations.  It is widely recognized as the foundation of self-
determination as a legal concept in international law and calls for the emancipation of colonial peoples “without 
any condition or reservation in order to allow them to enjoy full independence.” Id.  See also Principles which 
should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for 
under Article 73e of the Charter, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 of 15 December 1960.  It 
affirms that decolonization will comply with the principles of self-determination and details the three principle 
ways in which it may be exercised including in the decision to be recognized as a sovereign and independent 
state, to associate with an independent state and to integrate with an independent state already in existence.  
20 Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights 92-4 (2002). See infra Chapter 5 at Section I(C) and 
accompanying texting (discussing how these documents were unfortunate for Indigenous Peoples as the thrust of 
the content is to limit self-determination to colonial peoples). 
21 See Namibia Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971 16, International Court of Justice, at 52. 
22 See Western Sahara, ICJ Rep. 1974 12, International Court of Justice. 
23 See East Timor, ICJ Rep. 1995 90, International Court of Justice, at 90. 
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Discrimination [CERD] provides more detail offering insight into external self-
determination: 
 
The external aspect of self-determination implies that all peoples have the right 
to determine freely their political status and their place in the international 
community based upon the principle of equal rights and exemplified by the 
liberation of peoples from colonialism and by the prohibition to subject peoples 
to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation.24 
 
This traditionally has been the limit of self-determination with the bulk of 
international lawyers and academics of the opinion that self-determination only 
applies to colonial peoples who desire independence or to those whose territory 
is subject to foreign occupation.25  In turn, external self-determination focuses 
on claims by a people to a particular territory and is exercised either by 
maintaining existing state boundaries or changing the boundaries of an existing 
state.  In the case of the former, the people are the population of an existing 
state whereas in the latter the people wish to break away from an existing state 
which is known as secession.  More specifically, the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) 24 October, 1970 26 only understood self-determination 
then in an external exercise offering that it could be exercised through: the 
establishment of a sovereign and independent state, free association, integration 
with an independent state or the creation of any other political status as 
determination by a people.27    
 
                                                 
24 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21, The right to self-
determination, U.N. Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII at 125 (1996) at para. 4. 
25 Xanthaki identified that this was the consensus reached in 1992 by prominent international jurists and scholars 
including Franck, Higgins, Pellet, Shaw and Tomuschat. Xanthaki, UN Standards, supra n. 18, at 141. 
26 See generally Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) 
24 October, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), 25 UN GAOR Supp (No 28) 121 (every state has a duty to bring a 
speedy end to colonialism having regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned) [hereinafter 
Declaration concerning Friendly Relations XXV]. 
27 Id. at para. 4  
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Even this limited view of self-determination is subject to further limitations; the 
aforementioned Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) 24 
October, 197028 emphasizes that nothing in the declaration should be construed 
as dismembering or impairing in total or in part the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the state.29  Unsurprisingly, self-determination is also recognized 
in the Charter at Articles 1(2)30 and 5531 and its placement here has been 
interpreted to link self-determination to the right of people of a state to be free 
from interference from other states or governments; thus with an emphasis on 
the equal rights of states rather than the right of peoples to be independent as in 
the colonial context.32 
 
B. A Legal Right under IHRL: Indigenous Peoples as the 
Beneficiaries of Self Determination? 
 
Beyond its recognition under international law within the limited context of 
decolonization and the equality of states as a right to political power 
accompanying statehoood, self-determination has come to be recognized more 
specifically within IHRL.  Making manifest this shift to a specific human right, it 
appears in the twin articles 1(3) in the ICCPR and the International Covenant on 
                                                 
28 See generally Declaration concerning Friendly Relations XXV, supra n. 26. 
29 Id at para. 6 and 7.  The concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity and their powerful role in self-
determination will be explored herein. See generally infra Chapter 5. 
30 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, 
at Art. 1(2) (The Purposes of the United Nations are … [t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace…”). 
31 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, 
at Art. 55 (With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful 
and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, the United Nations shall promote: higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development; solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion) 
[emphasis added]. 
32 A. Kaczorowska, Public International Law 575 (4th ed. 2010). 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [CESCR] which collectively provide that 
“[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination [and] [b]y virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”33  However, inclusion as a human right did not 
result in an automatic expansion of the concept of self-determination from 
peoples living under colonialism to all peoples including Indigenous Peoples.  In 
essence, only after a lengthy, intense and contentious debate which 
predominately occurred within the drafting process of the UNDRIP concerning 
who are the beneficiaries of this right, has a general consensus been reached that 
Indigenous Peoples are the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination in 
IHRL.   
 
Apart from those aforementioned people living under colonial rule who are 
entitled to an external exercise of self-determination, international law does not 
address who are the “people” or “peoples” entitled to self-determination.  In 
turn, at the crux of this beneficiary debate is ultimately whether or not 
Indigenous Peoples qualify as “peoples” for the purpose of the right and so the 
debate turns on the definition of peoples in international law; unfortunately 
international law does not contain any such definition34 and this proved to be an 
issue from the very start of the drafting process of the Declaration with the 1994 
Technical Review of the draft Declaration noting that:   
 
A number of issues of a general nature have been brought up at sessions of 
the Working Group on Indigenous Populations.  These include questions 
                                                 
33 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976  at Art. 1(3)[hereinafter ICCPR]; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, at Arts. 1,3,6, 15 entered into force January 3, 1976 at Art. 
1(3)[hereinafter ICESCR](emphasis added). 
34 Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 135-6.  See also DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES, Technical Review of the United Nations draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2 paras. 10-13 (detailing the lack of a definition of peoples under international law) 
[hereinafter Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples]. 
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relating to the definition of the beneficiaries, the scope and meaning of terms 
and words such as "peoples"[and] "self-determination”35 
 
Professor Anaya has identified three traditional streams regarding self-
determination and the term peoples.36  The first stream as identified above 
restricts the term peoples to those under the conditions of classical colonialism 
and so focuses on decolonization and ultimately independent statehood  as the 
remedy as detailed above.37  The second stream includes in the term people not 
just those under the classical condition of colonialism but also those that include 
the aggregate population of independent states.38  The third view like the others 
continues to accept the premise that the world is divided into mutually exclusive 
territorial communities but does not define the peoples entitled to self-
determination as limited to colonialism or the state; rather it perceives alternate 
politically defined geographies based on the idea that peoples are units that either 
once were sovereign states or are entitled to be states based on ethnonationalist 
theory with the remedy here being most commonly associated with the re-
division of Europe in the aftermath of World War I  along ethnic lines.39   
 
Noticeably, none include Indigenous Peoples as just that: peoples entitled to 
self-determination.  Even assuming acceptance as peoples, it does not follow for 
some states that Indigenous Peoples would be entitled to self-determination.  
Indeed early in the drafting process Argentina noted that they took the view that 
the applicability of the right to self-determination for Indigenous Peoples 
“simply because they are indigenous peoples is nowhere supported by the 
practice of states or by current international law.”40  Throughout the drafting 
process concerns persisted in relation to the beneficiary debate.  For instance, 
                                                 
35 Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 34, at para. 9. 
36 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 16, at 100. 
37 Id. See supra Section A (discussing the application of self-determination to decolonization). 
38 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, at 100. 
39 Id. at 101. 
40 See Information Received by Governments, Argentina, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2 para. 6 reprinted in 
Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 133. 
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Chairperson-Rapporteur: Mr. José Urrutia noted in his 1996 report on the Draft 
Declaration that  
 
A large number of Governments were opposed to the use of the term 
"peoples" since it would imply that indigenous people were considered to be 
subjects of international law and as such would be entitled to the right of 
self-determination and sovereignty…41 
  
Yet, at the same time, he noted that other states had no problem with the term 
“peoples” in the draft Declaration in relation to Indigenous Peoples and self-
determination.42  Finally, other states took the position that before such a 
determination could be made that the scope and content of self-determination 
and its compatibility with international law needed to be determined.43  In turn, 
summarizing the positions taken in the drafting process almost 10 years after the 
1993 Draft Declaration in relation to the beneficiaries’ debate, Chairperson-
Rapporteur Mr. Luis-Enrique Chávez identified the following positions 
demonstrating just how complex and contentious the debate remained: 
 
There was no consensus on the term “indigenous peoples” at the working 
group on the draft declaration.  Some States can accept the use of the term 
“indigenous peoples”.  Some States can accept the use of the term 
“indigenous peoples” pending consideration of the issue in the context of 
discussions on the right to self-determination.  Other States cannot accept 
the use of the term “indigenous peoples”, in part because of the implications 
this term may have in international law, including with respect to self-
determination and individual and collective rights.  Some delegations have 
suggested other terms in the declaration, such as “indigenous individuals”, 
“persons belonging to an indigenous group”, “indigenous populations”, 
“individuals in community with others”, or “persons belonging to indigenous 
peoples”.44  
 
                                                 
41 Mr. José Urrutia Report of the Working Group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84 at para. 38; See also id. at para. 44. 
42 Id. at para. 24 
43 Id. 
44 Mr. Luis-Enrique Chávez, Indigenous Issues, Report of the Working Group established in accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/32,  U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98 at Annex 1 Compilation of 
Amendments Proposed by Some States for Future Discussions Based on the Sub-Commission Text, at p.22 
Explanatory Note. 
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However, ultimately a general consensus was reached that the right of self-
determination under IHRL was applicable to Indigenous Peoples.  
Unsurprisingly, Indigenous Peoples and their advocates consistently have 
claimed access to the right.45  As Professor Anaya notes, 
 
[n]o discussion of indigenous peoples’ rights under international law is 
complete without a discussion of self-determination … Indigenous peoples 
have repeatedly articulated their demands in terms of self-determination, and, 
in turn self-determination precepts have fueled the international movement 
in favor of those demands.46 
 
Indeed, Indigenous Peoples have placed heavy emphasis on claims to self-
determination viewing it as the cornerstone to all other rights and key to their 
advancement and even survival.47  In relation to the Declaration in particular, 
indigenous groups stated: “the right of self-determination is the heart and soul of 
the declaration.  We will not consent to any language which limits or curtails the 
right of self-determination.”48  Any efforts to deny its application to Indigenous 
Peoples have been viewed by these groups as racism, discrimination and 
prejudice.  As the Grand Council of the Crees noted: 
 
…the right of self-determination applies universally to ‘all peoples’ and … 
indigenous peoples must not be deprived of a right simply because certain 
States want the right to be applied in a discriminatory manner to the 
prejudice of indigenous peoples.  There is no reasonable justification for … 
efforts to … restrict or circumscribe the right … Let us call it what it is: 
racism, discrimination, prejudice.49 
 
                                                 
45 This claim fits into the structure identified by Kingsbury as typical of claims by non-state actors.  Aside from 
self-determination, they are claims to minority rights, human rights, sovereignty legitimized by historical 
arguments and claims to other special rights based on prior occupation.  Each has its own discourse and 
structures that shapes the way the claims are made and the responses to such claims. See Benedict Kingsbury, 
Claims by Non-State Groups in International Law, 25 Cornell International Law Journal 481, 1992.  
46 Anaya, International Peoples, supra n. 16, at 97. 
47 Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 4. See also Urrutia Report of the Working Group established in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/84 at para. 51. 
48 J. Gilbert, Indigenous Rights in the Making: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 14 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 207, 218 (2007) [citation omitted]. 
49 Ambassador Ted Moses, Grand Council of the Crees, Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, 12th Session, 
July 1994 reprinted in Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 4. See also  Urrutia, supra n. 41, at para.36 
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Aside from Indigenous Peoples, many others have made the case for the 
applicability of self-determination to the former through a variety of theories and 
interpretations of international documents and decisions.  For instance, 
Professor Anaya argues that the aforementioned three streams he noted are 
narrow conceptions of the term peoples for the purposes of  who are the 
beneficences of self-determination as they all share the same flaw: they limit their 
vision of the world to a world that is divided into mutually exclusive sovereign 
territorial communities which no longer corresponds to the reality of a post-
Westphalian world which consists of “multiple, overlapping spheres of 
community, authority, and interdependency that actually exists in the human 
experience.”50  Further, Anaya also asserts that self-determination is 
presumptively universal in its application to benefit all segments of humanity like 
all human rights norms51 while Thornberry suggests that the universality of the 
applicability of self-determination which thereby would include Indigenous 
Peoples can be seen in Human Rights Committee [HRC] General Comment 12 
as this article notes that self-determination is “an inalienable right of all 
peoples.”52  Subsequently, it is suggested that numerous other documents under 
international law and IHRL confirm that self-determination applies universally 
and so beyond the colonial context such as the Helsinki Final Act as adopted by 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe53 as well as the African 
                                                 
50 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 16, at 101.  In essence, Anaya’s argument to expand self-determination’s 
applicability to Indigenous Peoples rests upon the notion that sovereignty no longer carries the same weight as it 
once wielded in this post-Westphalia world.  Regardless of the accuracy of his argument and conclusion, implicit 
in it is that a clear link exists between the concepts of self- determination and sovereignty.  This link and its 
importance is made explicit in Chapter 5. See infra Chapter 5 at Section I(C).  Further, Dr. Xanthaki finds this 
distinction useful as it takes the focus away from self-determination as an exercise related solely to independence. 
Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 159.  Regarding the accuracy of such an argument, it can be questioned 
in light of this thesis which ultimately demonstrates that sovereignty continues to wield great influence to such an 
extent that it  serves to drive the structural incapacity of IHRL  to meet the demands of Indigenous Peoples 
concerning a right to the restitution of their cultural property. See infra Chapter 6 at Section I(A). 
51 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 16, at 99. 
52 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 12, Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 (1994) 
[herein after General Comment 12], at  para. 2.  See also Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 126. 
53 See Helsinki Final Act as adopted by the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975) available at 
http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true  (noting that the right to self-determination applies to all 
peoples including peoples in independent states and not just the colonial context.) Id. at Principle VIII.  
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Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 198154 though as Dr. Xanthaki notes 
none of these are definitive statements on the applicability of self-determination 
to Indigenous Peoples.55  Yet advocates also stress that documents long 
associated with restricting the right of self-determination to the colonial context 
or an external exercise have been read more broadly to a human rights 
application.  For instance, the aforementioned Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) 24 October, 197056 which is associated with the 
application of self-determination to the colonial context can be read more 
broadly to transcend this application and link it with human rights57 as it notes 
that “[e]very state has the duty to promote through joint and separate action 
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in accordance with the Charter”58 and that beneficiaries of the right include 
“peoples under colonial or racist regimes or other forms of alien domination.”59  
As Thornberry notes, it is this flexibility which makes it possible to interpret self-
determination in the context of human rights and ultimately an internal exercise 
of self-determination60 rather than merely a conservative application to the 
colonial context.61   
 
                                                 
54 See African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 at Art. 20 (All peoples have the right 
to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination.  They shall freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic and social development according to the policy 
they have freely chosen). 
55 See Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 139 (noting that they continue to be over shadowed by concerns 
with sovereignty and territorial integrity). See generally infra Chapter 5 (discussing the concepts of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity in self-determination). 
56 See supra  ns. 26-9. 
57 Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 94. 
58 Declaration concerning Friendly Relations, supra n. 26. 
59 Id. 
60 See infra Section C (discussing internal self-determination). 
61 Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 95.  However, he is careful to note that a reading of the 
Declaration Concerning Friendly relations as encapsulating such a conservative approach is by no means off the 
table as a result of state concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity that underpin self-determination. Id. See 
also Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 138 (also noting that this interpretation would be hampered by the 
principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty).  See generally Chapter 5 (discussing the concepts of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity in self-determination). 
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Regarding jurisprudence, very little exists in IHRL in relation to the right to self-
determination as it has been deemed non-justiciable by the HRC in relation to 
the ICCPR and is generally considered a no-go area.  However, the ICJ found 
self-determination to be erga omnes in nature.  In the East Timor Case (Portugal v. 
Australia) as aforementioned the ICJ noted that self-determination was “one of 
the essential principles of contemporary international law”62 as relates to the 
colonial context but it added that it is also a right erga omnes—binding on the 
international community as a whole.  The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory more commonly known as The Wall 
Opinion63 also confirmed the erga omnes nature of self-determination.  This 
recognition of the erga omnes nature of self-determination to some means that it is 
clear now that it applies outside of the colonial context; confirming the long-
standing suspicion that the U.N. limits on the application of self-determination 
to the context of decolonization smelled more of pragmatism rather than 
principle.64  However, beyond this there is little as the HRC held in Kitok v. 
Sweden65 that an individual does not have locus standi under Article 1 of the ICCPR 
which houses the right to self-determination.  Specifically, Kitok could not claim 
to be a victim of a violation of a right to self-determination as it is a collective 
right that accrues only to peoples66 and as the First Optional Protocol only 
allows the HRC to hear complaints from individuals it therefore refuses to hear 
cases or portions of cases concerning self-determination.  This ruling has been 
followed consistently in the jurisprudence of the HRC including in Ominayak67 
                                                 
62 See East Timor, supra n. 23, at 90. 
63 See The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Rep. 2004 International Court of Justice 136. 
64 Craven, supra note 14, at 232.  
65 Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988) [hereinafter Kitok].  
66 Id. at para. 6(3). See infra Section III (discussing the collective nature of self-determination). 
67 Ominayak v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990) at 
para. 13.3 [hereinafter Ominayak].  “The question whether the Lubicon Lake Band constitute a “people” is not 
an issue for the Committee to address under the Optional Protocol” Id. at para 32.  Further the HRC noted that 
“the author, as an individual, could not claim under the Optional Protocol to be a victim of a violation of the 
right of self-determination … which deals with rights conferred upon peoples, as such” and ultimate address the 
claims in terms of Article 27. Id. at para. 13.3.   
152 
 
and Mahuika68.  The obvious consequence is that this prevents alleged victims 
from bringing complaints but even more concerning is that decision prevents the 
HRC from making a contribution to the understanding of this right in IHRL.69  
Yet, despite ruling that self-determination is non-justiciable, the HRC has issued 
a general comment regarding self-determination noting that it is essential to 
fulfilling all other human rights.  Specifically, General Comment 12 offer that 
“…[t]he right of self-determination is of particular importance because its 
realisation is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of 
individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those 
rights.”70  General Recommendation 21 issued by CERD also stresses the link 
between self-determination and human rights and in particular the rights of 
ethnic groups to self-determination.71 
 
Perhaps ultimately however, the most definitive signs of the applicability of self-
determination to Indigenous Peoples are two-fold.  First, self-determination has 
been included in the Declaration as a right at Article 3 mirroring much of the 
language of the right to self-determination offered in the twin articles 1(3) in the 
ICCPR and the CESCR.  UNDRIP Article 3 provides: “Indigenous Peoples 
have the right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
                                                 
68 Mahuika v New Zealand, Communication No 547/1993,Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993  (27 October 2000) at paras. 3(15) - 3(17).  
69 Thornberry also notes that as a consequence of this distinction a potentially untenable position is taken by the 
HRC in relation to the idea that individuals cannot claim to be the victims of a denial of groups’ rights when 
human rights are understood as interdependent and reciprocal.  Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 
129.  For Thornberry, these decisions must be interpreted as offering that violations of collective rights are more 
appropriately address through different mechanisms  from those available to individuals or left to politics. Id.  
Indeed, perhaps the UNDRIP is the basis for such a mechanism and thereby its nature as an embodiment of 
collective rights is a further reasons why the Declaration as a whole and therefore Article 11 experienced such 
resistance and ultimately a retrogression. See infra n. 154 and Section III(B) [discussing collective rights opposition 
in Article 11 and the Declaration as a whole). 
70 HRC General Comment 12, supra  n. 52, at para. 1. 
71 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21, The right to self-
determination, U.N. Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII at 125 (1996) [hererinafter CERD General Recommendation 
21]. 
153 
 
development.”72  Second, the fact that states have come to recognize a form of 
self-determination available to Indigenous Peoples means that a priori states 
have recognized Indigenous Peoples are the beneficiaries of self-determination, 
albeit a form limited to an internal modality. 
 
C. Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: External to Internal 
Modalities under IHRL  
 
Given the concerns with external self-determination even within the traditional 
context of decolonization73 and even its applicability to Indigenous Peoples as it 
emerged as right in the cannon of IHRL,74 it is unsurprising that outside of this 
context including in the minority/ indigenous context there has been strong 
resistance on the part of states to recognize such an external exercise of self-
determination for Indigenous Peoples.  Ultimately then, given these contentions 
the form of self-determination opened up to Indigenous Peoples by IHRL has 
been limited.  Specifically, it has been transitioned from an external to an internal 
modality as applied to Indigenous Peoples under IHRL.  
 
As outlined above, in the context of colonialism the exercise of self-
determination took the form of an external exercise: secession or independence.  
In Reference Re Secession of Quebec,75  the Supreme Court of Canada was asked 
whether or not there was a right of self-determination under international law 
that would give Quebec the right to secede from Canada unilaterally.  The Court 
answered this question with great care noting that the right to self-determination 
                                                 
72 United Nations Declaration of  the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295 ,UN GAOR, 61st sess 107th 
plen mtg, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (13 September 2007) at Art. 3.  Note, the right of  self-determination that 
has been opened to Indigenous Peoples in the Declaration is in the form of  an internal modality. See infra Section 
I(C) (discussing internal modality of  self-determination generally); see also generally infra Section III conclusions 
(discussion Article 3 in the Declaration in more detail). 
73 See supra Section A. 
74 See supra Section B. 
75 See Reference Re Secession of Quebec (1998) 2 SCR 217, Canadian Supreme Court. 
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can be exercised in a number of ways without secession or independence outside 
of the colonial context; in essence through internal self-determination.   
 
The recognized sources of international law established that the right to self-
determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-
determination – a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and 
cultural development within the framework of an existing state.  A right to 
external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of 
the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme 
of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances…76 
 
However, the court found that in this particular circumstance, that the right to 
self-determination did not provide Quebec with the right to secede as Quebec 
has not been blocked from a meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination internally: “even assuming that … [this] is sufficient to create a 
right to unilateral secession under international law, the current Quebec context 
cannot be said to approach such a threshold…”77  As regards the exercise of 
self-determination and Indigenous Peoples,  the court skillfully avoided  any 
discussion.78 
 
General Recommendation 21 issued by CERD provides more detail offering 
insight into the aspects of internal self-determination.  Specifically, internal self-
determination is in essence the preferred mode of self-determination outside of 
the colonial context and in particular for Indigenous Peoples as it eliminates the 
possibility of secession.  Rather its focus is on the right of peoples to choose 
their political status within the existing state or a right to meaningful political 
participation.  It provides: 
 
                                                 
76 Reference Re Secession of Quebec (1998) 2 SCR 217, Canadian Supreme Court at para. 126. (noting two 
situations where external self-determination has been acceptable including in the colonial context and in the 
context of where people have been subjected to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation but outside of 
colonialism). See id. at para. 133. 
77 Id. at para. 135. 
78 Id. at para. 139. 
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Governments should be sensitive towards the rights of persons belonging to 
ethnic groups, particularly their right to lead lives of dignity, to preserve their 
culture, to share equitably in the fruits of national growth and to play their 
part in the government of the country of which they are citizens.  Also, 
governments should consider … vesting persons belonging to ethnic or 
linguistic groups … with the right to engage in activities which are 
particularly relevant to the preservation of the identity of such persons or 
groups.79 
 
Aside from building the idea in IHRL that internal self-determination is the 
appropriate form of self-determination available to Indigenous Peoples, this 
statement fleshes out the contours of internal self-determination which focuses 
on participation in the democratic process, autonomy and self-government 
within the state.80  This has been the approach of most international documents 
to the form of self-determination available to Indigenous Peoples.  For instance, 
although the ILO Convention 169 does not refer to the right to self-
determination it does require states to base their relationships with Indigenous 
Peoples on cooperation and in certain instances good-faith negotiations and 
consent.  Taken together, these provisions very nearly approximate the right to 
self-determination but fall short of an external variant such as secession and 
independence.81  Moreover, the approach of the African Commission illustrates 
that internal self-determination is understood as the right of peoples to 
participation.  Specifically, in Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire, the Commission 
was asked to recognize the liberation movement for the independence of 
Katanga from Zaire and ultimately to recognize its independence under the 
auspices of the Article 20 right to self-determination secured in the African 
Charter.  In dismissing the case the Commission noted: 
 
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the 
point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called to question and in 
the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to 
                                                 
79 CERD General Recommendation 21, supra n. 71, at para. 10 
80 See Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n.18, at 160-66 (detailing democracy, autonomy and participation relevant 
to fulfilling an internal right to self-determination). 
81 Cultural Survival Website, Making the Most of the ILO Convention 169, at http://www.culturalsurvival.org/p
ublications/cultural-survival-quarterly/bolivia/making-most-ilo-convention-169  
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participate in government as guaranteed by Article 13(1) of the … Charter, 
the Commission holds … that Katanga is obliged to exercise variant of self-
determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Zaire.82    
 
As Thornberry notes, this statement demonstrates a number of points; aside 
from reinforcing the link between internal self-determination with the right of 
participation it more importantly demonstrates that internal self-determination is 
the normal variant of the right to be exercised in the absence of gross human 
rights violations.83  Indeed, others commentators have highlighted this opinion 
as standing for the principle that autonomy aka internal self-determination serves 
as a variant of self-determination which could be exercised within the territorial 
borders of the state in which the group claimed the rights and in turn have gone 
further and explicitly extended this modality to Indigenous Peoples.84 
 
However, most importantly, even those states that were initially most ardently 
opposed to the application of self-determination to Indigenous Peoples have 
come to recognize a right to internal self-determination for Indigenous Peoples 
fulfilled through some combination of the democratic process, autonomy and 
self-government within the state.85  In its report to the HRC concerning 
                                                 
82 Communication No. 75/92: compilation, pp. 50-1 reprinted in Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 
256.  This statement also demonstrates that at the root of self-determination lies concerns with sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. See generally infra Chapter 5.  
83 Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 257.  In essence, gross human rights violations trigger a right to 
external self-determination but bar this internal self-determination is the normal modality of this right.  
Thornberry also relies on the aforementioned Declaration on Principles of International Law to support this 
theorem concerning the relationship between misgovernment and self-determination though noting it is by no 
means completely clear. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 95.  Numerous other scholars support 
this view of remedial secession. See Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at141-3 (detailing scholars that support 
this view).  In turn, the external variant of self-determination starts to look more like a remedy; a remedy which 
began as a measure to rectify colonization and now has been extended to gross violations of human rights.  
However, as Dr. Xanthaki notes, this approach necessarily raises the issue of the interpretation; who decides 
what suffices as grounds for remedial secession and what constitutes a gross violation of human rights. Id. at 143-
5.  Ultimately, she argues that the interpretation must be on an ad hoc basis and the interpreter must be the 
international community in the form of the U.N. General Assembly though territorial integrity and sovereignty 
still remain as hurdle even here.  Moreover, she also points out that it is by no means guaranteed that this 
relationship between external self-determination and remedial secession exists under international law. Id.  The 
importance of this remedial aspect will be addressed further herein. See infra Chapter 6 I(B)(i). 
84 See W. Barney Pityana, Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Africa, DOC/OS(XXVI)/130 at para. 11 reprinted in 
Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 257. 
85 Xanthaki notes that in this approach by states on the national level any measures that would fulfil an internal 
right to self-determination are not linked to self-determination at all for fear of additional controversy but on the 
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implementation of the ICCPR, the U.S. made multiple references to the self-
determination of Native Americans but that such determination meant to right 
to implement their own governmental systems but within the broader 
framework of the American political system.86  The U.S. again affirmed this 
approach to the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples within the context of 
the drafting of the UNDRIP at the close of the Clinton administration noting 
that it would support the 
 
…use of the term ‘internal self-determination’ in both the UN and OAS 
declarations on indigenous rights, defined as follows: ‘Indigenous peoples 
have a right of internal self-determination.  By virtue of that right, they may 
negotiate their political status within the framework of the existing nation-
state and are free to pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.  
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right of internal self-determination 
have the internal right of autonomy or self-government in matters relating to 
their local affairs, including determination of membership, culture, language, 
religion, education, information, media, health, housing, employment, social 
welfare, economics activities, lands and resource management, environment 
and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these 
autonomous functions.87 
 
Aside from the U.S., the internal modality of self-determination was the form 
advocated and reinforced in the drafting process by other states and politically 
savvy indigenous advocates given its contentious nature.88  During the drafting 
of the Declaration, Finland noted that it did not find self-determination as 
                                                                                                                                                    
international level they have been very eager to understand the right of self-determination as an internal exercise 
achieved through democracy and participation as an effort to set aside any external aspect of the right and its 
remedy of secession or independence. Xanthanki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 162. 
86 See Initial reports of States parties due in 1993 : United States of America. 24/08/94 (State Party Report), U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/81, Add. 4, 14 (August 1994), at paras. 9-76. 
87 Cable attached to memorandum of January 18, 2001, by Robert A. Bratke, Executive Secretary, National 
Security Council, to Kristie Kenny, Executive Secretary, Department of State; Julie Falkner, Director of 
Executive Secretariat, Department of the Interior; Frances Townsend, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, 
Department of Justice; Chris Klein, Staff Assistant to the Representative of the United States to the United 
Nations (January 18, 2001) reprinted in Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 16, at 125.  It should be noted that this 
is progress as numerous states including the U.S. initially did not accept the evolving notion of self-determination 
to include anything outside of the colonial context including an internal modality.  See Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, 
supra n. 18, at 151 (noting the approach of the U.S. as one of opposition to the evolution of the concept of self-
determination in its 1995 statement to the WGIP).  Anaya provides numerous other examples of states willing to 
at least in some measure extend self-determination to Indigenous Peoples but a form that falls short of an 
external exercise.  See Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 16, at 112-3.   
88 See generally also Chapter 3 Section V (discussing generally indigenous advocacy and its shift towards supporting 
a position of internal self-determination). 
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provided for in the Declaration as incompatible with international law and 
specifically other U.N. documents as it understood the self-determination 
contained within the text of the draft as the variant detailed in General 
Recommendation 21 issued by CERD89 which is widely recognized as promoting 
the internal modality in the context of Indigenous Peoples and so could offer its 
support.90  The Saami Council agreed with this interpretation of self-
determination provided by the Finnish representative “which emphasized the 
distinction between internal and external aspect of self-determination … [and] 
concurred with this statement because it reflected the opinion of how self-
determination should be understood in current international law.”91  The 
representative from Chile made a similar declaration of support for self-
determination as contained in the draft as it understood self-determination 
contained within the text as the variant detailed in the aforementioned ILO 
Convention 16992 which is also widely recognized as promoting an internal 
modality.93  The Colombian representative agreed that the form of self-
determination promoted in the draft was in line with the form promoted in 
Colombia; a form that did not clash with the sovereignty of the state as it was 
limited to providing Indigenous Peoples with internal autonomy94 while the 
Philippines noted that it could only lend it support if it was made clear that self-
determination was limited to an internal variant so as to protect territorial 
integrity.95  The indigenous group of the Mejlis Crimean Tartar People also 
emphasized that the form of self-determination in the draft be considered 
                                                 
89 See generally CERD General Recommendation 21, supra n. 71 and accompanying text. 
90 Mr. José Urrutia, Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1995/32, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/102 (1997) at para. 45. 
91 Id. at para. 313.  However, later in the drafting process Saami noted their support for external self-
determination. See Implementation of the Programme of Activities for the International Decade of the World's 
Indigenous People, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/2000/85 (1999) at 
para. 79.  However, as aforementioned Engle noticed a shift in indigenous advocacy towards advocating for an 
internal form of self-determination.  See generally supra Chapter 3 at Section V.  This incongruous position is 
reflective of the fact that it is only possible to identify overarching trends in indigenous advocacy.  After all, these 
advocacy strategies are political and so subject to vagaries.  
92 See supra n. 81 and accompanying text (discussing ILO Convention 169 as promoting and internal variant of 
self-determination for Indigenous Peoples). 
93 Urrutia, supra n. 90, at para. 119. 
94 Id. at para. 325. 
95 Id. at para. 314. 
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limited to an internal variant by noting that they fully continued to support self-
determination and the integrity of the Ukrainian state as succession would be 
dangerous to all peoples.96  The World Council of Indigenous Peoples also took 
this view of self-determination in the draft Declaration noting that it specifically 
discouraged secession.97  
 
In sum, based on the preceding a number of precepts can be gleaned concerning 
the right of self-determination.  Specifically, external self-determination was 
developed within and recognized for the context of decolonization and can be 
fulfilled through independence or secession.  Beyond this, some scholars 
tentatively have suggested that aside from colonization, external self-
determination can be exercised in the face of gross violations of human rights 
where peoples are so severely persecuted or mistreated that it is necessary to 
preserve their existence.  However, this is by no means a rule of international 
law.  By contrast, in IHRL the focus of internal self-determination is on 
participation within the existing state through the democratic process, autonomy 
and self-government and has been the form slowly and cautiously opened to 
Indigenous Peoples under IHRL.  Indeed, it is even suggested that it is the 
normal variant of self-determination to be exercised and is the form that has 
been secured for Indigenous Peoples in the Declaration.  
 
D. Linking Self-Determination with Cultural Property: A Dangerous 
Maximizing Approach or How to Restrict the Restitution of 
Cultural Property under IHRL 
 
Given the aforementioned lengthy, intense and contentious debate in relation to 
both the modality and even the applicability of the right to self-determination for 
Indigenous Peoples, at minimum linking self-determination with cultural 
                                                 
96 Id. at para. 323. 
97 Id. at para. 327. 
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property is a risky approach.  Yet it is the approach that has been taken by 
Indigenous Peoples and their advocates in relation to claims for the restitution of 
cultural property as self-determination has been linked in general with the related 
concepts of culture, cultural heritage and in particular with the restitution of 
cultural property to Indigenous Peoples via its internal cultural aspect.  Indeed a 
key tenant of Cultural Indigenism98 is a focus on links with self-determination.99      
 
The logic of this link between self-determination and cultural property has 
been summarized as follows:  
 
Cultural property/heritage and cultural rights both aim -- at least to some 
extent – at protecting human identity.  Cultural identity in its individual 
dimensions of human identity is an aspect of human dignity.  Thus, the 
protection of cultural property or heritage can be seen as protecting a human 
right.  Cultural identity in its collective dimension may contribute to 
constituting a group and hence be one factor giving rise to the right to self-
determination.100 
 
Specifically, the two concepts have been linked repeatedly by a variety of sources 
under IHRL although the UNDRIP does provide for the separate regulation of 
cultural property independent of self-determination.  Broadly speaking, self-
determination has been linked to all human rights with the HRC noting in the 
aforementioned General Comment 12 that it is “apart and before all of the other 
rights” 101  in the ICCPR while Cassesse provides that in particular internal self-
determination is a “manifestation of the totality of rights embodied in the 
Covenant [ICCPR].102  Moreover, international instruments link self-
determination with the concept of culture.  The aforementioned CERD General 
Recommendation 21, which details internal self-determination, notes that the 
                                                 
98 See supra Chapter 3, at Introduction (discussing Cultural Indigenism). 
99 Kuprechet, supra n. 8, at 18. 
100 Katja Ziegler, Cultural Heritage and Human Rights, Working Paper No 26/2007, University of 
Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series  (2007), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002620 
(identifying  more broadly with the protection of cultural rights can indirectly protect human rights more widely).  
Moreover, this again demonstrates a clear link between cultural property and cultural identity.  See supra Chapter 
3, at Section III(A).  
101 HRC General Comment 12, supra n. 52, at para. 1 
102 A. Cassesse, Self-Determination of Peoples Cambridge 35 (1995). 
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internal aspect is “the rights of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, social 
and cultural development without interference.”103  Moreover, the aforementioned 
twin articles on self-determination [Article 1(3)] of the ICCPR and CESCR as 
well as Article 3  on self-determination in the Declaration also makes its  
connection with culture explicitly clear in referring to the fact that peoples and in 
the case of the later specifically Indigenous Peoples have the right to freely 
determine their cultural development.  In turn, it is unsurprising that cultural rights 
have been linked to self-determination under IHRL through various decisions 
and instruments.  In Diergaardt et al. v Namibia, although the HRC did not find a 
violation of Article 27, it noted that “the provisions of Article 1 [the right to self-
determination] may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected by 
the Covenant, in particular Article[] … 27 [the right to enjoy one’s culture].”104  
Shortly following suit, in Mahuika105 the HRC continued to stress the non-
justiciability of the issue of self-determination but again offered that “the 
provisions of Article 1 may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights 
protected by the Covenant, in particular Article 27.”106  Even prior to these 
decisions, it was suggested that self-determination was a pre-requisite to the right 
to a cultural life and in turn culture assures self-determination.107  Moreover, it is 
arguable internal self-determination is also closely linked with the Article 27 of 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights [UDHR]108 and Article 15 of the 
                                                 
103 General Recommendation 21, supra n. 71, at para. 4 [emphasis added].  It goes on to suggest that “[a]lso, 
governments should consider … vesting persons belonging to ethnic or linguistic groups … with the right to 
engage in activities which are particularly relevant to the preservation of the identity of such persons or groups. 
CERD General Recommendation 21, supra 71, at para. 10.  Implicit in this is the restitution of cultural property 
given the strong connection between identity and restitution. See supra Chapter 3, at Section III(A). 
104 J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia, Communication No. 
760/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000) at para. 10.3  See also  Mahuika v New Zealand, 
Communication No 547/1993, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (27 October 
2000) at  para 9.2 [hereinafter Mahuika]. 
105 Mahuika, supra n. 105. 
106 Id. at para. 9.2.  Dr. Xanthaki notes that this link could be even further implicit recognition that Indigenous 
Peoples are beneficiaries of the right to self-determination. Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 134. 
107 Aureliu Cristescu, Special Study in the Right to Self-determination- Historical and Current Development on the Basis of 
United Nations Instruments, U.N. Doc (E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1) (1981) at para. 641. 
108 UDHR, Article 27 reads: (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, 
to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.  (2) Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
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ICESCR109 as both have at their core participation; the former has as its focus 
the right of peoples to choose their political status within a state while the latter 
two right have as their focus the right to participate in cultural life.  
 
More specifically, self-determination has been linked with the restitution of 
cultural property by numerous academics who advocate for Indigenous Peoples.  
Under Professor Anaya’s broad understanding of self-determination, it    
 
…is identified as a universe of human rights precepts concerned broadly with 
peoples, including indigenous peoples, and grounded in the ideas that all are 
equally entitled to control their own destinies.  Self-determination gives rise 
to remedies that tear at the legacies of empire, discrimination, suppression of 
democratic participation, and cultural suffocation.110 
 
In turn, on Anaya’s understand it is easy to see how the concept of self-
determination requires the restitution of cultural property.111  Rebecca 
Clements112 also argues that the restitution of cultural property is the first step 
towards self-determination building on the work of Berman.113  Berman offers 
that the “self” in self- determination has both a subjective and objective 
understanding.  The desirable subjective understanding is “constituted primarily 
by the aspirations and efforts of a people to achieve self-determination” and 
results in the political concept of nationality while the objective self is defined in 
                                                                                                                                                    
he is the author. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (1948), at Art. 27. 
109 ICESCR Article 15(1) provides: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit 
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production 
of which he is the author. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, at Arts. 1,3,6, 15 entered 
into force January 3, 1976, at Art. 15(1). 
110 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 16, at 98. 
111 He supports such a view by suggesting that self-determination is a framework complemented by other human 
rights norms that work together to comprise a government institutional order. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra 
n. 16, at 99.  Specifically, he argues that self-determination stands on the two pillars of the norms of non-
discrimination and cultural integrity; norms by their nature require which special measures. See generally  Chapter 
3(B)-(1) (discussing Article 11 of the Declaration as encompassing the norms of cultural integrity and non-
discrimination and thereby requiring  special measure that in theory can include the restitution of cultural 
property.) 
112 Rebecca Clements, 49 University of Toronto Faculty Law Review 4 (1991). 
113 N. Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
51, 52 (1988). 
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terms of group characteristics.114  Berman considers that later undesirable as it 
created the possibility that outsiders can impose identity on the group.115  Yet 
Clements notes that the subjective and the objective will overlap in stable 
communities as people both identify themselves by both their group belonging 
in the same way that the identify the other.  At the root of this identity, is 
tradition which changes over time as culture is constantly in a process of renewal 
and reaffirmation therefore the first step towards self-determination is the 
restitution of cultural property.116  Further, Vrdoljak, who Kuprecht identifies as 
one of the major proponent s of Cultural Indigenism117, suggests that “[t]he 
continuing denial or limitation on the exercise of the right to self-determination 
is clearly manifest in respect of enjoyment and development of culture.”118  As a 
corollary then restitution of cultural property is necessary to fulfill the right to 
self-determination; indeed Vrdoljak identifies human rights and in particular self-
determination as one of three bases for claims of cultural loss.119  
 
Aside from these links more broadly among self-determination and culture, 
cultural property and its restitution, these links have been encouraged more 
specifically in relation to Indigenous Peoples.  Thornberry notes, “[m]uch of the 
indigenous understanding and claiming on the issue [of cultural heritage] consists 
                                                 
114 Clements, supra n. 112, at 4. 
115 This subjective/objective argument is similar to the cultural insiders/outsiders argument that Professor Tsosie 
makes in relation to the repatriation of cultural unidentifiable human remains in the context of the U.S. 
legislation for such return which builds on the work of Professor Melissa Tatum to suggests that only Indigenous 
Peoples aka cultural insiders can make determinations about their identity to vindicate their right to self-
determination. See infra Chapter 5 at n. 180 and accompanying text.  This significance of this lies in part in 
highlighting again how Article 11 is completely bound up in the concept of and attempts to regulate identity and 
in part in demonstrating the various and overlapping ways in which a wide variety of commentators have 
accepted and argued for such regulation albeit it with Indigenous Peoples in charge of making such 
determinations.  Again, at its core Article 11 and the entire dialogue about the restitution of cultural property 
comes down to one not about ownership but about who controls the presentation of identity.  However, this is 
not to suggest that there are not ownership issues.  Indeed as will be explored herein the ostensible link between 
Article 11 and traditional property concepts also helped to fuel its retrogression which combined with its links to 
self-determination explored here, locking it in a fatal triumvirate of concepts that saw its failure to secure a sui 
generis right. See generally infra Section II (discussing it slinks with traditional property concepts).  
116 Clements, supra n. 112, at 4. 
117 See supra at Introduction (discussing Cultural Indigenism). 
118 Ana F. Vrdoljack, Reparations for Cultural Loss in Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: international and 
Comparative Perspectives198 (F. Lenzerini ed., 2007). 
119 Id. at 203. 
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in spelling out the further implications of self-determination; indigenous peoples 
frequently link heritage to this fundamental concept.”120  Even prior to the 
Declaration, Indigenous Peoples themselves stressed the link between the 
cultural property and self-determination noting that in exercising the right they 
must be “recognized as the exclusive owners of their cultural and intellectual 
property.”121  Within the context of the Declaration, Indigenous People 
continued to stress this link between restitution which allows for the control, 
possession and use of cultural objects and self-determination by noting that 
“[t]he Special Rapporteur on the protection of the cultural heritage of indigenous 
people had placed her study within the overall framework of self-determination 
and the working group should do the same.”122  Specifically, in her “Study on the 
protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous peoples”123 
Special Rapporteur Daes notes that: 
 
The protection of cultural and intellectual property is connected 
fundamentally with the realization of the territorial rights and self-
determination of indigenous peoples.  Traditional knowledge of values, 
autonomy or self-government, social organization, managing ecosystems, 
maintaining harmony among peoples and respecting the land is embedded in 
the arts, songs, poetry and literature which must be learned and renewed by 
each succeeding generation of indigenous children.  These rich and varied 
expressions of the specific identity of each indigenous people provide the 
required information for maintaining, developing and, if necessary, restoring 
indigenous societies in all of their aspects.124  
 
Unsurprisingly, she concludes that the further erosion of their heritage will be 
destructive of their self-determination and development.125  Daes emphasizes 
                                                 
120 Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 20, at 392. 
121 The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
Preamble, June 1993 at para. 2.5. available at http:/www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/creative_heritage/indigenous/
link0002.html. 
122 Urrutia, Report, supra n. 90, at para. 89.   
123 The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities endorsed a study 
regarding the protection of the cultural and intellectual of Indigenous Peoples by Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-
Irene Daes. See Erica-Irene Daes, Study on the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous 
peoples, by Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28(1993).  
124 Id. at para. 4. 
125 Id. at para. 162. 
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this link throughout her studies on the cultural property of Indigenous Peoples 
noting in  the document following up the aforementioned study that “to be 
effective, the protection of indigenous peoples’ heritage should be based broadly 
on the principle of self-determination, which includes the right and the duty of 
indigenous peoples to develop their own cultures and knowledge systems.”126  In 
her final report, Daes maintains this link adding only “to develop their own 
cultures and knowledge systems, and forms of social organization.”127  
Unsurprisingly, in response to the proposed changes to Draft Article 12 of the 
Declaration discussed in Chapter 3, Indigenous Peoples urged that the article 
remain the same on a number of grounds128 including on the basis that there is a 
link between self-determination and the right to practice and revitalize cultural 
traditions and customs.129   
 
In turn, Indigenous Peoples stress that the restitution of cultural property is 
integral to the maintenance, development and the renewal of their culture and 
identities as they emerge from the shadows of imperialism and colonialism, 
which saw the removal of much of their cultural property as part and parcel of 
the process of marginalization and assimilation that they suffered at the hands of 
the dominate state.  Indeed, this argument echoes that of Cultural Nationalists 
and their calls for the repatriation of property from market to source states as 
                                                 
126 Erica-Irene Daes, Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, submitted in conformity with Sub-
Commission resolution 1993/44 and decision 1994/105 of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.3/1994/31 (1994) at para. 2.   
127 Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, [Annex 
“Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People” paras. 21 and 22], U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26(1995) at para. 2. Interestingly Daes later qualified this link with self-determination 
noting that it “did not use the principle of self-determination in the same broad sense as in Article 3 of the Draft 
United Nations Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples.” Erica-Irene Daes, Report of the seminar on the 
draft principles and guidelines for the protection of the heritage of indigenous people, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/26(1995) at para. 19.  At that stage early in the drafting process, some Indigenous Peoples 
were still advocating and understanding of self-determination as an external modality. See supra Chapter 3 at 
Section V (discussing changing advocacy strategies).  In turn, presumably in making this contrast Daes was 
limiting self-determination to the internal variant and so linking the right to internal self-determination with 
cultural heritage.  
128 See supra Chapter 3 at ns. 36-45 and accompanying text (discussing indigenous proposals regarding Draft 
Article 12). 
129 Mr. Luis-Enrique Chávez, Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/85 (2001) at para. 151.   
166 
 
justified given the suspect and often unsavory circumstances that frequently 
accompanied the acquisition of these artifacts noting that “works … resid[ing] 
abroad in foreign museums and collections are wrongfully there [as] the result of 
plunder, removal by colonial powers130, theft, illegal export or exploitation…”131  
Indeed, this concept of the wrongful taking of property is at the core of cultural 
nationalism and its demands for repatriation132 as Cultural Nationalists argue that 
such takings never resulted in the grant of valid ownership rights but rather 
remain vested in the state from which the property was removed.133  In turn, for 
Cultural Nationalists continued possession is offensive and degrading to origin 
cultures134 and further has overtones of continued imperialism, paternalism and 
in some cases theft.135  Some Cultural Nationalists further suggest that retaining 
                                                 
130 For instance, core to Napoleon’s campaigns was the extraction of art for the Musée Napoleon, later the 
Louvre, in a fashion that emulated the aggressive extraction of art by the Romans and the Crusades. J.H. 
Merryman et. al., Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts 3 (5th ed.2007).  Regarding his campaign to Egypt, it “sparked a 
European obsession with all things Egyptian, fueling an intense Anglo-French competition as to which foreign 
intruder could strip the desert of the most antiquities.  Armed with firmans, or permits to excavate, from the 
acting Ottoman authorities, the European rivals carted off hundreds of thousands of priceless artifacts … In 
London, Paris and other sophisticated metropolises, the appetite for ancient Egyptian valuables and curiosities 
was so insatiable that museums were prepared to ship entire rooms, friezes and tombs from across the 
Mediterranean.” Josh Shuart, Note, Is All “Pharaoh” in Love and War? The British Museum’s Title to the Rosetta Stone 
and the Sphinx’s Beard, 52 Kansas Law Review 667, 667-9 (2004) [citation omitted].  As Father Géramb said to 
Mohammed Ali in 1833, “it would hardly be respectable, on one’s return  
from Egypt, to present oneself in Europe without a mummy in one hand and a crocodile in the other.” Id. at 671 
citing Brian M. Fagan, The Rape of the Nile 11 (1975).  Eventually, the colonial practice of the, “theft of cultural 
property became even more widespread, and practically systematic, no longer necessarily linked to war or military 
occupation.  In general terms, the colonial penetration into Africa, Asia and South America generated a 
movement that scattered cultural heritage for the benefit of Western collections.  This colonial framework 
continued to coexist with the more traditional, but ever-present, spoils of war.” UNESCO, The Return or The 
Restitution of Cultural Property 1, document on file with author.  In turn, Cultural Nationalists in particular stress the 
return of cultural property to regions of the world subject to such expeditions such as Africa and the Middle East 
as it would “engender a sense of pride and self-worth that would help them emerge from the shadow of 
colonizers and develop their own identities.” Shuart, 675 citing Karen Goepfert, The Decapitation of Ramses II, 13 
Boston University  International Law Journal 503, 513 (1995). 
131 J.H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 American Journal of International Law 831, 845 
(1986). 
132 See Goepfert, supra n. 130 at 512 (arguing wrongful taking as the basis for repatriation of cultural property).  
133 Id.  
134 Id. At 513. 
135 See Elzar Barakan, supra n. 3, at16, 18, 27. (“Efforts to save singular antiquities may, indeed, be well 
intentioned by can only be viewed locally as paternalistic imperialism and a misplaced renewal of the ‘white man’s 
burden’ to civilize the world.”); See also Kareem Faheem, The Whistle Blower at the Art Party  Village Voice, Aug. 
6-12, 2003, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0332.fahim.46047,1.html (noting that the idea that 
cultural property  is “better off in western museums and cultural institution [is] … a pillar of colonialism”); 
Lawrence J. Persick, The Continuing Development of United States Policy Concerning the International movement of Cultural 
Property, 4 Dickson Journal of  International Law 89 (1985-6) (asserting that “[e]very object  in the national 
museum of a colonial power is a reminder to a former colony of those years during which that foreign power 
imposed its rule”); Mark A. Gutchen, The Mayan Crisis and The Law: current United States Legal Practice and the 
International Law in the Mayan Antiquities Trade,  1 Arizona Journal International & Comparative Law 283, 289 
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cultural property at minimum serves as “a blow to a source nation’s self-esteem 
and amounts to a form of bullying by these importing nations”136 if not an actual 
wrong-doing as “[t]he surfacing of an object outside its region of origin and its 
possession in an overseas jurisdiction have become offenses against the nation-
states whose people define themselves and their nationhood by a cultural 
patrimony of material objects.”137  In turn, “[i]n the context of indigenous claims 
for reparations, restitution is the most unsettling for states because it often 
involves a direct confrontation with colonial and assimilation policies and 
practices.”138  Yet Indigenous Peoples view restitution as vital to building, 
maintaining and developing their culture, overcoming these injustices and even 
their survival in the 21st century.  As Professor Michael Dodson, an indigenous 
activist notes, “[a]s indigenous peoples, we are acutely aware that our survival as 
peoples depends on the vitality of our culture.  The deepest wound that 
colonization has inflicted has come from a process of stripping us of our distinct 
identities and cultures.”139  Therefore, the link between restitution and self-
determination becomes more evident as the restitution of cultural property is a 
victory, even if partial, over these policies as it can lead to cultural development 
                                                                                                                                                    
(1982) (noting that “[t]he continued flow of national treasures out of a country is seen simply as a continuation of 
cultural imperialism and colonial repression”). 
136 Molly L. McIntosh, Note: Exploring Machu Picchu: An Analysis of the Legal and Ethical Issues Surrounding the 
Repatriation of Cultural Property, 17 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 199, 220 (2006).  
137 Chippindale, Gill, Salter & Hamilton, Collecting the Classical World: First Steps in a Quantitative History, 10 
International Journal of Cultural Property 4-7 (2001) reprinted in Merryman, Visual Arts, supra n. 130, at 222.   
138 Vrdoljak, Reparations for Cultural Loss, supra n. 118, at 213.  Undoubtedly, this is the case but arguably it’s 
more than just coming to grips with colonial policies and practices.  Its arguably also about coming to grips with 
an identity that rooted in the darkest of colonial policies as the latter is more than descriptive of their identity but 
constitutive of state identity as well.  In essence, every new national identity must “invent the traditions” in which 
it builds its identity and shared past. Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 Columbia Law Review 
2004, 2026 (2007). [cituations omitted].  In the U.S., this was accomplished through playing Indian which from 
its earliest forms allowed the colonists to throw off the shackles of British monarch at the Boston Tea party to 
empowering genocidal policies of removing Indians from land. See id., at 2026-36 (detailing the concept of 
playing Indian and its manifestations in U.S. sporting mascots).  In turn, restitution means removal of control 
and ownership not only of cultural property but of control and ownership of the colonizers very identity.  
Indeed, again the issue of the restitution of cultural property is about this regulation and control of identity.  
139 M. Dodson, Cultural Rights and Educational Responsibilities, The Frank Archibald Memorial Lecture, University of 
New England, 5 September 1994 cited in Moira Simpson, Museums and restorative justice:  heritage, repatriation and 
cultural education, 61 Museum International 121, 123 (2009).  Simpson details evidence that suggest that cultural 
renewal has a positive effect on the survival of Indigenous Peoples who have endured colonial and post-colonial 
trauma. See generally id.   
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and renewal also suggesting that claims for repatriation are not simply cultural 
claims but political claims as well.  
 
Finally, it is arguable that Article 11(2) itself is linked explicitly to the concept of 
self-determination.  As aforementioned, the provision under discussion at Article 
11(2) offers: 
 
States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect 
to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without 
their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions 
and customs. 
  
Indeed, it has been argued that the concept of free, prior and informed consent 
is crucial to fulfilling the right of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination.140  In 
turn, on this understanding mechanisms of redress including restitution of 
property taken without free, prior and informed consent  required by Article 
11(2) work to fulfill self-determination.141  
 
Ultimately, linking the right of self-determination with the restitution of cultural 
property follows a maximizing approach to self-determination.  There are two 
principal approaches to self-determination in terms of its scope: a minimalist and 
a maximalist approach.142  A minimalist approach advocates that self-
determination be viewed only as independence and has been favored by many 
states regardless of the fact that as Dr. Xanthaki argues an examination of 
international documents regarding self-determination indicates that this is too 
                                                 
140 Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA and the Problem of “Culturally Unidentifiable” Remains: The Argument for a Human Rights 
Framework, 44 Arizona State Law Journal 809, 847 (2012) citing Mauro Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the 
Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 18 International Journal of Human Right 1 (2012). 
141 Although given the retrogression that Article 11 experienced in relation to the concept of restitution, it means 
that the likelihood of fulfilling the right to self-determination through this article almost has been read out of the 
text despite the continued use of the language free, prior and informed consent. 
142 See generally Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, 146-55. 
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restrictive of an understanding.143  On the other hand, a maximalist approach to 
self-determination views it as a broad umbrella right encompassing economic 
and/or cultural aspects.144  Dr. Xanthaki notes that this understanding is 
entrenched in claims:  
 
…for democracy and political rights; distinct political and judicial systems; 
territorial integrity; political independence and non-intervention; or 
concerning the name of  a country and border adjustments; religious 
freedom; and educational provisions.  In its distorted form, nationalism, 
fundamentalism, racism and even ethnic cleansing have all been justifies in 
the name of  self-determination.145  
 
In turn, many indigenous advocates follow a maximalist approach and it appears 
to be supported by the language of the twin article of 1(3) located in the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR which understand self-determination as a peoples pursuit of 
their “economic, cultural and social development.”146  For instance, Anaya 
argues that: 
 
[s]elf-determination is not separate from other human rights norms; rather, 
self-determination is a configurative principle or framework complemented 
by the more specific human rights norms that in their totality enjoin the 
governing institutional order.147 
 
Although it does have its benefits including viewing self-determination as an 
evolving concept which can respond to current international needs, there are 
serious issues with such an approach.148  First, to use self-determination as an 
umbrella right risks distorting its meaning and scope and so serves as a poor and 
irresponsible legislative method.149  To make self-determination all things to all 
                                                 
143 Id. at 146.  Indeed, the shift to an internal modality undermines the minimalist view. See supra Section I(C) 
(discussing shift from external to internal modalities). 
144 Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 152. 
145 Id. at 152 [citation omitted]. 
146 Id. at 152-3. 
147 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 16, at 99. See also Xanthaki, UN Standards, supra n. 18, at 152-3 (providing 
further examples of indigenous advocates who follow a maximalist approach). 
148 Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 153. 
149 Id. at 153 [citation omitted]. 
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peoples risks that it will be nothing to no one.  In turn, this downside focuses on 
the risks that a maximalist approach to self-determination has for the right itself.   
 
However, of greater significance here is the concern that is generated by linking 
self-determination to other claims.  Dr. Xanthaki describes this as a poor tactic:  
 
[c]laims that are justified by loose links with established rights, and even more 
so with a right as controversial as self-determination, are not convincing.  
Very often, other human rights can serve as a legitimate basis for these 
claims, but the use of self-determination obscures this.150  
 
Indeed, the link between the right to self-determination and the right to 
restitution of cultural property not only obscured the development of the latter 
as sui generis human right it underpinned its retrogression.  In turn, the 
retrogression of Article 11 concerning the restitution of cultural property in the 
UNDRIP as detailed in Chapter 3 parallels the restriction of the right of self-
determination in IHRL in relation to Indigenous Peoples from an external to an 
internal modality.  However, it not only just parallels this retrogression; it helps 
to explain this retrogression given its contentious nature thereby also 
demonstrating the dangers of a maximizing approach to the right to self-
determination.  Aside from being a cultural right, by linking the restitution of 
cultural property with the right to self-determination it paved the way for the 
retrogression of Article 11 to step back and fit comfortably back within the 
confines of the existing cannon of IHRL and in particular cultural rights. 
 
 In fact, Xanthaki specifically highlights this danger in relation the culture aspect 
of the right to self-determination as an area of particular risk: 
 
[a]dding a cultural aspect to the right of self-determination fails to provide a 
solid basis for culture-related claims and adds nothing to the human rights 
cannon; on the contrary, it practically disempowers a series of cultural rights 
                                                 
150 Id. at 154 [citation omitted]. 
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by drawing attention away from them and hinders their further interpretation 
and evolution.151  
 
However, it was not these links alone that secured the retrogression 
of Article 11; its links with traditional property concepts completed 
this fatal triumvirate of concepts.  It is to this final link that this 
thesis now turns. 
 
II. Disruption of Property Rights as a Limitation on Article 11 and the 
Restitution of Cultural Property  
 
Table 1.  Dichotomy of Western and Indigenous Conceptions of Cultural 
Property152 
 
Western Conceptions of Cultural 
Property 
Indigenous Conceptions of Cultural 
Property 
Ownership 
Individual Ownership 
Alienable 
Commodification- commercial value 
Western law – i.e. hearsay rules 
Individual Right 
Civil and Political Right 
Custodianship- intergenerational  
Collective Ownership 
Inalienable 
Non-fungible—identity 
Customary Law- i.e. oral traditions and 
histories 
Collective Right 
                                                 
151 Id. at 154.  Although in this particular case, understanding the right to the restitution of cultural property 
strictly as a cultural right in the cannon of IHRL did not disempower cultural rights by drawing attention away 
from them nor did it hinder their interpretation and evolution.  Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 3 cultural 
rights would not have served as a platform that could secure the right to the restitution of cultural property for 
Indigenous Peoples. See supra Chapter 3 at Section IV(A)(1) and V (discussing the issues with cultural rights in 
IHRL as the mechanism for the restitution of cultural property and the advocacy strategy that nonetheless 
attempted such an approach].  In turn, the restitution of cultural property suffered not only as a result of its 
association with self-determination but also as a collective cultural right.  As will be demonstrated below, it 
further suffered from its association with and disruption of property rights thereby locking it in a fatal triumvirate 
of concepts that face powerful opposition under IHRL ensuring its failure as a sui generis right.  
152 Table developed for thesis but as modified from intellectual property dichotomy. See F. Batt, Ancient indigenous 
deoxyribonucleic acid  (DNA) and intellectual property rights, 16 International Journal of Human Rights 152, 154 
(January 2012) [citations omitted].  
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1970 UNESCO Convention 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
Cultural Right 
Self-determination 
UNDRIP? 
 
Aside from its links with self-determination, the watering down of Article 11 
concerning the restitution of cultural property in the UNDRIP to fit comfortably 
back within the confines of existing IHRL also stems from its attempted 
disruption of the much vaunted  and well protected conception of  property.  
Specifically, it reflects the continued resistance on the part of states in particular 
to disturb legal title in property and thereby third party rights and in general their 
disdain to disturb the sacrosanct nature of property as understood in the 
Western tradition as core to individual civil and political rights in favor of 
Indigenous Peoples and their alternative understanding of property as a heritage 
which is collective and core to identity.153   
 
A. Western Conceptions of Property Rights: A Bundle of Individual 
Civil and Political Rights 
 
Property has been describes as a “category of cardinal importance in the 
Common Law, around which important politico-philosophical theories have 
been developed.”154  It is suggested that the right to property is the most widely 
protected right in domestic legal systems codified in constitutions throughout 
the world.155  Indeed, under IHRL the right to property is secured in numerous 
                                                 
153 There are numerous ways to express this debate.  This thesis uses the terms Western and indigenous Peoples 
in relation to property to explore the polarization between these two different conceptions.  However, the 
relevant literature also uses industrialized and non-industrialized and the North-South divide to express this 
dichotomy. See generally, A. Ngenda, The Nature of the International Intellectual Property System: Universal Norms and 
Values or Western Chauvinism? , Information & Communications Technology Law (2005). 
154 Lyndel V. Prott and Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural Property’, 1 International Journal of 
Cultural Property 307, 309 (1992).   
155 Karolina Kuprecht, The Concept of Cultural Affiliation: in NAGPRA: Its Potential Limits in the Global Protection of 
Indigenous Cultural Property Rights, 19 International Journal of Cultural Property 33, 51 (2012). 
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documents at the international156 and the regional level.  At the international 
level, it is secured in  Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others” and that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
property.”157  Article 5 of the CERD provides that everyone has equality before 
the law “without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin” in 
relation to the "right to own property alone as well as in association with others" 
and "the right to inherit"158 while Article 16 of  The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women [CEDAW] provides 
that in particular states shall ensure that “[t]he same rights for both spouses in 
respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment 
and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable 
consideration.”159  The property of other vulnerable groups is secured in IHRL 
at Article 15 and Articles 8, 13 and 14 respectively of International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families160 and The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.161  At the 
regional level the right to property is more widely recognized.  Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights provide for the right to property noting 
that “[e]veryone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property [however 
it also notes that] [t]he law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the 
interest of society.”162  Further, in the case of deprivation it provides for just 
                                                 
156 Noticeably, the right to property is not included in either the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that have been under discussion 
throughout this thesis. 
157 UDHR, supra n. 108, at Art. 17. 
158 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,  
opened for signature 21 December 1965, G. A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, 660 
U.N.T.S.195, (entered into force 4 January 1969) at Art. 5.  
159 Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, U.N.T.S. 1249, p 13 
at Art. 16(1)(h). 
160 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990 at Art. 15, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/cmw.htm 
161 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, U.N.T.S. 189, p. 137 at Arts. 1, 13, and 14. 
162 Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", Costa Rica, 22 
November 1969, at Art. 21(1). 
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compensation.163  Article 23 of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man offers that all peoples have the right “to own such private 
property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the 
dignity of the individual and of the home.”164  Article 14 in the African Charter 
on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights similarly protects the right to property 
while Article 13 offers that every citizen has “the right of access to public 
property and services in strict equality of all persons before the law.”165  It also 
provides for adequate compensation in case of deprivation.166  Finally, Article 1 
of the Protocol 1 in the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights offers the “right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.”167  However, 
such property can be subject to deprivation under certain conditions recognized 
in law when balanced against public interests.168 
 
This widely protected right to property has specific contours shaped by Western 
conceptions dating back to Roman law principles which were rooted in notions 
of absolute ownership, the examination of acquisition as the defining element of 
legitimate property and monetary compensation.169  In his well-known article, 
A.M. Honoré described the Western concept of ownership of something as 
comprising a number of liberties, rights, powers and duties.170  Although a 
number of different combinations have been suggested those traditionally 
associated with ownership in this panoply or bundle171 includes: control of the 
                                                 
163 Id. at Article 21(2). 
164 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. official Rec., OEA/ser.L/V.II.23, doc.21 
rev.6 (1948) at Art. 23. 
165 African Charter, supra n. 54, at Art. 13. 
166 Id. at Art. 21. 
167 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 
Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, E.T.S. 5, at Protocol 1, Art. 1. 
168 Id. 
169 Karolina Kuprecht, The Concept of “Cultural Affiliation” in NAGPRA: Its Potential Limits in the Global Protection of 
Indigenous Cultural Property Rights, 19 international Journal of Cultural Property 33, 36 (2012). 
170 A.M. Honoré, Ownership in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 107(A.G. Guest ed., 1961).  
171 It is worth noting that a body of literature is dedicated to the critique of this concept of understanding 
property as a bundle including on the grounds that “Honoré’s taxonomy assumes an integrated conception of 
property without supplying one.” Eric R. Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions in Legal and Economic Scholarship, 8 
Economic Journal Watch 205, 206 (2011).  See generally Daniel B. Klein and John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of 
Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium 8 Economic Journal Watch 193 (2011) (outlining the arguments for and 
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use of the property172, the right to any benefit from the property, a right to 
transfer or sell the property and a right to exclude others from the property and 
a right to alienate the property.  Although there is no combination common to 
all forms of property in all situations, implicit in this panoply of rights and its 
extensive protection emerges the core features of the Western conception of 
property including that it is an individual right173 and that in particular it is a civil 
and political right and perhaps most ubiquitously  its commodification.  Indeed, 
this commodification served as the justification of many colonizers for 
confiscating indigenous land.174  Locke outlined the quintessential European 
position of the land rights of Indigenous Peoples noting that they had no rights 
to lands that they did not cultivate.  In turn, it was not viewed as dispossession 
but rather as creating economic use out of land that was being “wasted” by 
Indigenous Peoples whose land tenure systems did not reflect European 
cultivation patterns.175  
 
The right to restitution as originally provided for in Draft Article 12 necessarily 
would have resulted in a dramatic infringement of this panoply of property rights 
that come with ownership as it called for a right to the restitution of cultural 
property with the result of a loss of all of the rights and incidents of ownership.  
                                                                                                                                                    
against understanding property as a bundle of rights).  Regardless of these critiques and deeper philosophical 
inquiries, it will suffice herein as a useful mechanism to understand the basics of a Western conception of 
property which stands in stark contrast to indigenous understandings.  
172 In theory, this even extends to the destruction of the property. See Joseph Sax, Playing Darts with a 
Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures 10 (1999)( discussing whether or not individuals 
should be allowed to destroy cultural treasures). 
173 This stems from the fact that Western concepts of property prevail as it was Europeans that developed the 
forerunner to modern intellectual property law. David N. Chang, Stealing Beauty: Stopping the Madness of Illicit Art 
Trafficking, 28 Houston Journal of International Law 829, 851 n. 144 (2006) citing  K. Kalan, Comment, Property 
Rights, Individuals rights and the Viability of Patent Law Systems, 71 University of Colorado Law Review 1439, 152 
(2000).  In turn, intellectual property laws and the protection that they offer to inventors is based on the 
individualist concept of identity prevalent in Western philosophy. David N. Chang, Stealing Beauty: Stopping the  
Madness of Illicit Art Trafficking, 28 Houston Journal of International Law 829, 851 n. 144 (2006) citing Steven Wilf, 
Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 1,4 (1999). 
174 Lindsey L. Wiersma, Indigenous Lands as Cultural Property: A New Approach to Indigenous Land Claims, 54 Duke L.J.  
1061, 1065 (2005) [citation omitted].  Other justifications for land confiscation were much more insidious and are 
considered outmoded under international law. See infra Chapter 6, at Section I(B) (discussing the doctrines of terra 
nullis and extinguishment).  Interestingly however, this Lockean position still continues to influence the practice 
of many states in relation to the land rights of Indigenous Peoples. Lindsey L. Wiersma, Indigenous Lands as 
Cultural Property: A New Approach to Indigenous Land Claims, 54 Duke L.J.  1061, 1066 (2005) [citation omitted].   
175 Wiersma, supra n. 174, at 1063 [citation omitted].   
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As discussed at Chapter 3, Draft Article 12 of the Declaration provided for the 
absolute right to the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples.  It 
would not have required a balancing of the interests of Indigenous Peoples in 
their traditional cultural property versus the interests of current 
owners/possessor of this property as it did not consider the latter.  Therefore, 
states continue to urge that the norm of cultural integrity is not absolute and that 
although it requires affirmative measures these must be balanced with the rights 
and interests of non-Indigenous Peoples and the state.176  In turn, as Article 11 
forms part of the norm of cultural integrity and given the importance states 
ascribe to the protection of property [as understood in a Western fashion] and 
especially the protection of third party ownership rights, it is unsurprising that 
states pushed for watering down its provisions on restitution as originally 
included in Draft Article 12 and traced in Chapter Three and thereby avoiding 
altogether this issue of rights balancing.   
 
Indeed, in explaining her suggested downgrading of the right to restitution in 
relation to cultural property that ultimately formed the basis of the weaker 
Article 11,177 Special Rapporteur Daes notes specifically concerns over the rights 
of third parties and thus the balancing of interests.  For objects removed in the 
past in this new formulation, Daes provides it  
 
…does not require that they be returned in every case, but according to their 
cultural religious and historical significance.  [Further it] … also contemplates 
the retention of objects in private as well as public collections, under 
agreements for custody made with the traditional owners.  This strikes a 
balance between the interests of indigenous peoples in retaining particularly 
significant elements of their heritage, and the interests of good-faith 
purchasers in what they believe they have lawfully acquired.178    
 
                                                 
176 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra n.16, at 140-1. 
177 See supra Chapter 3 at Section 1 (discussing how Special Rapporteur Daes's report served as the basis for 
watering down Draft Article 12 and the emergence of final Article 11).  
178 Erica-Irene Daes, Final report, supra n. 127, at para. 20. 
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Interestingly, even the retrogression of the restitution of cultural property 
justified here by Daes and ultimately the basis of Article 11 did not satisfy some 
states revealing its extremely controversial and highly charged nature.  The 
representative from Mexico noted that it would be almost impossible for her 
country to abide by the guidelines given that much of the indigenous heritage of 
Mexico was spread around the world while Canada noted that were still unclear 
and did not address competing claims.179  Similarly, the representative from the 
U.S. noted that while his delegation supported the basic principle behind Draft 
Article 12, “the wording of article 12 was overbroad, in particular the open-
ended obligation of restitution of cultural and similar property which at present 
was not a rule of international law.”180  Ultimately, this stems from the fact that 
even the possibility of redress retained in Article 11 will still result in a 
deprivation of at least some of the property rights associated with ownership.  
For instance, in 2000 the American Museum of Natural History and the 
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon announced an 
out of court settlement that maintained the presence of a meteorite sacred to the 
tribes at the museum for purposes of science and education while ensuing access 
for the tribes to the meteorite for religious, historical, and cultural purposes.  In 
turn, the museum necessarily lost some of its right to complete control the use 
of the property.  Further, they will lose all ownership rights if the museum fails 
to display it publicly then it shall be conveyed to the tribe.181   
 
Moreover, some states were still not happy with what they perceived as 
the continued absolute nature of the Declaration as a whole and so states 
pushed for further assurances that the rights included in the Declaration 
were not absolute.  In explaining in part the U.S. initial vote no Robert 
Hagen noted that   
                                                 
179 Erica-Irene Daes, Report of the seminar, supra n. 127, at para. 33. 
180 Urrutia, supra n. 90. 
181 D. H. Thomas Finders Keepers And Deep American History: Some Lessons In Dispute Resolution in Imperialism, Art 
And Restitution 233 (J. Merryman ed., 2006).    
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[t]he aspirational principles and collective rights described in the declaration 
are typically written in extremely general and absolute terms.  It was 
recognized by State in the Working Group that it would not be possible to 
implement such broadly expressed provisions and the debating the 
restrictions  on the exercise of each provisions was not feasible given time 
constraints.  It was therefore decided that the ability of democratic States to 
govern for the good of all their citizens be recognized at the end of the 
declaration (Article 46) and that such a clause would apply to all the 
principles and collective rights set for in this declaration.182 
 
Indeed, arguably even if Draft Article 12 had survived so that Article 11 included 
a right to restitution it could still be limited by the last minute addition to the 
Declaration of Article 46 in 2006 which provides that, “[t]he exercise of the 
rights set forth in the Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
determined by law and in accordance with international human rights 
obligations.”183 
  
In sum, the diluted version of Article 11 specifically reflects the continued 
resistance on the part of states in particular to disturb legal title in property and 
thereby third party rights and in general their disdain to disturb the sacrosanct 
nature of property and its panoply of rights as understood in the Western legal 
tradition. 
 
B. Decoupling Traditional Property Concepts and Cultural Property 
 
Western legal tradition has a history of securing almost absolute property rights 
and does not look favorably on situations that involve forfeitures, random 
redistribution and unequal exchanges.184  In turn, “where traditional values 
                                                 
182 Explanation of vote by Robert Hagen, U.S. Advisor, on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
to the UN General Assembly, available at http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/press_releases/20070913_2 
(13 September 2007). 
183 Article 46 and how it operates as a restriction and its broader significance will be discussed further herein. See 
infra Section III.   
184 Claudia Caruthers, International Cultural Property: Another Tragedy of the Commons, 7 Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal 143, 145 (1998).  In 1762 Adam Smith stated: “justice means [to] prevent the members of a society from 
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attached to property need to be modified in order to secure other social goals … 
opposition is often mustered on the basis that ‘property’ has come kind of 
fundamental importance in our culture and its traditional legal incidences must 
be given priority.”185  As Kuprecht notes, “the philosophical and religious 
question, ‘[w]hat kind of res should be accessible for private property’, has 
dissolved into the question. ‘[w]hat kind of res should be excluded from private 
property.”186  However, the aforementioned is not to suggest that Western 
conceptions of property have never treated ‘cultural property’ as special too 
some extent.  Dating back even to Roman times,187 there is the notion that, “… 
in no legal system is the right of property absolute; it is possible to establish new 
rules of property, or modify old ones, and although the right of property is 
respected, it is subject to regulation and even, in extreme cases to 
expropriation.”188  Indeed, the international regime for the protection of cultural 
property is at least premised upon this notion189 and many states have made 
space to restrict traditional rights of absolute ownership through legislation 
limiting the unrestricted alienability of cultural property including amongst 
others: prohibitions against destruction or damage190, import or export, copying; 
zoning of cities to protect historic areas; establishment of the right of creators in 
their works even after they have sold them; formation of registers of works 
subject to periodic inspection to test their state of conservation.191  All of this is 
                                                                                                                                                    
encroaching on one another[‘s] property, or seizing what is not their own.” Id. citing Adam Smith Lectures on 
Jurisprudence 5 (R. Meek, et al. eds. 1978). 
185 Prott and O’Keefe, supra n. 154, at 309. 
186 Karolina Kuprecht, Cultural Affiliation, supra n. 155, at 34. 
187 Karolina Kuprecht, Cultural Affiliation, supra n. 155, at 36 (discussing the Roman concept of res extra 
commercium—property that would be classified as cultural property today—which has been carried over into many 
civil law systems). 
188 John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 Michigan Law Review 1881, 1910 (1984-85). 
189 See generally Chapter 2 (discussing the international framework for the protection of cultural property). 
190 Indeed, this is the idea that maybe we should not play darts with a Rembrandt. See supra n. 172. 
191 As listed by Prott and O’Keefe See Prott and O’Keefe, supra n. 154, at 310.  Despite the principle of the free 
movement of goods at the core of the European Union, states still have the power to place limits on the free 
movement of their cultural treasures.  For instance, Article 36 on the Treaty for the Functioning of the European 
Union [TFEU] provides regarding the free movement of goods that “[t]he provision of Arts. 30 to 34 shall not 
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, export or goods in transit justified on the grounds of … the 
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historical or archaeological value … [provided that] [s]uch 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States.”  This provision parallels Article XX of the General Agreement on 
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implicit recognition of the unique nature of cultural property generally based on 
the recognition of its nature as finite, irreplaceable and non-fungible.192   
 
More specifically, a wide body of literature across a range of disciplines has 
developed which has devoted itself to disentangling the traditional property 
regime or at least to alter it to accommodate cultural property and its restitution.  
Three principle threads can be identified.  Some literature attempts to remove 
the discussion of law and property concepts and rights altogether suggesting that 
we need to find new mechanisms to resolve these disputes that depend on 
discussion and negotiation.193  At the other extreme, another strand suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                    
Tariffs and Trade [GATT] which provides that “ [s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied 
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contraction party of measures … Imposed for the 
protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value…”.   
192 M. Catherine Vernon, Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention, 26 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of  International Law 435, 436 (1994) (indicating that unlike natural resources, archaeological 
resources are not renewable.)  Although Vernon’s analysis is concerned with the protection of non-movable 
cultural property the same description applies to movable cultural property.  
193 Professor Cuno, a pre-eminent academic in cultural property law, has expressed the view that the law no 
longer has a place within its repatriation debate.  Specifically,  Professor Cuno stated, “I do not think that legality 
matters at all at this point.” J. Cuno, Cultural Property Rights Symposium, Panel Discussion, 16 Connecticut  
Journal of International Law 313, 314 (2000-02) (Statement by Professor James Cuno in relation specifically to 
the return of the Elgin Marbles but more broadly applicable).  The context in which this was said was reference 
to the face that he believes that traditional property laws and the issues of due diligence will not be the basis on 
which any return is made as it has not worked so far in that the regime of cultural property law has not worked 
either in its incorporation of traditional property law and general law concepts. Id.  Although speaking in the 
context of the specific dispute over the repatriation of the Elgin Marbles, Professor Cuno’s statement is 
applicable more widely in expressing the dismay of many that the law has failed thus far to resolve the 
repatriation debate and more broadly is a systemic failure as it simply cannot be used as a basis of repatriation.  
Indeed, another preeminent cultural property scholar, Lyndel Prott, echoes this sentiment specifically within the 
context of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples noting that “relying on the law to provide an 
answer in such cases is to misunderstand the situation. Lyndel Prott, The Ethic and Law of Returns, 61 Museum 
International 101, 102 (2009). See also generally Michael F. Brown, Who Owns Native American Culture (2003) (“If 
we turn culture into property, its uses will be defined and directed by law, the instrument by which states impose 
order on an untidy world.  Culture stands to become the focus of litigation, legislation, and other forms of 
bureaucratic control.  The readiness of some social critics to champion new forms of silencing and surveillance in 
the name of cultural protection should trouble anyone committed to the free exchange of ideas.” at 8] cited in   
Mezey, supra n. 158, at 2046.  Indeed, Mezey aligns her arguments in the same vein as that of Brown.  As 
aforementioned, Mezey outlines an anti-essentialist argument to challenge the paradox of the cultural property 
discourse. See supra Chapter 3 at ns. 109-15 and accompanying text (discussing Mezey’s argument regarding the 
paradox of culture property in that it contributes to its own ineffectuality and is conceptual dearth).  Aside from 
this paradox, Mezy argues that the cultural property discourse also suffers from a further paradox namely that it 
is contradictory in the very pairing of its two core concepts: culture and property. “Property is fixed, possessed, 
controlled by its owner, and alienable.  Culture is none of these things. Thus cultural property claims tend to fix 
culture, which if anything is unfixed, dynamic and unstable.’ Mezey, supra n. 158, at 2005.  Moreover, for Mezey 
there is a danger in approaching the cultural property debate from the perspective of property as property and 
property distribution always are determined by political and social power meaning that those with power are able 
to define and protect their property and ultimately control their own identities even at the expense of others. Id. 
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such a disentangling is not necessary as existing laws including property laws if 
actually appropriately applied allow for restitution194 while in between these 
strands is a third view that seeks to develop or identifies new understandings of 
traditional property concepts that would allow for restitution.195  
                                                                                                                                                    
at 2026-31.  Ultimately, then she suggests that there is a danger in approaching debates over cultural property 
from the perspective of property.  Although she does not rule out the possibility of other kinds of law providing 
a better more suitable model she leaves open that idea that the law “should not be the only or even the primary 
answer to conflict of culture.” Id. 2045-6. 
194 See e.g. Tamara Kagan, Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at Common Law: A Contextual approach 63 University 
of Toronto Faculty Law Review 1 (2005) (arguing for a reinterpretation of traditional common law concepts and 
presumptions to support  and provide for a conceptual framework at common law which provides for the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples according to Mark Walter’s idea of a normative  common 
law whereby the law is reformulated to reflect justice inherent in the system); Sherry Hutt & C. Timothy Mc 
Keown, Control of Cultural Property as Human Rights Law, 31 Arizona State Law Journal 363 (1999) (arguing that 
property rights are human rights and that the common law can protect Indigenous Peoples through the 
appropriate interpretation of both).  
195 See e.g. Karolina Kuprecht, Cultural Affiliation, supra n. 155 (identifying the concept of cultural affiliation in the 
U.S. legislation known as Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act as a concept that amends 
traditional property concepts of ownership to allow for the evolution of the restitution of cultural property); 
Steven Wilf, What is Property’s Fourth Estate? Cultural Property and the Fiduciary Ideal, 16 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 177 (2001) (developing the idea of the fourth estate in property law to allow for treating 
cultural property different).  A particularly popular approach in this strand is to build upon the work of Margaret 
Jane Radin who developed in property law the concept of the personality theory of ownership. See generally 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stanford Law Review 957 (1982).  Radin argued that certain 
property is bound up with the identity of the owner which is important to owner’s self-development and 
fulfillment as so deserves the highest level of protection.  This property is personal as opposed to fungible 
property which does not deserve special protection.  The determination of which property falls into the category 
of the former is not solely based on the subjective through the attachment of the owner to the property but has 
objective limits in that no matter how strong the relationship is between the owner and the property it should 
only be considered personal property if it is deemed through an objective moral consensus to be bound up with 
the individual’s personhood in a healthy way.  Where the attachment inhibits the development of the owner’s 
identity in a positive way this is termed fetishistic or bad object relations and so is not deserving of this special 
protection. Tanya Evelyn George, Using Customary International Law to Identify “Fetishistic” Claims to Cultural Property, 
80 New York University Law Review 1207  at 1209- 10 (2005) (summarizing Radin).  In turn, within the 
repatriation debate is has been very popular to apply Radin’s conception of property to justify demands for 
repatriation by extending the personhood theory which applies to the individual owner to a group through a 
grouphood theory. Id. at 1210 (citing the following as examples of the use of this theory to settle cultural 
property disputes: Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: the Protection of Cultural Property in the United 
States, 75 Boston University Law Review 559, 570, 647 (1995); Pamela Bruzzese, Note, Distributing the Past: Jewish 
Cultural Property in Lithuania,  31 New York University  Journal of  International Law & Policy 145 (1998); John 
Moustakas, Note, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 Cornell Law Review 1179, 1190 
(1989).  According to George, the most notable of these has been the work of Moustakas as he initially built on 
Radin to develop the grouphood theory of property to justify repatriation and by extension the ideas that as a 
result of this grouphood, cultural property is strictly inalienable because its removal threatens the group cultural 
identity. George, at 1220.  Indeed, this concept of the inalienability of cultural property also has received much 
attention in the literature. See generally Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: the Rights of Groups, 56 Southern 
California Law Review 1001 (1983); Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: Intellectual Property Rights 
in Native American Cultural Symbols, 29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 355 (1998).  Moustakas’s 
inalienability is predicated on the fact that an object would qualify as group property if it is “bound up with the 
group identity and its retention does not constitute bad object relations.”  However, like Radin he does not 
define what constitutes bad object relations though he notes that it involve an examination of four factors 
including: length of time of ownership, historic factors, group identity and continuity, and intention to dedicate 
as grouphood property. Moustakas, 1193.  For her part, George builds upon Radin and Moustakas by 
acknowledging that both have left what is bad object relations undecided there is no analytical framework for 
making determinations about what is the objective moral consensus.  Ultimately, she suggests this framework 
could be provided by principles of jus cogens, which permit not derogation under customary international law, as 
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Although how each strand of the literature goes about decoupling cultural 
property from traditional property concepts, this literature has at its core 
recognized the need to decouple these concepts in order to achieve restitution.  
Yet this perception of the absolute nature of property while distorted in light of 
these strands remains powerful.196  In fact, extremely powerful; these 
aforementioned Western conceptions of property and it panoply of revered 
almost sacred liberties, rights, powers and duties have prevailed resulting in the 
watering down of Article 11 concerning the restitution of cultural property in the 
UNDRIP to fit comfortably back within the confines of existing IHRL as it 
attempted in Draft Article 12 to establish as sui generis right which would have 
disrupted this much vaunted and well protected conception of property.  
Consequently, only when the cultural item being repatriated is not treated strictly 
as property in the traditional Western conception with all the rights and incidents 
that it entails is restitution possible hence the core discussion in these strands of 
literature.  This is most aptly displayed by examining the closely related matter of 
the issue of the repatriation of human remains in the Declaration at Article 12 
which has been successfully decoupled from traditional property concepts.   
 
C. Remaining Remains: The Importance of How the Restitution of 
Human Remains Survived the Draft Declaration 
 
Specifically, human remains have a long history of being treated not strictly as 
property in particular in the U.S.; and this treatment has resulted in the inclusion 
of a right to repatriation for human remains in the UNDRIP unlike cultural 
property and  which ultimately reflects the legislation for repatriation of human 
                                                                                                                                                    
the limit on property for grouphood. George, 1212.  In essence, if the identity of the group bound up with the 
object violated a principle of jus cogens then the claim to such property should be considered bad object relations 
and not subject to special protection including repatriation and/or inalienability.  As she notes this is particularly 
important when the object is bound up with the identities of multiple claimants that are characteristic of many 
cases concerning the restitution of cultural property. George, 1228-1236.  Moreover, this again demonstrates the 
clear link between cultural heritage and cultural identity in the literature. See supra Chapter 3 at Section III(A) and 
accompanying text (discussing the link between cultural heritage and its protection and restitution with the 
concept of cultural identity).  
196 Prott and O’Keefe, supra n. 154, at 310-11. 
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remains in the U.S. on which it is modeled.197  Indeed, even the description of 
human remains as property is particularly controversial given this tendency 
towards commodification in juxtaposition to the particular emotive nature of 
human remains. 
 
Although ostensibly if not tangentially included as cultural property under the 
international framework for its protection,198 the understanding that there can be 
no property or very limited property rights in human remains has a long tradition 
at common law.  “[A]mong tangible objects of portable size, the dead human 
body is practically unique in its inability to be made subject to ownership in the 
full commercial sense of the word.”199  As early as 1644, Lord Coke noted that: 
 
In every sepulcre that hath a monument, two things are to be considered, viz, 
the monument and the sepulcre, or burial of the dead.  The burial of the 
cadaver, that is caro data vermibus [flesh given to the worms] is nullius in 
bonis [among the property of no person] and belongs to the ecclesiastical 
cognizance …200  
 
Blackstone continued: “though the heir has a property in the monuments and 
escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies.”201  
 
Case law at least in obiter dicta continued that human remains were not to be 
treated as property.  In R. v. Sharpe the defendant excavated his mother’s remains 
                                                 
197 See infra Chapter 5 at Section II (discussing U.S legislation, known as Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act, which acts as a litmus test for the Declaration in relation to the restitution of human remains 
and cultural property).  This is not to suggest that the treatment of human remains to a certain extent as property 
is not desirable as it can afford legal protection.  See generally L.B. Moses, The Applicability of Property Law in New 
Contexts: From Cells to Cyberspace" 30 Sydney Law Review 4, 639 (2008).  Indeed, it is argued that not treating 
bodies as property interferes with the development of science and therapy. See Steven Cooper, Consent and Organ 
Donation (1985) 11 Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal 559, 578 (1985).  However, this treatment as not 
strictly property has had the benefit of paving the way for the restitution of human remains.  In addition, it is 
likely that securing the repatriation of human remains has been more widely acceptable not simply because it has 
not been treated as property but at least to some extent on the grounds that it does not interfere as much with 
the aesthetic and financial interests of collectors in the same way as it would with cultural property.  
198 Human remains could qualify as cultural property as defined in the 1970 UNESCO Convention at Articles 
1(a), (c) and (f). See supra Chapter 2 at n. 31. 
199 Sideman & Rosenfeld, Legal Aspects of Tissue Donation from Cadavers, 21 Syracuse Law Review 825, 826 (1970) 
reprinted in Steven Cooper, supra n. 197, at 577. 
200 3 E. Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Law of England 203 
201 2 W Blackstone, Commentaries 429 reprinted in Steven Cooper, supra n. 197, at 577. 
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for the purposes of relocating her body to consecrated ground.  Subsequently, he 
was charged and convicted of the offense of opening a grave and removing a 
body.  In obiter dicta provided by Erle J he pronounced that there could be no 
property in a corpse at common law.  
 
Our law recognises no property in a corpse, and the protection of the grave 
at common law, as contradistinguished from ecclesiastical protection to 
consecrated ground, depends upon this form of indictment.202 
 
This principle was reconfirmed and strengthened when restated obiter dicta in 
Foster v Dodd where Byles J added that since a dead body belongs to no one by 
law, it is under the protection of the public.203  
 
Nonetheless there are exceptions at common law to this ‘no property’ rule as 
detailed in the 1909 Australian case of Doodeward v Spence.204  Here the court 
provided that in certain instances ownership of human bodies or body parts is 
acceptable even without the intention to bury.  Griffith CJ noted that even 
though at death a corpse cannot be owned, this did not make the rule absolute, 
and that bodies which are of informative or instructive value could be capable of 
possession legally, unless it is contrary to public health or decency.  A popular 
test resulted, wherein if by the lawful exercise of work or skill a person 
transforms a human body (which is lawfully in their possession) into something 
which is not merely a corpse awaiting burial, then that person acquires a right to 
possession over it as being enforceable against everyone except for the individual 
that is entitled to possession for the purposes of reburial.205  More recently, in 
1999 R v. Kelly206 considered the ‘no property’ rule of Sharpe as well as the 
                                                 
202 R. v. Sharpe (1857) 169 ER 959. 
203 Foster v Dodd (1867) LR 30B 67, 77. 
204 Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406. 
205 Id. at 414.  A frequently cited example is that of the Aztec drinking vessel made from a skulls and popular in 
many museums.  As Charlotte Woodhead notes, this has still not been tested  by the courts in the context of 
human remains in museum collections. C. Woodhead, The Legal Issues around the Excavation and Custody of 
Human Remains, 5.   
206R. v. Kelly (1998) 3 All ER 741. 
185 
 
‘sweat/equity’ exception laid out in Doodeward v. Spence.  Kelly, an artist who used 
body parts in his exhibitions, together with a lab technician whom he paid to 
help him smuggle human parts from the Royal College of Surgeons, were 
charged with theft.  The trial judge convicted them both, and the Court of 
Appeal upheld the convictions because the human remains at issue could be the 
subject of theft.  Rose L.J. confirmed the common law rule noting that “neither 
a corpse, no parts of a corpse, are in and of themselves and without more 
capable of being property protected by rights.”207  He further noted that this rule 
from Sharpe had held for more than a century and if the time had come to 
change it then it was to be settled by Parliament.  Moreover, for purposes of 
Section 4 of the Theft Act of 1968 which details property for the purposes of 
the statute, human remains could amount to property but only if “they have 
acquired different attributes by virtue of the application of skill, such as 
dissection or preservation techniques, for exhibition or teaching purposes”208 
thus confirming the ‘sweat/equity’ rule of Doodeward.   
 
Moreover, some “quasi-property”209 rights in relation to human remains have 
emerged.  Quasi-property rights in relation to human remains at minimum mean 
that the property interest involved in the body is a very limited one restricted 
primarily to possession for next of kin for purposes of burial.210  This 
understanding of “property” in human remains has developed with the most 
                                                 
207 Id. at 749.  As Charlotte Woodhead notes, the search of Paul Matthews has uncovered that the origin of this 
rule is based in part of the misreading of earlier cases.  However, the fact remains that the court here was happy 
to accept it existence as a common law rule despite its dubious judicial basis. C. Woodhead, supra n. 205, at, 2  
n.6. See also Steven Gallagher, Museums and the Return of Human Remains: An Equitable Solution?, 17 International 
Journal of Cultural Property 65, 70-71 (2010) (succinctly describing the work of Matthews  in tracing  the 
dubious nature of this rule that eventually became self-sustaining). See generally P. Matthews, Whose Body? People 
as Property, Current Legal Problems 193 (1983).  
208 Kelly, supra n. 206, at 749.   
209 See Steven Cooper, supra n. 197, at 578 n. 113 (1985) (using the term quasi-property rights and describing these 
as more properly understood as a right of possession). 
210 Id. at. 579.  This second exception would even trump the first exception of the sweat/equity exception.  
Steven Gallagher, supra n. 207, at 72 citing  C. Woohead, ‘A Debate Which Crosses All Borders’ The Repatriation of 
Human Remains: More than Just a Legal Question , 7 Art, Antiquity and Law 317, 319-20 (2002).  Moreover, the first 
exception remains subject  to the rule nemo dat quod non habet (no one may give what he does not have); in essence 
even the sweat/equity exception does not apply in situations of theft  or other dubious circumstances as it 
presupposes lawful possession. Steven Gallagher, supra n. 207, at 72. 
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detail in the U.S211 as “property is a fundamental institution within American 
society” that “also has a profound connection to concepts of morality … [hence] 
the reluctance to associate property rights with human beings or their 
remains.”212 
 
A dead body is considered to be property or quasi-property for some 
purposes but in the strict sense of the term there is no right of property in a 
dead body … The right, however, to bury a corpse and to preserve it in the 
same condition in which death leaves it … is a legal right which the courts 
recognize and protect as a quasi-property right.213 
 
Further, Judge Prosser notes: 
 
A number of decisions have involved the mishandling of dead bodies … In 
these cases the courts have talked of a somewhat dubious ‘property right’ to 
the body, usually in the next of kin, which did not exist while the decedent 
was living, cannot be conveyed, can be used only for the one purpose of 
burial.  And not only has no pecuniary value but is a source of liability for 
funeral expenses.  It seems reasonably obvious that such ‘property’ is 
something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that it is in reality 
the personal feelings of the survivors which are being protected under a 
fiction likely to deceive no on by at lawyer.214 
 
In turn, it is well established at common law and in particular in the U.S. that 
human remains are not treated strictly as property in the traditional Western 
conception with all of the rights and obligations that the bundle entails.  
Ultimately, then this decoupling of human remains from traditional property 
concepts allows for the restitution of human remains.  In turn, this decoupling 
and the resultant scheme can be understood as the creation of sui generis or a 
                                                 
211 This is not to suggest that there have not been flagrant violations of this principle and that laws have been 
inadequate in providing protection. See  Hutt and  Mc Keown, supra n. 194, at 365-9  (succulently detailing the 
flagrant violations of this rule and the inadequacy of the law prior to the  adoption of legislation in the U.S. 
specific to the protection and repatriation of Native American human remains). See also The Antiquities Act of 
1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994) (classifying Native American remains as “objects of antiquity” and so 
treatment as federal property); Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm 
(1994) (classifying that Native American remains found on federal land were property of the U.S. government 
though giving Native American authority to control the treatment and disposition of remains on tribal lands and 
giving Native Americans a voice in those found on federal lands). 
212 Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Cultural Values 31 Ariz St. 
L.J. 583, 668 (1999). 
213 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies 2 reprinted in See Steven Cooper, supra n. 197, at 578 n. 114. 
214 W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 43-44 (2d ed. 1955) reprinted in See Steven Cooper, supra n. 197, at 578 n. 115. 
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specifically tailored set of rules to deal with something – i.e. human remains, 
which are not treated strictly as property.  Indeed this is most aptly demonstrated 
by the fact that the UNDRIP provided for a right to the repatriation of human 
remains from the very beginning.  
 
i. Article 12: Human Remains and the Declaration 
 
As the Cultural Council of Marican Indians, Alaska Natives and Native 
Hawaiians noted, ‘[t]he topic of repatriation is important as it is difficult to teach 
our children to be proud of who they are as native people if museums continue 
to believe that they can “own” the remains of our ancestors and our sacred 
objects.215  Vrdoljak notes, the obligation to treat human remains with respect 
and dignity has a strong tradition under classical international law and more 
recently in both International Humanitarian Law regime as well as the regional 
level in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.216  As regards repatriation, 
prior to the UNDRIP Indigenous Peoples called on the international community 
in The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples to return human remains and burial objects to them in a 
cultural  appropriate manner.217  In turn, from the outset the Draft Declaration 
provided for the repatriation of human remains.  Draft Article 13 offered: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach 
their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to 
maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural 
sites; the right to the use and control of ceremonial objects; and the right to the 
repatriation of human remains.  States shall take effective measures, in 
conjunction with the indigenous peoples concerned, to ensure that 
indigenous sacred places, including burial sites, be preserved, respected and 
protected. 
 
                                                 
215 Statement reprinted in Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 221. 
216 Vrdoljak, Reparations for Cultural Loss, supra n. 118, at 215. See also The Vermillion Accord on Human Remains, 
World Archaeological Congress Inter-Congress, South Dakota (1989) available at http://www.worldarchaeologicalcongre
ss.org/site/about_ethi.php 
217 The Mataatua Declaration, supra  n. 121, at para. 2.12. 
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Only minor revisions were proposed throughout the drafting process.  The first 
proposal provided:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach 
their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to 
maintain, protect, and have [reasonable] access in privacy to their religious 
and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of [their] ceremonial 
objects; and the right to the repatriation of human remains. 
 
States shall/should take effective measures, in conjunction with the 
indigenous peoples concerned, to ensure that indigenous sacred places, 
including burial sites, be reserved, respected and protected.218 
 
The second proposed amendment provided:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach 
their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to 
maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural 
sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the 
right to the repatriation of their human remains. 
 
States shall take effective measures, in conjunction with the indigenous 
peoples concerned, to ensure that indigenous sacred places, including burial 
sites, be preserved, respected and protected.219 
 
In turn, these amendments focused not on the inclusion of the repatriation of 
human remains itself but rather on fine tuning this right by inclusion of the word 
“their” in relation to the repatriation of human remains suggesting that the 
concern of states laid not with the concept of the repatriation of human remains 
itself but more with assurances that such repatriation be limited to Indigenous 
Peoples.220  Indeed the inclusion of repatriation of human remains was not 
questioned.221  
                                                 
218 See Chairperson-Luis-Enrique Chávez, Report of the working group established in accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/32, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/81 (7 January 2004) at 22 
(Additional text in bold). 
219 Information provided by States Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Amended Text 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.1 (6 September 2004) at 7 [Additional text in bold].  
220 Another interpretation is possible in that “their” is intended to restrict repatriation of human remains to those 
that are cultural identifiable. See infra Chapter 5 Section II(B) (discussing the repatriation of human remains in the 
context of the U.S. including culturally identifiable and unidentifiable remains). 
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Taking stock of these proposals, Chairperson Chàvez agreed and recommended 
the proposed change in relation to the insertion of the word “their” so that his 
text of Draft Article 13 read: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach 
their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to 
maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural 
sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right 
to the repatriation of their human remains. 
 
States shall take effective measures, in conjunction with the indigenous 
peoples concerned, to ensure that indigenous sacred places, including burial 
sites, be preserved, respected and protected.222 
 
The final text at Article 12 offered no change to the issue of the repatriation of 
human remains, providing that: 
 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and teach 
their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to 
maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural 
sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right 
to the repatriation of their human remains. 
 
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of 
ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession through 
fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in conjunction 
with indigenous peoples concerned.223 
 
Indeed even the term repatriation used in conjunction with human remains as 
opposed to the word restitution used in relation to cultural property in the 
                                                                                                                                                    
221 This conclusion is supported by the comments concerning the comparable insertion of the word “their” in 
relation to ceremonial objects in the same article.  Chairperson-Luis-Enrique Chávez noted that state delegations 
and Indigenous Peoples supported the inclusion of the word “their” as it simply made the article more precise. 
See Chairperson-Luis-Enrique Chávez, supra n. 218, at 10. See also report of the Working Group establish in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, E/Cn.4/1999/82 (3 March 1998) at para. 
72 (Chairperson Chávez noting that Draft Article 12 seemed to be generally accepted by most states). 
222 Chairperson-Luis-Enrique Chávez, Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission 
on Human rights resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its tenth session, United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Commission on Human rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/2, (1 September 2005) (emphasis 
added).  
223 The text in bold represents the additional text included in the final Declaration after the Chairperson-Luis-
Enrique Chávez proposal. 
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UNDRIP suggests that former is not treated strictly as property.  Repatriation 
refers to “the return of cultural objects to nations of origin (or to the nations 
whose people include cultural descendants of those who made the objects; or to 
the nations whose territory includes their original sites or the sites from which 
they were last removed).”224  It is therefore very political rather than legal in 
nature in that “it [the term] assumes that cultural objects have a patria, a national 
character and a national homeland.”225  In turn, the term repatriation suggests a 
return based on identity; the notion of going home and home as the appropriate 
context.  It is the suggestion of this geographical dimension, the link to a specific 
country [or in this case to Indigenous Peoples], and identity in relation to return 
that gives it a political nature.  By contrast, the word restitution which UNDRIP 
reserves for cultural property226 at Article 11 is more legal in its nature as it is 
more closely bound up with traditional property concepts; in particular the 
return of the property to an owner after its theft as part of a scheme of 
reparations which aims to make one whole after a wrongful act.  In the case of 
Indigenous Peoples it is sought to address the removal of cultural property that 
was part and parcel of colonialism.  Indeed, restitution is the most sought after 
remedy within cultural property disputes as opposed to monetary damages227 and 
only when restitution is impossible are other remedies considered.228  This 
indicates the importance of the specific item to the state, individual or group 
                                                 
224 Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra n. 131, at 845.  
225 John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical 
Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law 107 (2000).Merryman,  As mentioned in Chapter Two, this thesis finds 
itself placed within the larger debate known as the “repatriation” debate. See supra Chapter 2 Section I.  Indeed, 
the fact that it is referred to as the repatriation debate suggests then the highly politicized nature of the 
discussion.   
226 Initially there was opposition by states to employing the word restitution in relation to cultural property on the 
part of a number states given this link with property; specifically the fear that it would implicate third party 
property rights. See infra Chapter 5 at ns. 107-111 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to the term 
restitution in relation to cultural property).  However, it is conceivable that eventually as Article 11 was watered 
down to ensure no sui generis right it became clear that any chance of disturbing third part property rights was slim 
to none and so restitution remained in the text despite its links with property law.  Indeed, regardless it has 
associations with property law in a way that repatriation which is used in relation to human remains does not. 
227 Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, supra n. 188, at 1889.  
228 Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution: Ensuring Each Group’s Contribution to Humanity, 22 European Journal 
of International Law 17, 44 (2011).The primacy of the restitution of cultural property  in ‘circumstances deemed 
offensive to the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscious’ which surely includes colonialism has 
been recently reaffirmed by the international community. See id. at 45 (2011)citing UNESCO Doc. 
181/EX/53Add, Annex I, at 2.  
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including Indigenous Peoples requesting return as a result of the unique and 
non-fungible nature of much cultural property which to them distinguishes it 
from other pieces of property.229  
 
In sum, the UNDRIP from the very outset intended to and provides for the 
right to the repatriation of human remains.  Ultimately, this stems from the fact 
that human remains unlike cultural property typically have not been treated as 
traditional property subject to the full panapoly of the powerful rights of 
ownership which is well-established at common law and in particular in the U.S.  
In turn, due to this distinction in treatment the UNDRIP simultaneously 
provided for an unfettered substantive right to the restitution of human remains 
while offering the restitution of cultural property as a possible discretionary 
remedy as a derivative of another right, which steps back to comfortably fit 
within the practice under Article 27 under IHRL which does not guarantee 
restitution.230  Therefore, the diluted version of Article 11 specifically reflects the 
continued resistance on the part of states in particular to disturb legal title in 
property, and thereby third party rights, and in general their disdain to disturb 
the sacrosanct nature of property and its panoply of rights as understood in the 
Western tradition; all of which has come at the expense of restitution of cultural 
property to Indigenous Peoples and their conceptions of property.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
229 Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, supra n. 188, at 1889 (discussing the unique and non-fungible 
nature of cultural property and the theoretical underpinnings of such a concept and its consequences).   
230 Interestingly, this scheme for both human remains and cultural property in the Declaration ultimately reflects 
to a certain extent the legislations in U.S. for repatriation, where these common law concepts of quasi-property in 
relation to human remains took the most hold as well as legal pluralism where there is comprehensive legislation 
for the repatriation of human remains. See infra Chapter 5 at Section II(D) (discussing the significance of the 
relationship between U.S. legislation for repatriation and the Declaration).  
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D. Indigenous Peoples and Property: Collectivity, Heritage and 
Identity   
 
Indeed, this resistance rooted in the continued dominance of a Western view of 
personal property that contributed to the retrogression of Article 11 came at the 
expense of traditional communal property practices, has been observed by 
numerous Indigenous Peoples. 
 
When indigenous groups attempt to assert ownership rights in their cultural 
property, they often have great difficulty satisfying the common-law 
requirement of a prior possessory interest and demonstrating a chain of title 
which would provide a legal basis to demand the return of objects.  
Establishing property rights is made easier if ownership is asserted on 
collective or communal basis- forms of ownership which are antithetic to 
many common law property policies.  Collective and communal systems of 
property ownership do not recognize ownership in any individual, but rather 
in the social group as a whole … Although there is a great diversity in 
customary laws of indigenous groups, the concept of communal ownership is 
common to many, and may be used to justify … a right of repatriation of 
cultural property.231 
 
Indeed, for Indigenous Peoples, “[h]ertiage is ordinarily a communal right, and is 
associated with a family, clan, tribe or other kinship group.”232  In turn, 
Indigenous Peoples view cultural property through a collective lens that is not 
only at odds with Western conceptions of property but also confronts Western 
beliefs that communal ownership is economical inefficient.233  Even prior to the 
UNDRIP, Indigenous Peoples called on the international community in The 
Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples to ”develop in full co-operation with indigenous peoples an additional 
cultural and intellectual property rights regime incorporating [the idea of] 
collective (as well as individual) ownership and origin.”234  Incorporating the 
                                                 
231 Theresa Simpson, Claims of Indigenous Peoples to Cultural Property in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 
18 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 196, 203-4 (1994-5). 
232 Erica-Irene Daes, Study, supra n. 123, at para.  28. 
233 Lindsey L. Wiersma, supra n. 174, at1073 [citation omitted (discussing facing this idea of economic 
inefficiency).   
234 The Mataatua Declaration, supra n. 121, at para. 2.5. 
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Mataatua ideas into her preliminary and final report on the protection of the 
heritage of Indigenous Peoples, Special Rapporteur Daes provides the principle 
that the ownership of indigenous heritage must “continue to be collective, 
permanent and inalienable, as prescribe by the customs, rules and practices of 
each people.”235  
 
In fact, Indigenous Peoples do not view their cultural property as property 
at all.  As Daes noted in her aforementioned study on the protection of 
cultural property: 
 
Indeed, indigenous peoples do not view their heritage in terms of property at 
all—that is, something which has an owner and is used for the purposes of 
extracting economic benefits—but in terms of community and individual 
responsibility … For indigenous peoples, heritage is a bundle of 
relationships, rather than a bundle of economic rights.  The “object” has no 
meaning outside of the relationship, whether it is a physical object such as a 
sacred site or ceremonial tool, or an intangible such as a song or s story.  To 
sell it is necessarily to bring the relationship to an end.236    
 
In essence, the indigenous conception of property cannot be reduced to and 
understood as the aforementioned traditional bundle of property rights centered 
on commodification and individualism that typify Western conceptions of 
property.  As Alexander Bauer notes: 
 
Western notions of property—both “real” and “intellectual”—have 
established  a system whereby anything can be isolated, decontextualized, 
packaged for consumption, marketed, and traded—in short commodified.  
This has become even more prevalent in a global era where individuals are 
increasingly seeking to distinguish themselves from increasingly similar 
crowd.  Culture perceived as a resource for supplying consumers with 
innovative, different and authentic” (and “unique”) objects and experiences, 
has thus become the ultimate commodity—the last resort for people to 
distinguish themselves in a Sombartian sense of “conspicuous consumption” 
through their acquisition of preciosities.237 
                                                 
235 Erica-Irene Daes, Preliminary Report, supra n. 126, at Annex para. 5; Erica-Irene Daes, Final Report, supra n. 127, 
at Annex para. 5.  
236 Erica-Irene Daes, Study, supra n. 123, at para.  26. 
237 Alexander Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates, 
31 Fordham International Law Journal 690, 697 (2007). 
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Such a notion goes against understandings of Indigenous Peoples of culture 
which view culture as part of the community.  “No person ‘owns’ or holds as 
‘property’ living things.  Our Mother Earth and our plant and animal relatives are 
living beings with rights of their own in addition to playing an essential role in 
our survival.”238  In essence, culture for Indigenous Peoples represent a 
relationship between human beings, animals, plants and places with which 
culture is associate and economic rights have no place: The European concept of 
the natural world, knowledge and culture as ‘property’ (therefore commodities to 
be exploited freely and bought and sold at will) has resulted in disharmony 
between human beings and the natural would, as well as the current 
environmental crisis threatening life.  This concept is totally incompatible with a 
traditional Indigenous worldview.239  Indeed, private property was not a feature 
of the indigenous way of life prior to interaction with Europeans.  Moreover, it 
is even argued that this process of commodification may result in the loss of 
certain aspects of culture in the difference between the original expression and 
the commodified one which may result in the loss of identity for members of the 
group, in this case Indigenous Peoples, and so can justify the sui generis protection 
of cultural heritage.240  Rather what emerges from this understanding is a 
                                                 
238 See International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), IITC Discussion Paper on Biological Diversity and Biological 
Ethics, 30 August 1996, p. 5 reprinted in Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 28, at 209. 
239 Id.  
240 Marianna Bicskei et al., Protection of Cultural Goods, 19 International Journal of Cultural Property 97, 98 (2012).  
This argument is another example of literature that develops or identifies new understanding of traditional 
property concepts that allow for the special protection and restitution of cultural property.  See supra n. 195 and 
accompanying test (discussing literature that seeks to decouple cultural property from traditional notions of 
property).  Specifically, Bicskei et al. argue that general property rights are not sufficient to prevent the 
commercialization of cultural goods including both tangibles and intangibles that need protection.  However, 
they are careful to argue that not all culture goods deserve special protection outside of the normal property 
regime.  Rather they argue that only certain goods should be subject to such protection and identify these goods 
through an economic analysis as those that are essential to identity and dignity. Bicskei et al., 99.  In turn, they 
recognize that it is not guaranteed that such commodification will result in the loss of identity.  In particular, this 
leaves open the possibility that if Indigenous Peoples are in control of the process of commodification it could 
even lead to cultural renewal, pride and of course much needed income as well as serving as the basis for 
creativity in the same vein as the concept art begets art.  However, their focus explicitly is on situations where 
economic changes caused by third parties or cultural outsiders who do not belong to the particular social 
category known as cultural carriers. Id. at 100.  Moreover, not even every kind of cultural consumption and 
reproduction by cultural outsiders equals an attack on the dignity of a person and identity. Id. 107.  In turn, on 
their analysis they narrow this special protection including the ability to control and supervise the consumption 
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of their cultural goods as well as to restricting their access to such goods to a very small subset of cultural goods 
and this determination they argue ultimate should be made on a cases by case basis and in line with the UNDRIP 
with the participation of the cultural group affected. Id. at111.  On this analysis, they ultimately conclude that this 
requires sui generis rights to protect cultural property but caution that given the dynamic nature of culture that this 
model could be problematic as sui generis rights grant perpetual rights.  Therefore, they urge that time and 
community limits should be included into any legislation to avoid additional social costs caused by overreaching 
legislation regarding the public domain. Id. at 113.  On this analysis, it is arguable that Bicskei et al. would not 
have supported Draft Article 12 as a sui generis right to the restitution of cultural property as overly-broad 
legislation and indeed might support Article 11 as it stands as it could provide a more case by case approach.  
Nonetheless, this analysis of Bicskei et al. again demonstrates the clear link between cultural heritage and cultural 
identity albeit on an economic rather than IHRL analysis in the literature though their approach recognizes the 
changing nature of identity. See supra Chapter 3 Section III(A) and accompanying text (discussing the link 
between cultural heritage and its protection and restitution with the concept of cultural identity). Bicskei et al. are 
not alone in making the ultimate argument that sui generis rights might not be appropriate for the restitution of 
cultural property.  Professor Sarah Harding also by extension arrives at this conclusion.  See generally Sarah 
Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 Arizona State Law Journal 291 (1999).  Specifically, Professor 
Harding seeks to identify the inherent value in cultural heritage in order to understand the best way to regulate 
cultural heritage including its restitution as this avoids discussion of culture and property/ownership rights in 
relation to the disposition of cultural heritage which she argues undermine meaningful discussion. Id. at 302.  In 
essence a stronger theory of the significance of cultural heritage provides the best guidance for resolving future 
disputes. Id.  Traditionally intrinsic value is measured as something that is an end itself.  However, Harding argues 
for a more expansive understanding in that things can have significance beyond their secondary instrumental 
value and yet cannot be classified as ends-in-themselves.  These things like cultural heritage are intrinsically 
valuable in that they are constituents of other things that are ends-in-themselves.  Specifically, Harding argues 
that on a broader definition of intrinsic value, cultural heritage is intrinsically valuable because it is constituent of 
aesthetic and cultural experiences and particularly with the later in mind is how the regulation of cultural property 
should be structured. Id. at. 295-6.  Regarding these aesthetic and cultural experiences, ultimately both are 
essential to the well-being of individuals and communities hence are constituent of ends-in themselves. Id. at 315.  
Specifically, the aesthetic experience is the part of cultural heritage “that can be called art and evokes wonder” 
and thus is intrinsically valuable. Id. at 333.  As concerns the cultural experience, Harding builds her idea of the 
cultural experience on the idea that instead of trying to define culture as she finds most definitions static and 
essential that we should understand culture as a context. Id. at 334.  Culture as a context for Harding builds upon 
the work done by Charles Taylor which views this context in a communitarian framework “emphasizing the 
dialogical nature between individuals and culture … [which] captures the fluid, responsive nature of culture.” Id. 
at 336.  Although at first blush that it might seem that if we view culture as fluid that cultural heritage become 
dispensable as part of cultural evolution, she argues that this does not mean that we need to go the other way and 
view the protection of heritage then as an essentialization of culture. Id. at 338-9.  She believes cultural heritage is 
“indispensable … in the existence and evolution of distinct cultures … [it] is not the totality of culture but it is a 
constituent in that, in the right hands, it provides the seeds and tools for growth and invention.  The desire of 
culturally affiliated groups to control and in some cases preserve their cultural heritage is not a reflection of a 
tendency towards cultural essentialism as much as it is an attempt by specific cultures to preserve ‘a particular 
historical trajectory’”. Id. at 339-40.  Based on these aesthetic and cultural experiences as the basis of the intrinsic 
value of cultural heritage she then offers a loose idea of how to approach cultural heritage.  Specifically, “if the 
intrinsic value of cultural heritage is intimately connected to the value of cultural experience and the value of 
cultural experience exists in something like a dialogical relationship to the individuals who comprise the culture 
then this tells us something about the appropriate treatment of cultural heritage.  If an object, custom story or 
ritual has a living context it should remain in or be returned to that context if we are to accord it the respect 
which is due.” Id. at 344.  It avoids being “an act of breathtaking condescension” which would be the case if 
claims for cultural heritage were made on the assertion of cultural rights and in essence essentialism alone. Id. at 
345.  Ultimately, she concludes that “the rigidity and finality of overly zealous legal protections are not well suited 
to a good whose value is intimately connected with something as fluid as culture.  Culture is not a fixed, 
corporeal thing and so both our designation of things considered cultural heritage and the association of such 
things with specific cultures should not be forever fixed.” Id. at 353.  In turn, the commonality in these 
arguments lies in the fact that both on a bold reading would suggest that law might not be the appropriate forum 
to address these matters in the same vein as the literature mentioned above which  attempts to remove the 
discussion of law and property concepts and rights altogether suggesting that we need to find new mechanisms to 
resolve these disputes that depend on discussion and negotiation. See supra n. 193 and accompanying text.  On a 
more conservative reading, at minimum both suggest that sui generis rights might not be the best approach as they 
are overly–broad or in the words of Harding they avoid being “an act of breathtaking condescension” which 
would be the case if claims for cultural heritage were made on the assertion of cultural rights and in essence 
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different bundle of features that Indigenous Peoples associate with cultural 
property including as aforementioned its collective nature as well as a preference 
for the term heritage over property. 
 
More broadly under international law, cultural heritage refers to “manifestations 
of human life which represent a particular view of life and witness the history 
and validity of that view.”241  The 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage [World Heritage 
Convention] provides more detail, dividing heritage into cultural heritage and 
natural heritage.  Cultural heritage includes monuments, groups of building and 
sites242 while natural heritage includes geological and physiographical formations 
and sites that are valuable both in terms of science and beauty.243  More recently, 
UNESCO detailed a further dimension of cultural heritage: intangible cultural 
heritage.  The UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage 2003 defines intangible cultural heritage as “the practices, 
representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, 
objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, 
                                                                                                                                                    
essentialism alone. Harding, at 345.  In turn, for them the retrogression of Article 11 might not be so bad as it 
offers a case by case approach more conducive to understanding that culture and identity are fluid and in this 
sense is in the same vein as anti-essentialists See supra Chapter 3 at  ns. 109-15 (discussing essentialism and anti-
essentialism).  In turn, the retrogression of Article 11 in addition could be seen as a theoretical stance against 
essentialism in addition to a practical reaction against its links with the concepts of self-determination and 
property as discussed herein.    
241 Prott and O’Keefe, supra n. 154, at 307.   
242 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Paris, November 16, 
1972. 1037 U.N.T.S. 151, 27 U.S.T. 37, 11 I.L.M. 1358.  “For the purposes of this Convention, the following 
shall be considered as "cultural heritage": monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and 
painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of 
features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; groups of 
buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or 
their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; 
sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are 
of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.” Id. at 
Art. 1. 
243 Id. at Art. 2. “For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be considered as "natural heritage": 
natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are of 
outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view; geological and physiographical 
formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants 
of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation; natural sites or precisely 
delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or natural 
beauty.” Id.  
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groups and, in some cases, individuals recognized as part of their cultural 
heritage.”244  It then lists the areas in which intangible heritage is made manifest 
as including: oral traditions and expressions, including language as a vehicle of 
the intangible cultural heritage;  performing arts;  social practices, rituals and 
festive events;  knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe;  
and traditional craftsmanship.245  Indeed, both tangible and intangible heritage 
are inextricably related with each being integral to sustaining the other and so in 
some ways is an artificial divide.  
 
Collectively, these definitions outline the broad contours of cultural heritage 
under general international law as including both movable and immovable 
property as well as tangible and intangible items.  Cultural property undoubtedly 
is part of the cultural heritage of Indigenous Peoples.246  Indeed, these central 
features of cultural property and cultural heritage as gleaned from their definition 
in international law247 make clear that the former is subset of the later much 
broader term of art within international law as cultural heritage necessarily 
includes cultural property both in its substance as movable and tangible property 
as well as in its qualities.  International conventions in their discussion of cultural 
property support the view that it represents a subset of cultural heritage.  For 
instance, Article 1 of the 1954 Hague Convention 1954 provides that cultural 
property is both “movable or immovable property of great importance to 
                                                 
244 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage.  Paris, October 17, 2003.  2368 U.N.T.S. 
3 at Art.1.  The definition of intangible cultural heritage continues, “[t]his intangible cultural heritage, transmitted 
from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their 
environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and 
continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.  For the purposes of this 
Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with existing 
international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect among communities, 
groups and individuals, and of sustainable development.” Id. at Art. 1.  
245 Id. at art. 2. 
246 Erica-Irene Daes, Preliminary Report, supra n.126, at Annex para. 12. (The heritage of indigenous peoples 
includes all moveable cultural property as defined by the relevant conventions of UNESCO…) Id. ;Erica-Irene 
Daes, Final Report, supra n. 127, at Annex para. 12. 
247 See supra Chapter 2 at Section II (discussing the definition of cultural property in international law). 
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cultural heritage.”248  The peacetime regime also is not short of such references 
to cultural heritage in relation to cultural property that also support the idea that 
the latter is a subset of the former.  Article 2 of the UNESCO Convention notes 
that “the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property is 
one of the main causes of the impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the 
countries of origin of such property…” while Article 4 provides that states party 
to the convention “ recognize that for the purpose of the Convention property 
which belongs to the following categories forms part of the cultural heritage of 
each State…” and then goes on to list items of cultural property. 249  The text of 
the UNIDROIT Convention similarly makes such references.  It refers to the 
“… fundamental importance of the protection of cultural heritage and of 
cultural exchanges for promotion understanding between peoples…” as well as 
at its preamble stating that  the illicit trade in cultural objects is detrimental to the 
cultural heritage of national, tribal, indigenous and other communities.250  
Similarly, at the regional level in the Americas The Convention on the Protection 
of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations 
recognizes at Article 1 that property makes up “the cultural heritage of the 
American nations...”  while Article 2 then provides that the property referred to 
in Article 1 is cultural property and then lists such property while Article 5 
                                                 
248 U.N., 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural  Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed 
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 at Art. 1. 
249 Aside from these articles, the UNESCO Convention also provides references to cultural heritage in relation to 
cultural property in a fashion that suggests that the former is understood in the international legal regime as a 
subset of the later in numerous other articles including at the Preamble and Articles 4, 5, 9, 10, 12 and 14.  See  
UNESCO, Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232.  Similarly, the Constitution of 
UNESCO, the parent organization that developed the previous convention on cultural property, states  at Article 
1 paragraph 2(c) that its core function is to “assure the conservation and protection of the world’s cultural 
heritage and to this effect recommend to nations to adopt the necessary international conventions.” Constitution 
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 16 November 1945, 4 
U.N.T.S. 275.  Hence the adoption on the UNESCO Convention on cultural property suggests that it must be 
part of cultural heritage.  
250 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the 
Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects, done June 24, 1995, 34  I.L.M. 1326 at Preamble, Art.1 and Art. 5. 
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further provides that the  “cultural heritage of each state consists of property 
mentioned in Article 2…”.251 
 
Some commentators support the use of the term heritage over that of property.  
Initially, Prott and O’Keefe argued that the latter carries with it an “ideological 
load” and so that if the term property is to be used it must be done so with great 
care and it will frequently require re-interpretation252 creating the potential for 
misunderstandings and so ultimately the use of the term heritage is preferable.253  
Specifically, Prott and O’Keefe argued that the term property has particular 
connotations all aimed at contributing towards commoditization or thinking 
solely in terms of commercial value.  In particular, property has commercial 
connotations which include “control by the owner expressed by his ability to 
alienate, to exploit and to exclude others from the object.”254  Over time, this 
position has been refined and Prott now argues that heritage in all situations 
must be the preferred term. 
 
[C]ultural property, in my view, necessarily carries with the phrase a whole 
baggage of associations and implications, in particular the view in the 
common law (based on a philosophy broadly shared by the legal systems of 
continental European countries) that property and ownership rights clearly 
authorize exploitation, alienation (that is, divestment to any other person at 
will), and exclusion of others from access—all elements that, in modern 
heritage law, may well be restricted.  For this reason, I would argue that 
heritage should be preferred, as it is in all recent UNESCO instruments.255 
 
                                                 
251 Convention on the Protection of the Archeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American 
Nations. Santiago, June 16, 1976.  15 I.L.M. 1350. Art. 1, 2 and 5. 
252 See infra Chapter 6 at Section II(A)-(B) (discussing how in the dialogical space provide by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights this is exactly what occurred: a re-interpretation of the term property so at to provide for 
the restitution of land to Indigenous Peoples that a traditional concept of property could not provide). 
253 Prott and O’Keefe, supra n. 154, at 309-10 (arguing that the term cultural heritage should supersede the term 
cultural property  as the existing term  property does not cover adequately what the law needs to protect).  In the 
same vein, even the use of the term cultural object by the UNDROIT as opposed to cultural property in the 
international regime for its protection seems preferable though does not go as far as heritage. See supra Chapter 2 
at Section II (discussing UNDROIT Convention’s use of the term cultural object). 
254 Prott and O’Keefe, supra n. 154, at 310. 
255 Lyndel V. Prott, The International Movement of Cultural Objects, 12 International Journal of Cultural Property 225, 
226 (2005). 
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Indeed, aside from these elements that comprise the substance of cultural 
heritage as gleaned under general international law which shed the ideological 
baggage of traditional property concepts, the term heritage also includes a 
penumbra of different qualities which replace these traditional concepts to the 
benefit of Indigenous Peoples as they have developed more specifically in the 
laws and norms as related to Indigenous Peoples.  This penumbra of different 
qualities that heritage protects includes that of the ideas of inheritance and 
cultural identity256  The former is the notion that cultural heritage is to be handed 
down from one generation to another i.e. intergenerational  while the latter 
refers to a link between the cultural identity of a group and that of a state or a 
peoples.257  In turn, the protection of cultural property is not only implicitly 
linked to the concept of cultural identity as an incident of the protection of 
cultural rights as aforementioned258 but it is also explicitly linked to this concept 
of identity through its inclusion as culture heritage.  It is these additional features 
of the explicit link to identity and inheritance that form the core of the 
indigenous understanding of and preference for the term heritage over property.  
As Daes provides the indigenous understanding of heritage is “everything that 
belongs to the distinct identity of a people and which is theirs to share, if they 
wish, with other peoples” and that it is “comprised of all objects, sites and 
knowledge, the nature or use of which has been transmitted from generation to 
generation … [as well as] objects, knowledge and literary and artistic works 
which may be created in the future based upon its heritage.”259   
 
The Declaration does refer to the cultural heritage of Indigenous Peoples in 
Article 31 offering that Indigenous Peoples “have the right to maintain, control, 
protect and develop their cultural heritage…”; however it makes no reference to 
                                                 
256 Janet Blake, On Defining The Cultural Heritage, 49 International & Comp. Law Quarterly 61, 84 (2000). 
257 Id. 
258 See supra Chapter 3 at Section III(A).  
259 Erica-Irene Daes, Preliminary Report, supra n. 126,at Annex para. 11; Erica-Irene Daes, Final Report, supra n. 127, 
at Annex para. 11. 
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restitution.260  Rather, UNDRIP continues to use the term cultural property in 
relation to the concept of restitution.  Indeed, Special Rapporteur Daes wanted 
the term property changed to heritage in the text:  
 
Articles 12, 24 and 29 of the draft declaration include references to aspects of 
the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous peoples.  It may be noted 
that the Special Rapporteur on the study on the protection of the cultural and 
intellectual property of indigenous peoples, Ms. Erica-Irene Daes, 
recommends that the term "cultural heritage" be adopted and her study 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28) has been renamed accordingly.  It may, thus, be 
appropriate to examine whether such a change can be made in the relevant 
articles of the draft declaration.261 
 
It is unsurprising that Indigenous Peoples and their advocates would reject the 
continued use of the term cultural property in relation to the issue of restitution 
given the aforementioned connotations with traditional Western conceptions of 
property.  However, this proposal was ultimately rejected and thereby reinforces 
Western conceptions of property; and in doing so follows suit in the same vein 
as the international framework for the protection of cultural property regardless 
of the preference of Indigenous Peoples for use of the term cultural heritage that 
has developed within the laws and norms relating specifically to Indigenous 
Peoples.  Further, the continued use of the term cultural property with these 
traditional property associations within the text of an IHRL document in general 
and  the UNDRIP in particular which was developed with intense participation 
by and for Indigenous Peoples suggests something further: namely the continued  
power of Western values/concepts in international law in general and in 
particular the continued  power of their values and conceptions of property to 
the detriment of Indigenous Peoples advocacy, which ultimately raises the 
question about whether IHRL can serve the demands of Indigenous Peoples; a 
                                                 
260 See infra Chapter 5 at Section II(E) (discussing Article 31).  This is also interesting because aside from the fact 
that cultural property is part of cultural heritage, the UNDRIP represents one of the few documents in 
international law to refer to both cultural property and cultural heritage in the same text.  Most documents in 
international law tend to use one tem and not to mix the two within the same text. 
261 Technical Review of the United Nations Draft Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. 
Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994.2 at para 16 
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question that was tentatively addressed by Professor Karen Engle in the context 
of the broader Declaration.   
 
III. Mirroring Meso-Level Analysis: The Limits of the UNDRIP 
 
In her aforementioned seminal article On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights 262, Professor Karen 
Engle offers an astute analysis of why the Declaration on the whole failed to 
properly and fully address the desires of Indigenous Peoples.  In essence, she 
provides a meso-level analysis of the failure/flaws of the Declaration while the 
preceding offered a micro-level analysis in concentrating specifically on one 
article within the Declaration; Article 11 and its failure to address the demands 
of Indigenous Peoples in relation to securing a right the restitution of cultural 
property.263  As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the watering down of 
Article 11 occurred as a result of its relationship with the concept of self-
determination and the disruption of property rights while at the meso-level 
Professor Engle offers that the failure of the UNDRIP to address the desires of 
Indigenous Peoples stems from the concept of self-determination and the 
privileging of individual rights and in particular civil and political rights at the 
expense of subjugating collective rights.264  In turn, the weakening of Article 11 
which specifically resulted in its failure to provide for the restitution of cultural 
property to Indigenous Peoples directly mirrors the dilution of the broader 
                                                 
262 Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples in the Context of  Human 
Rights, 22 European Journal of  International Law 141 (2011).  
263 This is my interpretation of  Engle as providing a meso-level analysis; she does not reference such a term in 
her work.  I use this term herein to distinguish my level of  analysis at the micro-level in exploring Article 11 and 
restitution specifically within the Declaration from her meso-level analysis which focuses on the Declaration as a 
whole.  In turn, Chapter Five provides a macro-level analysis of  this failure to provide for the restitution of  
cultural property to Indigenous Peoples by looking at the IHRL more generally.  
264 But see Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 
European Journal of International Law 121 (2011) (takes a softer less critical stance towards IHRL and the 
Declaration arguing that there is a reshaping of the former with new actors and new drivers in the wake of the 
Second World War but that the reshaping is slow and the Declaration is still a successful example of part of this 
process though recognizing that some challenges remain ahead). 
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Declaration indicating that Indigenous Peoples  have been failed on both the 
micro-level in Article 11 and the meso-level in the broader Declaration.     
 
A. UNDRIP and the Limit of Self-Determination: Internal Modality 
Alone 
 
Just as Article 11 suffered from its links with self-determination,265 Engle 
demonstrates, at the meso-level the UNDRIP also suffered as a result of the 
limitation of self-determination266 and in this respect both follow in the footsteps 
of the trend in broader IHRL to limit self-determination to an internal variant.  
Specifically, in the Declaration, Article 3 provides that “Indigenous Peoples have 
the right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”267  However, significantly it is limited by Article 46(1) which 
provides that 
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any 
act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or constructed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States.268 
 
By stressing that nothing in the Declaration will impair the territorial integrity or 
political unity of the sovereign and independent state, this article in essence 
confirms that the only form of self-determination available to Indigenous 
Peoples is internal.  Ultimately, this watered down version of internal self-
determination was crucial to the passage of the Declaration and emerged as the 
direct result of concerns expressed by a numerous states over the years.   
                                                 
265 See supra Section I. 
266 See Engle, supra n. 262, at 144-8.  
267 UNDRIP, supra n. 72, at Art. 3. 
268 Id. at Art. 46(1). 
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Initially, the Draft Declaration detailed the areas over which Indigenous Peoples 
would have control including “culture, religion, education, information, media, 
health, housing, employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and 
resources management, environment and entry by non-members.”269  However, 
this article did not survive and an “arguably watered down understanding of self-
determination”270 emerged stating at Article 4 that the right to self-determination 
guarantees “the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their 
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their 
autonomous functions.”271  As Engle notes, although this limitation was 
sufficient for the Human Rights Council it was not sufficient for a number of 
African states who voted to defer consideration of the declaration through a 
non-action resolution.272  Specifically, in 2006, the Human Rights Council 
adopted the Declaration.  However a number of member states with large 
indigenous populations made objections and so proposed a non-action 
resolution to defer consideration of the Declaration to a later date.273  In turn, at 
the behest of a group of African states, known as the “African Group”, the 
General Assembly delayed its consideration of the Declaration on the grounds 
that this group had serious concerns surrounding the language on self-
determination, the definition of Indigenous Peoples and the issue of free and 
prior informed consent that would prevent the passage of the text of the 
                                                 
269 Draft Declaration, in UN Commission on Human rights, Subcommission on Prevention of  Discrimination 
and Protection of  Minorities, 45th Session, ‘Report of  the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its 
Eleventh Session’, UN Doc. E/CN.4?/Sub.2/1993/29/Annex I (23 Aug. 1993), at Article 31. 
270 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 262, at 145.  
271 UNDRIP, supra n. 72, at Art.4.  Heather Northcott discusses in detail autonomy in the Declaration and argues 
that autonomy can serve as a reconceptualization of  self-determination that would engender less state opposition 
and grant Indigenous Peoples de facto control over their political, social, economic and cultural activities.  
However, in essence it secures even by her own admission a form of  self-determination that falls short of  an 
external modality though she casts it in the best possible light. See H. Northcott, Realisation of  The Right of  
Indigenous Peoples to Natural Resources under International Law through the Emerging right to Autonomy, 16 
The International Journal of  Human Rights 73. 
272 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 262, at 145. 
273 Namibia formally proposed the resolution on behalf  of  the African Union, noting that “the vast majority if  
the peoples of  Africa are indigenous to the African continent’ and that ‘self-determination only applies to nations 
trying to free themselves from the yoke of  colonialism.” Reprinted in Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 262, at 
144 [citations omitted]. 
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Declaration in its present form by consensus.  As an effort to reach such 
consensus, the African Group suggested a number of changes.  In relation to 
self-determination, they stressed that it must be clear that self-determination 
applies only to the colonial and/or foreign occupation context as outlined in the 
UN Charter at Article 77 and Article 3.  Yet, according to the African Group, as 
UNDRIP stood, Articles 3 and 4 
 
…may be misunderstood as embracing and promoting self-determination 
within nation states.  Its very basis and content, namely ethnicity, culture and 
language could easily become a rationale for other groups seeking exclusivity 
within nation states.  The United Nations has the responsibility to protect the 
integrity of nation States, it cannot be seen as abetting and promoting 
dynamics that are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and that can 
unravel unity and territorial integrity of Member States.  It is therefore 
important that a document adopted by the General Assembly should be 
watertight to leave no room for misinterpretation.274 
 
In essence, the concern of the African Group boiled down to a fear that self-
determination within the Declaration could be understood to allow an external 
modality in relation to Indigenous Peoples which in their perception provided a 
new meaning of the concept and that it would contradict international law.  To 
“cure” this defect, the African Group suggested that as Article 3 of the 
UNDRIP paralleled the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 
(XXV) 24 October, 1970275, that it would be essential that the UNDRIP also 
include text that reflects Articles 6 and 7 of the 1970 Declaration as this would 
provide balance and avoid contraction in international law.276 Articles 6 and 7 of 
the 1970 Declaration stress respectively that self-determination will not result in 
the disruption of national unity and territorial integrity and that the 1970 
                                                 
274 Draft Aide Memoire, African Group, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples, 9 
November 2006 at para. 3.2. 
275 See supra Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra n. 26. 
276 Draft Aide Memoire, supra n. 274, at para. 3.3. 
206 
 
Declaration is rooted in the principles of equality, non-interference in the 
internal affairs of states and respect for sovereignty.   
 
As a result of these concerns expressed by the African Group, a compromise 
emerged in the form on the inclusion of Article 46(1) in order to bring these 
states back into the fold.277  As aforementioned, Article 46(1) provides: 
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any 
act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or constructed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States. 
 
With the language of this article which emphasizes that nothing in the 
declaration should be construed as dismembering or impairing in total or in part 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, Article 46(1) parallels that 
found in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) 24 October, 
1970 at Article 6 and 7 as desired by the African Group and thereby confirms 
that the only form of self-determination available to Indigenous Peoples is 
internal in the Declaration.  As Engle concludes, UNDRIP “seals the deal: 
external forms of self-determination are off the table for indigenous 
peoples…”278   
                                                 
277 It should be noted that it was not just African states that had concerns over self-determination.  A whole host 
of  states throughout the entire negotiations process expressed concerns over self-determination and it was 
identified by the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the four states that initially objected to the 
declaration, as a reason for such rejection.  However, since this initial rejection these states have issued statements 
of  support for the Declaration through a process known as selective endorsement whereby these states “have 
simultaneously maintained their position in the human-rights-advocating, international community of  states 
without any intent of  implementing international Indigenous rights norms domestically.” Sheryl L. Lightfoot, 
Selective Endorsement without Intent to Implement: Indigenous Rights and the Anglosphere, 16 The International Journal of  
Human Rights 100, 102 (2012). 
278 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 262, at 147.  Dr. Xanthaki notes that excluding the availability of  
external self-determination to  Indigenous Peoples is discriminatory, unnecessary  and would hinder the 
possibility of  new and innovative ways of  exercising self-determination. Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 18, at 
167. Indeed, it is offered that this view of  Engle  is inaccurate in that the Declaration offers the right to self-
determination at Article 3 which mirrors the language of  the twin Articles of  the ICCPR and ICESCR that 
provide the right to self-determination more broadly under IHRL in all its forms to all peoples equally as any 
other construction would be discriminatory. Discussion with Dr. A. Xanthaki, (notes on file with the author).  
Indeed, Article 4 then would be viewed not so much as a restriction or explication of  what Article 3 offers but as 
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B. UNDRIP and the Limitation of Individual Rights: Subjugating the 
Collective  
 
Moreover, just as Article 11 suffered at the micro-level from its attempted 
disruption of the much-vaunted and well-protected right to property which is 
core to traditional individual civil and political rights and replacement with 
conception of property rooted in the collective,279 Engle demonstrates at the 
meso-level the UNDRIP’s ability to meet the needs of Indigenous Peoples more 
broadly also suffered as a result of the continued privileging of individual civil 
and political rights and in this respect both follow in the footsteps of the trend in 
IHRL to eschew collective rights.280  In general, states have consistently resisted 
the development of the concept of collective rights under IHRL.281  The 
experience of the UNDRIP did not prove different.  It provided a space for this 
continued resistance to play out in IHRL despite the insistence of Indigenous 
Peoples that the “exercise of our collective rights is not only critical to 
indigenous spirituality, but also [to] maintaining the inter-generational nature of 
all our social, cultural, economic and political rights”282 and the high praise that 
has been accorded to the Declaration regarding its approach to collective rights: 
                                                                                                                                                    
a right to be read independently or as a non-exhaustive list. However, there remains the matter of  Article 46(1) 
which limits any reading of  the Article 3 right to self-determination to deny secession as this would undoubtedly 
undercut the territorial integrity that the former seeks to preserve.  However, this does necessarily suggest that 
position of  Engle is untenable  as she only suggests that external forms of  self-determination i.e. secession is off  
the table nor that the inclusion of  self-determination in the Declaration is not laudable, progressive and an 
evolution of  international law in making applicable the right of  self-determination to Indigenous Peoples.. See 
Robert T. Coulter, The Law of  Self-Determination and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples, 15 
University of  California at Los Angeles Journal of  International Law and Foreign Affairs 1 (2010). Regardless, 
even this discussion emphasizes the controversial nature of  the right to self-determination.  
279 See supra Section II(D). 
280 See Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra n. 262, at 148-50.  Indeed, concern with collective rights undoubtedly 
also fuelled at least in part the limitation of  self-determination as by its nature it is a collective right belonging to 
peoples.  
281 See generally P.  Jones, Human Rights, Group Rights and Peoples’ Rights’, 21 Human Rights Quarterly 80 (1999); M. 
Freeman, Are There Collective Human Rights?, 43 Political Studies 25 (1995); M. Scheinin, How to Resolve Conflicts 
Between Individual and Collective Rights? in Rethinking Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights 219 (M. Scheinin 
and R. Toivanen eds., 2005); J. Gilbert, Individuals, Collectivities and Rights in Minorities, Peoples, and Self-
Determination (N. Ghanea and A. Xanthaki eds., 2005). 
282  Proposals by indigenous representatives, seventh session of  the WGDD, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/98, Annex 
II, p. 28. 
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In the end, the Declaration proposes a good balance between individual and 
collective rights.  The preamble affirms “that indigenous individuals are 
entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international 
law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are 
indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as 
peoples.”  This idea that collective rights and individual rights are not 
necessarily antonymic is certainly one of the keystones in the development of 
indigenous peoples’ rights.  Hence, the adoption of the Declaration will mark 
an important step towards the affirmation of collective rights for indigenous 
peoples.283 
 
In reality however, Engle demonstrates the less often explored side of the 
Declaration in relation to collective rights which shows the significant number of 
collective rights provisions dropped from the Draft version in 2006.284  
Specifically, she points to numerous collective rights removed from the Draft 
Declaration including: Draft Article 8 (‘to maintain and develop their distinct 
identities’ collectively and individually), Draft Article 32 (‘to determine their own 
citizenship in accordance with their customs and traditions’) and Draft Article 34 
(‘to determine the responsibilities of individuals to their communities’); noting 
that if they are retained in the final Declaration the reference to the collective 
aspect has been removed.285  
 
This diminution of collective rights came at the behest of a number of states 
concerned with the concept of collective rights under IHRL.  Unsurprisingly, the 
states that initially rejected the Declaration lead the way in opposition.  New 
Zealand on behalf of Australia and the U.S. noted that: 
 
It seems to be assumed that the human rights of all individuals, which are 
enshrined in international law, are a secondary consideration in this text.  The 
intent of States participating in the Working Group was clear, that, as had 
always been the case.  Human rights are universal and apply equally in equal 
                                                 
283  Gilbert, supra n. 48, at 226.  See also Barelli, supra n. 140, at 963. 
284 Engle, supra n. 262, at 148-9. 
285 Article 33 has replaced Draft Articles 8 and 32 of  the Draft but with the elimination of  collective aspect 
providing that “Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance 
with their customs and traditions” while Article 35 in the final Declaration replaces Draft Article 34 using the 
same langue but eliminating the word collective. Engle, supra n. 262, at 149. 
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measure to all individuals.  This means that one group cannot have human 
rights that are denied to other grounds within the same nation-state.286  
 
Other states during the drafting process, also expressed concern.  France noted 
its position that collective rights do not exist in IHRL287 with Japan expressing 
the same sentiment288 while the Netherland recognizing such rights was 
nonetheless concerned about the imbalance between collective and individual 
rights.289  
 
Indeed, even the collective rights that avoided the aforementioned cull remain 
subject to limitation or flat out rejection.  Upon adoption of the Declaration, the 
representative from the UK noted that  
 
The United Kingdom fully supported the provisions in the Declaration 
which recognized that indigenous individuals were entitled to the full 
protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms in international 
law, on an equal basis to all other individuals.  Human rights were universal 
and equal to all.  The United Kingdom did not accept that some groups in 
society should benefit from human rights that were not available to others.  
With the exception of the right to self-determination, the United Kingdom 
did not accept the concept of collective human rights in international law.  
That was without prejudice to the United Kingdom’s recognition of the fact 
that the Governments of many States with indigenous populations had 
granted them various collective rights in their constitutions, national laws and 
agreements.290 
 
The representative from Slovakia continued and noted that it did not 
accept the distinction between individual and collective rights while 
Sweden elaborated that it  
 
                                                 
286 Statement by H.E. Ms. Rosemary Banks, Ambassador and Permanent representative of  New Zealand, on 
behalf  of  Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, available at www.australia.org/unny/Soc_161006.html 
reprinted in Engle, supra n. 262, at 149. 
287 Urrutia, Report, supra n. 90, at para 108. 
288 Id. atpara 184; see also Chávez, Report, supra n. 129, at para. 65. 
289 Urrutia, Report, supra n. 90, at para 109. 
290 U.N. Website, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ 
Towards Human Rights For All, Says President at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.ht
m (13 September 2007). 
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…had supported the Declaration throughout the negotiation process, had 
voted in favour of the text and hoped that its implementation improved the 
situation of indigenous peoples.  At the same time, the Declaration included 
several references to collective rights.  While the Swedish Government had 
no difficulty in recognizing such rights outside the framework of 
international law, it was of the firm opinion that individual human rights 
prevailed over the collective rights mentioned in the Declaration.291 
 
Aside from this deletion of a number of collective rights, the UNDRIP provided 
further assurance that “indigenous rights would not be permitted to stray outside 
the boundaries of ‘human rights protections’” by the inclusion of Article 46 
which as aforementioned not only restricts the meaning of self-determination 
from an external to an internal modality through paragraph 1 but potentially 
affects the understanding and application of all rights in the Declaration through 
paragraphs 2 and 3.292  Article 46(2) reads that “[t]he exercise of the rights set 
forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
determined by law and in accordance with international human rights 
obligations’ while paragraph 3 requires that the Declaration be interpreted “in 
accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights 
equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.”293  Professor 
Engle then asks, if the Declaration intends to expand the recognition of 
collective and cultural rights under IHRL could this expansion not be restricted 
by the same?294  She concludes, that indeed it “has restricted the ability of 
indigenous cultural and collective rights to be recognized in a way that would 
challenge the persistence of the individual liberal rights paradigm of human 
rights.  That is, the rights are ultimately defined by a human rights framework 
that is based on some of the very premises they are meant to challenge.”295  
Indeed, Engle’s conclusion is supported by the view of states.  The U.S. 
                                                 
291 Id.  The Saami Council noted this incongruous position on the part of Sweden early in the drafting process 
stating that “[t]he Swedish position with regard to collective rights was inconsistent with national Swedish 
legislation in which the Saami reindeer herding rights were recognized as collective Saami rights.” Urrutia, 
Report, supra n. 90, at para. 148. 
292 Engle, supra n. 262, at 150 
293 UNDRIP, supra n. 72, at Arts. 46(2) and (3).  
294 Engle, supra n. 262, at 150. 
295 Id. at 149. 
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representative offered that his state understands Article 46 to act as just such a 
restriction on collective rights noting its necessity as  
 
… if a collective entity or group – as opposed to individuals – could hold and 
exercise human rights, individuals within those groups would be extremely 
vulnerable to potential violations of the human rights by the collective.  In 
addition, if groups and individuals could each hold human right, it would be 
difficult to reconcile disputes over which human right should prevail … [Yet] 
Article 46 also makes clear that human rights are not to be violated in the 
exercise of collective rights.296  
 
In fact, Article 34 explicitly limits cultural rights and the norm of cultural 
integrity offering that Indigenous Peoples have the right to maintain and 
promote all aspects of their culture “in accordance with international 
human rights standards.”  Ultimately, if this is the case, “this would mean 
submitting human rights to the oppression of a western jurisprudential 
viewpoint; and ultimately this would not serve the quest for global 
justice.”297 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
296 Explanation of  vote by Robert Hagen, U.S. Advisor, on the Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples, 
to the UN General Assembly at http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/press_releases/20070913_2 (13 
September 2007). See also supra n. 182 (U.S. statement reiterating this point that Article 46 acts as a restriction on 
collective rights). 
297 A. Xanthaki, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and collective Rights: What’s the Future for Indigenous 
Women in Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 389 (S. Allen and A. Xanthaki 
eds., 2011). 
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Conclusions 
 
Diagram 3.  
 
 
The previous chapter, Chapter Three, more broadly demonstrated that the issue 
of the restitution of cultural property found itself located in indigenous advocacy 
strategies that pushed for its contextualization in the cannon of IHRL as a right 
to culture.  Yet, in particular, it demonstrated that it was this contextualization 
that meant that the issue of restitution of cultural property experienced a 
retrogression; as the sui generis right to restitution secured in Draft Article 12 of 
the Declaration did not survive the drafting process to emerge in Article 11 but 
rather what is offered steps back to fit comfortably within the existing cannon of 
IHRL and specifically cultural rights.  Yet this was not the full story.   
 
This chapter has explored what underpins the retrogression which has played 
out at the micro-level in Article 11 of the UNDRIP.  It posits that the failure to 
accommodate the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples in 
Article 11 through this retrogression is also underpinned by the continuing 
concerns on the part of states over self-determination and the disruption of 
property rights which is exacerbated by their association with collective rights 
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thereby locking it in a fatal triumvirate of concepts that face powerful opposition 
under IHRL ensuring its failure as a sui generis right.  Ultimately, this micro-level 
analysis parallels the meso-level analysis of UNDRIP itself as provided by 
Professor Karen Engle.  However, again this is not the full story.  These parallels 
suggest that is it necessary to explore a final level of analysis.  
 
In turn, this thesis will now turn to a macro-level analysis in that it will explore 
what explains the retrogression of Article 11 on a broader level in international 
law while Chapter Six will explore both the conclusions that can be drawn from 
this tripartite analysis of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous 
Peoples and the consequences that flow from the contextualization of this 
restitution as a human rights issue in IHRL.   
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Chapter Five 
Exploring the Limits of Contextualization:  
A Macro-Level Analysis of the Failure of Article 11 to 
Accommodate the Restitution of Cultural Property to 
Indigenous Peoples  
 
 
Introduction  
 
As demonstrated in the preceding chapter through a micro-level analysis of the 
contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples in Article 11 of the Declaration, it suffered a retrogression 
as a result of the continuing concerns on the part of states over self-
determination and the disruption of property rights both of which reinforce its 
nature as a collective right.  In essence, Draft Article 12 contextualized as a 
cultural right found itself the target at the center of a fatal triumvirate of 
concepts that face powerful opposition under international law and so left Draft 
Article 12 with little hope of survival as a sui generis right to restitution.   
 
In turn, this chapter explores what is ultimately at the root of this opposition to 
the restitution of cultural property and the Declaration itself through a macro-
level analysis of the issue of the restitution to cultural property to Indigenous 
Peoples in Article 11 of the Declaration in that it will explore what explains the 
retrogression of Article 11 on a broader level in international law.  This analysis 
demonstrates that at its root are state concerns with sovereignty as worries over 
sovereignty ultimately lie at the heart of opposition to the right to self-
determination and the disruption of third party property rights both of which 
have fuelled the retrogression of Article 11.  Indeed, if the limitations of Article 
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11 are rooted in its links with self-determination and the disruption of third 
party property rights then at the root of these limitations is sovereignty itself as 
undoubtedly Article 11 and its provisions of restitution have implications for 
sovereignty in the same fashion as all areas of international law impinge on the 
sovereignty of states by their very nature. 
 
 This chapter provides a macro-level analysis by first exploring the concept of 
sovereignty and demonstrating that the removal of its specter paves the way for 
return of cultural property.  Next, it exposes that the limitations of self-
determination and the disruption of property rights explored in Chapter Four, 
which fuelled the setbacks that Article 11 suffered in UNDRIP, at their root are 
fuelled under broader international law by state concerns with sovereignty.  
After exposing that these limitations have at their heart concerns over 
sovereignty in general, it next exposes that the issue of sovereignty that drives 
these limitations in particular fuelled opposition to the Declaration by providing 
direct evidence through state comments that such opposition was rooted in 
sovereignty.  Further, this chapter examines domestic legislation that provides 
for the restitution of cultural property implicitly demonstrating that sovereignty 
lies at the heart of the failure of the Declaration to address the demands of 
Indigenous Peoples.  Finally, in light of this legislation it reveals that Article 11 
actually suffered a double retrogression rooted in the very concept of restitution 
itself which is undoubtedly a dark side and unintended consequence of the 
contextualization of the issue of restitution under IHRL.    
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I. The Real Culprit: The Specter of Sovereignty  
 
A. Voluntary Restitution of Cultural Property 
 
Despite the non-retroactivity of the international framework for the protection 
of cultural property and the retrogression of Article 11 in IHRL, the voluntary 
return of cultural property to both states and Indigenous Peoples occurs.  
Professor Paul Bator noted “there is an interest in the international community 
promoting the ‘repatriation’ on a voluntary basis of specific art treasures that are 
important to the cultural patrimony of another country.”1  Typically, such 
repatriation here is motivated by some sense of moral correctness.  Appeals to 
morals in terms of the repatriation debate are not rare.  If anything, the moral 
argument is frequently all that is left to many states and Indigenous Peoples.  As 
Abner Mikva, a U.S. Congressman who sponsored the legislation to implement 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention said as part of his argument, “[w]e are either a 
moral nation or we’re not.”2  Further, states and other owners return cultural 
property based on a politics of apology3 though none are probably rarely 
motivated by solely altruistic reasons.4  Indeed, sometimes-voluntary 
repatriation carries a price.  For instance, in the wake of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, the Council of the Archaeological Institute of America [AIA] 
issued “Acquisition Guidelines” which suggest that museums do not violate the 
law of the country of origin, assure valid title prior to purchase and willingly 
                                                 
1 Paul Bator, The International Trade in Art 87-88 (1981).  Indeed, the same principal applies to Indigenous 
Peoples.  
2 George Lardner Jr., Stolen Art Traffic Bill Causes Flap; Dealers Oppose Bill to Curb Traffic in Stolen Art, Wash. Post, 
May 18, 1977, at A1 reprinted in Lynn S. Waterman, Was the Stela “Stolen”? 2 Indiana International & 
Comparative Law Review 515, 536-7 (1992). 
3 See Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitutions and Negotiating Historical Injustices (2000) 
(Documenting examples of states righting historical injustices by repatriating important pieces of cultural 
property and explaining the significance of such acknowledgement).  After World War II and increasingly after 
the Cold War, morality and justice have gained more significance in international politics and as a corollary 
restitution and reparations to past victims has become increasingly part of international politics and diplomacy. 
Id. 84.  
4 More likely reasons for voluntary repatriation stem from more individualistic concerns such as the desire on 
part of professionals within the art community such as museum curators and archaeologists to gain and retain 
access to sites and institutes within the requesting state.  Moreover, some voluntary repatriations actually are 
outright deals including the Simon Norton incident, the Teotihucan murals and the Euprohonios krater.   
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return illegal exported objects.  However, these guidelines also provide 
regarding this voluntary repatriation that returned objects be “given adequate 
monetary reimbursement.”5  Of course for less wealthy countries and especially 
Indigenous Peoples, such voluntary repatriation becomes more difficult if not 
impossible when the purchase price is that of the hammer price.6    
 
Nonetheless, voluntary repatriation actually occurs quite frequently.7  For 
example, in 1997 Denmark returned the “Codex Regius" (The Kings Volume) 
and the "Flateyjarbok" (The Book of the Flat Land) to Iceland.8  In some cases, 
even where a legal solution could be reached parties may still favor voluntary 
repatriation.9  Regarding the artifacts carried off by Yale professor Hiram 
Bingham from the ruins of Machu Picchu and now at the center of recent claim 
by Peru for their return,10 Yale President Richard Levin said “[o]ur position is 
that the law would actually support out claim to ownership, but in a way that’s a 
technical issue, … We feel the best solution for the long-term stewardship of 
these objects is to work out a cooperative arrangement.”11  Similarly, the 
remains of Pharaoh Rameses I were repatriated by the Michael C. Carlos 
Museum at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia on a voluntary basis.  Bonnie 
Speed, the director of the museum, cited the reason for the return of the 
mummy simply as “the right thing to do” and to serve “as a reminder of the 
                                                 
5 See generally Archaeological Institute of America, Policies and Documents, at http://www.archaeological.org/about/pol
icies 
6 The hammer price refers to the price that an object would receive if it was sole at an art auction house.  
7 Examples of such voluntary repatriation are too numerous to list herein and so only provide a flavor of this 
trend. See generally Bator, supra n.1; J.H. Merryman et. al., Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts 141 (5th ed.2007) 
(providing further examples of voluntary repatriation).  
8  See J. Greenfield, The Icelandic Manuscripts in The Return of Cultural Treasures (J. Greenfield ed., 2007). 
9 This trend towards deaccessioning pieces from permanent collections by museums began in the post-1970 
UNESCO Convention era resulting in “individual museums voluntarily return[ing] illegally exported and stolen 
works to their countries of origin.” Greenfield, Id. at 157. 
10 See generally Molly L. McIntosh, Exploring Machu Picchu: An Analysis of the Legal and Ethical Issues Surrounding the 
Repatriation of Cultural Property, 17 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 1999 (2006).  
11 Andrew Mangio, Elections Could Avert Peru’s Lawsuit, Yale Daily News, Apr. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=32634  
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great cultural debt all the world owes to the Middle East and the common 
heritage we share.”12    
 
However, the reality is for Indigenous Peoples that relying on voluntary 
repatriation alone does not serve the goals of Indigenous Peoples behind 
repatriation.  As aforementioned, in relation to the repatriation of cultural 
property the rationale for its repatriation is three-fold: restoration of the sacred 
link between people, land and cultural heritage; the amelioration or reversal of 
internationally wrongful acts, including discrimination and genocide;13 and 
repatriation as “an essential components of a people’s ability to maintain, 
revitalize and develop their collective cultural identity.”14  In turn, the restitution 
of cultural property for Indigenous Peoples necessarily requires both a 
prospective and a retroactive application.  The former application fulfils the 
goal of indigenous claims to present and future efforts to secure self-
determination, cultural revitalization and renewal while the later retroactive 
application fulfils the goal of efforts to redress past injustices.  In turn, if these 
are the twin goals of Indigenous Peoples and their rationale then they require a 
system of consistent and nuanced legal recognition and enforcement that 
voluntary repatriation even motivated by a sense of moral correctness or a 
politics of apology could not serve by its very nature as extra-legal and all the 
vagaries the come with such a position.  As Bonnie Speed continued to note 
after the repatriation from the Carlos Museum, “repatriation is a very complex 
issue, and we decide what to do on a case by case basis.”15  Indeed, while many 
are likely to cooperate as well and engage in such voluntary repatriation without 
                                                 
12 Mike Toner, Emory Sends Mummy Home to Egypt, Atlanta J-Const., Oct. 25, 2003, at 1D.  
13 See Ana Fillipa Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution: Ensuring Each Group’s Contribution to Humanity, 22 European 
Journal of International Law 17 (2011) (detailing this aspect of restitution).  
14 Ana Fillipa Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects, 299-30 (2006)  as 
paraphrased by and reprinted in Karolina Kuprecht, Human Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation, 
Working Paper No. 2009/34, NCCR Trade Regulation, 
Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, 15 (2009), at http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&
esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphase1.nccrtrade.org%2Fimages%2Fst
ories%2Fpublications%2FIP7%2FWorking%2520Paper%2520Kuprecht%252023062009.pdf&ei=fGz4VPHICe
2t7AbFvICwDw&usg=AFQjCNGjphJMl2XBTqLeKrgSBzqPsAFTvw&bvm=bv.87519884,d.ZGU 
15 Toner, supra n. 12.  
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lawsuits when there is evidence of theft, just as many are unwilling to repatriate 
just for the sake of it.  Cathy Morris, Associate Director of the Virginia Museum 
of Fine Arts in Richmond has said of claims brought by Zahi Hawass, the 
former Director of Egypt’s Supreme Council of Antiquities, for the return of 
ten stolen reliefs, “[w]e bought the relief from a private gallery in New York in 
1963, and it was documented in his collection as far back as 1944.  If it was 
really stolen we’d cooperate, but we can’t just send it back because they want it 
back.”16  In certain cases, even theft or illegal export does not guarantee 
voluntary repatriation.  Although the International Council of Museums 
(ICOM) in its 2004 International Code of Ethic for Museums notes at Article 
6.3 that restitutions by museums are recommended if a people can demonstrate 
that the object forms part of their “cultural or natural heritage” and was 
“export[ed] or otherwise transferred in violation of the principles of 
international and national conventions” it also reminds museums that such a 
return is only recommended if the museum is “legally free to do so”.17  Indeed, 
even in voluntary returns the specter of sovereignty and interference with it 
remains a concern.  In turn, it is precisely this cautious and extra-legal nature of 
voluntary returns which makes them possible as they leave the sovereignty of 
the state unchallenged.  
 
B. Sovereignty 
 
Sovereignty represents the notion that a solitary and supreme authority exists 
within the political community and nowhere else, which possesses both the 
undisputed and legitimate right to make the rules and regulations that govern 
the community.18  Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, this undisputed 
dominion over a territorial space to the exclusion of others as maintained by a 
                                                 
16 Id.  
17 International Council of Museums, 2004 Code of Ethics, available at http://icom.museum/the-vision/code-of-ethics/ 
18 David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and Democracy 215 (1989). 
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monopoly of power has served as the preeminent model for political 
community vested in the sovereign state.  In turn, states have a vested interest 
in maintaining the status quo with respect to sovereignty and its locus.  
Therefore, international law which has principally been developed by and for 
the benefit of states abounds with evidence of efforts to maintain this situation 
including in the macro-level presented herein.  As a fundamental pillar of 
international law, concern with the preservation of sovereignty is found at the 
heart of the U.N. Charter noting that “[n]othing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter”19 
while the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States of 1949 provides 
that every state has the right to “exercise jurisdiction over its territory and over 
all persons and things therein.”20  As a corollary then of sovereignty, respect for 
the territory integrity and the political unity of other states becomes paramount 
and manifests itself respectively in the principles of non-interference and the 
non-extraterritorial application of laws.  Naturally, then the specter of any norm 
or law that chips away at sovereignty encounters resistance from states and as a 
consequence enforces in the relevant political community a preference for the 
maintenance of the status quo.  In turn as the strong context of the Declaration 
“challenges State sovereignty at a deep level” 21 the following manifestations of 
such resistance is unsurprising. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 
1945 at Art. 2(7).  
20 Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, 6 December 1949, A/RES/375 at Art. 2. 
21 A Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-determination, Culture, and Land 102 
(2007). 
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C. Sovereignty and Self-Determination: Understanding the 
Limitation of  Self-Determination 
 
First, the resistance to self-determination that saw UNDRIP shift from an 
external to an internal variant and underpinned the retrogression of Article 11 is 
ultimately explained by state concerns with uprooting sovereignty from its locus 
within the state as the ultimate political community and the related issue of 
territorial integrity as these concepts encounter deep hostility from states in 
broader international law as evidenced by an exploration of self-determination 
more generally.  In particular, states possess a deep hostility to self-
determination as it viewed as chipping away at the scared twin pillars of 
statehood: the territorial and political sovereignty of the state.  Under 
international law, states long have expressed concerns over preserving 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and from the start were present in the self-
determination discourse. 
 
As aforementioned, the original application of self-determination was to 
colonial peoples, which as Thornberry notes was “unfortunate for indigenous 
groups.”22  Specifically, given the lack of a definition of peoples entitled to self-
determination the General Assembly gave preference to a version of self-
determination that understood its application to colonial peoples rather than as 
Belgium proposed to all peoples.  This universality approach of the “Belgium 
thesis” was ignored and the limits of its application to decolonization took 
precedence.23  Ultimately, what underpinned this opposition of application to 
Indigenous Peoples were concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
   
It was the putative threat to the sovereignty of newly independent States that 
secured the final rejection of the Belgian thesis and the purported restriction 
of Chapter XI to colonial territories … the vagaries of international politics 
                                                 
22 Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights 92 (2002). 
23 Id. at 92-4. 
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thereby imposed upon the United Nations a hypocritical stance towards the 
problems of indigenous peoples which was to frustrate organized efforts on 
their behalf for more than a decade.24  
 
Rather the approach of the General Assembly was to take colonial territories as 
a whole and to sideline the issue of Indigenous Peoples much to their detriment 
as evidenced through numerous resolutions and declarations including the 
previously discussed General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and General 
Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV)1960  which explicitly applied self-
determination to colonial territories.25  As regards the former, by making 
geographical separation a prima facie criterion for reporting it effectively left-out 
the examination of the conditions of groups outside of the salt-water paradigm 
while the latter struck the most detrimental blow to Indigenous Peoples at 
paragraph six by effectively sanctioning under United Nations auspices the 
association of the principle of territorial integrity with the right to self-
determination noting that “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption 
of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible 
with the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”26  
Indeed, as aforementioned self-determination even within the colonial context 
was not without its limits and these limits were rooted in concerns with 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.  As Heather Northcott notes, “the symbolic 
significance of control over a particular ‘homeland’ has achieved mythical status 
in relation to the principle of self-determination.”27  The aforementioned 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) 24 October, 197028 
                                                 
24 G. Bennett, Aboriginal Rights in International Law 13 reprinted in Thornberry, supra n. 22, Indigenous Peoples, 
at 93.  
25 See supra Chapter 4 at Section I(A) (discussing these resolutions more generally within the colonial context).  
26 Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 22, at 93-4. 
27 H. Northcott,  Realisation  of the right of indigenous peoples to natural resources under international law 
through the emerging right to autonomy, 16 The International Journal of Human Rights 73, 83 [citation omitted]. 
28 See generally  Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) 
24 October, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), 25 UN GAOR Supp (No 28) 121. 
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emphasizes this limitation in the form of sovereignty and territorial integrity 
noting that: 
 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.29 
 
Although Thornberry notes that this Declaration with its inclusion of a human 
rights component need not strictly be read in a conservative fashion, he does 
note that it does not preclude such conservation to the colonial context 
motivated by state concerns regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity.30   
 
However, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, Indigenous Peoples were eventually 
recognized as the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination but the form of 
this right opened to Indigenous Peoples was internal and not external as in the 
colonial context.31  Yet even in this internal form, concerns over sovereignty 
continue to exist as evidenced by the opposition to self-determination detailed 
in the section below which reveals that state concerns continue to be rooted in 
sovereignty even after it was clear that the right of self-determination secured in 
the UNDRIP was an internal form; so powerful is the commitment of states to 
sovereignty.32  This is unsurprising given that regardless of the form of the right 
to self-determination it remains a collective right which have traditionally been 
perceived as a threat to sovereignty33 and that both forms challenge the 
sovereignty of the state albeit in different ways.  As aforementioned, sovereignty 
refers to the notion that a solitary and supreme authority exists within the 
                                                 
29 Id. at para. 7.5 
30 Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples, at supra n. 22, at 95.  
31 See supra Chapter 4 at Section I(C).  
32 See infra Sections I(C)(i) and D(i) (providing evidence of state opposition rooted in sovereignty in the context 
of the UNDRIP). 
33 See Elsa Stamatopolou, Taking Cultural Rights Seriously in Reflections on the UN Declaration on the rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 389 (S. Allen and A. Xanthaki eds., 2011). 
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political community and nowhere else, which possesses both the undisputed 
and legitimate right to make the rules and regulations that govern the 
community.34  In turn, external self-determination challenges the horizontal 
sovereignty of the state while internal self-determination challenges the vertical 
sovereignty of the state.  Two sides of the same coin, horizontal sovereignty can 
be understood as an aspect of sovereignty that structures the arrangements 
between states in the international community and so is the more traditional 
form of sovereignty that is discussed.  It underpins the formation of the state 
itself and so structures the relationship between states ensuring the related 
principles of non-interference and territorial integrity.  In turn, the right of 
external self-determination which allows for the possibility of independence and 
secession necessarily challenges the horizontal sovereignty that affects the 
arrangements between states.  By contrast, vertical sovereignty raise issues with 
non-interference or territorial integrity but in different ways as it constitutes the 
relationship between entities within the state and so the right of internal self-
determination with its focus on autonomy necessarily challenges vertical 
sovereignty that affects the arrangement among entities within the states. 
 
Further, these concerns over sovereignty persist as a result of the fact that it was 
the right of self-determination and not the principle of self-determination that has 
been linked to the restitution of cultural property.  As aforementioned, self-
determination is both a principle of international law and a right with the 
preceding chapter focusing on the latter.35  Dr. Xanthaki outlines a number of 
understandings of a “principle” as opposed to a right,36 and ultimately 
concludes the following worth quoting at length: 
 
[A]s a principle, self-determination does not set out specific legal consequences for non-
compliance being more abstract and general.  It is related to the freedom that 
                                                 
34 Held, supra n. 18, at 215. 
35 See generally supra Chapter 4 at Section I. 
36 See Xanthaki, U.N. Standards, supra n. 21, at 155-157. 
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peoples should have to determine their lives and destinies and as such, it 
incorporates political, economic, cultural and social claims of all kinds.  It 
does not give a specific result, but is yet another factor that must be seriously 
considered, when reaching a decision, possibly together with other principles 
of international law … In contrast, as a human right, self-determination is 
much more definite and clear, it provides its beneficiaries with a specific claim and 
dictates a specific result.37  
 
In turn the main difference between self-determination as a right and as a 
principle is the degree of specificity; the former dictates a specific claim with a 
specific result while the latter does not set out a specific legal consequence for 
non-compliance and is more abstract and general.  On this understanding, it is 
clear that the restitution of cultural property has been linked with self-
determination as a right as the restitution of cultural property by its nature 
dictates a specific result.  As aforementioned, restitution is a legal form of 
redress that dictates a specific result.38  Specifically, in relation to their cultural 
property, Indigenous Peoples seek restitutio in integrum as it calls for a return to 
the situation as it existed before the legal wrong; in the case of Indigenous 
Peoples the wrong of colonialism and its incidents.  More specifically, “it calls 
for the return of a thing taken or the exact re-establishment of what has been 
lost.  It is not damages but rather restoration in natura.”39  It is the remedy 
sought most commonly in cultural property disputes40 given this specificity; an 
ethos which also aligns it with self-determination as a right.  
 
 
Further, as a right, self-determination has at its core political power which can 
be divided into an external and an internal modality41 but regardless as political 
power bears upon sovereignty.  Although described in a variety of ways, “[t]he 
gist of self-determination is political control of the people’s destiny 
                                                 
37 Id. at157 [emphasis added]. 
38 See supra Chapter 4 at ns.226-9.  
39 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law 111. 
40 See supra Chapter 4 at ns.226-9. 
41 Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards, 157. 
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(accompanied by other forms of control.)”42  Specifically, as the twin Articles of 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR make clear it has as its focus the process of 
pursuing development albeit political, economic or cultural.  In turn, the focus 
is on development rather than the type pursued as “[p]ursuing development 
essentially involves establishing policy priorities and trade-offs in policy 
allocations and benefits; this is political in nature.”43  Again, the restitution of 
cultural property has been linked with self-determination as a right as both have 
at their core political control.  In fact, it is access to this political power of self-
determination that is at the root of the ethos of the restitution of cultural 
property as it has at its heart the control, possession and use of cultural objects 
thereby specifically locating it within identity politics.44  Indeed, as 
aforementioned Indigenous Peoples stress that the restitution of cultural 
property is integral to the maintenance, development and the renewal of their 
culture as they emerge from the shadows of imperialism and colonialism, which 
saw the removal of much of their cultural property as part and parcel of the 
process of marginalization and assimilation that they suffered at the hands of 
the dominate state.  In turn, the restitution of cultural property is a victory over 
these policies as it can lead to cultural development and renewal.  In practice, 
such a link between restitution and cultural development and renewal has been 
demonstrated within the indigenous context.  At present, cultural 
anthropologists in the U.S. are now turning their attention to the impact of 
repatriation of cultural affiliated remains to the communities that they are 
intended to benefit.45  In turn, some ethnographers have reported that 
                                                 
42 Xanthaki, U.N.Standards, supra  n. 21, at 158 [citation omitted]. 
43 Id. 
44 See supra Chapter 3 at Section III(A) (discussing identity politics and the restitution of cultural property).  
Indigenous peoples are not the only ones to tap into this importance of the restitution of cultural property for 
asserting, creating and/or renewing identity as a political platform to reinforce their right to self-determination.  
In relation to the right to external self-determination in the post-colonial context peoples of previously colonized 
states argued for the return of cultural property as an important part of the journey to full equality with older 
states.  For instance, in 1929 debates in Irish Parliament consistently reference the importance of cultural heritage 
as a means to assert national identity in a new state. See F. Batt, Ancient indigenous deoxyribonucleic acid  (DNA) and 
intellectual property rights, 16 International journal of Human Rights 1, 152 at 156-7 (January 2012) [citations 
omitted]. 
45 Michael F. Brown and Margaret M. Bruchac, NAGPRA from the Middle Distance: Legal Puzzles and  
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Oklahoma tribe members who are mainly Christian have sought help from 
traditional ritual specialists from neighbor tribes to preside over the reburial 
ceremony of these remains on the grounds that it would be inappropriate to 
rebury non-Christian ancestors with a Christian ritual.46 
  
In turn, the preceding has demonstrated that concerns over sovereignty have 
fuelled concerns over self-determination more broadly in international law.  The 
following section demonstrates that even in this internal form, concerns over 
sovereignty continued to exist and to drive the resistance to the right of self-
determination as evidenced by the statements below even when it was clear that 
the right of self-determination secured in the context of the UNDRIP was an 
internal form. 
 
i. Evidence of Opposition to Self-Determination rooted in 
Sovereignty within the Context of the UNDRIP 
 
Evidence of opposition to self-determination rooted in concerns over 
sovereignty and territorial integrity within the context of the Declaration 
abound.  From the very beginning of the lengthy drafting process, the issue of 
self-determination proved contentious.  As aforementioned, the drafting of 
UNDRIP began in 1985 with the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations [WGIP], a working group of the then Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.47  At its fourth 
session, it decided that it would produce a declaration and to guide it the WGIP 
set out some preliminary draft principles which noticeably do not include the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Unintended Consequence, in Imperialism, Art and Restitution 208-9 (John Merryman, ed., 2006). See also  
Moira Simpson, Museums and restorative justice:  heritage, repatriation and cultural education, 61 Museum  
International 121(2009) (discussing cases of cultural renewal upon restitution in the Canadian context). 
46 Brown and Bruchac, supra n. 45, at 209 citing Edmund J. Ladd, A Zuni Perspective on Repatriation, in The 
Future of the Past: Archaeologists, Native Americans, and Repatriation 113 (Tamara L. Bray ed. 2001).  
However, both Brown and Bruchac are quick note that not all of the consequence of restitution are positive 
noting that it could actually destabilize and transform traditions while bringing to the surface how to reconcile 
tradition with contemporary standards and practice. Id. at 211.  
47 See supra Chapter 3 Section I (discussing the drafting process of the UNDRIP). 
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issue of self-determination.48  In total there were seven principles including: the 
right to the full and effective enjoyment of universally recognized human rights, 
the right to equality and freedom from discrimination, the collective right to 
exist and to be protected against genocide and the right to individual life, rights 
concerning religious ceremonies and access to sacred sites, the right to all forms 
of education, the right to preserve cultural identity and traditions as well as to 
pursue cultural development and the right to promote education and the 
exchange of cultural information with recognition of the dignity and diversity of 
cultures.49  It was not until the 1993 Draft Declaration that the WGIP produced 
a text that “discards all equivocations on the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination.”50 
 
Unsurprisingly, some of the states that initially rejected the Declaration which 
include the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, rejected 
explicitly the Declaration’s provisions on self-determination throughout and 
upon its adoption.  During the drafting process, Canada noted that its support 
for the concept of self-determination was limited to a concept that respected 
the territorial integrity of the state and so limited its exercise to a “right [that] 
involved negotiations between States and the various indigenous peoples within 
those States to determine the political status of the indigenous peoples involved 
and the best means of pursuing their economic, social and cultural 
development.”51  New Zealand offered that  
                                                 
48 See Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its fourth session U.N. Doc. 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22) 27 August 1985 Annex II: The first principles drafted for the future declaration.  
49 However, in the Plan of Action that was contained in the same report at Annex I it did promise to consider 
self-determination.  Yet, as Thornberry highlights, there is a striking difference between this approach taken by 
states through the WGIP under the auspices of the U.N. and that of the approach taken by Indigenous Peoples 
in the early days of drafting; compare the report prepared by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples included 
in the 1985 report of the WGIP that insists flatly that Indigenous Peoples have the right to self-determination 
which will be given full effect under national and international law.  Thornberry, International Law, supra n. 22, at 
372.  As he notes, the approach of the former is concerned with the elaboration of established human rights 
principles while that of the latter is to both question that recognition and push the boat out into deeper waters – 
i.e. to secure a broader judicial space for Indigenous Peoples. Id.    
50 Id. 373.  Though as detailed above, this has been limited to an internal variant in the final Declaration.   
51 Mr. Luis-Enrique Chávez, Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1995/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/85 (2001) at para. 85. 
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…her Government could accept the inclusion in the draft declaration of a 
right to self determination for indigenous people if the meaning was clearly 
elaborated in the text, was consistent with domestic understanding of the 
relationship between Maori and the Crown, and was clearly an internal right 
of self-determination which respected the territorial integrity of democratic 
States and their constitutional frameworks where these met current 
international human rights standards.  In its present form, however, some of 
the language of the draft declaration, including on land and resources, would 
be inconsistent with New Zealand government policy and would need to be 
clarified to ensure consistency with the Treaty of Waitangi and international 
and New Zealand law.52 
 
Australia took a stronger position noting that due to the differing 
understandings of the concept of self-determination his country flatly could not 
accept its inclusion noting that:    
 
…participants had differing understandings and difficulties with the use of 
the term self-determination in the context of the draft declaration.  For many 
people it implied the establishment of separate nations and separate laws.  
Since this would be inappropriate to his country’s situation, his Government 
was unable to accept its inclusion.53 
 
Upon its adoption, Australia continued to object on the grounds that “self-
determination applies to situations of decolonization and the break-up of states 
into smaller states with clearly defined population groups.”54  Specifically, it 
cited concerns over sovereignty and sought to return indigenous issues back to 
the realm of domestic politics noting that Australia 
 
…supported and encouraged the full engagement of indigenous peoples in 
the democratic decision-making processes, but did not support a concept that 
could be construed as encouraging action that would impair, even in part, the 
territorial and political integrity of a State with a system of democratic 
representative government.55 
 
                                                 
52 Id. at para. 109. 
53 Id. at para. 89 
54 Honourable Robert Hill,  Explanation of Vote by the Hon. Robert Hill, Ambassador and Permanent Representative 
of Australia to the United Nations’ (speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm.  
55 Id. 
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Further, the representative stressed that the Declaration was not legally binding, 
had only moral force and did not reflect international law.  The U.S. echoed 
these concerns regarding self-determination stressing that if  anything the term 
self-determination was only meant to mean self-government or autonomy 
within a state and was not applicable to sub-state groups seeking independence 
and the way that the term was used within the Declaration was confusing.56  
During the negotiations the representative from the U.S. stated that: 
 
…[a]rticle 3 presented the most difficult question arising out of the 
declaration.  He said that while his Government recognized the right of tribal 
self-determination as a matter of law domestically, they had certain difficulties 
with its use internationally in this context, as under contemporary 
international law the term self-determination was open to varying 
interpretations, depending on the specific context.  The reference to the term 
“self-determination” in an international context went beyond existing law, its 
meaning was not clear and there was no international consensus on its 
meaning.57 
 
This position was maintained even despite the compromise at the behest of  the 
African Group that assured that self-determination would be limited to internal 
forms given that the concept of  self-determination touched on sovereignty 
showing the force of  such opposition.  The U.S. in explaining its vote to reject 
the Declaration provided that: 
 
Despite the provisions that limit the scope of  Article 3 of  the declaration 
(e.g. Article 4 and Article 46) we are unable to associate ourselves with this 
text because of  the wholly inappropriate approach of  reproducing common 
Article 1 (of  the ICCPR and ICESCR) in Article 3 of  the text with no 
intention that Article 3 mean the same thing as common Article 1, not that it 
be considered to explain or modify the scope of  existing common Article 1 
legal obligations.  We find such an approach on a topic that involves the 
foundation of  international relations and stability (i.e., the political unity and 
                                                 
56 Robert Hagen, Explanation of the Vote by Robert Hagen, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the U.S. to 
the United Nations’ (speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at: http://www.un.org/N
ews/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm   
57 Mr. José Urrutia, Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1995/32, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/102 (1997) at para 325.  
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territorial integrity of  nation-states) to be ill advised and likely to result in 
confusion and disputes.58  
 
However, concerns over self-determination rooted in sovereignty and territorial 
integrity were not limited to the states that rejected the Declaration.  Evidence 
of such opposition is widespread and not limited to certain geographical areas.  
As aforementioned, the African group which requested to delay the General 
Assembly vote on the Declaration, asked for the delay in part on the grounds of 
self-determination as Articles 3 and 4 “can be misrepresented as conferring a 
unilateral right of self-determination and possible secession upon a specific 
subset of the national populace, thus threatening the political unity and the 
territorial integrity of any country.”59  Even states that support self-
determination for Indigenous Peoples during the drafting process did so on the 
grounds that this concept would not interfere with the sovereignty of the state; 
thereby limiting it to an internal modality.  Bangladesh, while supporting the 
idea of self-determination, did so on the understanding that this concept above 
all be understood as respecting the territorial integrity of the state.60 Cuba took 
the same position noting that: 
 
…the right of self-determination was well developed in the 1970 Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.  Cuba considered the concerns of some States with respect to self-
determination as unfounded, given that it is clearly expressed in this 
declaration that nothing in it shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.61  
 
                                                 
58 Robert Hagen, Explanation of vote by Robert Hagen, U.S. Advisor, on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, to 
the UN General Assembly, (13 September 2007) available at http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/press_releases
/20070913_2  
59 Draft Aide Memoire, African Group, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 
November 2006 at para. 3. See supra Chapter 4 at ns. 272-77 (discussing the African Group and concerns with 
self-determination). 
60 Chávez, Report, supra n. 51, at para. 69. 
61 Id. at para. 70. 
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Similarly, Norway indicated that it understood the right of self-determination to 
be a right that could only be exercised within existing states62 while Spain 
echoed these sentiments stressing that in no case would it threaten state 
sovereignty or territorial integrity of democratic states.63  
 
Even after the vote, those states that voted in favor of the Declaration 
reiterated that self-determination was limited to an internal variant to protect 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Takahiro Shinyo speaking on the behalf of 
Japan stressed that the vote in favor of the Declaration was possible as a result 
of the inclusion of Article 46 as it “clarified that the right of self-determination 
did not give indigenous peoples the right to be separate and independent from 
their countries of residence, and that that right should not be invoked for the 
purpose of impairing the sovereignty of a State, its national and political unity, 
or territorial integrity”64 while the representative of the United Kingdom echoed 
the opinion noting that it “was not intended to impact in any way on the 
political unity or territorial integrity of existing States.”65  This sentiment with 
respect to the fact that self-determination did not interfere with territorial 
integrity, political unity and sovereignty was explicitly reiterated by the 
representatives from Egypt, Turkey, Paraguay, Myanmar, Sweden and Jordan.  
The representative from the Philippines, Mr. Insigne, added that that the 
support of his state was unequivocally predicated on “the understanding that 
the right to self-determination shall not be construed as encouraging any action 
that would dismember or impair territorial integrity or political unity of a 
                                                 
62 Id. at para. 82. 
63 Id. at para. 83. 
64 Takahiro Shinyo, Explanation of Vote by Takahiro Shinyo, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United 
Nations’ (speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/d
ocs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm.   
65 Karen Pierce, Explanation of Vote by Karen Pierce, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the 
United Nations’ (speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm 
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sovereign or independent State.”66  Framing the matter in a slightly more 
positive fashion, the representative from Liechtenstein still stressed the limit of 
self-determination to an internal modality stating that:  
 
He was pleased, therefore, that the Declaration contained a number of 
provisions that marked an important new step in the way the United Nations 
was dealing with the concept of self-determination.  The introduction to the 
right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to internal and local 
affairs, including their financial aspect, offered a promising new approach 
which would help to genuinely address the aspirations and needs of many 
peoples to create an enabling environment for the full protection and 
promotion of human rights, without resorting to violence and strife.67 
 
Other delegations achieved the same ends by repeating the sentiment expressed 
by Australia, which rejected the Declaration, that self-determination only 
applied to decolonization and only as such an external modality was it 
compatible with international law.  For instance, India noted that  
 
Regarding references to the right to self-determination, it was his 
understanding that the right to self-determination applied only to peoples 
under foreign domination and that the concept did not apply to sovereign 
independent States or to a section of people or a nation, which was the 
essence of national integrity … In addition, article 46 stated clearly that 
nothing in the Declaration might be interpreted as implying for any State, 
people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any 
act contrary to the Charter.  It was on that basis that India had voted in 
favour of the adoption of the Declaration.68 
 
The representative Thailand reiterated the sentiment concerning self-
determination and international law while also seeking to bring the concept 
back into the realm of domestic politics in the same vein as the Australian and 
Mexican delegations.  The Mexican representative noted: 
                                                 
66 Mr. Insigne, Explanation of Vote by Mr. Insigne, Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United 
Nations’ (speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/d
ocs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm 
67 Patrick Ritter, Explanation of Vote by Patrick Ritter, Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United 
Nations’ (speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/d
ocs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm.  
68 Ajai Malhotra, Explanation of Vote by Ajai Malhotra, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations’ 
(speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/200
7/ga10612.doc.htm.  
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She … welcomed the provisions of the Declaration in accordance with the 
provisions of Mexico’s Constitution.  Article 2 of the Constitution recognized 
the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination, granting them 
autonomy to determine their internal form and system of norms for conflict 
resolution.  She understood, however, that the rights of indigenous people to 
self-determination, autonomy and self-government shared be exercised in 
accordance with Mexico’s Constitution, so as to guarantee its national unity 
and territorial integrity.69  
 
This position was maintained by Mexico throughout the drafting process.  Even 
before the vote the Mexican representative noted that his government 
recognized the concept of self-determination but: 
 
The concept of self-determination was defined and delimited and was 
understood to mean autonomy for indigenous peoples in exercising a set of 
rights.  Self-determination of indigenous peoples was always to be 
understood in accordance with national legislation and self-determination was 
to be understood with full respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.70  
 
In sum, regardless of the approach and the nature of their vote, states 
representing a comprehensive geographical distribution all expressed the core 
the idea that self-determination must not interfere with sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. 
 
D. Sovereignty and Property: Understanding the Limitation of The 
Disruption of Property Rights 
 
Moreover, aside from underpinning the resistance to self-determination that 
saw UNDRIP shift from an external to an internal variant and ultimately 
resulted in the retrogression of Article 11, the resistance to the disruption of 
property rights which also contributed to the retrogression of Article 11 is again 
explained by state concerns with uprooting sovereignty from its locus within the 
                                                 
69 Ms. Rovirosa, Explanation of Vote by Ms. Rovirosa, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations’ 
(speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/200
7/ga10612.doc.htm.    
70 Chávez, Report, supra n. 51, at para. 64. 
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state as the ultimate political community as this concept encounters deep 
hostility from states in broader international law as evidenced by return to an 
exploration of the international framework for the protection of cultural 
property more generally. 
 
In particular, repatriation in the international framework for the protection of 
cultural property is significantly curtailed by the concept of non-retroactivity as 
explored in Chapter Two.  However, other significant limitations also affect this 
framework.  Specifically, aside from the express and complex limitations on 
these repatriation obligations that the conventions include as previously 
explored, this framework also suffers from a host of common features which 
significantly limit their reach and/or effectiveness and ultimately are 
underpinned by concerns over sovereignty.  These features include limited 
ratification and even assuming ratification they often suffer from limited 
implementation by state parties.  As regards limited ratification, the Convention 
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO Convention)71 initially 
suffered from serious limited ratification by most states and more importantly 
by most of the key art importing nations such as France, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom (U.K).  Only recently and after the adoption of the 1995 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT 
Convention)72 did these states ratify the 1970 UNESCO Convention.  
Respectively, their dates of ratification are 1997, 2003 and 2002.73  Rather, 
initially and for many years after it was first open for ratification in 1970, 
                                                 
71 UNESCO, Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]. 
72 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the 
Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects, done June 24, 1995, 34  I.L.M. 1326 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]. 
73 See UNESCO Convention Ratification Chart, UNESCO, available at http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention_p
.asap?order=alpha&language=E&KO=13039 (last visited 18 August 2008). 
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Australia, Canada and the U.S. represented the only major art importing/market 
states to ratify the 1970 UNESCO Convention.  By contrast, the overwhelming 
number of signatories represented source states, with forty-seven such states 
ratifying the convention.74  This undoubtedly stems from the fact that the 1970 
UNESCO Convention has at its heart the purpose to restrain the flow of 
cultural property from source to market states and while “[i]t is true that the 
Convention only applies to the ‘illicit’ international traffic in cultural property, 
[the fact that] … many source nations have policies that, in effect, prohibit all 
export of cultural property, the distinction as to them is not significant.”75  In 
turn, either the opposition or support on the part of these states reflected in 
ratification or lack thereof ultimately is rooted in concerns over sovereignty  as 
their actions hinged on whether or not the convention either supported or 
conflicted with national law/policies.  To address this issue, as aforementioned 
the UNIDROIT Convention was drafted in 1995.  However, ratification of the 
UNIDROIT Convention remains even more limited than 1970 UNESCO 
Convention.  At present, only twenty-nine states have ratified the UNIDROIT 
Convention and none of these ratifications include the major art importing 
states of Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.; again sovereignty 
concerns explain such opposition.76  
 
As regards limited implementation, part of the reason for such a situation stems 
from the issue of cost in terms of time, expertise and most importantly money 
that potentially impair the ability of many states to implement and so enforce 
these international obligations which thereby further hinders their effectiveness.  
However, a more significant explanation stems from the fact that states are 
again concerned with protecting sovereignty as in certain instances some states 
                                                 
74 Id. See also Patty Gerstenblith, Art, Cultural Heritage and the Law: Cases and Materials 556-7 (2nd ed. 2008); See 
generally John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 Michigan Law Review 1881, 1888. 
75 J.H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 American Journal of International Law 831, 843 
(1986). 
76 See UNIDROIT International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Convention Ratification 
Chart, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-main.htm (last visited 18 May 2009). 
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purposely have not implemented the conventions as they are written as they feel 
they are incompatible with their domestic legal system.  However as Professor 
Prott notes, “[t]his is, of course, the case for every country.  If there were not 
incompatibility in the domestic legal systems there would be no need of an 
international convention to try to harmonize them.  Traffickers are adept at 
exploiting the differences between legal systems…”77  For instance, as Professor 
Nafziger notes, the U.S. entered a reservation to the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention that states that it refuses to enforce “export controls of foreign 
countries on the basis of illicit trafficking of cultural property.”78  In effect, this 
reservation means that the U.S. will not implement Article 7(a) of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention.  As aforementioned, Article 7(a) of the convention 
provides that states 
 
…take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent 
museums and similar institutions within their territories from acquiring 
cultural property originating in another State Party which has been illegally 
exported after entry into force of this Convention, in the States concerned.79  
 
This provision is moot in states such as the US, the UK, France, Germany and 
Switzerland amongst a host of others which adhere to the principle that the fact 
that an object has been illegally exported does not in itself bar it from lawful 
importation.80  Specifically, this principle is rooted in the general rule of 
international law of legislative extraterritoriality which provides that states will 
not enforce the public laws of other states.  In effect, even if an export law of 
another state has been violated, as a domestic penal law it cannot be enforced 
                                                 
77 Memorandum submitted by Lyndel V Prott, Director, International Standards Unit, Division of Cultural 
Heritage, UNESCO, Appendix 45, United Kingdom Parliament, Hansard Archives, Select  Committee on 
Culture, Media and Sport, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm199900/cmse... 25 
July 2000   
78 James A.R. Nafziger, Seizure and Forfeiture of Cultural Property by the United States, 5 Villanova Sports & 
Entertainment Law Journal 19, 26 (1998). 
79 UNESCO Convention, supra n. 71, at Art. 7(a).  
80 See Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 Stanford Law Review 275, 287 (1982) (noting 
that the U.S. law will not disturb cultural property based on the claim of illegal exportation alone and that this is 
not unusual as most art importing states like the U.K., France, Germany, and Switzerland the “fundamental 
general rule is clear: the fact that an art object has been illegally exported does not in itself bar it from lawful 
importation.”) Id.  
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beyond the respective boundary of the state thus rendering moot Article 7(a).  
The case of Attorney- General of New Zealand v. Ortiz81 clearly demonstrates this 
principle within the context of cultural property.  At the heart of this case was a 
series of wooden door panels carved by Maori craftsmen.  The government of 
New Zealand claimed that the panels had been removed in violation of its 
Historical Articles Act 1962 and customs laws which provided for the automatic 
forfeiture of illegal exported cultural property.  The items were buried in a 
swamp and eventually purchased by London collector, Oritz, who co-signed 
them to a London auction house for resale.  In turn, New Zealand attempted to 
enjoin the sale and requested an order affecting forfeiture.  The court rejected 
the forfeiture claim finding that New Zealand had not seized the property 
before it was removed from the country and that both New Zealand and 
English law required actual seizure for it forfeiture.  In turn, forfeiture was not 
automatic or implied and it could not be achieved extraterritorially.  Moreover, 
the court concluded that it would not enforce the forfeiture provisions of New 
Zealand law regardless of whether they were described as “penal” or “public” 
and denied jurisdiction stating: “the rule of international law … says that no 
country can legislate so as to affect the rights of property when that property is 
situated beyond the limits of its own territory.  It is a direct infringement of the 
territorial theory of sovereignty.”82  Therefore a convention requiring states to 
recover illegally exported cultural property through their own domestic laws 
would contravene this rule of international law; the rule of legislative 
extraterritoriality.  In turn, due to this contravention of international law 
designed to protect the sovereignty of states the aforementioned states and host 
of other negotiating the 1970 UNESCO Convention vociferously opposed a 
requirement for the repatriation of illegal exported cultural property in Article 7 
and so it remains moot in many states.   
                                                 
81 Attorney General of New Zealand v. Oritz, 3 W.L.R. 570 (1983), 3 All. E.R. 432 (1981).  
82 Id. Ultimately, what underpins this rule are the principles are sovereignty and equality between states in 
international law. 
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Interestingly however, U.S. v. McClain83 makes a departure from this general rule 
of extraterritoriality fuelled by sovereignty concerns.  In McClain I, the 
defendant removed ceramic objects and jewelry amongst other pre-Columbian 
artifacts from Mexico which has laws proclaiming state ownership of cultural 
property.  The theory of prosecution was therefore that the property was stolen 
according to the law of Mexico.  Once the objects were imported into the U.S. 
they became subject to the National Stolen Property Act [NSPA] like any other 
stolen property in interstate or foreign commerce.  The NSPA makes it a crime 
to transport and possess goods worth at least $10,000 in interstate or foreign 
commerce, while knowing that the goods are stolen, converter or the result of 
fraud.84  The defense objected on the grounds that the prosecution violated the 
black letter rule of private international law that one state will not enforce the 
penal laws of another.  To a certain extent the Court agreed noting that  
 
[t]he general rule today in the United States… is that it is not a violation of 
law to import simply because an item has been illegally exported from 
another country.  This is a fundamental general rule today with respect to art 
importation … This means that a person who imports a work of art which 
has been illegally exported is not for that reason alone actionable, and the 
possession of that work cannot for that reason alone be disturbed in the 
United States.85   
 
The Fifth Circuit further held that if “an object were considered ‘stolen’ merely 
because it was illegally exported, the meaning of the term ‘stolen’ would be 
stretched beyond its conventional meaning.”86  Yet the court upheld the 
applicability of NSPA to cases such as this providing the basis for a conviction; 
cases where cultural property is exported out of a state which has declared 
ownership over the property in question.   
 
                                                 
83 U.S. v. McClain 545 F. 2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977). 
84 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (2000).   
85 McClain, supra n. 83, at 996.   
86 Id. At 1002. 
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A declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal export of an 
article can be considered theft, and the exported article can be considered 
“stolen”, within the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act.  Such a 
declaration combined with a restriction on exportation without the consent 
of the owner is sufficient to bring NSPA into play.87   
 
The applicability of the NSPA to illegally exported cultural property in such 
situation was affirmed by McClain II.88  The McClain doctrine, as it has come to 
be known, potentially raises many concerns in terms of domestic law in the U.S. 
concerning constitutional and common law principles as well as concerns that it 
violates policy concerning the free trade in cultural objects.89  However, in terms 
of the thesis here it is most significant is that McClain doctrine results in U.S. 
courts enforcing foreign law.  Since the “[i]llegal export, after the adoption of 
the declaration [of state ownership of all antiquities], suddenly becomes “theft” 
then U.S. adherence to the aforementioned general principle of international 
law becomes nothing more than lip service which in effect makes this particular 
aspect of its limited implementation of the UNESCO Convention moot.”90  
Merryman agrees noting that  
 
[a]ll that has happened in some nations in the formal process of enactment 
[of national patrimony law] … Analytically, it is not clear why this should 
change the way the importing nation will treat actions to recover works from 
sites that were undiscovered at the time of enactment, works that have 
remained in private collections after enactment, and works that the state has 
done nothing to possess, preserve, house, study, or display since enactment.91  
 
Yet some argue that this enforcement of foreign export laws  is not exactly what 
the McClain doctrine stands for as it does require some evidence of domestic 
enforcement of such laws thereby ensuring that:  
 
                                                 
87 Id. at1000.  
88 See U.S. v. McClain II, 593 F. 2d 658, 663-65 (5th Cir. 1979). 
89 See generally Adam Goldberg, Comment: Reaffirming McClain: The National Stolen Property Act and the Abiding Trade in 
Looted Cultural Object, 53 University of California Law Review 1031 (2006).   
90 Bator, Essay, supra n. 80, at 350. 
91 Merryman, Elgin Marbles, supra n. 74, at 1891. Indeed, the objects at the center of the McClain case were likely 
acquired from private individuals or found on private property in Mexico. Merryman, Visual Arts, supra n. 7, at 
180-81. 
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…foreign nations cannot simply change a few words in a statute—editing 
“export control” to “ownership declaration”- in order to receive the 
protection of U.S. law.  Domestic enforcement gives courts a means to 
distinguish between found-in-the ground laws establishing national 
ownership and those that create mere export controls: National ownership is 
not established when countries nationalize cultural objects possessed by 
foreigners but leave domestic ownership rights undisturbed.92 
 
Indeed, technically the McClain doctrine rests on the foreign law being an 
ownership law and so merely is enforcement of a private law of theft; however 
this distinction according to many is merely technical and in reality there is not 
much difference between this and enforcing it as an export law.93  Moreover, 
efforts to amend the NSPA so that it would no longer apply to situations like 
McClain have been introduced in the Senate but they have failed.  In turn, the 
McClain doctrine continues to apply and despite some inconsistencies in 
subsequent cases all point to the fact that it makes possible to enforce export 
restrictions of other states and so thereby circumvent the general rule of 
international law94; the rule of legislative extraterritoriality which provides that 
states will not enforce the public laws of other states and ultimately geared at 
protecting the sovereignty.  Yet this does not suggest that the broader concern 
with sovereignty that underpins the resistance to the disruption of property 
rights which contributed to the retrogression of Article 11 does not continue to 
apply.  Rather, it confirms sovereignty remains a relevant issue as this illustrates 
how domestic law acts as the measure of a state’s actions rather than 
international law.  In essence what is essentially the enforcement of export 
restrictions came about for the U.S. not as a result of Article 7(a) of the 
UNESCO Convention to which it was a party but subsequently de facto as a 
result the McClain doctrine.   
                                                 
92 Goldberg, supra n. 89, at 1048.   
93 Andrea Cunning, U.S. Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Export Restrictions on Cultural Property and Destructive 
Aspects of Retention Schemes, 26 Houston Journal of International Law 449, 476 (2003-04).  
94 See United States v Shultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) aff’d, 333 F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2003); Peru v. 
Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989); United States v Pre-Columbian Artifacts, 845 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 
1993).  Indeed, many states have taken advantage of this approach and passed patrimony laws declaring 
themselves the owner of all cultural property.  In turn, these laws make “importers” subject to criminal liability 
for theft. 
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In turn, the preceding has demonstrated that concerns over sovereignty have 
fuelled concerns over the disruption of property rights more broadly in 
international law.  The following section demonstrates the concerns over 
sovereignty continued to exist and to drive the resistance Draft Article 
12/Article 11 as evidenced by the statements below. 
 
i. Evidence of Opposition to Restitution of Property rooted in 
Sovereignty within the Context of the UNDRIP 
 
Aside from cultural property, the Declaration provides for redress in relation to 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property, human remains, ceremonial objects 
and land; yet in all contexts it was the concept of redress itself that received the 
most fierce and vociferous opposition from states during the drafting and 
adoption of the Declaration.95  Evidence of opposition to the restitution of 
cultural property based on concerns over disturbing domestic property law and 
in particular third party property rights which are ultimately rooted in fears of 
undermining state sovereignty abound within the context of the Declaration.  
 
Early in the drafting process, Canada noted that “there was a positive evolution 
at both the international and national levels with respect to the return of cultural 
property on which the provisions of the declaration should build”96 and that the 
Canadian delegation considered that states should facilitate this process.  
However, such facilitation should be subject to national laws “while respecting 
the legitimate rights of others.”97  Further, Japan noted that as concerned Draft 
Article 12, “property ownership and expropriating under national law had to be 
                                                 
95 This was confirmed in a discussion with Les Maelzer based on his experiences during the drafting of the 
Declaration.  Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, ICWS  
Conference, September 2013 [notes on file with author].   
96 Urrutia, Report, supra n. 57, at para. 80. 
97 Id. at para. 80. 
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taken into account”98 with the representative of Malaysia expressing that his 
government held similar concerns regarding property ownership99 while more 
generally the Swedish delegation noted concerns with the concept of 
restitution.100  Moreover, as aforementioned, the U.S. was careful to stress that 
although there was overall support for the basic idea of Draft Article 12, the 
article was overbroad in relation to the open-ended obligation of the restitution 
of cultural property as it was not a rule of international law.101 
 
Concerns persisted.  A number of states opposed the use of the language 
restitution as included in Draft Article 12 in relation to cultural property.  Some 
states suggested replacing the word “restitution” with the word “return” as 
“another main problem was that restitution could lead to conflict with the rights 
of third parties or the national interest” 102 while others noted that “[t]here is 
support for use of the wider term “redress” in place of “restitution” which may 
not always be possible.  Obligation placed on States is to provide effective 
mechanisms for obtaining redress.”103  This resistance in disturbing domestic 
property laws continued as other states suggested the inclusion of an explicit 
new general paragraph on third party rights which would read: 
 
Implementation of the rights in this Declaration shall take into account 
measures necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” (Source: article 18 (3) ICCPR) 
or Although this Declaration, in itself, does not modify international or 
national standards,  it seeks to promote the analysis and review of those 
norms which contravene or impede the full realization of the rights set forth 
in it, without affecting the legitimate rights of other persons.104  
 
                                                 
98 Id. at para. 68.  
99 Id. at para. 75. 
100 Id. at para. 76. 
101 Id. at para. 90. 
102 Id. at para. 147. 
103 Information provided by States, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Explanatory 
Comments to Amended Text Tabled by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.2  (6 September 2004). 
104 Chávez, Report, supra n. 51, at para 145. 
244 
 
Other states had less drastic proposals calling on the text to provide further 
detail on the meaning and limits of the term “restitution” and the rights of third 
parties should be left to future international instruments and national 
legislation.105  Ultimately, as aforementioned Chairperson Chávez reinserted the 
word restitution as included in the original draft text thereby rejecting this 
proposal, 106 yet collectively these statements demonstrate the resistance of 
states to the idea of disturbing domestic property law and their protection of 
third party rights ultimately as a result of concerns over undermining the 
sovereignty of the state.  
 
Unsurprisingly, on adoption of the Declaration some of the states that initially 
rejected it, which again include the United States, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia, rejected explicitly the Declaration’s provisions on restitution.  For 
instance, the representative for Australia noted regarding third party rights that 
 
… in seeking to give indigenous people exclusive rights over property, 
intellectual, real and cultural, the Declaration did not acknowledge the rights 
of third parties, in particular the rights of third parties to access indigenous 
land, heritage and cultural objects where appropriate under national law.  The 
Declaration also failed to consider the different types of ownership and use 
that could be accorded to indigenous people and failed to consider the rights 
of third parties to property.  Australia was also concerned that the 
Declaration placed indigenous customary law in a superior position to 
national law.  Customary law was not “law” in the sense that modern 
democracies used the term, but was based on culture and tradition.  Australia 
would read the whole of the Declaration in accordance with domestic laws, as 
well as international human rights standards.107 
 
                                                 
105 Id. at para 147. 
106 See Chairperson Luis-Enrique Chávez, Report of the working group established in accordance with 
Commission on Human rights resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its tenth session, United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human rights, E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/2, 1 September 2005.  
Although the motivations of Chairperson Chavez are not know, it is arguable that the reinsertion of this word 
despite the opposition of some states occurred is in part as a result of the fact that the downgrading of Article 11 
traced in Chapter Three ensures that it would not disturb property rights thereby rending concerns over 
semantics moot. See supra Chapter 4 at ns. 224-6 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the using 
the term restitution). 
107 Hill, supra n. 54.  Australia held this position and maintained it throughout the drafting process. See Urrutia, 
Report, supra n. 57 at para. 83. 
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Even those states that voted in favor of the Declaration reiterated their 
concerns with restitution rooted in issues with disturbing property and third 
party rights and ultimately sovereignty.  The representative from the UK noted 
that the “United Kingdom understood the commitments of [draft] articles 12 
and 13 [ Declaration Articles 11 and 12] on redress and repatriation as applying 
only in respect of such property or of such ceremonial objects and human 
remains that were in the ownership or possession of the State.”108  Furthermore, 
Sweden directly addressed it concerns regarding sovereignty in relation to 
restitution from the outside of the drafting of the Declaration.  
 
In connection with the recovery and restitution of heritage, the Government 
of Sweden observed that its current treaty obligations and national laws 
pertain only to the return of moveable cultural property between certain 
European Governments.  The Special Rapporteur is aware of the limitations 
of existing bilateral and multilateral treaties for the return of moveable 
cultural property, having identified this as an important obstacle to the 
effective protection of indigenous peoples' heritage in her study.  She also 
observes that the instrument she has drafted for consideration by the 
Subcommission is in the nature of a declaration, rather than a binding 
convention; that a declaration, in United Nations practice, is aspirational, and 
ordinarily goes further than the existing practices of States, with the aim of 
encouraging all States to adopt more effective legislation; and that this 
declaration of principles and guidelines, should it eventually be approved by 
the General Assembly, would constitute an invitation to States to consider 
taking additional steps to secure the purposes to which their existing cultural 
and educational legislation is already addressed.109  
 
Furthermore, the statements in relation to land restitution are also instructive 
here as they raise many of the same issues as the restitution of cultural property.  
In relation to land, the statement by Japan also demonstrates concerns with 
disruption to property and third party rights applicable to cultural property 
noting that: 
 
                                                 
108 Pierce, supra n. 55. 
109 Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, [Annex 
“Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People” paras. 21 and 22], U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26(1995) at paras. 19-20. 
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Japan believed that the rights contained in the Declaration should not harm 
the human rights of others.  It was also aware that, regarding property rights, 
the contents of the rights of ownership or others relating to land and territory 
were firmly stipulated in the civil law and other laws of each State.  Therefore, 
Japan thought that the rights relating to land and territory in the Declaration, 
as well as the way those rights were exercised, were limited by due reason, in 
light of harmonization with the protection of the third party interests and 
other public interests.110 
 
Similarly, the representative from New Zealand noted that her state had 
difficulties with a number of provision that were deemed incompatible with 
New Zealand’s  constitutional and legal arrangements, the Treaty of Waitangi, 
and the principle of good governance for all citizens which included Article 26 
concerning land and resources and Article 28 on its redress.  
 
The provision on lands and resources could not be implemented in New 
Zealand, she said.  Article 26 stated that indigenous peoples had a right to 
own, use, develop or control lands and territories that they had traditionally 
owned, occupied or used.  For New Zealand, the entire country was 
potentially caught within the scope of the article, which appeared to require 
recognition of rights to lands now lawfully owned by other citizens, both 
indigenous and non-indigenous, and did not take into account the customs, 
traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.  The 
article, furthermore, implied that indigenous peoples had rights that others 
did not have.  The entire country would also appear to fall within the scope 
of article 28 on redress and compensation.  The text generally took no 
account of the fact that land might now be occupied or owned legitimately by 
others, or subject to numerous different or overlapping indigenous claims.111 
 
In agreement with New Zealand, the statement of the U.S. provided to explain 
its opposition to the Declaration included that “[t]he provisions on lands and 
resources are phrased in a manner that is particularly unworkable.  The language 
is overly broad and inconsistent.  For example, Article 26 appears to require 
recognition of indigenous rights to lands without regard to other legal rights 
existing in land, with indigenous or non-indigenous.”112 
                                                 
110 Shinyo, supra n. 54. 
111 Rosemary Banks, Explanation of Vote by Rosemary Banks, Permanent Representative of New Zealand to 
the United Nations’ (speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at http://www.un.org/Ne
ws/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm.   
112 Hagen, supra n. 58. 
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Finally, the Swedish representative noted that Article 28 did not give Indigenous 
Peoples in Sweden, the Sami, “the right to redress for regular forestry by the 
forest owner.”113  Rather her government would interpret references in the 
Declaration to the ownership and control of land to apply to the traditional 
rights of the Sami people already in place in Sweden law which were known as 
reindeer herding rights and included rights short of restitution such as “the right 
to land and water for the maintenance of reindeer herds by Sami herding 
communities, as well as the right to build fences and slaughterhouses for the 
reindeer and the right to hunt and fish in reindeer herd areas.”114 
 
In sum, regardless of the approach and the nature of their vote, states 
representing a comprehensive geographical distribution all expressed the core 
the idea that provision for redress must not interfere with disturb property 
rights rooted in concerns with sovereignty. 
 
II. Doing the Two-Step: NAGPRA, Sovereignty,  and the Double 
Retrogression of Article 11  
 
With sovereignty at the root of the retrogression of Article 11, it is unsurprising 
that the domestic laws of states specifically related to the issues of the 
restitution of cultural property acted as a litmus test: determining the acceptable 
limits/ maximum limits of Article 11 and the restitution of cultural property 
within the Declaration.  In particular, examining U.S. legislation which proves 
the most comprehensive of all domestic legislation relating to the  identification, 
ownership and repatriation of cultural property and human remains, known as 
                                                 
113 Ulla Strom, Explanation of Vote by Ulla Strom, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations’ 
(speech, United Nations, New York, 13 September 2007) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/200
7/ga10612.doc.htm 
114 Id. 
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Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act [NAGPRA],115 
demonstrates how such domestic legislation directly informed and so provided 
the acceptable limits for the Declaration in relation to the restitution of both 
human remains and cultural property; and in doing so can help to flesh out the 
details of Article 11 which are vague while reaffirming that where cultural items 
are decoupled from  traditional Western conceptions of property  with all of the 
rights and obligations that the bundle entails that restitution is possible.   
 
A. Introduction to NAGPRA and Legal Pluralism 
 
Widely viewed as a success, NAGPRA offers an example of legal pluralism in 
action.  Legal pluralism refers to “different normative systems, legal or quasi-
legal, [which] co-exist and form a ‘hybrid legal space’ applicable to the same 
social field.”116  In particular, they have been developed in the legal systems of 
states where colonial settlers moved and Indigenous Peoples still live117 and 
which is part of the broader concept of value pluralism, itself the product of 
multiculturalism and a central feature of the democracy in the U.S which 
involves the balancing of different values.118  Indeed, pluralistic societies are 
currently engaged in the continuous process of determining “how democratic 
social institution will recognize the distinct cultural identities of the diverse 
constituent groups that comprise these societies.”119  Specifically, the ideal aim 
of legal pluralism is to place indigenous laws and customs on the same footing 
as common or civil laws within a non-indigenous court system in order to 
“transform the courts in[to] appropriate venues for establishing … indigenous 
                                                 
115 NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013, 18 U.S.C. 1170. See supra Introduction at ns. 36-43 and accompanying text 
(discussing the choice to explore NAGPRA).  
116 Kristin Hausler, Indigenous Perspectives in the Courtroom, 16 The International Journal of Human Rights 51, 52 
(2012). 
117 Id.  
118 See Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Cultural Values 31 
Arizona State Law Journal 583, 618 (1999). 
119 Id. at 648 [citations omitted].  Indeed from its very theoretical foundations at the outset, it is clear that the 
scheme for restitution and ownership in NAGPRA just like that of IHRL is rooted in identity.  
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rights.”120  In turn, legal pluralism ultimately fulfils that goal of promoting the 
rule of ‘laws’: “the protection of the rights of all members of nations and 
ensures equal treatment to all.”121   
 
With this focus on equality, it is unsurprising that NAGPRA from the outset 
was viewed principally as human rights legislation122 as equality is one of the two 
fundamental norms that all human rights legislation is founded upon.123  As 
Sarah Harding notes: 
 
In short, one of the most important aspects of NAGPRA, one that is a 
necessary component of its status as human rights legislation, is that it gives 
Native Americans the freedom to construct their own claims.  It gives them a 
voice in matters that pertain to the well being of their cultures rather than 
leaving questions about cultural identity in the hands of others.  It creates 
new space for collective and cultural agency, and as such, it is as much about 
sovereignty as it is about the disposition of cultural heritage and human 
remains.124  
                                                 
120 Kristin Hausler, supra n. 116, at 55.  As aforementioned, in Canada no comprehensive legislation exists in 
relation to cultural property as in the U.S. See supra Introduction at ns. 40-1 and accompanying text.  However, 
Hausler explores how the concept of legal pluralism has unfolded in Canada ad hoc within the context of 
indigenous land rights through the use of the common law court system in a series of cases which have 
progressively established such rights for Indigenous Peoples.  Specifically, since Calder in 1973 Canadian courts 
have recognized the existence of indigenous title to land and the past forty years have witness through the judicial 
system the fleshing out of this concept. See generally Kristin Hausler, Indigenous perspectives in the courtroom, 16 
The International Journal of Human Rights 51 (2012). 
121 Id. at 64. 
122 Jack F. Trope and Walter R. Echo-Hawk,The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background 
and Legislative History, 24 Arizona State Law Journal 35, 59-60 (1992).  See also, Statement of Senator Daniel 
Inouye, 136 Cong. Rec. S17, 174 (1990) [noting that the Act “is about human rights.”] Id.  Vrdoljak notes that in 
fact many national initiatives for the restitution of human remains are based on the enjoyment of human rights 
and the right to self-determination.  Ana F. Vrdoljak, Reparations for Cultural Loss in Reparations for Indigenous 
Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives 217 (F. Lenzerini ed., 2007).  Despite this intent, some 
indigenous groups oppose not the legislation itself but rather the broader construct that requires using a justice 
system that traditionally has been used to circumscribe the rights of Indigenous Peoples and work serious 
injustices.  In particular, it has been viewed as surrender to the sovereignty of the state; an entity that has for so 
long denied rights to indigenous groups rights. See John Burrows & Leonard I. Rotman, The Sui Generis Nature of 
Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a Difference 36 Alberta Law Review 9 (1997).  This opposition to the use of a justice 
system that traditionally has been used to deny rights to Indigenous Peoples at the domestic level reflects the 
same irony of the use of international by Indigenous Peoples to secure rights in the UNDRIP. See infra Chapter 6 
at Section I(B) (exploring the irony of the use of international law in indigenous advocacy).  
123 In particular, NAGPRA is a multicultural exercise in securing substantive or de facto equality which as 
aforementioned involves treating as equal those who are equal and treating different those who are different and 
ultimately justifying special measures. See supra Chapter 3 at Section III(B) (discussing equality and human rights 
within the context of Article 11).  In turn, in doing so in the context of the U.S., NAGPRA is an example of a 
statute which “permissibly trumps certain constitutional norms of a liberal society.” Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging 
Claims, supra n. 118, at 655. 
124 Sarah Harding, Bonnichsen v. United States: Time, Place, and the Search for Identity, 12 International Journal of 
Cultural Property 249, 256 (2005). 
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Indeed, in articulating what it means to be human rights legislation, Congress 
and the courts have offered that this involves three tenets: “respecting the 
remains of the deceased; respecting the rights of American Indians; and 
empowering American Indians to control their cultural identity.”125  In turn, 
“NAGPRA … goes far beyond the usually limited scope of action of human 
rights standards.  It is a federal act that explicitly accomplishes human rights 
with positive, concrete duties imposed upon federal agencies and museums.”126    
 
More specifically, stemming from both legal pluralism and human rights, 
NAGPRA is an example of sui generis legislation within the ambit of special 
measures which as aforementioned are crucial to securing the integrity of 
Indigenous Peoples.127  As a result of this pluralist approach, on the whole 
NAGPRA has been the subject of much praise from both indigenous and non-
indigenous quarters for both its theoretical foundations of opening up a 
Western legal discourse to include that of Indigenous Peoples to practical 
benefits.  Describing the benefits of repatriation at the time of NAGPRA’s 
adoption, Michael J. Fox, former Director of the Heard Museum in Phoenix, 
Arizona, offered that it:  
 
1. helps to revive cultures; 2 serves to resolve injustices; 3 brings people 
together; … [and] encourages the participation and involvement of Native 
Americans in our institutions … These positive consequences foster a team 
approach that leads to productive museum and scientific working 
environments as they celebrate and preserve cultural heritage.128  
                                                 
125 Matthew H. Birkhold, Note: Tipping NAGPR’s Balancing Act: The Inequitable Disposition of “Culturally Unidentified” 
Human Remains under NAGPRA’s New Provision, 37 William Mitchell Law Review 2046, 2085 (2010-11). 
126 Karolina Kuprecht, The Concept of “Cultural Affiliation” in NAGPRA: Its Potential Limits in the Global  
Protection of Indigenous Cultural Property Rights, 19 International Journal of Cultural Property 33, 44 (2012) 
127 In particular it could be seen as a trump to the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. and the general suspect 
classification of any race based legislation.  Indeed as Tsosie notes there is a strong substantive legal tradition 
which allows the federal government to pass legislation to promote the cultural survival of Native Americans 
without the usual restraints that race based legislation encounters under constitutional law as such legislation is 
based not on their race but their political status. Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims, supra n. 118, at 663-4. See 
supra Chapter 3 at Section III(B) (discussing special measures within the context of Article 11). 
128 Steven J. Gunn, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act at Twenty: Reaching the Limits of Our 
National Consensus, 36 William Mitchell Law Review 2, 503, 521 (2010)[citation omitted]. 
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However, like most laws, NAGPRA is not absolute, it is a balancing act; 
balancing different and even opposing values, norms, customs and laws giving 
recognition and so favor to some at the expense of others. As Matthew 
Birkhold notes, “NAGPRA, is a carefully constructed balancing act.  
Accommodating ‘human rights, race relations, religion, science, education, [and] 
ethics’”129  Necessarily, there are winners and losers which is the very stuff of 
legal and quasi-legal systems and has been referred to as the “vexing problem of 
the ‘post-modern’ condition: ‘the confrontation between irreconcilable systems 
of meaning produced by two contending cultures.’”130  However perhaps in 
particular as a product of legal pluralism, as it typically operates in the post-
colonial context, the stakes of the “winner” and the “losers” are higher which is 
only compounded by the fact that the social field in which operates in 
NAGPRA is that of repatriation which engenders extreme emotions.  
Regardless, in this way, from the outset NAGPRA informed the theoretical 
foundations that Article 11 ultimately parallels.131  However, NAGPRA goes 
beyond informing theoretical foundations and also through its specific 
provisions sets the acceptable limits of the restitution scheme ultimately 
provided for in the Declaration in relation to both cultural property and human 
remains thereby and in doing so can help to flesh out the details of Article 11 
which are vague while reaffirming that where cultural items are decoupled from  
traditional Western conceptions of property  with all of the rights and 
obligations that the bundle entails that restitution is possible.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 Matthew H. Birkhold, supra n. 125, at 2046 [citations omitted].  However, not all are in praise of this balancing 
approach. See infra ns. 172-3 and accompanying (discussing critiques of the balancing approach). 
130 Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims, supra n. 118 at 673 [citations omitted]. 
131 See generally supra Chapter 3 (discussing the contextualization of Article 11). 
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B. The Restitution of Human Remains under NAGPRA 
 
As aforementioned, NAGPRA provides for the identification, ownership and 
repatriation of five different categories of cultural items both old and newly 
excavated including human remains, associated funerary objects, unassociated 
funerary object, scared objects and cultural patrimony.132  As regards human 
remains, NAGPRA first gives ownership of these remains excavated or 
discovered on federal or tribal lands after 1990 to Native Americans.  For those 
remains that were excavated, discovered or in any other way acquired before 
1990 by federal agencies and museums, it requires the repatriation of these 
remains.  In turn, NAGPRA provides for both a prospective application of the 
law and more importantly a retroactive application of the law.   
 
For its prospective application, ownership occurs in a tiered system of priority.  
The first tier and priority is to the lineal descendants of the remains133 which 
provides the only significant different between the schemes for human remains 
on one hand and sacred objects and cultural patrimony on the other hand.134  
NAGPRA guidelines note that the criteria for making a determination of a 
lineal descendant is that an individual can trace “his or her ancestry directly and 
without interruption by means of the traditional kinship system of the 
appropriate Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization or by the common 
law system of descendence to a known Native American individual whose 
remains … are being requested under these regulations.”135  In turn, it places 
indigenous systems of knowledge and understanding on par with Western 
conceptions and does not privilege one over the other thereby providing a 
                                                 
132 NAGPRA provisions regarding ownership are dealt with specifically at Section 5 of 25 U.S.C. §3002 while 
repatriation is dealt with under Section 7 at 25 U.S.C. §3005.  
133 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3002(a)(1).  This is the principal difference between ownership schemes for 
human remains and cultural patrimony in NAGPRA as this is not a category for the later.  
134 See infra at Section II(C) (discussing scared objects and cultural patrimony). 
135 National Park Service [NPS], U.S. Department of the Interior, Determining Cultural Affiliation Within 
NAGPRA, 43 C.F.R. 10.14(b)(2010) 
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direct example of NAGPRA’s legal pluralism.  Moreover, it is a continuation of 
the tradition in the U.S. of the recognition of quasi-property rights in the next 
of kin as related to the remains of the deceased.136  However, the likelihood of 
identifying a lineal descendant, particularly for truly ancient remains, is very rare 
and so is a seldom used category.   
 
The second tier breaks the priority down into three further categories including: 
1. the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization on whose tribal lands such 
remains were discovered;137 2. if the remains were not found on tribal lands 
then they will go to the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization which has 
the closest cultural affiliation with such remains;138 3. if the cultural affiliation of 
an object cannot be established then NAGPRA creates a presumption, 
rebuttable by another tribe proving a closer affiliation by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the remains belong to the Native American tribe which 
aboriginally occupied the area where the remains were found.139  Regarding 
these categories, the first is not often used as most remains are not found on 
tribal lands but rather on federal land while the third category is not often used 
because for land to be recognized as aboriginally occupied by a tribe, it requires 
a prior legal dispute which has resulted in a claims court making a final 
judgment that the land was aboriginal to a tribe.  Since such determinations are 
rare, most remains are not associated with such land.  Moreover, as Wendy 
Crowther also notes, “using a prior court determination regarding aboriginal 
land to determine who should be allowed to bury human remains is itself a 
concern because NAGPRA would then be granting human and religious rights 
(repatriation and burial) based on a property dispute.”140  In turn, this means 
                                                 
136 See Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims, supra n. 118, at 634.  However, NAGPRA goes beyond and departs 
from even this limited tradition of the recognition of property rights in the body and offers the right to the 
repatriation of human remains and cultural property to more fully serve Native American interests. Id.  
137 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3002(a)(2)(A). 
138 Id. at §3002(a)(2)(B). 
139 See id. §3002(a)(2)(C)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 
140 W. Crowther, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: How Kennewick Man Uncovered the Problems in 
NAGPRA, 20 Journal of Land Resources & Environmental Law 269, 274 (2000). 
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that for the majority of remains ownership is determined by closest cultural 
affiliation.141  
 
Cultural affiliation as defined by NAGPRA means that “there is a relationship 
of shared group identity which can be reasonably traced historically or 
prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian 
organization and an identifiable earlier group.”142  The evidence required to 
show cultural affiliation between a present-day individual, Indian tribe or Native 
Hawaiian organization and human remains must be established by using the 
following types of evidence: “geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological, 
anthropological, linguist, folklore, oral tradition, historical or other relevant 
information or expert opinion.”143  In turn, it does not privilege scientific 
knowledge over indigenous knowledge in making determinations of cultural 
affiliation again providing an example of NAGPRA’s legal pluralism in action 
serving not just as an evidentiary standard but reflecting indigenous views.144  
 
The cultural affiliation prong abandons that language of property and works 
with a language that emphasizes personal relations and interrelations with 
regard to an object.  It takes into account that the colonial private property 
regime was superimposed on Native American cultural property, of which 
the possession and use was formerly tied in with complex social and spiritual 
linkages between peoples and their surrounding world ‘through ties that did 
not have an abstract existence but were activated within social gatherings and 
rituals.’  The idea that cultural property may be accessible for private property 
reconceptualized Native Americans’ relationships to cultural practices within 
changing social and spiritual bonds.  Through the cultural affiliation 
component, NAGPRA allows a redevelopment of Native American 
traditional relations and ties, and loosens the tight private property language 
and thinking.145 
                                                 
141 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3002(a)(2)(B).  
142 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3001(2). 
143 NPS, supra n. 135, at 43 C.F.R. 10.1, 10.14. 
144 Hausler notes in the Canadian context of legal pluralism in relation to land rights that the most prominent 
features have been the adoption of court proceedings and the handling of evidence to include the admissibility of 
oral histories and traditions which normally would violate hearsay rules in order to accommodate indigenous legal 
concepts. See generally Kristin Hausler, supra n. 116. But see infra ns. 168-72 and accompanying text (discussing this 
scientific evidence and issue in relation to culturally unidentifiable human remains). 
145 Karolina Kuprecht, supra n. 126, at 39 [citations omitted].  Mezey hones in on this and argues that the concept 
of cultural affiliation makes clear how the problem of the paradox of cultural property is not solved by changing 
the property regimes as it doesn’t not address its ultimately essentialist nature. See supra Chapter 3 at ns. 109-115 
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The burden of proof rests with the claimant.  As aforementioned, if the cultural 
affiliation cannot be established then NAGPRA creates a presumption, 
rebuttable by another tribe proving a closer affiliation by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the remains belong to the Native American tribe which 
aboriginally occupied the area where they were found.146   
 
In sum, with these categories in mind, this meant that for the retroactive 
application of NAGPRA under its repatriation provisions in relation to human 
remains that after its passage all federal agencies and museums had to inventory 
their collections147 and that this inventory, to the greatest extent possible, had to 
identify the geographical and cultural affiliation of the human remains 
possessed by the agency or museum.148  Where cultural affiliation is made under 
NAGPRA, the institution must notify the affiliated Native American tribe 
about the holding149 and then upon the request of a known lineal descendent of 
the Native American or of the tribe or organization the agency or museum must 
repatriate the remains.150  Where cultural affiliation is not made upon such an 
inventory, repatriation still occurs where the claimant Indian tribe or Native 
Hawaiian organization can show cultural affiliation by a preponderance of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
(discussing Mezey’s anti-essentialist argument to challenge the paradox of the cultural property discourse).  Here 
she argues that just as much as Western conceptions of property, Native American concepts of ownership 
reinforce the idea that cultures belong to peoples.  Although cultural affiliation as a concept allows for quite a 
flexible definition of culture it still perpetuates the idea that cultures belong to peoples. Naomi Mezey, The 
Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 Columbia Law Review 2004, 2015-17 (2007).  “First, it assumes that we always 
know what Indian stuff is and who Indians are.  Moreover, it aligns Indians and their stuff in ways that can be 
problematic.  As Harding puts it, ‘the notion that identity, whether individual or group, must forever remain 
attached to a particular object is unsettling.  An immutable, intrinsic connection between identity and property 
may unduly limit, at least in theory, an ongoing process of cultural redefinition’” Mezey, 2017 citing Sarah 
Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72 Indiana Law Journal 723, 752 (1997).  In a 
different attack but not rooted in essentialism and the paradox of cultural property, Gerstenblith notes that 
cultural affiliation is problematic by virtue of its very pluralistic nature: “this formula mixes different types of 
evidence, thus setting the stage for a fundamental cultural and legal conflict.” Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural 
Significance and the Kennewick Skeleton: Some Thought on the Resolution of Cultural Heritage Disputes, in Claiming the 
Stones/Naming the Bones: Cultural Property and the Negotiation of National and Ethnic Identity 173 (Elazar 
Barkan & Ronald Bush eds., 2002) reprinted in Matthew H. Birkhold, supra n. 125 at 2065. 
146 See NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3002(a)(2)(C)(1)-(2). 
147 See id. at §3003(a). 
148 See id. 
149 See id. at §3003(d). 
150 See id. at §3005(a). 
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evidence again based on “geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological, 
anthropological, linguist, folklore, oral tradition, historical or other relevant 
information or expert opinion.”151  The most recent figures indicated that 
38,671 individuals152 have been returned to Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian 
organizations.  The only restriction upon repatriation of human remains is 
where the items are considered indispensable for completion of specific 
scientific study of major benefit to the U.S.153  Yet this study is limited in that 
not only was it to be where they were considered indispensable for the 
completion of a scientific study which would be of major benefit to the U.S., 
but it is also clear that this section is only applicable to remains that were in the 
custody of the federal government or a federally funded museum at the time 
NAGPRA became effective.154  No restrictions rooted in property law remain 
applicable to human remains that are culturally identifiable thereby reaffirming 
that where cultural items are decoupled from traditional Western conceptions of 
property with all of the rights and obligations that the bundle entails that 
restitution is possible. 
 
Only if none of these categories are met will the remains not be returned and 
some other solution will have to be sought “in accordance with the regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary in consultation with the review committee 
established under section 8 of this Act … Native American groups, 
representatives of museums and the scientific community.”155  Indeed, this was 
the case with culturally unidentifiable human remains [CUHR] which were 
contemplated from the start by Congress:  
                                                 
151 Id. at §3005(a)(4). 
152 National Parks Service [NPS], Department of the Interior, National NAGPRA: Frequently Asked Questions, 
available at http://www.nps.gov/history/nagpra/FAQ/INDEX.HTM [accessed on 21 January 2014]. 
153 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3005(b).   
154 Id. at §3002(d). See also NPS, supra n. 135, at 43 C.F.R. §  10.10(c)(1)(1998); Na Iwi O Na Kapuna O Mokapu v. 
Dalton 894 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Haw. 1995) (confirming that Congress intended scientific studies to complete 
inventories in order to achieve repatriation and drawing a distinction between research completed prior to the 
inventory for repatriation and research conducted after the  inventory stating that the intent of congress was to 
prevent new scientific testing on human remains held by the federal government). 
155 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3002(b). 
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[I]t may be extremely difficult, in many instances, for claimants to trace an 
item from modern Indian tribes to prehistoric remains without some 
reasonable gaps in the historic or prehistoric record.  In such instance, a 
finding of cultural affiliation should be based upon an overall evaluation of 
the totality of the circumstances and evidence pertaining to the connection 
between the claimant and the material being claiming should not be 
precluded solely because of some gaps in the record.156  
 
Indeed, in the Review committee’s 1995 Draft Recommendations it outlined 
three different categories of CUHR: 
 
1. Remains for which there is cultural affiliation with Native American 
groups who are not formally recognized by the [Bureau of Indian 
Affairs]; 
2. Ancient remains for which there is specific information about the 
original location and circumstances of the burial: and 
3. Remains which may be Native American but which lack information 
about their original burial location157 
 
Specifically, the coupling of the concepts of cultural affiliation and the 
definition of Native American create this category of human remains.158  In 
particular this prove problematic for ancient remains not culturally affiliated 
with any existing tribe and raises issues in relation to two sections of NAGPRA 
including the interpretation of the definition of “Native American” within the 
act which requires that the tribe people or culture “is indigenous” to the U.S. 
and the determination of cultural affiliation and how to apply it to ancient 
remains.159  However, NAGPRA provided little to no guidance regarding these 
questions and yet just such a situation presented itself in the case of The 
Kennewick Man.   
 
                                                 
156 H.R. Rep. No 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990) reprinted in Harding, Bonnichsen, supra n. 124 at 255.  
157 Draft Recommendations Regarding the Disposition of Culturally Unidentifiable Human Remains and 
Associated Funerary Objects, 60 Fed. Reg. 32, 163 (June 20, 1995) reprinted in Matthew H. Birkhold, supra n. 125, 
at 2068.  As Birkhold notes this categorization was abandoned and now CUHR are treated as one category 
despite the fact that in certain instances cultural affiliation is possible which is at the heart of his criticism. See infra 
n. 181- 85 (discussing Birkhold’s critique of the new rule on CUHR). 
158 Matthew H. Birkhold, supra n. 125, at 2066. 
159 W. Crowther, supra n. 140, at 274. 
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In 1996, the nearly complete skeletal remains of Kennewick Man or the Ancient 
One were found in the Columbia River Basin near the town of Kennewick, 
Washington and date back almost 9,000 years.  Shortly after his discovery, the 
Secretary of the Interior who has the responsibility for administering NAGPRA 
made a determination that Kennewick Man was Native American therefore 
NAGPRA applied and ultimately that the remains were culturally affiliated with 
a coalition of Native American tribe claimants and so should be transferred 
from the Burke Museum in California where they were initially placed after their 
removal and returned to the coalition of claimants.  This decision came despite 
the fact that the remains were not like that of any present day Native American 
population but the Secretary did not rule out the possibility that they could be 
culturally related to a modern tribe.  Therefore, he erred on the side of caution 
in favor of the Native American tribes using their oral histories and geography 
to tip the balance in the absence of any definitive information ruling out a 
Native American connection.160  After its initial case was rejected by the Corps 
of Army Engineers,161 a group of scientists filed an amended complaint 
challenging the Secretary’s decision and requested further scientific study of the 
remains.162  On appeal, the principal issue was the decision of the Secretary of 
the Interior and whether his finding of cultural affiliation was “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law.”163  In sum, the court found against the Secretary.  Writing for the court, 
Judge Gould noted that the plaintiffs not only had the stronger argument but 
the only reasonable argument.164  In essence, without a more definitive 
connection between the remains and a “presently existing” Native American 
                                                 
160 Harding, Bonnichsen, supra n. 124, at 252. 
161 See Bonnichsen et. al. v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1997).  Eight anthropologist filed a complaint 
against the Army Corps of Engineers to stop the repatriation and ask for access to study the remains they 
claimed the remains were of national and international importance and that the plaintiffs as well as all citizens 
would suffer irreparable harm if not studies.  In addition, they argued that the Secretary has violated NAGPRA 
by making a determination that the remains were Native American as defined in NAGPRA without adequate 
evidence. 
162 See Bonnichsen et. al. v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Or. 2002).  
163 Bonnichsen et. al. v United States, 357 F.3d 962 (9th cir. 2004); amended in 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004) citing 5 U.S.C. 
§706(2)(A). 
164 Harding, supra n. 124, at 253.  
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tribe NAGPRA did not apply as the only commonsense interpretation of 
NAGPRA is that it is meant to protect modern day Native Americans and any 
other result would lead to the absurd result: “the government’s unrestricted 
interpretation based solely on geography, claiming any ancient remains found in 
the United States is Native American if they predate the arrival of Europeans 
has no principal limitation beyond geography. This does not appear to be what 
Congress has in mind…”165  In turn, Judge Gould remanded the case to the 
District Court to determine the appropriate plan of scientific study of the 
remains.  At present, Kennewick Man remains in the Burke Museums in storage 
under the control of the Army Corps of Engineers as the remains were found 
on federal land.  
 
In response, to this decision, an outcry came from indigenous communities, 
legislators and academics alike that criticized the decision.  Sarah Harding 
reduces this down to two blows; first, it made clear that NAGPRA was not just 
to serve the interests of Native Americans but anyone or institution that choose 
to argue a case under its provisions and second it made it much harder  
 
…for Native Americans to claim ancient remains by requiring scientific 
evidence (oral history does not appear to be sufficiently accurate—Judge 
Gould labelled it “unreliable”) of a connection to a presently existing Native 
American group.  Both aspects marginalize Native American claims and 
perspectives; the first by limiting their voice within NAGPRA and the second 
by narrowing the application of NAGPRA altogether.166    
 
This second criticism goes straight to the heart of NAGPRA as David 
Lowenthal notes, “[t]he true purpose of NAGPRA should be seen as the 
returning to Native American groups the ability to control their own identity” to 
sustain “legitimate cultural authority.”167  In turn, this latter criticism in 
                                                 
165 Id.  
166 Harding, supra n. 124 at 254 [citation omitted].   
167 David Lowenthal, Why Sanctions Seldom Work: Reflections on Cultural Property Internationalism, 12 IJCP 393, 400 
(2005) [citations omitted](discussing more broadly NAGPRA as a manifestation of the essentialist logic of 
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particular regarding science has generated an enormous amount of literature.  
Indeed many Indigenous Peoples oppose scientific study on human remains as 
undoubtedly it is conjures memories of the wrong perpetrated against 
Indigenous Peoples and their human remains in the name of the pseudo-
scientific research in the 19th and 20th centuries.168  Even now indigenous 
activists note “[i]f you desecrate a white grave, you go to jail.  If you desecrate 
and Indian grave, you get a PhD.”169  At its essence is the issue of how 
information is regarded as a cultural choice and not a universal given.170  As an 
American curator noted pre-NAGPRA in a meeting with anthropologists who 
were disturbed by the prospect of losing artifacts to reburial the following 
occurred:  
 
Finally one Native American activists said ‘Why do you white people need to 
know all this stuff?  Why can’t you just let it go?’  Listening I had such a 
visceral reaction of horror, I knew he had hit on something very sacred to my 
culture.  The thought of deliberately letting knowledge perish was as 
sacrilegious to me as the thought of keeping one’s ancestors on a museum 
shelf was sacrilegious to the Indians.171  
 
In turn, this criticism provides an example of how legal pluralism does not 
necessarily resolve all conflict, it is not a panacea; it is merely a balancing act 
that weighs the values, customs, norms and laws of different groups in an effort 
to strike a balance.  Indeed, some still take issue with NAGPRA as such a 
balancing act especially in relation to the restitution of CUHR.  Specifically, 
Professor Rebecca Tsosie argues in the context of how NAGPRA approached 
CUHR that an interest balancing approach is inappropriate to resolve the issue 
                                                                                                                                                    
cultural heritage stewardship and restitution which he ultimately criticizes). See supra Chapter 3 at n. 122 
(discussing Lowenthal’s criticism of essentialism). 
168 See infra chapter 6 at ns. 56-62 (discussing pseudo-scientific research on human remains). 
169 Walter Echo-Hawk, Seattle Post Intelligence, 11 March 1996, p. C1 reprinted in Karolina Kuprecht, Human 
Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation, Working Paper No. 2009/34, NCCR Trade 
Regulation, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, 4 (2009), at http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&r
ct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphase1.nccrtrade.org%2Fim
ages%2Fstories%2Fpublications%2FIP7%2FWorking%2520Paper%2520Kuprecht%252023062009.pdf&ei=fGz
4VPHICe2t7AbFvICwDw&usg=AFQjCNGjphJMl2XBTqLeKrgSBzqPsAFTvw&bvm=bv.87519884,d.ZGU.  
170 David Lowenthal, supra n. 167, at 398. 
171 Id. [citations omitted].  
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as it perpetuates the human rights abuses that first generated the problem.172  In 
essence, she argues that through cases such as Kennwick that it is evident that 
scientific modes of identity prevail over cultural modes of establishing identity.  
The former is what Professor Melissa Tatum would describe as evidence 
presented by cultural outsiders and the later as evidence presented by cultural 
insiders.  Ultimately, Tatum argues that the ways in which particular groups are 
identified by outsiders can work to the disadvantage of the insiders.  Tsosie 
takes this as her premise to demonstrate that this has been the case with 
NAGPRA in relation to CUHRs in Kennewick with scientific modes of inquiry 
prevailing in this case over cultural modes of establishing identity thereby 
working to the detriment of Indigenous Peoples to vindicate their right of self-
determination.  In turn, for her only cultural insiders can express an indigenous 
identity that is necessary to realizing self-determination.173  
                                                 
172 See generally Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA and the Problem of “Culturally Unidentifiable” Remains: The Argument for a 
Human Rights Framework, 44 Arizona State Law Journal 809, 841 (2012).  Prior to developing the argument 
detailed here, Tsosie initially engaged in the balancing approach of pluralism taking the view that it was not a 
zero-sum game in balancing between culture and science and that these two things were not as some suggested 
irreconcilable. See Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims, supra n. 118 at Section IV, pp. 613-632.  Interestingly, as part 
of her argument, Tsosie documents the numerous creation stories of Native Americans and notes that at their 
core their connection between ancient and modern peoples is not spoken of in biological terms as to require 
scientific evidence to prove cultural affiliation with CUHR is futile.  Rather the importance in these stories lies in 
their unique cultural identity; hence the value of repatriation in NAGPRA as regards CUHR also should be in 
identity and this is what ultimately should be weighed in the balance against science. Id. at 640.  Again, this 
demonstrates the clear link between cultural heritage and cultural identity See supra Chapter 3 at Section III(A) 
(discussing the link between cultural heritage and its protection and restitution with the concept of cultural 
identity).  Similarly, Indigenous Peoples have the same stories about their land with the commonality that they 
“always have been in the place where they are.” Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 European Journal of International Law 121, 134 (2011) [citation omitted].  
As Wiessner notes, this may not actually reflect the historical truth given the migration patterns that have taken 
place. Id.  However, again it is arguable that the importance in these stories lies not in their historical accuracy as 
in any legal disputes it may be futile to have Indigenous Peoples prove such claims in terms of traditional 
property concepts; but rather their importance lies in recognizing their value to preserve cultural identity.  
Indeed, this has been confirmed by the approach of the IACtHRs in relation to indigenous land claims. See infra 
Chapter 6 at Section II(A) (discussing IACtHR judgments involving the protection, demarcation and restitution 
of indigenous land rooted in cultural identity).  
173 Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA and the Problem of “Culturally Unidentifiable” Remains: The Argument for a Human Rights 
Framework, 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 809, 814, 842 and 848 (2012).  Again, information is a cultural choice and not a 
universal given. See supra n. 170 and accompanying text.  Indeed, this choice may involve the restriction of 
information.  As David Lowenthal notes, part and parcel of heritage custodian practice is to keep things from 
general perusal from Maoris and Aborigines exclusion of outsiders and women and non-initiates from ceremonial 
displays to the value of Pawnee sacred bundles in being opaque to outsiders. David Lowenthal, supra n. 167 at 
400.  In essence, indigenous groups must proclaim their heritage but keep it hidden and the state must protect 
heritage but cannot inquire about that heritage. Id. [citations omitted].  The result is that “those who are not privy 
to the inside knowledge must accept the authority of those person who are privy, and the wisdom of the 
restrictions.” Id. at 408 [citations omitted].  Indeed, this also serves as another example of a paradox in the 
cultural property discourse. See supra Chapter 3 at ns. 109-15 (discussing Mezey’s argument).  Ultimately, 
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In light of these two principal criticisms, NAGPRA post-Kennewick Man 
eventually came to provides for the repatriation of CUHR.  Specifically, on May 
14, 2010 the Department of the Interior which from the outset of NAGPRA 
has been charged with issuing a rule on CUHR174 finally published a new final 
rule in direct response to the decision in Kennewick which allows for and lays 
out the procedures for the disposition of CUHR in the possession or control of 
federal agencies.175  Under the new rule, NAGPRA provides for the repatriation 
of CUHR subject to a limited right of possession defense in the same vein as 
cultural patrimony and sacred objects.  It offers that, when a museum or 
Federal agency is unable to prove that it has a right of possession to CUHR it 
must make an offer to transfer human remains to Indian tribes and Native 
Hawaiian organizations in the following priority: 
  
(C)(1) A museum or Federal agency that is unable to prove that it has right of 
possession, as defined at § 10.10(a)(2), to culturally unidentifiable human 
remains must offer to transfer control of the human remains to Indian tribes 
and Native Hawaiian organizations in the following priority order:  
(i) The Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization from whose tribal land, 
at the time of the excavation or removal, the human remains were removed; 
or  
(ii) The Indian tribe or tribes that are recognized as aboriginal to the area 
from which the human remains were removed. Aboriginal occupation may be 
recognized by a final judgment of the Indian Claims Commission or the 
United States Court of Claims, or a treaty, Act of Congress, or Executive 
Order.  
(2) If none of the Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian organizations identified in 
paragraph (c)(1) of this section agrees to accept control, a museum or Federal 
agency may:  
(i) Transfer control of culturally unidentifiable human remains to other 
Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian organizations; or  
                                                                                                                                                    
Lowenthal suggests that this juxtaposing of the rebuke of national avarice and the justification of tribal interest is 
justified on the grounds of cultural survival and global equity. David Lowenthal, supra n. 167 at 401.  Indeed, the 
protection of cultural property and its restitution in IHRL is rooted in the concept of preserving identity and 
ultimately cultural diversity. See supra Chapter 3 at Section III(A) (discussing cultural identity and diversity 
underpinning the justification of the protection of cultural property and its restitution). 
174 See NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3002(b). 
175 National Parks Service, Department of the Interior, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
Regulations- Disposition of Culturally Unidentifiable Human Remains, 72 Fed. Reg. 58, 582 (Oct. 16, 
2007)(codified at 43 C.F.R. 10.11). 
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(ii) Upon receiving a recommendation from the Secretary or authorized 
representative:  
(A) Transfer control of culturally unidentifiable human remains to an Indian 
group that is not federally-recognized; or  
(B) Reinter culturally unidentifiable human remains according to State or 
other law.176  
 
However, a right of possession means that there was meaningful consent to 
transfer the remains from the group or the individual that would otherwise have 
the right to possession and “because there is no effective right to possession in 
human remains without an effective transfer from the next of kin, this should 
mean that most sets of CUHR with any geographical marker of identity should 
be transferred to Native claimants.”177   
 
It is expected that  this “will lead to a tectonic shift in the balance of power 
between museums and indigenous groups, and that museums are likely to 
challenge the regulations in court as exceeding the scope of allowable 
administrative action under NAGPRA.”178  As aforementioned, the most recent 
figures indicated that 38,671 individuals179 have been returned to Indian tribes 
and Native Hawaiian organizations.  With the repatriation of CUHR, it is 
estimated that an additional 118,000 remains will now be subject to 
repatriation.180  In response to this change, criticism naturally came from other 
corners.  Matthew H. Birkhold argues that this rule treats all CUHR as one 
monolithic category and in doing so “discounts Native American rights, 
mistreats remains, and disenfranchises Native American groups from 
controlling their own cultural identities.”181  In essence, the cumulative effect is 
that it tips the balance of NAGPRA over the edge and so is no longer legal 
pluralism at work in balancing the interests of indigenous and non-indigenous 
communities.  “NAGPRA ... was not intended merely to benefit American 
                                                 
176 Id.  
177 Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA, supra n. 172, at 841.  
178 Karolina Kuprecht, Cultural Affiliation, supra n. 126, at 41. 
179 NPS, FAQs, supra n. 152. 
180 Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA, supra n. 172, at 839.  
181 Matthew H. Birkhold, supra n. 125, at 2048.  
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Indians, but rather to strike a balance between the needs of scientists, educators, 
and historians on the one hands, and American Indians on the other.”182  In 
particular, he argues that this lack of equilibrium will result in negative impacts 
of the Native American community as a whole by mistreatment of the remains 
themselves and ultimately loss of control over identity.  By treating CUHR 
equally as one monolithic bloc it undermines the goal of NAGPRA which 
operates on the principle that that remains should be returned to their 
ancestors183 as it places last in priority of repatriation groups that though 
cultural affiliated with the remains are not federally recognized tribes and so is 
incredibly unjust in NAGPRAs own estimation of its purposes as human rights 
legislation.184  In essence, his argument is rooted in the idea that NAGPRA 
strays from its overarching principle of offering Native American control over 
their past rooted in the notion of control over identity without questioning the 
idea of rooting repatriation itself in identity typical of much of the literature in 
this area.185 
 
Regardless, this opens up the possibility in the future that the Declaration’s 
provisions on the repatriation of human remains could be read to include not 
only the return of identifiable but unidentifiable remains as again NAGPRA 
acts as a litmus test determining how far IHRL can go in relation to restitution.  
As with many provisions in the Declaration it is vague in that it does not 
explicitly flesh out important details.  Amongst other vagaries, it makes no 
reference to: by whom these claims can be made, the priority of repatriation if 
any among those who can and do make claims and against whom these claims 
can be made.  In turn, it is possible to read Article 12 as providing for the 
                                                 
182 Id. at 2056 [citation omitted].  Obviously this stands in stark contrast to Tsosie’s argument and is of course at 
the heart of her argument against Kennewick.  See supra ns. 172-75. 
183 Matthew H. Birkhold, supra n. 125, at 2082. 
184 Id. at 2083-4.   
185 Id. at 2089. See supra Chapter 3 at n. 123 (discussing lack of essentialist critique).  However, for those like 
Mezey who have engaged in an essentialist critique it seems that cultural affiliation as the basis for restitution is 
problematic in and of itself as a mechanism of disposition however it is simply now brought to the fore under 
this rule to expose the paradox of the cultural property discourse.  See supra Chapter 3 at ns. 109-15 (discussing 
Mezey’s critique and the paradox of cultural property). 
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restitution of both culturally identifiable and unidentifiable remains.  Yet, one of 
the aforementioned proposals during the drafting process of the Declaration 
suggested the insertion of the term “their” in relation to the repatriation of 
human remains.  Draft Article 13 reads 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach 
their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to 
maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural 
sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the 
right to the repatriation of their human remains.186 
 
Taking stock of these proposals, Chairperson Chàvez agreed and recommended 
the proposed change in relation to the insertion of the word “their” and so the 
final text at Article 12 reads: 
 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and teach 
their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to 
maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural 
sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right 
to the repatriation of their human remains. 
 
As previously discussed, by including the word “their” in relation to the 
repatriation of human remains this suggests that the concern of states laid not 
with the concept of the repatriation of human remains itself but more with 
assurances that such repatriation be limited to Indigenous Peoples.187  However, 
this insertion could also suggest that “their” is intended to restrict further the 
repatriation to Indigenous Peoples of human remains to those that are cultural 
identifiable.  This interpretation is supported by the fact that it reflects the 
traditional approach of NAGPRA which as aforementioned until 2010 
restricted the repatriation of human remains to identifiable remains through a 
tiered system of priority that has at its core assurances related to insuring 
                                                 
186 Information provided by States Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Amended Text 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden And Switzerland, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.1, p. 7 (6 September 2004) [Additional text in bold].  
187 See supra Chapter 4 at Section II(B) (discussing the drafting of Article 12 of the Declaration regarding the 
repatriation of human remains).  
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affiliation as NAGPRA sets the maximum limits of what states are willing to do 
on the international level in relation to issues of restitution.  However, with 
such a change under NAGPRA such a change should follow in the 
interpretation of the Declaration to include CUHR as well in the their of in 
Article 12.  Interestingly,  despite the criticism of the territorial based approach 
to the repatriation of CUHR provided for in the NAGPRA regulations with 
priority at Section 10.11(C)(i) and (ii) in 2010, this was advocated under IHRL 
fifteen years prior in the final report on the protection of the heritage of 
Indigenous Peoples where Daes noted that “[i]n the case of objects or other 
elements of heritage which were removed or recorded in the past, the traditional 
owners of which can no longer be identified precisely, the traditional owners are 
presumed to be the entire people associated with the territory from which these 
objects were removed or recordings were made”188 which suggests some mutual 
influence.  Though in light of NAGPRA with sovereignty at the root of the 
retrogression of Article 11, it possible that Daes’ suggestion would be subject to 
the limited right of possession defense as provided for in the regulations.189  
 
C. The Restitution of Cultural Property under NAGPRA 
 
Like CUHR but in contrast to identifiable remains, NAGPRA retains limited 
restrictions rooted in property concepts for cultural property.  Cultural 
patrimony and sacred objects are terms that are distinct in that it they are a 
statutory constructs but their definition under NAGPRA is most closely 
associated with cultural property and frequently the former in particular is used 
                                                 
188 See Erica-Irene Daes, Final Report, supra n. 109, at para 24. 
189 As Tsosie notes, “because there is no effective ‘right to possession’ to human remains without an effective 
transfer from the next of kin, this should mean that most sets of CUHR with any geographical marker of identity 
should be transferred to Native claimants.” Tsosie, NAGPRA, supra n. 172, at 841.  Nonetheless, as guided by 
NAGPRA, IHRL would likely at least nod to the right of possession defense.  
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interchangeably in the relevant literature and analyses.190  Again informed by 
legal pluralism, cultural patrimony as defined by NAGPRA provides that it  
 
shall mean an object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural 
importance central to the Native American group or culture itself, rather than 
property owned by an individual Native American, and which, therefore, 
cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of 
whether or not the individual is a member of the Indian tribe or Native 
Hawaiian organization and such object shall have been considered inalienable 
by such Native American group at the time the object was separated from 
such group.191 
 
In turn, this is an example of legal pluralism in that it privileges the views of 
Native American as to what falls within the category of cultural patrimony 
based on “ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the 
Native American group or culture itself” and what the group considers 
“inalienable” and so by definition also recognizes indigenous understanding of 
ownership in the collective.  Moreover, this is also important as it depends on 
Indian definition and not on common law property institutions.192 
 
It seems utterly uncontroversial to allow Native American tribes to define 
what is significant to them in their own terms, but prior to NAGPRA, Native 
Americans did not have any federally recognized right to control 
representations of their identities as expressed in their material culture, and 
claims with respect to their cultural heritage were routinely ignored.  It is this 
aspect of NAGPRA, more so than the scope of its application, that marks it 
as significant human rights legislation.193 
 
Sacred objects “mean specific ceremonial objects which are needed by 
traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice of traditional 
Native American religions by their present day adherents.”194  The scheme for 
                                                 
190 Outside of the context of NAGPRA in the broader cultural property debate, Professor James Cuno questions 
the logic of this interchangeability suggesting that rather cultural patrimony is a subset of cultural property. See 
generally James Cuno, Museums and the Acquisition of Antiquities, 19 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 83 
(2001). 
191 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3001(3)(D). 
192 Harding, Bonnichsen, supra n. 124, at 255.  
193 Id.  
194 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3001(3)(C). 
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both the ownership and the repatriation of cultural patrimony and scared 
objects almost directly mirrors that of the aforementioned scheme of human 
remains.  However, there are some relevant differences.   
 
As regards the prospective application of NAGPRA in providing for the 
ownership of cultural patrimony and sacred objects there is no initial category 
of lineal descendants as in relation to human remains.195  However, beyond this 
the tiered system of priority remains the same offering three further categories 
including: 1. the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization on whose tribal 
lands such remains were discovered;196 2. if the remains were not found on 
tribal lands then they will go to the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian 
organization which has the closest cultural affiliation with such remains;197 3. if 
the cultural affiliation of an object cannot be established then NAGPRA creates 
a presumption, rebuttable by another tribe proving a closer affiliation by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the remains belong to the Native American 
tribe which aboriginally occupied the area where the remains were found.198 
Again, only if none of these categories is met will the remains not be returned 
and some other solution will have to be sought “in accordance with the 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary in consultation with the review 
committee established under section 8 of this Act … Native American groups, 
representatives of museums and the scientific community.”199  
 
In turn, with these categories in mind, this also meant that for the retroactive 
application of NAGPRA under its repatriation provisions in relation to cultural 
patrimony and sacred objects that after its passage all federal agencies and 
museums had to summarize their collections of cultural patrimony and sacred 
                                                 
195 See supra ns. 133-4 and accompanying text. 
196 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3002(a)(2)(A) 
197 Id. at 3002(a)(2)(B) 
198 See id. at § 3002(a)(2)(C)(1)-(2) [emphasis added]. 
199 Id. at §3002(b). 
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objects and then engage in a consultation with tribal governments and Native 
Hawaiian organizations officials and religious leaders.200  Pursuant to this, if 
cultural affiliation was made with respect to a particular Indian tribe or Native 
Hawaiian organization then upon their request the Federal agency or museum 
with the item must repatriate the object.201  To date, the figures indicate that 
4,303 sacred objects, 948 objects of cultural patrimony and 822 objects that are 
both sacred and patrimonial have been repatriated.202  However, unlike 
identifiable human remains this repatriation is subject to a “right of possession” 
defense which offers: 
 
If a known lineal descendant or an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian 
organization requests the return of Native American unassociated funerary 
objects, scared objects or objects of cultural patrimony pursuant to this Act 
and presents evidence which, if standing alone before the introduction of 
evidence to the contrary would support a finding that the Federal agency or 
museum did not have the right of possession, then such agency or museum 
shall return such objects unless it can overcome such inference and prove that it has 
right of possession to the objects. 203 
 
Although it is only subject to a limited right of possession defense204 in that 
right of possession is defined as “possession obtained with the voluntary 
consent of an individual or a group that has authority of alienation.”205  This 
concept has its roots in the general property law principle that “an individual 
may only acquire the title to property that is held by the transferor.”206  
However, taken together with the definition of cultural patrimony which 
stresses an on-going relationship with the object and that only the Indian tribe 
can make determinations about the alienability of the object,207 NAGPRA only 
                                                 
200 See id. at §3004(a)-(b). 
201 Id. at §3005(a)(2). 
202 NPS, FAQs, supra n. 152. 
203 Section 3005(c).[emphasis added].  
204 See Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation, supra n. 145, at 729 (identifying this right of possession defense as 
being limited). 
205 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3001(13).   
206 136 Cong. Rec. S17176 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. McClain) reprinted in Jack F. Trope and 
Walter R. Echo-Hawk, supra n. 122, at 67. 
207 See Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation, supra n. 145, at 729. 
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allows federal agencies and museums to retain cultural patrimony as well as 
scared objects “if they can trace their title back to a voluntary transfer by the 
culturally-affiliated Indian tribe.”208  Although this leans towards traditional 
conceptions of property ownership, it is not in that view of acquisition is 
exceptional: it asks first about the alienability of the object in indigenous 
customs before looking at the transactions itself.209  Further, this repatriation 
provision should be read in light of the overall caveat which nods to legal 
pluralism in NAGPRA that nothing in the act should be construed so as to limit 
the authority of any federal agency or museums to repatriate cultural items to 
Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations or individuals.210  
 
Notably, in all of these schemes NAGPRA only applies to Federal agencies and 
federally funded institutions211 thereby excluding private possessors including 
private museums and individuals that undoubtedly possess Native American 
cultural property and human remains; again demonstrating the balancing act 
that defines legal pluralism. 
 
D. The NAGPRA Litmus Test: Sovereignty and Determining the 
Acceptable Limits of the Declaration  
 
Two principal conclusions can be drawn from exploring NAGPRA provisions.  
First, more specifically in terms of the argument herein this exploration of 
NAGPRA demonstrates that it set the maximum acceptable limits for the 
scheme of restitution that could be secured in the Declaration at the 
international level.  In essence, NAGPRA acted as a litmus test determining 
                                                 
208 This also demonstrates that cultural patrimony is determined not by common law rules regarding personal 
property but the attitudes of Indigenous Peoples and the importance they place on the object. Harding, 729.  In 
turn, this is yet another example of how NAGPRA is a demonstration of legal pluralism.  In turn, it is 
unsurprising that elsewhere Harding suggests that it is actually this aspect of NAGPRA that marks it as human 
rights legislation. See Harding, Bonnichsen, supra n. 124, at 255.  
209 Karolina Kuprecht, Cultural Affiliation, supra n. 126, at 42. 
210 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3009(1)(A). 
211 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3005(a).  
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how far the Declaration could go in relation to the restitution of both human 
remains and cultural property thereby confirming that sovereignty is at the heart 
of the retrogression of Article 11.  Second, more broadly this analysis 
demonstrates that this litmus test is no guarantee that IHRL will follow suit as 
when compared with NAGPRA and its provisions on the repatriation of 
cultural patrimony and sacred objects, the highly discretionary nature of Article 
11 of the Declaration actually experienced not a single but a double 
retrogression. 
 
Turning to the first conclusion, with sovereignty at the root of the retrogression 
of Article 11, it is unsurprising that NAGPRA as the most comprehensive 
domestic legislation in relation to the restitution of human remains and cultural 
property acted as a litmus test; determining the acceptable limits/ maximum 
limits of Article 11 and the restitution of cultural property within the 
Declaration.  This stems from the fact that undoubtedly, the Declaration’s 
provisions on both the restitution of cultural property and human remains were 
informed by the scheme in place in NAGPRA despite the fact that NAGPRA 
was careful to note that it reflects only “… the unique relationship between the 
Federal Government and Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations and 
should not be construed to establish a precedent with respect to any other 
individual, organization or foreign government.”212  Rather, this provision more 
aptly demonstrates that the drafters were keen to ensure that NAGPRA is not 
consider as evidence of or influence on customary international law 
demonstrating an astute awareness of both the comprehensiveness of the 
statute and the sensitivity of this issue in other states and at the international 
level rather than preventing it from serving as a litmus test.  Indeed, perhaps 
more telling is that Special Rapporteur Daes in her aforementioned report the 
Working Paper on the Question of the Ownership and Control of the Cultural 
                                                 
212 NAGPRA, supra n. 115, at §3010. 
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Property of Indigenous Peoples explicitly noted that she had looked to the 
scheme that was already in place for the restitution of cultural heritage at the 
domestic level in the U.S. in NAGPRA.213  In turn, this scheme set the 
acceptable limits for the Declaration. 
 
In turn, as a litmus test as NAGPRA offers the unfettered repatriation of 
culturally identifiable human remains to Indigenous Peoples it is unsurprising 
that the repatriation of human remains that the Declaration offers Indigenous 
Peoples at Article 12 reflects this scheme.  However, this stands in stark 
contrast to cultural property under Article 11.  As demonstrated in Chapter 
Three, initially the Declaration at Draft Article 12 of the UNDRIP provided a 
sui generis right to the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples 
under IHRL.  However, in the final version of the Declaration, Draft Article 12 
appeared as Article 11 which offered Indigenous Peoples the restitution of 
cultural property not as a right but as the discretionary derivative of another 
right.  In turn, this dilution allowed Article 11 to step back and fit comfortably 
within existing IHRL as demonstrated by an analysis of Article 27 of the ICCPR 
thereby offering no real change for Indigenous Peoples in their efforts to 
repatriate their cultural property.  Yet, NAGPRA offers a far more generous 
right to the repatriation of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples subject only 
to a very limited right of possession defense.  There is a distinct discrepancy 
between what NAGPRA offers as a litmus test and what the Declaration 
provides; in essence this also demonstrates that acting as a litmus test offered 
no guarantee that IHRL would follow suit.  In turn, this further shows that 
Article 11 for the U.S. actually presented a particular retrogression in light of its 
domestic legislation that other states which do not have such extensive if any 
legislation experience in relation to the restitution of cultural property by 
                                                 
213 Erica-Irene Daes, Working Paper on the Question of the Ownership and control of the cultural property of  
Indigenous Peoples prepared by Erica-Irene Daes, 3 July 1991, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/34, at paras. 22-
3; see also Vrdoljak, Reparations, supra n. 122, at 217 n. 120 and accompanying text. 
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stepping back to fit comfortably within existing IHRL.  However, this is not to 
suggest that this double retrogression is unique to the U.S.; in another aspect 
the retrogression of Article 11 to step back to fit comfortably within IHRL is a 
two steps back for all states as it goes to the very heart of the concept of 
restitution.  
 
E. Two Steps Back:  UNDRIP and The Decoupling of Restitution 
and Retrospectively Righting Wrongs  
 
As demonstrated through an analysis of its contextualization, the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property for Indigenous Peoples under IHRL as 
articulated in the watered-down version of Article 11 of the Declaration offers 
no real change as it steps back to fit comfortably within existing IHRL which 
does not at present provide for a right to the restitution of cultural property and 
does not seem likely through existing human rights.  However, this is not the 
only retrogression that this analysis has uncovered.  As Vrdoljak notes, 
 
If  the right […] contained in Article 11 … simply elaborate[s] upon the 
application of  Article 27 of  the ICCPR to indigenous peoples, then the 
revision [of  Article 11] makes a significant difference.  Restitution is no 
longer an intrinsic element of  the right to enjoy culture;214 nor is it required as 
part of  the cessation of  an ongoing wrongful act.  Instead, restitution 
becomes a possible remedy for the violation of  this right.  The revised text 
therefore clouds the applicability of  restitution in respect of  items removed 
prior to the adoption of  the declaration.215   
 
                                                 
214 As aforementioned, Article 27 is part of the norm of cultural integrity and as such remedial measures are 
intrinsic to it and though this has not played out in practice in theory they remain intrinsic to the right to enjoy 
culture. See supra Chapter 3 at Section III(B). 
215 Vrdoljak, Reparations, supra n. 122, at 214.  By contrast, Allen starts from the premise that the retroactive 
application of the Declaration is clouded whereas Vrdoljak clearly starts from the premise that it is non-
retroactive.  Allen suggests that a literal reading of the text of the Declaration would be a prospective 
interpretation.  However, he noted that if the Declaration is remedial reparations would be central to its purpose.  
In turn, when applied retrospectively this would be quite problematic. Stephen Allen, The UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Limits of the International Legal Project  in Reflections on the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 240 (S. Allen and A. Xanthaki eds., 2011) (highlighting this in relation to the 
restitution of land under Article 28 but with equal applicability to Article 11). 
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This situation is not mitigated by the fact that the Declaration as 
aforementioned also includes reference to the broader concept cultural heritage. 
If anything, it confirms that by separating cultural heritage at Article 13 and 
cultural property at Article 11 that the latter is meant to be non-retroactive.  
Again, at Article 31 it provides that “Indigenous Peoples have the right to 
maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage ... [and] States shall 
take effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise of these rights.”216  
However, this closely related right noticeably lacks any reference to restitution. 
Indeed it is arguable that the inclusion of a passage on restitution here would 
have been superfluous as the normal remedy for theft is indeed restitution 
whereas by contrast it saved restitution and made it explicit for the more 
controversial situations of non-retroactivity addressed in Article 11.  At most, 
this again confirms that as aforementioned that NAGPRA served as the litmus 
test determining the acceptable limits of the Declaration.  Indeed, Article 31 
reflects NAGPRA in at least its prospective application in relation to cultural 
property by providing Indigenous Peoples with ownership as NAGPRA aside 
from providing for restitution retrospectively as aforementioned it also 
prospectively offers Indigenous Peoples ownership of their cultural property.  
Yet it places in question the entire retrospective application of Article 11 and 
even the Declaration. 
 
In sum, the aforementioned chapter demonstrates that the contextualization of 
the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples in Article 
11 resulted in a double retrogression; not only does Article 11step back to fit 
comfortably within existing IHRL, it serves as a further and more concerning 
retrogression in that it undermines the concept of restitution more broadly by 
decoupling restitution as a remedy for wrongful acts.  Undoubtedly, this double 
retrogression ultimately achieved in Article 11 through the contextualization of 
                                                 
216 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295 ,UN GAOR, 61st sess 107th 
plen mtg, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (13 September 2007) at Art. 31. 
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the issue of the restitution of cultural property in IHRL was not the aim of 
Indigenous Peoples and their advocates.  On the contrary, pursuing the 
restitution of cultural property as a human right was intended to move efforts 
for restitution forward; as after all human rights claims despite their appearance 
as universal, unhistorical and unpolitical217 are morally infused political claims 
and so thereby seek to push forward a particular agenda.  Yet, it was this effort 
to contextualize the restitution of cultural property in IHRL that ultimately 
secured a double detriment in relation to the issue of restitution of cultural 
property, in particular and more broadly restitution in general; thereby 
illustrating a further particular irony of contradiction associated with Article 11 
and its failure to provide for a right to the restitution of cultural property and 
indeed serves as a further dark side and unintended consequence in relation to 
cultural heritage. 
 
F. Dark Sides and Unintended Consequences218 
  
As aforementioned, Engle offers that there are limits or the dark sides to and 
unintended consequences in using IHRL to protect cultural heritage generally.219  
For instance, as aforementioned she argues that to the extent that indigenous 
advocacy claims to culture have been successful in penetrating IHRL, they are 
still limited in terms of the indigenous subjectivities that they cover and what 
they permit.220  In turn, she continues and notes that the same has occurred in 
the context of the right to culture as presented in the international framework 
for the protection of cultural heritage both tangible and intangible which places 
                                                 
217 See supra Chapter 3 at n. 218-22 and accompanying text (discussing this unpolitical nature within indigenous 
advocacy strategies).  
218 This expression comes from Engle. See generally Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous 
Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy (2010).  
219 These unintended consequence of using IHRL discussed herein would also be an example of an irony of the 
use of IHRL by Indigenous Peoples. See infra Chapter 6 at Section I(B) (discussing examples of the irony of the 
use of IHRL by Indigenous Peoples in relation to the contextualization of the restitution of cultural property in 
IHRL). 
220 Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the 
Context of Human Rights, 22 European Journal of International Law 161(2011).  See also Chapter 3 at Section 
IV(A)(1) and V (disusing these cultural claims and their limits). 
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emphasis respectively on the “common heritage” of mankind  and application 
of protection to only those practices that are “compatible with existing 
international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of 
mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable 
development.”221  As Engle notes in relation to the later provision: 
 
As in earlier contexts [IHRL] this provision recognizes that the right to 
culture might not mediate the potential conflict between human rights and 
respect for diverse cultures after all.  It also provides yet another avenue for 
states and regional and international organizations to oppose or fail to protect 
those parts of indigenous culture that appear uncivilized.222 
 
In sum, Engle concludes that this is also a dark side and unintended 
consequence; in this case regarding the international framework for the 
protection of cultural heritage. 
 
[T]here appear to be “built-in limits to indigenous cultural and political 
demands that constitute certain Indians (and manifestations of indigenity) as 
“permitted” and others as “prohibited.”  Attempts to transgress the 
boundaries of “neoliberal multiculturalism” end in indigenous activists 
either “being nudg(ed) … back inside the line,” or “isolated and 
dismissed.”223 
 
As regards the former, the  
 
…“common heritage” theory seems superficially attractive, and has the same 
broad appeal as claims for “universal citizenship” and other warm and fuzzy 
notions of “our common humanity”.  However … [t]his type of claim 
constitutes an imperialistic endeavor that seems more consistent with … 
colonial history … that its modern-ay proponents want to admit.224  
 
In turn, Engle further identifies another dark side and unintended consequence 
in the alienability of heritage in this framework which flows from this common 
                                                 
221 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage.  Paris, October 17, 2003.  2368 U.N.T.S. 
3 at Art. 1(1). See supra Chapter 4 at n. 244 and accompanying text (discussing intangible cultural heritage).  
222 Karen Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n. 118, at 148. 
223 Id. at 149 [citations omitted]. 
224 Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims, supra n. 118, at 632 (discussing common heritage in the context of science 
but of the same effect).  
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heritage idea as it means that “cultural heritage is separated from the very 
indigenous peoples from whom it is thought to emanate.”225  Ultimately, this 
has produced a political activism rooted in essentialism, which she refers to a 
“strategic essentialism”226 despite claims to the contrary it is justified by such 
activists on the grounds that in the absence of electoral, economic and military 
power that “’symbolic capital’ accompanying authentically performed cultural 
identities represents one of the most influential political resources available to 
indigenous peoples.”227  Moreover, while at the same time “this understanding 
of cultural as heritage fits nicely with state efforts to display, some might even 
say to commodify, native cultures.”228  In turn, the dark sides and unintended 
consequences are somewhat paradoxical in that:  
 
…culture is most like a commodity when it is seen to be owned by 
indigenous peoples … Once the heritage becomes seen as belonging to all of 
humanity, however, it is taken out of the market and placed into the public 
domain.  Commodified or not, it is nevertheless still a thing, largely alienated 
from the very people whose protection it is said to ensure.229 
 
Conclusions 
 
A micro-level analysis of Article 11 of the Declaration demonstrated that it 
suffered a retrogression as a result of the continuing concerns on the part of 
states over self-determination and the disruption of property rights both of 
which reinforce its nature as a collective right ultimately encasing it in a 
triumvirate of concepts that face powerful opposition under IIHRL that 
ultimately proved fatal to establishing a sui generis right.  In turn, this chapter has 
explored what is ultimately at the root of this opposition to the restitution of 
                                                 
225 Karen Engle Elusive Promise, supra n. 218, at 149. 
226 Id. at 156. 
227 Id. at 157. 
228 Id. at 152.  She cites numerous examples of the political activism rooted in essentialism. Id. at 152-54. See also 
supra Chapter 3 at Section III(A) [discussing essentialism and its role in underpinning the justification for the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples in IHRL.]  In turn, in this way it is unsurprising that Article 
11 is rooted in essentialism as it seems that indigenous activism that produced it was grounded in the same logic. 
229 Id. at 156. 
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cultural property and the Declaration itself through a macro-level analysis of the 
issue of the contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property 
to Indigenous Peoples in Article 11 of the Declaration.  This analysis has 
demonstrated more broadly that at its root are state concerns with sovereignty 
as worries over sovereignty ultimately lie at the heart of opposition to the right 
to self-determination and the disruption of third party property rights both of 
which have fuelled the retrogression of Article 11.   
Diagram 4. 
 
 
 
Beyond this, more specifically with sovereignty at the root of the retrogression 
of Article 11, it is unsurprising that the domestic laws of states specifically 
related to the issues of the restitution of cultural property acted as a litmus test: 
determining the acceptable limits/ maximum limits of Article 11 and the 
restitution of cultural property within the Declaration.  In particular, an 
examination of U.S. legislation known as NAGPRA, which proves the most 
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comprehensive of all domestic legislation relating to cultural property and 
human remains, has shown how such legislation directly informed and so 
provided the acceptable limits for the Declaration in relation to the restitution 
of both human remains and cultural property thereby fleshing out the details of 
Article 11 which remain vague and confirming that where decoupled from 
property concepts that restitution is possible; though as a litmus test NAGPRA 
offered no guarantee that these limits would be reflected in the Declaration in 
IHRL.   
 
With sovereignty uncovered as the root of the opposition to the restitution of 
cultural property which explains the retrogression of Article 11, the remainder 
of this thesis examines the consequences and conclusions that flow from the 
contextualization of the issue of the restitution of cultural property as included 
in the final text of the UNDRIP within the structure of IHRL. 
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Chapter Six  
Understanding the Limits of Contextualization 
Consequences and Conclusions  
 
 
Introduction  
 
The claims of Indigenous Peoples under international law stem from five main 
sources as identified by Professor Benedict Kingsbury including: non-
discrimination, minority rights, self-determination, historical sovereignty and sui 
generis claims as Indigenous Peoples.1  Article 11 of the Declaration undoubtedly 
encompasses all of these aspects as this thesis has demonstrated.  Chapter Three 
through its analysis of the contextualization of restitution as a human rights issue 
illustrated how Article 11 has its roots in non-discrimination, minority rights and 
historical sovereignty while Chapter Four through its micro-level analysis of 
Article 11demonstrated its links with self-determination.  Finally and perhaps 
most significantly the exploration of contextualization of the restitution of 
cultural property as a human right in Draft Article 12 revealed that it presented a 
sui generis right; a crucial development as IHRL did not include such an explicit 
right.  Yet, this sui generis right was short lived as it did not survive the Draft 
Declaration.   
 
Indeed, after demonstrating in Chapter Two the serious limitations on the ability 
of the international regime for the protection of cultural property to provide for 
the restitution of such property to Indigenous Peoples, Chapter Three revealed 
that its contextualization as a human right under IHRL suffered a retrogression 
which ultimately failed to provide a sui generis right.  In turn, the remainder of this 
                                                 
1 B. Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of  Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and 
Comparative Law in Peoples’ Rights 109 (P. Alston ed., 2001).  
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thesis has provided a tripartite analysis of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples under IHRL.  At the micro-level, this analysis in Chapter 
Four offered an examination of Article 11 in the Declaration concluding with an 
exploration of Engle’s seminal meso-level analysis of the Declaration itself while 
at the macro-level Chapter 5 offered an examination of broader international 
law.  It has demonstrated that at the micro and meso levels self-determination 
and the disruption of fundamental individual civil and political rights, the right to 
property in particular, have fuelled opposition the creation of a sui generis right to 
the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples while at the macro-
level in general concerns with sovereignty which underpin these concepts 
prevent IHRL from meeting the requests of Indigenous Peoples for a right to 
the restitution of cultural property.  In turn, this final chapter explores what are 
the consequences and conclusions we can draw from the preceding three-tiered 
analysis  
 
I. Extrapolating Engle: The Structural Incapacity of IHRL?  
 
A. Sovereignty and Globalization  
 
As the micro and macro-level analyses of Article 11 offered herein respectively 
mirror and extrapolate that of the meso-level analysis of the Declaration 
provided by Engle, unsurprisingly this thesis in exploring the contextualization 
of the restitution of cultural property as a human right as a whole first confirms 
the conclusions that she draws from her analysis of the Declaration.  Engle 
draws three principal conclusions.  First, she concludes from her analysis that 
human rights seem less threatening to states and international institutions than 
the political concept of external self-determination and thereby states only 
allowed the language of self-determination in the Declaration when they were 
sure that it would not pose a threat to their territorial integrity; as a human right 
282 
 
within IHRL and more specifically of an internal variant.2  Next, she provides 
that as individual civil and political rights would not be sufficient to meet the 
demands of Indigenous Peoples, they argued for human rights that would ensure 
them some sort of economic and political control and in particular did so 
through advocacy that stresses the right to culture or to collective property based 
on their cultural connection to it.3  Yet, typically theses advocacy strategies have 
not been very successful for the recognition of rights that are in real conflict with 
liberal individual rights and so the former is almost always subordinated to the 
later.4  Finally, she offers that beyond this subjugation of collective rights 
international law actually defines indigenous claims out of human rights through 
the aforementioned concepts of the “repugnancy clause” and ultimately the 
“invisible asterisk”.5  However, Engle, in her meso-level analysis of the failure of 
the UNDRIP to address the desires of Indigenous Peoples as a result of the 
limitations of self-determination and the privileging of individual civil and 
political rights rooted in concerns over collective rights, stops shy of concluding 
that there is a structural incapacity of IHRL to address the demands of 
Indigenous Peoples. Rather, paraphrasing political theorist Harold Laski in his 
critique of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Engle penultimately 
concludes that the Declaration reached “an uneasy compromise between 
irreconcilable principles of social action.”6  At best, she suggests then that the 
UNDRIP mediates temporarily these multiple tensions but it does not resolve 
                                                 
2 Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human 
Rights, 22 European Journal of International Law 161 (2011).  
3 Id. 
4 Id.  Although she does not reference the work of Engle, in many ways the work of the political theorist Dr. 
Sheryl Lightfoot in relation to the Declaration is very similar.  Lightfoot also concludes in her analysis that this 
(neo)–liberal framework is also at odds with the indigenous agenda but separates this liberal framework out from 
that of IHRL placing greater hope in it as a framework to address indigenous issues whereas Engle sees its 
operation within IHRL and takes at least a more cautious approach to it as an indigenous forum.  Lightfoot 
concludes: “[t]hese findings suggest that, in practice, the Anglosphere may be attempting to shift the Indigenous 
rights conversation away from the legitimacy concerns of the international human rights discourse, in favour of 
domesticating Indigenous issues and preserving a (neo)-liberal framework.” Sheryl L. Lightfoot, Selective 
Endorsement without Intent to Implement: Indigenous Rights and the Anglosphere, 16 The International Journal of Human 
Rights100, 119 (2012).  
5 Engle, Fragile Architecture, supra n. 2, at 161-2. See Chapter 3 n. 272 and accompanying text (discussing the 
repugnancy clause and the invisible asterisk.) 
6 Engle, Fragile Architecture, supra n. 2, at 163. 
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them.  In sum, she ultimately suggests that now is the time to expose and not to 
mask or reinforce this fragile architecture of the Declaration: 
 
If we are willing to examine it critically, the UNDRIP may have the potential to become an 
important site for the ongoing struggle over the meaning of human rights, the dominance of 
human rights as the basis of justice, and the extent to which it might be mined or abandoned 
for alterative, transformative strategies.7  
 
In essence, Engle calls for a further examination of the Declaration and IHRL 
and leaves any conclusion regarding the structural incapacity of IHRL for 
another day.8  The question becomes: does this thesis through its extrapolation 
of Engle in its macro-level analysis suggest a deeper structural incapacity of 
IHRL as a forum to address the demands of Indigenous Peoples in the context 
of the restitution of their cultural property?   
 
First, what is meant by structural incapacity?  The Oxford English Dictionary 
does not include “structural incapacity” amongst its defined phrases.  Taking the 
constituent parts, structural refers to “[o]f or pertaining to the arrangement and 
mutual relation of the parts of any complex unity”9 while incapacity refers to an 
“[i]nability to take, receive, or deal with in some way.”10  In turn, structural 
incapacity in the context of this thesis means the inability of IHRL in its present 
form to address the demands of Indigenous People and so ultimately then the 
root failure of IHRL to provide for the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples.   
 
                                                 
7 Id. at163. 
8 Indeed, Engle also leaves for another day suggestions regarding the future of indigenous advocacy strategies in 
light of what she has uncovered.  
9 Oxford English Dictionary, Structural, available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/191887?redirectedFrom=s
tructural#eid (last accessed 14 July 2014). 
10 Oxford English Dictionary, Incapacity, available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/93312?rskey=lAR09c&re
sult=3&isAdvanced=false#eid (last accessed 14 July 2014). 
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Indeed, the issue of structural incapacity has been raised albeit indirectly earlier 
in this thesis in relation to the issue of proportionality regarding the limitations 
on Article 27.11  Specifically, the issue of proportionality suggests a structural 
incapacity in IHRL on a procedural level to address the claims of Indigenous 
Peoples for the restitution of cultural property.  As aforementioned, Human 
Rights Committee [HRC] jurisprudence reveals that proportionality depends on 
findings and interpretations of facts rather than on the strict application of law, 
which stems from the fact that the HRC examines evidence in writing and so is 
not well placed to make independent findings of fact when faced with conflicting 
evidence or interpretations of evidence.  Therefore the HRC tends to uphold the 
facts as found by the domestic court refusing to act as a court of fourth 
instance12 which also explains its aforementioned emphasis on consultation with 
Indigenous Peoples.13  In turn, even assuming restitution remains an intrinsic 
part of the right to enjoy culture, this approach under IHRL would be a serious 
detriment to the restitution of cultural property given that such claims are by 
their nature extremely fact specific involving extensive and complex issues of 
fact and law rooted in deep and long histories.  Consequently, this 
proportionality approach to Article 27 suggests at present a structural incapacity 
to address the claims of Indigenous Peoples for the restitution of cultural 
property.   
 
This structural incapacity in IHRL is in relation to procedural aspects.  However, 
does this thesis through its extrapolation of Engle in its macro-level analysis 
suggest a more serious structural incapacity of IHRL as a forum to address 
                                                 
11 See generally Chapter 3 ns. 240-47 and accompanying text (discussing proportionality in the HRC). 
12 S. Joseph, Human Rights Committee: Recent Cases, 2 Human Rights Law Review 287, 297-98 (2000).  Recognizing 
this issue, Indigenous Peoples took a different strategy in Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi.  As Scheinin notes, here the 
Sami not only brought a claim under Article 27 but under Article 14 right to a fair trial.  After finding a violation 
of Article 14, the HRC said it did not have enough information to draw a conclusion about the factual 
importance of the lands at the heart of the dispute to reindeer husbandry and the long-term impacts on its 
sustainability as a cultural activity under Article 27.  However, when addressing the Article 14 violation of the 
right to a fair trial and an effective remedy the HRC called on Finland to reconsider the Article 27 claim on the 
domestic level. M. Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 
International Law and Indigenous Peoples 8 (J. Castellino and N. Walsh eds., 2005).   
13 S. Joseph, supra n. 12, at 287, 297-98.   
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indigenous demands to secure a sui generis right to the restitution of cultural 
property to Indigenous Peoples?  In short, yes.  The macro-level analysis herein 
has demonstrated that IHRL also suffers from a deeper structural incapacity 
rooted in the concept of sovereignty which serves to prevent IHRL from 
meeting the demands of Indigenous Peoples.14  It should be noted that this 
conclusion regarding the structural incapacity of IHRL which flows from 
sovereignty and so fails to meet the demands of Indigenous Peoples is confined 
to its incapacity in this instance to meet the demands of Indigenous Peoples in 
relation to securing a sui generis right to the restitution of cultural property as 
demonstrated in the thesis.15  
 
As aforementioned, sovereignty represents the notion that a solitary and 
supreme authority exists within the political community and nowhere else, which 
possesses both the undisputed and legitimate right to make the rules and 
regulations that govern the community.16  Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 
the sovereign state has served as the preeminent model for political community.  
In turn, states have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo with respect to 
sovereignty and its locus.  Therefore, international law which has principally 
been developed by and for the benefit of states abounds with evidence of efforts 
to maintain this situation.  Yet it is well documented that the role of states as the 
principal actors in international law has been seriously challenged over the past 
                                                 
14 At minimum, this incapacity in terms of procedure serves to complement that of sovereignty in securing the 
structural incapacity of IHRL to provide for the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples as a matter 
of right.  Arguably these procedural aspects do not just complement but flow from that of sovereignty as states 
have ultimately structured the mechanisms of IHRL such as the HRC. 
15 Any further conclusion regarding the incapacity to meet other indigenous demands would be supposition that 
it not directly supported by this thesis as it is outside the remit of the research question, though such a question 
would be worthy of inquiry; which in turn suggests a further significance of this thesis.  Indeed this issue of 
structural incapacity fuelled by sovereignty is raised below in relation to the issue of the restitution of land and 
the international legal project as a dialogical space. See generally infra Section II.  However, as part and parcel of the 
failure to meet the demands of Indigenous Peoples regarding the restitution of cultural property it is not without 
merit to suggest that this incapacity necessarily extends to the demands of Indigenous Peoples regarding external 
forms of self-determination. See generally supra Chapters 4 and 5 (discussing the limitation of self-determination to 
an internal form and rejection of an external form).  Collectively, given these failures to meet the main 
triumvirate of main indigenous demands, this thesis does tentatively lend itself to suggesting a structural 
incapacity on the part of IHRL to meet more broadly the demands of Indigenous Peoples; however again further 
inquiry would be warranted.   
16 David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and Democracy 215 (1989). 
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60 years leading to significant changes that have chipped away at the power of 
state sovereignty.  In particular, it is fashionable and so repeatedly suggested in 
many quarters that sovereignty is an outmoded concept in the 21st century in the 
face of globalization.   
 
In brief, globalization refers to a multidimensional set of forces, which transform 
the organization of human relations and transactions, by generating 
transcontinental and/or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, 
and the exercise of power.17  Globalization operates and thus manifests itself in 
seven areas including: economics, politics, technology, the military, law, culture 
and the environment.  Developments in each of these areas have challenged the 
competence of the state by creating supra and sub-national actors, who share 
and barter for control of state sovereignty and autonomy, thus transforming the 
state as the locus of effective political power.  
 
In turn, in the face of globalization it is popular in many quarters to suggest that 
sovereignty remains only as a convenient legal fiction in the international legal 
project; perhaps nowhere more fashionable than amongst Indigenous Peoples 
and other advocates.  For instance, Professor Anaya is a proponent of such a 
view casting sovereignty in the best possible light for indigenous advocacy: 
 
Under contemporary international law, however, the doctrine of sovereignty 
and its Charter affirmation are conditioned by human rights values also 
expressed in the Charter and embraced by the international community.  In a 
global community organized substantially by state jurisdictional boundaries, 
sovereignty principles continue, in some measure, to advance human values 
of stability and ordered liberty, and they guard the people within a state 
against the disruptive forces coming from outside the state’s domestic 
domain.  But since the atrocities and suffering of the two world wars, 
international law does not much uphold sovereignty principles when they 
would serve as an accomplice to the subjugation of human rights or act as a 
shield against international concern that coalesces to promote human rights.18 
 
                                                 
17 David Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture 16 (1999).  
18 S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 109 (2nd ed. 2004).  
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Allen describes the “international legal project” as a project amongst 
international lawyers and scholars where international law and its institutions are 
presented as forces for “good” while states are to be understood as “bad” and 
consequently need to be encouraged and pushed into “doing the right thing”.19  
In essence, then the international legal project is a normative project which: 
 
...[s]eeks to promote the authority of international norms on a wide range of 
issues (especially on human rights) at the expense of the autonomy of 
national legal systems.  The project aims to alter the concept of sovereignty 
so that it reflects cosmopolitan rationality.  Accordingly it challenges the 
primacy of the State, claiming that it is being superseded by a web of 
institutions that promote and deliver global governance.20 
 
In turn, it is understandable to see the appeal of such a project amongst 
Indigenous Peoples and other advocates given their exclusion from and 
oppression at the hands of the state and the development of international law 
and its state-centric focus.  Consequently, amongst these circles it is popular to 
suggest that although the state may still possess a privileged status in the new 
global legal order, its primacy has waned and it is being superseded by “more 
dynamic transnational institutional processes” whereby soon it will be consigned 
not just to history but to history as an “aberration”.21  No one more clearly 
captures this view that indigenous advocate and scholar, Professor Anaya who 
explains: 
 
                                                 
19 Stephen Allen, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Limits of the International Legal Project  in 
Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 226 (S. Allen and A. Xanthaki eds., 
2011) [citations omitted]. 
20 Id. [citations omitted]. See also supra Chapter 4 at Section I(B)-(C) (discussing Anaya’s argument that the 
beneficiaries of self-determination should include Indigenous Peoples as any argument to the contrary does not 
recognize the realities of a post-Westphalian world where sovereignty no longer wields the same power as it once 
did).  
21 Allen, supra n. 19, at 248.  Allen refers to this as the “functional decline of the State” narrative and further 
highlights that its appeal to Indigenous Peoples  also stems from the fact that a global legal order can justify the 
internationalization of the indigenous struggle for rights while legitimizing its role in implementing international 
solutions in  a national context and finally it can allow Indigenous Peoples to present a parallel version of 
sovereignty that co-exists though in a  highly qualified way next to the state. Id. Allen however argues that this 
places too much reliance on the capacity of global and transnational institutions to govern effectively and that 
there remains a need for an impartial institutional structure first to organize and then exercise this power and that 
this continues to rest in the juridical state. Id. at 249. 
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Notions of state sovereignty, although still very much alive in international 
law, are ever more yielding to an overarching normative trend defined by 
visions of world peace, stability and human rights.  This trend, promoted by 
modern international institutions and involving nonstate actors in multilateral 
settings, enhances international law’s competency over matters at one time 
considered within states’ exclusive domestic domain.22 
 
Yet, in particular the macro-level analysis in the thesis has demonstrated that 
despite these suggestions that sovereignty remains only a convenient legal 
fiction, it in fact remains a powerful reality; a reality that has worked to deny the 
demands of Indigenous Peoples to secure a sui generis right in IHRL to the 
restitution of their cultural property, even where domestic laws such as 
NAGPRA secured such a right, and so more broadly suggests that the traditional 
conception of international law as made by and for the benefit of the state 
remains strong and well entrenched.  
 
B. The Irony of International Law  
 
In addition, by demonstrating the structural incapacity of IHRL to meet the 
demands of Indigenous Peoples in securing a sui generis right to the restitution of 
cultural property, this thesis also supports H.P. Glenn’s thesis that the use of 
international law by Indigenous Peoples is ironic in the traditional sense by 
revealing ironies specific to the contextualization of the restitution of cultural 
property as a human right in Article 11. 
 
                                                 
22 Id. at 248 [citations omitted].  However, this view is not confined to Anaya, as suggested it has wide appeal 
amongst indigenous advocates.  See also generally  H. Northcott,  Realisation  of the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Natural 
Resources under International Law through the Emerging Right to Autonomy, 16 The International Journal of Human 
Rights 73 (2012); Rhiannon Morgan, On Political Institutions and Social Movement Dynamics: The Case of the United 
Nations and the Global Indigenous Movement,  28 International Political Science Review 3 (2007); Harold Koh,Why 
Transnational Law Matters, 24 Pennsylvania State International Law Review 4 (2006). See also Siegfried Wiessner, 
The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 European Journal of International 
Law121 (2011)(“Law is no longer seen, at least through the human rights lens of the early 21st century, as a 
protector of the status quo, if that situation is inconsistent with preferred value goals, or as a vehicle for social 
Darwinism (although it may often still work out to be).  It is to empower the disempowered and dispossessed, to 
curb abuses, arguable to provide access to the necessities of life.  It intends to protect against discrimination and 
allow for self-determination of those who legitimately seek it”)] Id. at 123.  
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Professor Glenn takes as his starting point the statement of anthropologist A. 
Kuper who commented that Indigenous Peoples “demand recognition for 
alternative ways of understanding the world, but ironically enough they do so in 
the idiom of Western culture theory.”23  Noting that such a statement needs 
further justification, Glenn explores this and two other ironies in the Declaration 
including the use of the profoundly western notion of international law by 
Indigenous Peoples for its creation and ultimately the refusal of important states 
to vote in favor of the Declaration despite the fact that these states traditionally 
have been at the forefront of the judicial affirmation of indigenous rights.24  He 
suggests that these three ironies correspond to the contemporary understanding 
of irony as explained by the Concise Oxford Dictionary as “the expression of 
one’s meaning by language of the opposite or a different tendency.”25  In turn, at 
its core it involves some sort of dissembling or contradiction.   
 
Regarding the irony of the use of international law to aid Indigenous Peoples, 
Professor Glenn suggests that it is ironic when the history of international law is 
contemplated given its significant role in denying Indigenous Peoples entry into 
the magic circle of states and their privilege of sovereignty and justifying the 
colonization process and ultimately the destruction of indigenous culture.26  In 
essence, Indigenous Peoples are using the traditional tools of colonial 
oppressors.  For example, amongst these constructs in international law are the 
doctrines of terra nullis and extinguishment.  Terra nullius or discovery was rooted 
in the idea that Indigenous Peoples were savages and as such their social systems 
including concepts of ownership of property were inferior.  Much of the 
European effort to assert dominance over indigenous populations in America 
and elsewhere rested on the principle of discovery which ultimately gave colonial 
                                                 
23 Glenn, supra n. 24, at 171 [citation omitted]. 
24 H.P. Glenn, The three ironies of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Reflections on the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 171-2 (S. Allen and A. Xanthaki eds., 2011). 
25 Id. at 172.  Glenn also explores a different form of irony that will be discussed further below. See generally infra 
Section II.  
26 Glenn, supra n. 24, at 173. 
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powers title to indigenous lands which was consummated by possession.  This 
left Indigenous Peoples with mere possessory rights that could be extinguished 
at will by the government.  The U.S. Supreme Court case of Johnson v M’Intosh is 
most instructive: 
 
[U]sually, [the indigenous peoples] are incorporated with the victorious 
nation, and become subjects or citizens of the government with which they 
are connected.  The new and old members of society mingle with each other; 
the distinction between them is gradually lost, and they make one people.  
Where this incorporation is practicable, humanity demands, and a wise policy 
requires, that the rights of the conquered to property should remain 
unimpaired … But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce 
savages … To leave them in possession of this country, was to leave the 
country a wilderness; to govern them as distinct people, was impossible … 
The Europeans were under the necessity … of enforcing [their] claims … by 
adoption of principles adapted to the condition of a people with whom it was 
impossible to mix.27 
 
In essence, the courts justified the policy of terra nullius or discovery to strip 
Native Americans of title to their land based on their savage nature, which made 
them both ungovernable and incapable of assimilation.  Specifically, as the term 
terra nullius suggests their land literally belonged to no one paving the way to 
legitimize colonization in general and possession of their land in particular under 
international law.  Extinguishment achieved the same ends also by stressing the 
backwardness of Indigenous Peoples though it was underpinned by the concept 
of manifest destiny and had a flavor of imperial paternalism by offering to place 
Indigenous Peoples in a trust.  Of course terra nullis has been rejected by modern 
international law.28  Yet, some argue that this irony continues given international 
                                                 
27 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823).  
28 See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 28 International Legal 
Materials, 1382 at Arts. 13(1) and 14(1); See United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA 
Res. 61/295 ,UN GAOR, 61st sess 107th plen mtg, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (13 September 2007)at Arts. 
25,26,28 and 29(1); See Western Sahara, ICJ Rep. 1974, 12 International  Court of Justice at 56 ([A] determination 
that Western Sahara was a ‘terra nullius” at the time of colonization by Spain would be possible only if it were 
established that at the time the territory belonged to no one in the sense that it was open to acquisition through 
the legal process of “occupation”.) ; See Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) , 107 A.L.R. 1 (1992).  
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law’s “homogenizing, universalizing’ tendency towards Third World mass 
resistance.”29   
 
Regarding the irony and the idiom of the Western culture theory, Glenn suggests 
that it is ironic in the sense of contradictory for Indigenous Peoples to express 
their understanding of the world through this idiom given that the view of the 
later, and especially through the Declaration, is a focus on written rights while 
the former have a chthonic legal tradition long prior to the colonial experience.30  
In essence, irony stems from the Declaration then as the ultimate imperialist 
instrument as both a written and rights based document; in particular as a result 
of the later as rights have been developed and refined by the modern state and 
granted to citizens while identities other than that of citizenship have been 
reduced.  In essence, “[h]uman rights thus emerge not in opposition to the state, 
or antagonistic to the state, but as the sole, approved means of resistance.”31  
Finally, regarding the irony of opposition, Professor Glenn highlights the initial 
rejection of the Declaration by Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United 
States who did not vote in its favor despite the fact that these states traditionally 
have been at the forefront of the judicial affirmation of indigenous advocacy and 
rights thus producing a contradiction between “local support and formal, 
international opposition.”32   
 
In turn, Glenn concludes that the Declaration on the whole is a product of these 
ironies of contradiction.33  This thesis supports Glenn’s conclusion by revealing 
through its tripartite analysis of the contextualization of the restitution of 
cultural property as a human right that there is a particular irony associated with 
                                                 
29 Glenn, supra n. 24, at 174 [citation omitted]. 
30 Id. at 175-6. 
31 “Id. at 176 [citation omitted].  
32 Id. at 180. 
33 Glenn also concludes that the Declaration is the product of a more subtle form of irony that is not about 
contradiction and dissemblance but more positive and progressive.  See generally infra Section II.  
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Article 11 and its failure to provide for a right to the restitution of cultural 
property.  
 
i. The Dangers and Benefits of a Maximizing Approach to Self-
Determination 
 
Aside from a general irony of the use of international law-- typically referred to 
as the tools of colonial oppressors-- as a site for indigenous advocacy, a 
particular irony associated with Article 11 and its failure to provide for a right to 
the restitution of cultural property relates to its maximizing approach to self-
determination.  As demonstrated in the micro-level analysis provided in Chapter 
Four, the failure of IHRL and so the Declaration to provide for a right to the 
restitution of cultural property by securing its retrogression was not simply 
fuelled by its contextualization as a cultural right; this retrogression was further 
underpinned in part by the continuing concerns on the part of states over its 
specific links with the concept of self-determination which as the macro-level 
analysis in Chapter 5 ultimately demonstrated are rooted in sovereignty.  Given 
the aforementioned lengthy, intense and contentious debate in relation to both 
the modality and even the applicability of the right to self-determination for 
Indigenous Peoples and ultimately its connections with sovereignty, linking self-
determination with cultural property as aforementioned in Chapter Four was a 
risky approach.34   
 
Yet it was the approach that has been taken by Indigenous Peoples and their 
advocates in relation to claims for the restitution of cultural property as self-
determination has been linked in general with the related concepts of culture, 
cultural heritage and in particular with the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples thus taking a maximizing approach to the concept of self-
                                                 
34 See supra Chapter 4 at Section I(D) (discussing links with self-determination). 
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determination.  Ultimately, such links not only obscured the development of a 
sui generis right to the restitution of cultural property, it underpinned its 
retrogression.  In turn, it is these links with the concept of self-determination in 
relation to the restitution of cultural property that have been detrimental to 
securing this right thereby demonstrating the dangers of a maximizing approach 
to the right to self-determination.   
 
Yet at the same time, this maximizing approach which sees the restitution of 
cultural property as well as other human rights linked with the concept of self-
determination can benefit Indigenous Peoples; thereby revealing an irony of 
contradiction in its usage by indigenous advocates particular to the issue of the 
issue of the restitution of cultural property.  Specifically, linking self-
determination with restitution can pave the way for retroactivity as it alters the 
doctrine of inter-temporal law which is in particular crucial to the restitution of 
cultural property given the nature of the repatriation debate. 
 
Anaya details two different aspects of self-determination: substantive and 
remedial.35  As regards the former, Anaya asserts that it consists of two 
normative strains: constitutive self-determination and on-going self-
determination.  Constitutive self-determination “requires that the governing 
institutional order be substantially the creation of processes guided by the will of 
the people, or peoples, governed.”36  In turn, constitutive self-determination 
does not specify the outcome of such processes but stipulates that where they 
occur “participation and consent such that the end result in the political order 
                                                 
35 Anaya, supra n. 18, at 104. Anaya proposes this dichotomy as an alternative to the internal/external divide 
prevalent in IHRL. See supra Chapter 4 at Section I(C) (discussing internal and external modalities of self-
determination).  Anaya rejects this traditional dichotomy on the grounds that it is premised on an untenable 
position: a world comprised of a limited number of “peoples” in mutually exclusive communities—i.e. states. 
Anaya, supra n. 18, at 105.  Alternatively, he proposes this dichotomy as it recognizes the reality that of today’s 
word that there are multiple human associations “including but not exclusively those organized around the state, 
[and so] it is distorting to attempt to organize self-determination precepts into discrete internal versus external 
spheres defined by reference to presumptively mutually exclusive peoples.” Id.  
36 Id. at 105. 
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can be said to reflect the collective will of the people, or peoples concerned.”37  
The on-going aspect of substantive self-determination “requires that the 
governing institutional order, independently of the processes leading to its 
creation or alteration, be one under which people may live and develop freely on 
a continuous basis.”38  In turn, this requires that both individuals and groups can 
make meaningful decisions regarding all aspects of their lives.39  Collectively 
then, substantive self-determination fuelled opposition to and the demise of 
colonization.   
 
On the other hand, remedial self-determination deals with situations that stray 
from the substantive elements of self-determination to provide for prescriptions; 
hence in the context of colonization the remedial aspect was decolonization.40  
Specifically, this aspect “gives rise to remedies that tear at the legacies of empire, 
discrimination, suppression of democratic participation, and cultural 
suffocation.”41  Anaya is not alone here in emphasizing a remedial aspect to self-
determination.  Special Rapporteur Daes understands self-determination in a 
remedial fashion by focusing on its ability to serve as a mechanism for belated 
state-building “through which indigenous peoples are able to join with all the 
other peoples that make-up the state on mutually agreed and just terms, after 
many years of isolation and exclusion.”42  Further, Dr. Xanthaki understands 
Benedict Kingsbury’s relational approach to self-determination which focuses on 
a constructive relationship between the state and Indigenous Peoples as remedial 
noting that it is triggered by a disruption in the relationship between these two 
groups.43  In turn, linking self-determination understood in its remedial aspect 
                                                 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 106. 
40 Id. at 107.  
41 Id. at 98. 
42 Special Rapporteur Eric-Irene Daes, Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1 (1993). 
43 A Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-determination, Culture, and Land 150 
(2007).  See also B. Kingsbury, Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relational Approach in Operationalizing Self-
Determination 24 (P. Aikio and M. Scheinin eds., 2000).   
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with the restitution of cultural property then serves as a benefit as it can pave the 
way for its retroactive application as it alters the doctrine of inter-temporal law 
which is in particular crucial to the restitution of cultural property. 
 
The modern international law of self-determination, however, forges 
exceptions to or alters the doctrine[] of … intertemporal law.  Pursuant to the 
principle of self-determination the international community has deemed 
illegitimate historical patterns giving rise to colonial rule and has promoted 
corresponding remedial measures … notwithstanding the law 
contemporaneous with the historical colonial patterns.  Decolonization 
demonstrates that constitutional process may be judged retroactively in light 
of self-determination values--- notwithstanding … contemporaneous legal 
doctrine--- where such processes remain relevant to the legitimacy of 
governmental authority or otherwise manifest themselves in contemporary 
inequities.44  
 
As aforementioned, non-retroactivity serves as one of the major limits to the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under the current 
international legal framework for the protection of cultural property.45  Again, 
non-retroactivity is the idea that ‘[u]nless a different intention appears from the 
treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to 
any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the 
date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.’46  In turn, 
this fundamental principle of international treaty law creates a serious obstacle to 
the requests by Indigenous Peoples for the restitution of their cultural property 
under the international legal framework for its protection as the vast bulk of this 
property left their possession long before the UNESCO and UNIDROIT 
Conventions came into effect; respectively 1972 and 1998 or any later date of 
ratification of the conventions between the state parties involved.47  
                                                 
44 Anaya, supra n. 18, at 107. 
45 See supra Chapter 2 at Section IV(B). 
46 U.N., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331; 8I.L.M. 679, entered 
into force January 27, 1980. at Art. 28. 
47 A different intention does not appear from these Conventions; the UNESCO Convention implicitly adheres to 
this principle while the UNIDROIT Convention’s adherence is made express. See UNESCO, Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 
adopted Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232  at Art. 7; International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, 
Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the 
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Its contextualization in IHRL in the Declaration does not automatically 
overcome this limitation48 as IHRL is not by its nature non-retroactive; for 
instance, in the U.K. the Human Rights Act 1998 [HRA] is subject to the 
principle of non-retroactivity49 and at the international level the HRC is 
precluded ratione temporis from adjudicating on cases if the facts complained of 
date to a period prior to that on which the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR 
entered into force with respect to the state party concerned.  Specifically, 
Professor Allen offers that the Declaration under consideration here is 
prospective on a literal reading of the text and not retroactive.50  In turn, linking 
self-determination understood in its remedial aspect with the restitution of 
cultural property then serves as a benefit as it can pave the way for its retroactive 
application as it alters the doctrine of inter-temporal law.  
 
This principle of non-retroactivity is rooted in international law in the well-
established principle of inter-temporality.51  As Judge Huber of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration noted in the 1928 Island of Palmas Case, “a juridical fact must 
be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in 
force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.”52  
The International Court of Justice more recently confirmed this principle in the 
Right of Passage over Indian Territory, noting that “the validity of a treaty concluded 
                                                                                                                                                    
International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, done June 24, 1995, 34  I.L.M. 1326  at Art. 
10. 
48 A priori, the Declaration as a soft law instrument is not enforceable rendering the issue of non-retroactivity 
moot.  However, this does not detract from the merit of this line of inquiry and conclusion given the potential 
for the Declaration to crystallize on its own into hard law or to serve as the basis for a future treaty. See generally 
supra Introduction. 
49 The time limit set down by the HRA for a claim is one year from the date on which the act complained of  
took place. See Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 at Art. 7 
50 Allen, supra n. 19, at 240 (highlighting this in relation to the restitution of land under Article 28 but with equal 
applicability to Article 11).  But see supra Chapter 5 Section II(E) (discussing the significance of the prospective 
and retroactive application of the Declaration and specifically highlighting Professor Vrdoljak’s opinion that the 
Declaration if remedial must be retroactive by default and the significance of Article 31). 
51 See generally T.O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 American Journal of International Law 285 (1980).  
See generally also F. Lenzerini ed., Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives 
(2008). 
52 U.S. v Neth., 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 845 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 1928). 
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as long ago as the last quarter of the eighteenth century, in the conditions then 
prevailing … should not be judged upon the basis of practices and procedure 
which have since developed only gradually.”53  In turn, non-retroactivity requires 
events to be judged in light of law contemporaneous with the claim. 
 
Therefore, success depends on both the act complained of and when the act 
complained of took place to establish its legality or illegality.  As Merryman notes 
in relation to the Elgin Marbles, though with equal applicability to the situation 
of Indigenous Peoples in their quest for the restitution of cultural property, 
 
[i]n international law, however, as in domestic law, the rule is that the legal 
effects of a transaction depend on the law in force at the time.  The justice, as 
well as the practical necessity of such a principle is obvious.  It is both fair 
and practically advantageous that people be able to rely on the existing law to 
determine the legality of their actions.  The most obvious applications of this 
principle occurs in our own constitutional prohibition against ex post facto 
laws and in our legal system’s bias against retroactive legislation.  Thus if the 
removal of the marbles was proper under the then applicable international 
law, as it seems to have been, then the British are legally entitled to keep 
them.54 
 
Indeed, the time and the historical circumstances surrounding the removal of the 
bulk of the cultural property of Indigenous Peoples at the center of the 
repatriation debate often deemed such removal legitimate.  In turn, linking self-
determination understood in its remedial aspect with the restitution of cultural 
property is particularly vital.  Frequently, these wrongs emerged as a result of 
early adventures in anthropology and/or archaeology when these disciplines first 
explored cultural property “outside of the civilized world”55 and then embarked 
upon an unprecedented campaign of collection and removal often as a result of 
mixed motives which ranged from the mercenary “fortune and glory kid, fortune 
                                                 
53 Port. v. India, 1960 I.C.J. 6, 37 (Apr. 12). 
54 John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 Michigan Law Review 1881, 1900 (1984-85).  
55 Mark Lindsay, The Recovery of Cultural Artifacts: The Legacy of our Archaeological Heritage 22 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 165, 167 (1990). 
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and glory”56 to the paternalist and even the outright egregious; especially in the 
case of the collection of human remains at the hands of archaeologist, 
anthropologist and government officials often working in conjunction in the 
name of pseudo-scientific research to confirm the intellectual, racial and overall 
inferiority of Indigenous Peoples and their culture as a means to justify their 
subjugation if not elimination.  For instance in the U.S., a serious period of 
collection of Native American remains was carried out in the 1840 by physical 
anthropologists keen to prove that indigenous peoples were not only biologically 
different but inferior to whites.57  This was followed by an issue from the 
Surgeon General in 1868 ordering army personnel to collect Native American 
skulls and other body parts for the Army Medical Museum resulting in an 
aggressive collection of Native American remains from the battlefield, prisoners 
of war, hospital and grave sites.  The 1880s saw no abatement in this collection 
policy simply a shift from the Army Medical Museum to museums more 
generally as well as amongst private collectors as it was fashionable to display all 
things Native American.58  Commonly referred to as Cultural Darwinism,59 
ultimately these wrongs were part of the broader historical pattern of colonialism 
and nation-building that required either the assimilation or even destruction of 
indigenous culture which was supported and deemed legitimate by the 
government, public policy and contemporaneous law and subsequently enforced 
by the courts.60  This all occurred while playing Indian became necessary in order 
to secure the myth of the vanishing Indian as these genocidal federal policies 
                                                 
56 Indiana Jones and The Temple of Doom (Paramount Pictures 1984).  
57 W. Crowther, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: How Kennewick Man Uncovered the 
Problems in NAGPRA, 20 Journal of Land Resources & Environmental Law 269 (2000) at 270 [citation 
omitted].  
58 Id. at 270 [citation omitted]. 
59 Karolina Kuprecht, Human Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural Property Repatriation, Working Paper No. 2009/34, 
NCCR Trade Regulation, Swiss National Centre of Competence in 
Research, 12 (2009) [citation omitted] at http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&c
d=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphase1.nccrtrade.org%2Fimages%2Fstories%2Fpublications%
2FIP7%2FWorking%2520Paper%2520Kuprecht%252023062009.pdf&ei=fGz4VPHICe2t7AbFvICwDw&usg=
AFQjCNGjphJMl2XBTqLeKrgSBzqPsAFTvw&bvm=bv.87519884,d.ZGU  
60 See supra at n. 27 (discussing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823)).   
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flourished.61  Indigenous advocates highlight that this was the result of a focus 
on a positivist approach prevalent in the 19th century and that by contrast if 
focus shifted to classical era naturalism with its emphasis on what ought to be 
rather than what is, then that this would support the indigenous cause and in 
particular the cause for reparations.  However, as Professor Allen points out, it 
was this natural law approach in the 19th century that underpinned the 
aforementioned historical pattern of colonialism and nation-building that 
required either the assimilation or even destruction of indigenous culture.62  In 
turn, the natural law that indigenous advocates seek to resurrect was never one 
that actually existed but rather is  
 
…a version of universal naturalism which is consistent with contemporary 
human rights values … projected back to a moment before the advent of 
European colonialism in order to recognize indigenous peoples’ sovereign 
rights, despite the fact that they were not recognized in any material sense by 
the natural law of that time.  It is clear that … [this ignores] the temporal and 
contingent nature of international (and natural) law in order to reinstate a 
politically motivated universalism.63 
 
Regardless, understanding self-determination as remedial and in turn its linkage 
with the restitution of cultural property can be understood to overcome this 
hurdle of inter-temporal law and further without resort to either the approach of 
the ‘best possible light’64 or natural law revisionism.  
 
                                                 
61 Namoi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 Columbia Law Review 2004, 2029 (2007)(“It is not by 
accident that playing Indian ‘necessarily went hand in hand with the dispossession and conquest of actual Indian 
people’”) Id. at 2036  [citation omitted]. 
62 See Allen, supra n. 19, at 241. 
63 Id. at 241-2.  In particular, Allen identifies Anaya as one of the advocates who ignore the temporal and 
contingent nature of international and natural law concluding that rather at best natural law is ambivalent in its 
support of indigenous rights. Id.  Elsewhere Anaya does recognize this ambivalence in asserting that natural law 
articulated a duality in the normative construct applicable to Indigenous Peoples that simultaneous offered and 
denied indigenous rights. See Anaya, supra n. 18, at 16-19.  Rather, it seems that in relation to natural law Anaya 
does not ignore or resurrect a natural law that never existed but casts natural law in the ‘best possible light’ in the 
same fashion as his approach to state sovereignty and customary international law. See supra  n. 18 and 
accompanying text [discussing ‘best possible light’ in sovereignty] See supra  Introduction at ns. 13-14 and 
accompanying text [discussing ‘best possible light’ in customary international law].   
64 But see infra n. 102 (discussing best possible light though as a prerequisite to remedial self-determination). 
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Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that arguably this benefit could be 
achieved without resorting to any links with self-determination thereby reducing 
the irony associated with the use of self-determination by Indigenous Peoples via 
importing precedent developed in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and/or 
the concept in IHRL of continuing violations.   
 
The precedent from IHL stems from the aftermath of the Second World War 
and concerns the Allied program of restitution for cultural property confiscated 
by the Nazis in Germany since 1933 in The Declaration of the Allied Nations 
against Dispossession Committed in Territories under enemy Occupation or 
Control (London Declaration) of 1943,65 which has been described as “an act of 
humanitarian intervention by the international community in the domestic 
activities of a state”66 and was so far reaching it was suggested this program  
represented new principles of international law.67  In this regime, there are a 
number of significant features that could prove helpful for indigenous efforts to 
achieve the restitution of cultural property in general and in particular to 
overcome the hurdle of inter-temporal law.  In general, this regime of restitution 
is helpful for Indigenous Peoples as it could help flesh out the details and 
provide clarity to any restitution of cultural property that occurs under Article 11 
                                                 
65 5 January 1943, 8 Dep’t St. Bull. (1943) 21. See generally Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution: Ensuring Each 
Group’s Contribution to Humanity, 22 European Journal of International Law 17, 25-28 (discussing the London 
Declaration generally).  Indeed, many of these provisions have been incorporated and built upon in the 
aforementioned 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
and it’s the Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict which are 
specialized instruments for the protection of cultural property during armed conflict. See generally supra Chapter 2 
(discussing in brief the 1954 Hague Convention and its protocols).  As Vrdoljak notes regarding these Hague 
Conventions, “this was the first time restitutory relief specifically in respect of violations of the laws and customs 
of war relating to cultural property had been codified in international law, and was made prospective and 
potentially universal in application.” Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution, at 33.  Specifically, The First Protocol 
requires states undertake to prevent the exportation of cultural property from a territory occupied by it during an 
armed conflict.  Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed May 
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358 at Art. 1(1).  Subsequently, it requires the return of any such property exported in 
contravention of this rule to the competent authorities of the territory previously occupied at the end of the 
hostilities without any reference to time limits on this return. Id. at Art 1(3).  This provision is far-reaching in that 
it is not subject to time limitations, is applicable against bona fide purchasers as well as states that were not party 
to the conflict.  Finally, this provision related to the repatriation of cultural property in the aftermath of armed 
conflict also provides for the protection of good faith holders of such property subsequent to its return. Id. at 
Article 1(4).    
66 Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution, supra n. 65, at 25 [citation omitted]. 
67 Id. at 27 [citation omitted]. 
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[despite its retrogression] which is left vague or in a future treaty that provides a 
sui generis right.  Specifically, under this IHL regime, restitution applied to 
transactions ‘even when they purported to be voluntary in effect.”68  In essence, 
a presumption was made in favor of the claimant that any transaction during the 
period of National Socialism constituted a confiscation if the individual from 
whom the property was confiscated was a member of a group subject to 
persecution because of race, religion, nationality, ideology or political opposition 
to National Socialism, or because of any of the following grounds: threats or 
duress, by government act or abuse of such act, and as the result of measures 
taken by the Nazi regime and its affiliates.69   In turn, the possessor carried the 
burden of proof that the cultural property had been acquired through a ‘normal 
transaction’ and proof of payment was not sufficient to overcome this burden.70  
Moreover, when assessing claims for restitution due recognition of the 
difficulties faced by claimants especially in relation to the production of evidence 
through the loss of documents, death or unavailability of the witnesses or their 
residence abroad was to be taken into consideration.71  Finally, there was no time 
limit attached to this restitution scheme.72  As aforementioned, many of the 
transactions under colonialism regarding the transfer of cultural property from 
Indigenous Peoples were not only by their very nature a long time ago generating 
significant evidentiary problems; they were also dubious transfers at best.  In 
turn, these presumption in IHL in favor of claimants would work to the benefit 
of Indigenous Peoples in relation to the restitution of their cultural property if 
applied to IHRL to flesh out the details of Article 11 and any future treaty right.  
In particular, this IHL regime of restitution on the heels of the Second World 
War is also potentially helpful for Indigenous Peoples in relation to the 
aforementioned issue of overcoming the hurdle of inter-temporal law without 
                                                 
68 Dep’t St. Bull., supra n. 65. 
69 Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution, supra n. 65, at 26 [citation omitted]. 
70 Id. at 26 [citations omitted]. 
71 Id. at 26-7 [citations omitted]. 
72 Id. at 27 [citations omitted]. 
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resort to linkages with self-determination as by its very nature this regime was 
retroactive73 and applied to transfers regardless of the apparent legality of the 
transaction at the time.  Specifically, in creating this restitution scheme Allied 
governments recognized that the confiscation of property was part and parcel of 
the program of persecution of groups and incorporated into domestic law as a 
mean of legitimization.  Therefore, regardless of the lex loci, the laws they laid 
down in relation to restitution of cultural property noted that it was not 
permissible “to plead that an act was not wrongful or contra bonos mores because it 
conformed with a prevailing ideology concerning discrimination against 
individuals’ belonging to particular groups.”74  In turn, these principles of this 
post-Second World War scheme for the restitution of cultural property could 
prove significant not only in fleshing out the details of such a scheme for 
restitution to Indigenous Peoples in IHRL at Article 11 of the Declaration and 
beyond; but also prove important in overcoming the hurdle of inter-temporal 
law faced by Indigenous Peoples in their quest for restitution under IHRL 
without resort to linkages with self-determination thereby reducing the irony 
associated with the use of self-determination by Indigenous Peoples.  However, 
the issue with this approach lies in the fact that these principles however helpful 
are precedents that exist within the context of IHL rather than IHRL and that 
the removal of indigenous cultural property under discussion herein did not 
occur in the situation of armed conflict. 
 
Regarding the concept of the doctrine of continuing violations in IHRL, it serves 
as an exception to the rule of non-retroactivity allowing the admission of claims 
otherwise inadmissible ratione temporis that could also potentially overcome the 
hurdle of inter-temporal law without resort to linkages with self-determination.  
                                                 
73 This is not the only example of a retroactive application of the law in IHL in relation to the restitution of 
cultural property.  UN Security Council Resolution 1483 which was passed in response to the invasion of Iraq in 
2003 required member states to return cultural property illegally removed from Iraq not only from 2003 onwards 
but since 6 August 1990, the date of the first invasion of Iraq.  See Security Council Resolution 1483, P7, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003).  
74 Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution, supra n. 65, at 26 [citations omitted]. 
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Arguably it has its roots in an evolutionary approach to inter-temporality.  In the 
aforementioned Island of Palmas Case, Judge Huber of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration noted “a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law 
contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in 
regard to it arises or falls to be settled.”75  Yet he continued in the particular case 
to note that regarding sovereignty over the Palmas Islands that at the time it was 
based upon the rule of discovery but that the maintenance of sovereignty 
depended on how the law and fact evolved.  In essence, he took an evolutionary 
approach to the rule of inter-temporality allowing in this particular case for the 
original title to divest based on legal developments.76  Despite some suggestion 
that this “extension” of the rule of inter-temporality has not been followed,77 this 
evolutionary approach was also taken in subsequent cases such as Advisory 
Opinion on Namibia concerning the mandate over South-West Africa noting that 
“an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the 
framework of the entire legal statement prevailing at the time of 
interpretation.”78  Further, the Institute de Droit International adopted a 
resolution in 1975 on inter-temporality in public international law serving as the 
foundation of the doctrine of continuing violations.79  In essence, it provides 
that the legality or the illegality of an historical act must be judged according to 
the law in force at the time but that the continuing effects of these events can be 
judged by more recent standards.80  In turn, continuing violations operate in a 
situation where the alleged violation of a right took place before the relevant 
treaty entered into force.  Continuing violations allow for consideration of the 
alleged violation where it has or continues to have effects after the treaty enters 
into force thereby overcoming its non-retroactivity.  
                                                 
75 U.S. v Neth., supra n. 52, at 845. 
76 See Dinah Shelton, The Present Value of Past Wrongs, 47-72 at 62 in F. Lenzerini supra n. 51. 
77 See Anthony D’Amato, International Law, Intertemporal Problems in Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
1236 (1992). 
78 Legal Consequence for the States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, (1971) ICJ Rep. 16 reprinted in Shelton, supra n. 76 at 63. 
79 The Inter-temporal Problem in Public international Law, Resolution adopted by the Institut de Droit at its 
Wiesbaden Session’ (1975) 56 Ann. De l’Institute de Droit International 537. 
80 Shelton, supra n. 76 at 63. 
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Indeed Indigenous Peoples and their advocates have highlighted the need for the 
concept to continuing violations in light of the non-retroactivity of human rights 
law and made use of it for their benefit.  In The Case of the Moiwana Vs. Suriname 
Community ,81 the concept of continuing violations had to be utilized as Suriname 
did not recognize the jurisdiction of the by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights [IACtHR] until November 1987 and the alleged incident under 
consideration took place in November 1986.  At issue was a military operation 
carried out by the State in the village of the Moiwana where 39 unarmed 
members of the community were killed.  The IACtHR held that it did not have 
jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the events of this armed attack in 
November 1986 but that it did possess jurisdiction through the concept of 
continuing violations to examine just that; the effects which continued to exist in 
the community of the Moiwana and of course events which occurred after 
Suriname recognized jurisdiction.82  Specifically, the court found that the forced 
displacement of the community from their lands was a continuing violation as 
they could not return and in turn linked this internal displacement with 
violations of the American Convention on Human Rights [ACHR] including the 
right to personal integrity, the right to private property, freedom of movement 
and residence, the right to a fair trial and the right to judicial protection.83  In 
turn, the concept of continuing violations was the key to finding state liability.  
Of particular interest, the court found through this concept the Article 5 right of 
personal integrity and Article 21 right to property which continued to affect the 
rights of the Moiwana as they could not return to their traditional lands84 and 
                                                 
81 Caso de la Comunidad Moiwana Vs. Suriname. Execepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. 
Judgment of June 15, 2005.   
82 Id. at para. 39. 
83 Mauricio Iván Del Toro Huerta,  The Contributions of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to 
the Configuration of Collective Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 10 at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/sela/
Del_Toro.pdf 
84 Although the Moiwana lacked a written title to their property the court found that this did not preclude their 
ownership as possession of the land would be sufficient. Moiwana, supra n. 81 at para. 131 and 134.  In doing so 
the court took an evolutionary approach to the concept of property to include indigenous understandings. See 
infra Section II(A) (discussing IACtHRs approach to  property). 
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they could not properly bury their dead relatives which would negatively 
continue to impact their emotion, psychological, spiritual and economic well-
being.85  Further, within the specific context of the restitution of the cultural 
property and human remains Indigenous Peoples have highlighted the need for 
the concept to continuing violations in light of the non-retroactivity of human 
rights law.  Prior to the adoption of the Human Tissue Act 2004 in the UK, 
which is legislation that is explicitly retroactive in the same vein as NAGPRA, 
that allows for [but does not compel] the restitution of human remains to 
Indigenous Peoples,86 it was recognized by indigenous advocates that under 
existing human rights law such as the HRA that the date of acquisition of human 
remains was a highly unlikely route to follow since museums would have had 
such remains in their collection for many years.  In turn, Kevin Chamberlain and 
the Working Group on Human Remains argued that the retention of human 
remains at a museum is an offense which continued to violate the community’s 
right every day that the remains are kept from their rightful resting place.  In 
essence, the retention of human remains presents a continuing violation and so 
time would begin to run when a request for return is made and refused thereby 
overcoming the issue of non-retroactivity.87  
                                                 
85 Moiwana supra n. 81, at paras. 93-7, 100 and 103.  
86 Section 47 allows a select group of nine museums to de-accession human remains from their collections 
provided that they are less than 1,000 years old when the legislation comes into force.  However, it does not 
require this return. See Human Tissue Act 2004, c. 30 Part 3 Miscellaneous Section 47.  In this way, the Human 
Tissue Act does not go as far as Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act [NAGPRA] which 
compels the restitution of human remains.  Indeed as aforementioned in the Introduction this underpins the 
decision to use NAGPRA for the point of comparison in this thesis. See Introduction at ns. 36-43 and 
accompanying text.  Interestingly, this stems from the fact that unlike NAGPRA the UK legislation was less 
willingly to alter private property principles and thereby does not have the same reach as NAGPRA confirming 
the importance of decoupling traditional property principles for restitution. See Chapter 4 at Section II(B) and (C) 
(discussing decoupling traditional property concepts from human remains to secure restitution).  Indeed, as the 
Report of the British Governments’ Working Group on Human Remains noted, only very compelling reasons 
would allow for the return of an artefact or the museums’ property and in the case of return compensation would 
have to be paid in order to avoid breaching the human right to property.  Norman Palmer and James Dowling, 
The Report of the Working Group on Human Remains, British Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2003/2007 
159 at para. 395 provisions as paraphrased by Karolina Kuprecht, Human Rights Aspects of Indigenous Cultural 
Property Repatriation, Working Paper No. 2009/34, NCCR Trade Regulation, Swiss National Centre of 
Competence in Research, 23 (2009), at http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd
=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphase1.nccrtrade.org%2Fimages%2Fstories%2Fpublications%2
FIP7%2FWorking%2520Paper%2520Kuprecht%252023062009.pdf&ei=fGz4VPHICe2t7AbFvICwDw&usg=A
FQjCNGjphJMl2XBTqLeKrgSBzqPsAFTvw&bvm=bv.87519884,d.ZGU.  
87 K Chamberlain, We Need to Lay Our Ancestors to Rest – The Repatriation of  Indigenous Human Remains and the Human 
Rights Act, at 337. 
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However, continuing violations does not provide a secure method to overcome 
non-retroactivity.  In particular, continuing violations would be on shaky 
grounds in securing non-retroactivity in relation to cases of restitution rooted in 
cultural renewal.  Yet, even beyond situations regarding renewal, continuing 
violations remains a tenuous tool as the jurisprudence of the HRC in relation to 
continuing violations demonstrates that it is unclear.  The HRC explicated upon 
the concept of continuing violations as an exception to the rule of ratione temporis 
in Könye and Könye v. Hungary88 where the complainant alleged a violation before 
the date of entry into force of the Optional Protocol in Hungary in December 
1988.  Specifically, the complainants alleged that the state expropriated property 
prior to 1988 but that the failure of the state to compensate them for this 
expropriation served as a continuing violation of the Article 17 right to privacy 
within the family home and further that the rejection of their request for a new 
compensation hearing after 1988 also violated Article 14 as this rejection was not 
a public hearing.  Although the HRC rejected the assertion that this constituted a 
continuing violation regarding Article 17, the Committee laid out its test to 
determine such a violation offering that it must “be interpreted as an affirmation, 
after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol, by act or by clear implication, 
of the previous violations of the State party.”89  It is suggested that at least this 
test of affirmation is unhelpful as it means that it prevents admissibility where 
the continuing effects of a violation carry on without exacerbation of the 
situation by the state of those violations after entry into force of the Optional 
Protocol.90  In turn, on this logic Lovelace,91 who after her divorce in 1980 
complained of the loss of her Maliseet Indian status under the Indian Act in 
1970 when she married a non-Indian man, could also have been inadmissible on 
                                                 
88 Könye v. Hungary, Communication No. 520/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/520/1992 (1994). 
89 Id. at para. 6.4. 
90 S. Joseph et. al., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary 
61 (2nd ed. 2005).  
91 See supra Chapter 3 at ns. 230-41 and accompanying text (discussing Lovelace in another context: that of the 
Article 27 right to culture).  
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the affirmation test as the Canada did not exacerbate the situation after entry 
into force of the Optional Protocol in 1976;92 and yet the HRC came to the 
conclusion that Lovelace’s complaint regarding the Indian Act and its denial of 
her status had continuing effects including cultural benefits of living in a 
community, emotional ties to home and family and loss of identity93 and so was 
admissible ratione temporis.  
 
The Committee considers that the essence of the present complaint concerns 
the continuing effect of the Indian Act, in denying Sandra Lovelace legal 
status as an Indian, in particular because she cannot for this reason claim a 
legal right to reside where she wishes to, on the Tobique Reserve.  This fact 
persists after entry into force of the Covenant, and its effects have to be 
examined, without regard to their original cause.94 
 
Nonetheless, ICCPR Commentary offers that in Könye the act of expropriation 
was completed wholly prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol 
while in Lovelace banishment from her community was not completed before the 
Optional Protocol.95  
 
However, further issues with the continuing violations exist aside from this test 
that places it on shaky grounds.  In J.L. v Australia,96 the complaint was a 
solicitor who refused to pay the annual fee require by the Law Institute of 
Victoria on the grounds that he considered recent fee increases invalid.  Yet, he 
continued to practice law without a certificate denied to him by the Institute on 
the grounds of this refusal of payment.  Further, at the request of the Institute 
the Supreme Court of Victoria fined him, struck him of the roll of barristers and 
solicitors and ordered that he be imprisoned for contempt of court.  The 
complaint alleged a violation of Article 14 proceedings before an independent 
                                                 
92 S. Joseph et. al., supra n. 90, at 61. 
93 Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R.6/24 (29 December 1977), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/36/40) (1981) at para. 5. 
94 Id. at para. 13.1. 
95 S. Joseph et. al., supra n. 90 at 61. 
96 J.L. v. Australia, Communication No. 491/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/45/D/491/1992 (1994).  
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and impartial tribunal; though the alleged violations took place before entry into 
force of the Optional Protocol for Australia in 1991 he argued that they had 
continuing effects.  The HRC agreed and noted that although the denial of an 
impartial and fair hearing took place before 1991 “the effects of the decision 
taken by the Supreme Court continue until the present time.  Accordingly, 
complaints about violations of the author’s rights allegedly ensuing from these 
decisions are not in principle excluded.”97  By contrast, in Kurowski v Poland 98 the 
HRC found that the complaint was inadmissible ratione temporis.  Here, the 
complainant alleged a violation of Article 25 of the ICCPR which offers that 
right to have access on terms of equality to public service in the country of the 
individual.  Specifically, the complainant was dismissed from his public service 
position allegedly on the grounds of political persecution as a result of his 
affiliation with the Polish United Workers’ Party and leftist views but as the 
dismissal took place in 1990 before entry into force of the Optional Protocol for 
Poland in 1991 the HRC found it inadmissible.  As the ICCPR Commentary 
notes, it is difficult to discern the distinction between these two cases where in 
the former striking off the roll of solicitors was considered admissible as a 
continuing violation and in the later dismissal as a public servant was not 
considered as such; at best it is suggested that striking off continues to deny an 
individual access to their livelihood whereas  dismissal form a public service job 
does not preclude an individual from seeking another public service job.99  
 
However, if this is splitting hairs, then in the following cases the difference in 
which side of the line the decisions fall in relation to continuing violations is 
almost imperceptible.  In contrast to Kurowski, in Aduayom et al v Tongo,100 the 
complaint was considered admissible despite the factual similarity.  Here, the 
                                                 
97 Id. at para. 4.2. 
98 Mr. Eugeniusz Kurowski v. Poland, Communication No. 872/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/872/1999 (2003). 
99 S. Joseph et. al., supra n. 90, at 62. 
100 Aduayom et al. v. Togo, Communications Nos. 422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990 (1996). 
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complainants like Kurowski also alleged that their dismissal from civil service 
was the result of political persecution and again, the alleged violation took place 
before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol respectively 1985 and 1988.  
Yet, the HRC unlike Kurowski in found the case admissible noting that  
 
…the alleged violations had continuing effect after the entry into force of the 
Optional Protocol for Togo, in that the authors were denied reinstatement in 
their posts until … 1991 … and that no payment of salary arrears or other 
forms of compensation had been affected.  The Committee considered that 
these continuing effects could be seen as an affirmation of the previous 
violations allegedly committed by the State party.  It therefore concluded that 
it was not precluded ratione temporis from examining the communications…  
 
As the ICCPR Commentary notes, it is extremely difficult to locate a distinction 
between these two cases which deems the former inadmissible and the later 
admissible; it is offered that a possible difference could lie in that the alleged 
political persecution in the later was more clear but the perceived merits of a 
complaint are not the grounds on which it is deemed inadmissible ratione 
temporis.101  In turn, after Kurowski the line between continuing and non-
continuing violations is ambiguous at best.   
 
Of course by its nature, the remedial aspect of self-determination is arguably also 
on shaky grounds given its association with sovereignty as sovereignty is the 
context in which the remedies of self-determination are developed thus Anaya 
offers:  
 
…ideally self-determination and sovereignty principles will work in tandem to 
promote a peaceful, stable, and humane world.  But where there is a violation 
of self-determination and human rights, presumptions in favour of territorial 
integrity or political unity of existing states may be offset to the extent 
required by an appropriate remedy.102  
 
                                                 
101 S. Joseph et. al., supra n. 90, at 63. 
102 Anaya, supra n. 18, at 109.  In turn, casting sovereignty in the best possible light is an essential prerequisite to 
the success of a remedial self-determination for Anaya.   
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Indeed, this association with sovereignty goes to the crux of the irony associated 
with the use of self-determination by Indigenous Peoples in the context of the 
restitution of cultural property.  The retrogression of Article 11 was not simply 
fuelled by its contextualization as a cultural right but was further underpinned in 
part by the continuing concerns on the part of states over its specific links with 
the concept of self-determination which in turn was ultimately rooted in 
concerns over sovereignty; yet simultaneously this association with remedial self-
determination still serves as an important arrow albeit it a fragile arrow in the 
arsenal of Indigenous Peoples in their quest for the restitution of cultural 
property.  In sum, linking self-determination with the restitution of cultural 
property both makes it meaningful by offering the possibility of a retroactive 
operationalizing, while simultaneous this maximizing approach worked to its 
determinate by securing its demise as a sui generis right; ultimately demonstrating 
an irony of contradiction in its usage by indigenous advocates particular to the 
issue of the issue of the restitution of cultural property. 
 
II. Rethinking the Macro:  A Dialogical Space, A Subtle Irony  
 
However, it is not gloom and doom; the structural incapacity of IHRL rooted in 
sovereignty is not a fatal flaw to indigenous advocacy to secure a right to the 
restitution of cultural property.  Resistance to norms and laws at both the 
international and the domestic level wax and wane over time as sovereign 
opposition diminishes and even vanishes resulting in the constant evolution of 
new norms and laws.  At the domestic level this change is expressed ideally 
through the will of the people and percolates into the international resulting in 
the development of new treaties and customary international law.  As Professor 
Prott notes, “ethical principles alter with changing attitudes in a community.  
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Since the law formalizes these principles and turns them into rules, changing 
attitudes often foreshadow changes in the law.”103   
 
Nevertheless beyond the diminution and even extinction of sovereign 
opposition to particular norms and laws which allow for their evolution, the 
international legal project104 itself offers a nuanced space for development which 
suggests that ultimately IHRL is not without its merits as a forum for indigenous 
advocacy.105  Specifically, despite the structural incapacity of IHRL in particular 
to provide for a right to the restitution of cultural property for Indigenous 
Peoples, and the irony that its use has produced in relation to the issue of 
restitution, the international legal project provides an important dialogical space 
to explore the grievances and demands of Indigenous Peoples through the 
judgments of international courts.  This is precisely because from the outset they 
do not implicate the sovereign will of the state in the same fashion as customary 
international law and treaties as states do not negotiate, draft and ultimately pen 
the judgments of international courts.  As one such court, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights [IACtHR],   recognized in the context of indigenous 
property rights under discussion below:   
 
…[T]he Court cannot decide that the right to traditional property of the 
members of the Sawhoyamaxa community is above the right to private 
property of the actual owners or vice versa, since the Court is not a court of 
domestic law which resolves controversies between individuals.  That work 
exclusively belongs to the State of Paraguay.  Nevertheless, the Tribunal is 
competent to analyze if the State guaranteed or not the human rights of the 
members of the Sawhoyamaxa community.106  
 
Indeed this provides an important distinction.  Although for treaties, customary 
international law and international judgments their remains an enforcement 
                                                 
103 Lyndel Prott, The Ethics and Law of Returns, 61 Museum International 101,103 (2009). 
104 See supra ns. 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing the international legal project). 
105 See infra Chapter 7Post Script (discussing the future of indigenous advocacy).  
106 Caso Comunidad Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay, Judgement of 29 March 2006, Ser. C No. 146 at para. 136.  
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obligation,107 the distinction between the processes that result in the former as 
opposed to the later provides an important buffer that does not implicate the 
sovereign will of the state.  After all, as Professor Allen notes: 
 
[w]hile States remain major actors within international institutions, 
institutions often have independent executive bodies with agendas separate 
from those of their State members; and where multilateral human rights 
treaties exist, monitoring or adjective bodies often perceive their empowering 
treaties as living instruments and their jurisprudence appears to develop in 
quite a different direction to the one foreseeable to States parties when 
ratification occurred.108 
 
Ultimately, this dialogical space flows from another and more subtle form of 
irony than that explored above and as applied in particular to the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property.  Indeed, Glenn also discusses another and more 
subtle form of irony beyond that in traditional sense of contradiction or 
dissemblance.  He offers it is also possible to understand irony as:  
 
…placing statements in relation to some kind of other ‘truth’ and therefore 
interrogating each truth by juxtapositioning it with another.  This 
understanding of irony assumes the commensurability of the truth involved, 
as well as the need for mutual interrogation and the possibility of mutual 
influence.  Irony here would be both a means of understanding and a check 
on fundamentalist or apodictic understanding of given texts or sources of 
law.  This form of irony, more than the first,109 is to be welcomed in an age of 
interdependence.  It teaches the need for mutual understanding and broadly-
based normative support.110 
 
In turn, on this understanding of irony the broader international legal project 
acts as a dialogical space where Indigenous Peoples and states can interact and 
engage in conversation aimed at generating normative support for the rights of 
the former.  Yet even though this space has not generated an indigenous 
understanding of the truth in relation to the restitution of cultural property in the 
Declaration as demonstrated by this thesis, the international legal project has 
                                                 
107 See infra Section II(D)(b) (discussing enforcement issues). 
108 Allen, supra n. 19, at 245.  
109 See supra Section I(B) (discussing first form of irony, irony as contradiction).  
110 Glenn, supra n. 24, at 172. 
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acted as a dialogical space offering an indigenous version of the truth in relation 
to the restitution of land as evidenced by the international judgments of the 
IACtHR.  
 
A. The Restitution of Land to Indigenous Peoples and The 
Judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
[IACtHR]   
 
The restitution of land has been explored in detail by the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights [IACtHR].  Beyond Article 27, the IACtHR considered the 
norm of cultural integrity in the groundbreaking case of Awas Tingni Mayagna 
(Sumo) Indigenous Community v. Nicaragua.111  This case involved concessions by the 
Nicaraguan Ministry of the Environment to Sol del Caribe, S.A. [SOLCARSA], a 
subsidiary of the Korean company Kumkyung Co. Ltd., for logging in forests in 
lands traditionally owned by the Awas Tingni without consultation.  The 
complainants alleged violations of provisions in both the Nicaraguan 
Constitution and international law; at the crux of their complaint was the failure 
of Nicaragua to recognize and protect the lands that the Awas Tingni 
traditionally occupied.  Ultimately, the IACtHRs ruled that Nicaragua violated 
the Article 25 right to judicial protection and the Article 21 right to property in 
the American Convention on Human Rights.  As Engle notes, the Inter-
American system eventually developed its own rubric for protecting indigenous 
culture [and by extension cultural integrity] outside of Article 27 through the 
right to property thereby eliminating the need for a separate right.112   
 
As regards the right to property, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights [IACHR] on behalf of the Awas Tingni argued that the concessions 
                                                 
111 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of  August 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. 
C) No. 79 (2001). 
112 Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of  Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy 126 (2010).  
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endangered amongst other things the cultural integrity of the community and 
therefore was a violation of the right to property.113  The court accepted the link 
between culture and the norm of cultural integrity to land and the right to 
property and in particular the right to property on an indigenous understanding 
as communal property explaining that,  
 
[...] Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition regarding a 
communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense that 
ownership of the land is not centered on an individual but rather on the 
group and its community.  Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very 
existence, have the right to live freely in their own territory; the close ties of 
indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood as the 
fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their 
economic survival.  For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not 
merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual 
element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy 
and transmit it to future generations.  
[...]  
Indigenous peoples’ customary law must be especially taken into account for 
the purpose of this analysis.  As a result of customary practices, possession of 
the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to 
property of the land to obtain official recognition of that property, and for 
consequent registration.114 
 
In turn, the State had an obligation to delimit, demarcate and issue titles to the 
community in accordance with their customary law and indigenous values, uses 
and customs as well as to abstain from granting further concessions and to 
provide reparations.115  Ultimately this was achieved “[t]hrough an evolutionary 
interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human 
rights…”116  As Professor Engle notes, this decision is significant as it pushes the 
envelope by accepting that the right to property to includes the protection and 
restitution of the communal property of Indigenous Peoples.117   
 
                                                 
113 Awas Tingni, supra n. 111, at para. 140(k). 
114 Id. at paras. 149 and 151. 
115 Id. at paras. 150-5. 
116 Id. at para. 148. These international instruments mentioned included the ILO Convention 169, the UN Draft 
Declaration and  the Organization of  American States (OAS) Proposed Declaration on the rights of  Indigenous 
Peoples. Id. at para 83(d).  
117 Engle, Elusive Promise, supra n. 112, at 131. 
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Subsequent decisions of the IACtHR have confirmed its use of the right to 
property as a tool to secure indigenous culture and identity and in particular a 
right to communal property and eventually reparations for violations of this right 
including restitution.  As a result of social marginalization and extreme poverty 
Indigenous Peoples in both Case Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa v Paraguay118 and 
Case Comunidad Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay,119 were internally displaced from their 
traditional lands.120  In each case, the central question focused on their right to 
return to their traditional lands and the necessity of this return as a condition for 
life and the preservation of the cultural identity of Indigenous Peoples within the 
context of a delayed return to ancestral lands.121   
 
In Yakye Axa, amongst other violations including the right to life, the right to a 
fair trial, the right to judicial guarantees in relation to the obligation to respect 
rights and domestic legal effect122, the IACtHR found a violation of Article 21123 
right to property again enshrined in the American Convention on Human Rights 
as in Awas Tingni.  Here the court noted: 
 
…the special importance of the land for indigenous people in general and for the Yakye 
Axa community  in particular, that determines that any act concretely denying 
territorial rights violates values especially relevant for these peoples, who risk 
to lose or to suffer irreparable damages to their lives, cultural identity and 
cultural heritage which shall be transmitted to future generations.124  
 
Aside from the link between land and cultural identity and heritage which was of 
importance in finding a violation of the right to property, of importance as well 
was the broader indigenous conception of culture generally which    
 
                                                 
118 See Caso Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa v Paraguay, Judgement of  17 June 2005, Ser. C No 125. 
119 See Sawhoyamaxa, supra n. 106.  
120 Mauricio Iván Del Toro Huerta, supra n. 83, at 11.  
121 Id.  
122 See Yakye Axa, supra n. 118, at paras. 1-4. 
123 Id. at paras. 124 and 131-156 (finding a violation of  the Article 21 right to property). 
124 Id. at para. 203 (emphasis added).   
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…corresponds to a particular form of life of being, seeing, and acting in the 
world, constituted through their close relationship with their traditional lands 
and the resources that are found therein, not only since these are their 
primary means of subsistence, but also because they constitute an integral 
element of their cosmic vision, religion, and, therefore, of their cultural 
identity.125  
 
Further, of significance again was recognition that their understanding of 
property does not necessarily correspond to classical Western conceptions of 
property in terms of ideas regarding possession and control; yet this 
understanding is equally as deserving of the equal protection of the law and that 
failure to protect such an understanding would make the Article 21 right to 
property “illusory for millions of people.”126  Ultimately, it again rooted this 
communal understanding of property in a right traditionally understood as one 
of private property in the notion that international human rights instruments are 
living documents whose interpretation must evolve to reflect the actual lives of 
peoples; thus utilizing an evolutionary method of the interpretation of IHRL.  
 
However and most notably, in this evolutionary approach the court made 
reference to the notion that it should consider broader IHRL in interpreting 
Article 21 and in particular made reference to ILO Convention No. 169 as 
evidence to support the interpretation that Article 21 includes a communal right 
to property.127  In essence, the court purposively sought to extend its connection 
between the protection of culture and specifically land under the rubric of the 
regional right to property included in Article 21 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights to other obligations under the broader IHRL regime, in this case 
ILO Convention No. 169 to which Paraguay is party.  Finally, the Article 24 
right to equal protection and Article 1(1) obligation to respect rights required 
that in interpreting the rights in the American Convention that “States should 
take into consideration the typical characteristics that differentiate members of 
                                                 
125 Id. at paras. 131 and 135. 
126 Id. at para. 120. 
127 Id. at paras. 124, 126-30. 
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indigenous peoples from the population in general and in conformity with their 
cultural identity.”128    
 
Recognizing the creation of a potential conflict between these two different 
conceptions of property and that the communal property may require restitution, 
the court emphasized the traditional guidelines for establishing a restriction to 
the exercise and enjoyment of any human right including: that it should be 
established by law, it should be necessary, it should be proportionate, and it 
should be made with the purpose of achieving a legitimate objective in a 
democratic society.129  In turn, every claim should be assessed on a case by case 
basis taking care to make note of the above considerations regarding the 
importance of land to Indigenous Peoples.  In particular, the court noted that  
 
States should take into account that indigenous territorial rights embrace a 
broader and different concept that is related to the collective right to the 
survival as an organized people, with control of their habitat as a necessary 
condition for the reproduction of their culture, for their own development 
and in order to carry out their life plans.  Ownership over land guarantees 
that the members of the indigenous community preserve their cultural 
heritage.130 
 
When restitution is required an indemnity would be required.131  However, the 
court was careful to note that the interests of Indigenous Peoples do not always 
prevail over those of the state and individuals as sometime the individual private 
right to property will prevail.132  In such a case, the compensation to Indigenous 
Peoples should reflect “the meaning the land has for them.”133  Here, Paraguay 
was required to delimit and demarcate the ancestral lands of the Yakye Axa and 
issue titles of collective property for no compensation.134   
                                                 
128 Id. at para. 151. 
129 Id. at para. 145.   
130 Id. at para. 146.  
131 Id. at paras. 147-8. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at para. 149. 
134 Id. at paras. 211-8. 
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Similarly in Case Comunidad Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay,135 the IACtHR again found a 
violation of a number of rights including the obligation to respect rights, the 
right to life and the Article 21 right to property; the latter again based on again 
the recognition that this right includes protection for both individual private 
property and communal property136 which entails the adoption of special 
measures to ensure for  “the members of indigenous and tribal peoples the full 
and equal exercise of the right to the territories that they have traditionally used 
and occupied.”137  Again, it was rooted in an understanding that 
 
[t]he close ties of indigenous peoples with the land must be recognised and 
understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their 
integrity, and their economic survival.  For indigenous communities, their 
relationship with the land is not merely a matter of possession and 
production but a material and spiritual element, which they must fully enjoy 
to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.138 
 
Moreover, it again applied an evolutionary method of interpretation and made 
reference to ILO Convention No. 169 for support of this communal 
understanding of property in Article 21.139  Most importantly, for the first time 
the court also explicitly linked this understanding of culture to include 
reparations containing for the first time a chapter entitled ‘devolution of 
traditional lands’ in its consideration of the adequate measures for reparations.140  
Based on the violation of Article 21 the court provided that,  
 
In view of its conclusions contained in the chapter related to Article 21 of the 
American Convention (supra para. 144), the Court considers that the 
restitution of traditional lands to the members of the Sawhoyamaxa 
Community is the reparation measure that best complies with the restitutio in 
                                                 
135 Sawhoyamaxa, supra n. 106. 
136 Id. at para. 89. 
137 Id. at para. 91. 
138 Id. at para. 90. 
139 Id. at para. 117. 
140 Gabriella Citroni and Karla I. Quintana Osuna, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples in the Case Law of  the Inter-
American Court of  Human Rights  in F. Lenzerini, supra n. 51 at 337 (noting generally that this was the first time the 
court included a chapter on reparations). 
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integrum principle, therefore the Court orders that the State shall adopt all 
legislative, administrative or other type of measures necessary to guarantee 
the members of the Community ownership rights over their traditional lands, 
and consequently the right to use and enjoy those lands.141 
 
In relation to this restitution of land, the court noted that the right to restitution 
was not time bound due to the unique relationship between Indigenous Peoples’ 
and their traditional lands noting: “while that relationship exists, the right to 
reclamation will remain valid, otherwise, it will be extinguished.”142  However, 
the court was careful to note that the possession of land by Indigenous Peoples 
was not a prerequisite for official recognition of ownership and thereby 
restitution.  
 
[I]t is concluded that: 1) the traditional possession of the indigenous over 
their lands has an effect equivalent to a title of full control granted by the 
State; 2) traditional possession grants the right to the indigenous to demand 
official recognition of ownership and registration; 3) the members of 
indigenous peoples that, due to causes unconnected to their own volition, 
have left or lost the possession of their traditional lands maintain the right to 
property over the same, despite the lack of a legal title, except when the lands 
have been legitimately transferred to third parties in good faith; and 4) the 
members of the indigenous peoples that involuntarily have lost the 
possession of their lands, and which have been legitimately transferred to 
innocent third-parties, have the right to recover them or to obtain other lands 
of equal size and quality.  Consequently, possession is not a requirement on 
which is conditioned the right to recovery of indigenous lands.  The present 
case is classified within the last assumption.143 
 
In turn, the court gave wide scope to its view of a contextual right to restitution 
of land that it developed paving the way for a retroactive application. 
 
In addition, the Case of Pueblo Saramaka Vs Suriname144 which involved mining 
concessions granted by Suriname on land possessed by the Saramaka without 
their full and effective consultation marks an important shift.  The IACtHR 
again found a violation of Article 21 making reference to its previous decision in 
                                                 
141 Sawhoyamaxa, supra n. 106, at para. 210.  
142 Id. at 131. 
143 Id. at paras. 211-8. 
144 Caso del Pueblo Saramaka Vs Suriname, Judgment of  28 November 2007 Ser. C No. 172.  
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this respect that it “has consistently held that ‘the close ties the members of 
indigenous communities have with their traditional lands and the natural 
resources associated with their culture thereof, as well as the incorporeal 
elements deriving there from, must be secured under article 21.’”145  In turn, it 
again found that to protect this communal right to property the state had a 
responsibility to take special measures “to guarantee to the members of 
indigenous and tribal peoples the full and equal exercise of the right to the 
territories that they have traditionally used and occupied.”146  These measures 
include delimiting and demarcating the lands of the Saramaka peoples and 
issuing titles of collective property in accordance with their customary law. 
 
However, of particular importance here is the interpretation of Article 21.  
Previously, the court took an evolutionary approach to interpretation noting that 
it should consider broader IHRL in interpreting Article 21 and in particular 
made reference to ILO Convention No. 169 as evidence to support the view 
that Article 21 includes a communal right to property which can require 
restitution.  As aforementioned, this resulted in a purposeful extension of the 
connection between the protection of culture and specifically land under the 
rubric of the regional right to property included in Article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights to other obligations under the broader IHRL 
regime, in particular ILO Convention No. 169.  Here the court extended this 
connection more broadly into IHRL through the use of systemic interpretation 
techniques.147  The need for these techniques arose as a result of the fact that 
Suriname had not ratified ILO Convention No. 169 and its domestic legislation 
did not recognize a communal right to property.  In turn, the court engaged in a 
broad systemic interpretation to overcome this hurdle.148  Specifically, the court 
                                                 
145 Id. at para. 188. 
146 Id. at para. 91. 
147 Marcos A. Orellana, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, International Decisions, 102 American Journal 
of  International Law 841, 843 (2008) (identifying generally the use of  systemic interpretation). 
148 Id. 
321 
 
made reference to common Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the CESCR on 
self-determination which again provides that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-
determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” and the 
observations of the HRC regarding Article 27 of the ICCPR that “minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture [, which] may consist in a way of life which is 
closely associated with territory and use of its resources.  This may particularly 
be true of members of indigenous communities constituting a minority”  In turn,  
the court used these articles as the basis to support and interpretation of Article 
21 to find that Suriname had an obligation to protect the communal right to 
property of the Saramaka peoples in accordance with their communal 
traditions.149   
 
The above analysis supports an interpretation of Article 21 of the American 
Convention to the effect of calling for the right of members of indigenous and 
tribal communities to freely determine and enjoy their own social, cultural and 
economic development, which includes the right to enjoy their particular 
spiritual relationship with the territory they have traditionally used and 
occupied.  Thus, in the present case, the right to property protected under 
Article 21 of the American Convention, interpreted in light of the rights 
recognized under common Article 1 and Article 27 of the ICCPR, which may 
not be restricted when interpreting the American Convention, grants to the 
members of the Saramaka community the right to enjoy property in 
accordance with their communal tradition. 
 
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the present case, the Court thus 
concludes that the members of the Saramaka people make up a tribal 
community protected by international human rights law that secures the right 
to the communal territory they have traditionally used and occupied, derived 
from their longstanding use and occupation of the land and resources 
necessary for their physical and cultural survival, and that the State has an 
obligation to adopt special measures to recognize, respect, protect and 
guarantee the communal property right of the members of the Saramaka 
community to said territory.150 
 
                                                 
149 Saramaka, supra n. 144, at paras. 94-5. 
150 Id. at paras. 95-6. 
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However, the court still recognized that this right to property is not absolute and 
could be subject to limitations in law151 and therefore should not be read in every 
case to prevent the “granting [of] any type of concession for the exploration and 
extraction of natural resources within Saramaka territory.”152  
 
In its most recent pronouncement in June 2012 in Caso Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de 
Sarayaku vs. Ecuador, the IACtHR did not explicitly mention Article 1 and Article 
27 though it again found a violation of Article 21 right to property amongst 
others and importantly continued to support a communal understanding of the 
right to property and to provide restitution.153  Here the IACtHR ruled that 
Ecuador violated the rights of the Sarayaku people by granting oil concessions 
on their traditional lands without consultation.  In reaching this determination, 
the court for the first time in its history travelled to the site of the alleged 
violations in order to conduct its proceedings with the consent of both the state 
and alleged victims.154  In particular, the court found violations of the rights to a 
fair trial155 and judicial remedy156 in light of irregularities in issuing a writ of amparo 
and the failure to carry out effective investigations as well as violations of the 
rights to life and physical integrity in relation to the failure to fulfil the obligation 
to guarantee communal property by the placing of explosives on the land of the 
Sarayaku;157 and finally the court found a violation of the Article 21 right to 
property.158   
 
                                                 
151 Id. at paras. 127-8. 
152 Id. at para. 126.   
153 See Caso Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku Vs. Ecuador Fondo y reparaciones, Judgement of  27 June 2012, Ser. C 
No. 245. 
154 Id. at para. 21. This examination of more than evidence in writing and making a trip into the field to examine 
the land in question before awarding restitution is significant given the aforementioned discussion of the 
procedural limits of IHRL which at least complement that of sovereignty in securing the structural incapacity of 
IHRL to provide for the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples as a matter of right.  See supra ns. 
11-13 and accompanying text (discussing procedural issues).   
155 Sarayaku, supra n. 153, at para. 278. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. at para. 249.  
158 Id. at para. 232. 
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Specifically, the court held that the state has an obligation under both its 
domestic law and international law to consult the Sarayaku concerning projects 
that would affect their territory, their cultural and social life, their rights to 
communal property and to cultural identity.159  By failing to make such 
consultations with the Sarayaku, Ecuador specifically violated the Article 21 right 
to communal property in relation to the right to cultural identity.  In reaching 
this determination, the IACtHRs again laid out that in addition to individual 
property, Article 21 also protects the communal property which is associated 
with the indigenous cosmovision; stressing that without such protection Article 
21 would have little meaning for Indigenous Peoples: 
 
In other words, the right to use and enjoy the territory would be meaningless 
for indigenous and tribal communities if that right were not connected with 
the protection of natural resources in the territory.  Therefore, the protection 
of the territories of indigenous and tribal peoples also stems from the need to 
guarantee the security and continuity of their control and use of natural 
resources, which in turn allows them to maintain their lifestyle.  This 
connection between territory and natural resources that indigenous and tribal 
peoples have traditionally maintained, one that is necessary for their physical 
and cultural survival and the development and continuation of their 
worldview, must be protected under Article 21 of the Convention so that 
they can continue living their traditional lifestyle, and so that their cultural 
identity, social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and traditions are 
respected, guaranteed and protected by States.160 
 
The court continued and again linked this protection of communal property with 
cultural identity noting that the former is an essential component of the later and 
that as the right of consultation is founded on the latter that ultimately then the 
protection of the communal property of Indigenous Peoples requires 
consultation.161  Again, the IACtHRs took an evolutionary approach to 
interpreting Article 21 in such a fashion; it noted that it should consider broader 
IHRL and yet again in particular made reference to ILO Convention No. 169 to 
support the view that the Article 21 protects a communal right to property and 
                                                 
159 Id.  
160 Id. at para. 146  
161 Id. at para. 159. 
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that for its protection it requires consultation.162  As aforementioned, this once 
more resulted in a purposeful extension of the connection between the 
protection of culture and specifically land under the rubric of the regional right 
to property included in Article 21 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights to other obligations under the broader IHRL regime, in particular ILO 
Convention No. 169.  Moreover, the court again found that to protect this 
communal right to property under Article 21 that the state had a responsibility to 
take special measures.163  In turn, the restitution, satisfaction and guarantees of 
non-repetition that the court ordered in relation to the communal right to 
property included the obligation of the state to: 
 
…adopt the necessary measures to guarantee and protect the right to 
property of the members of the Kichwa indigenous community of Sarayaku 
with respect to their ancestral territory, guaranteeing the special relationship 
between the Sarayaku community and its ancestral territory;164 
 
…guarantee members of the Community the exercise of their traditional 
subsistence activities by removing the explosive materials planted on their 
territory165 
 
As well as the:  
 
…immediate cessation of any type of oil exploration or exploitation in the 
territory of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku carried out without respecting the 
rights of the Community;166 
 
…the removal of all types of explosives, machinery, structures and non-
biodegradable waste and the reforestation of the areas deforested by the oil 
company when clearing trails and establishing camp sites required for seismic 
prospecting;167 
 
                                                 
162 Id. at paras. 160-2.   
163 Id. at para. 171.  
164 Id. at para. 286(i). 
165 Id. at para. 286(ii). 
166 Id. at para. 287(iii) [citation omitted]. 
167 Id. at para. 287(iv). 
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…respect for the decision of the Sarayaku People to declare their entire 
territory as ‘Sacred Territory’ and Heritage Site of Biodiversity and of the 
Ancestral Culture of the Kichwa Nation;168 
 
B. Dialogical Space: A Sui Generis Right to the Restitution of Land 
 
Exploring the jurisprudence of the IACtHR reveals that it acts as a dialogical 
space in relation to the restitution of land to Indigenous Peoples.  As 
aforementioned, this dialogical space flows from Glenn’s notion of a more 
subtle form of irony outside of the traditional sense of contradiction.  Again, it 
is: 
 
…placing statements in relation to some kind of other ‘truth’ and therefore 
interrogating each truth by juxtapositioning it with another.  This 
understanding of irony assumes the commensurability of the truth involved, 
as well as the need for mutual interrogation and the possibility of mutual 
influence.  Irony here would be both a means of understanding and a check 
on fundamentalist or apodictic understanding of given texts or sources of 
law.  This form of irony, more than the first,169 is to be welcomed in an age of 
interdependence.  It teaches the need for mutual understanding and broadly-
based normative support.170 
 
In the context of the Declaration under examination in this thesis, Glenn asserts 
that this form of irony reveals that: 
 
[i]nternational law is thus juxtaposed with indigenous law; written, individual 
rights are juxtaposed with unwritten collective enjoyment; and positive 
charismatic acts of adherence or rejection are juxtaposed with gradual 
processes of influence over time.171 
 
In essence, the process of drafting the entire Declaration in general occurred in 
this dialogical space playing out the juxtapositioning of alternative truths.  
Therefore, the process of drafting Article 11 in particular as explored in Chapter 
Three also occurred in this dialogical space playing out this juxtapositioning of 
                                                 
168 Id. at para. 287(v) [citation omitted]. 
169 See supra Section I(B) (discussing first form of irony, irony as contradiction).  
170 Glenn, supra n 24, at 172. 
171 Id. 181-2. 
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alternative truths in relation to the issue of the restitution of cultural property.  
In particular, the truths of individual rights and collective rights, of private 
conception of property and collective conceptions of property, of property and 
heritage and of external and internal self-determination, non-retroactivity and 
retroactivity.  Although the “truth” that emerged in Article 11 regarding the 
restitution of cultural property did not reflect the indigenous version, 
nonetheless its negotiation and drafting occurred in this space.  Yet even though 
this space did not generate support for an indigenous understanding of the truth 
in relation to the restitution of cultural property in the Declaration, as mentioned 
above the international legal project has acted as a dialogical space offering an 
indigenous version of the truth in relation to the restitution of land, which is 
demonstrated by the preceding judgments of the IACtHR indicating that it still 
provides an important forum to explore the grievances and demands of 
Indigenous Peoples despite sovereignty. Specifically, as gleaned from these cases, 
this space juxtapositioned written law and customary law, individual rights and 
collective rights, private conceptions of property and communal conceptions of 
property, property and heritage, and culture as commodity and indigenous 
cosmovision, non-retroactivity and retroactivity and ultimately through the use 
of its evolutionary interpretation techniques the IACtHR produced judgments 
which reflect indigenous truths of the latter in relation to the restitution of land. 
Collectively, the indigenous truth developed in this dialogical space through 
these decisions of the IACtHRs offer an approach to property that allows for 
the protection and restitution of land to Indigenous Peoples.  This is based on 
the recognition of the close ties of such groups with their traditional lands and 
the links between their culture and natural resources found in these lands to the 
preservation of their identity and ultimately survival.   
 
Moreover, the Declaration arguably reflects these judgments and their 
recognition of communal property and the restitution of land to Indigenous 
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Peoples.  Unsurprisingly, from the outset the Declaration addressed the 
restitution of lands to Indigenous Peoples as it is one of the principal 
characteristic of indigenous claims.172  As indigenous representative William 
Means said: “the issue for indigenous peoples is the land; indigenous peoples are 
one with the land.”173  Draft Article 27 provided:   
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, 
and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without their 
free and informed consent.  Where this is not possible, they have the right to just and 
fair compensation.  Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples 
concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and 
resources equal in quality, size and legal status. 
 
As with cultural property, the use of the term restitution proved unacceptable to 
many states.174  Led by delegations from Australia, New Zealand and the US, 
these states urged that in relation to Draft Article 27 that the broader term 
redress be used instead arguing that it includes more possible remedies.175  
Indigenous groups opposed such a change and urged that explicit reference 
should be made to specific forms of redress such as restitution in relation to 
land, resources and territories that had been unjustly taken from them.  In 
particular, if the issue of their means of subsistence was raised compensation 
should take the form of restitution.176  Beyond seeking to remove the term 
restitution from the draft as states did with cultural property, some states again 
further sought to ensure that the term redress and the right of redress was 
                                                 
172 See Erica Irene-Daes, Final Working Paper Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, Human Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/25 (30 June 
2000). 
173 William Means, Statement by William Means in Voice of Indigenous Peoples: Native People Address the 
United Nations 60 (A. Ewen ed., 1994) reprinted in M. Barelli, Free Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Development and Challenges Ahead, 16 International Journal of Human 
Rights 1 at n. 4. 
174 See supra Chapter 4 ns. 224-229 (discussing the usage of restitution in relation to cultural property).  See also 
Chapter 5 at ns. 110-114 and accompanying text (discussing the other grounds of opposition in relation to the 
restitution of land which were similar to those in relation to cultural property). 
175 Working Group on the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 11th Session, 
available at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/handbook/Annexes/SS/WGDDIP.pdf (Geneva, 5 - 16 December 2005 and 30 
January – 3 February, 2006). 
176 Id. 
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expressed as a procedural right.  In turn, like the draft text on cultural property 
some suggested using the terms “entitled to effective mechanism for redress” 
and “right to pursue claims for” 177 to encourage such an interpretation.  
However, Indigenous Peoples rejected such proposals arguing that the language 
is necessary to ensure a substantive right to redress noting that access to 
mechanisms does not guarantee that Indigenous Peoples will receive fair and just 
remedies.178   
 
Ultimately, the final version which appears as Article 28 included in the 
Declaration offers that: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, 
when this is not possible, of a just, fair and equitable compensation, for the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, 
occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent. 
 
In turn, this process of retrogression in relation to the issue of restitution within 
the context of the Declaration was not unique to Article 11 and the restitution of 
cultural property.  Yet, as Dr. Gilbert notes in relation to land, “regarding the 
practical implementation of such a right, the Declaration reaffirms the rule that 
restitution should be the first principle, and only when it is not possible should 
other methods of compensation be contemplated.”179  In turn, although the 
restitution of land also suffered retrogression importantly unlike cultural 
property it remains a right and further it takes primacy in its implementation.  
Moreover, it also reflects the judgments of the IACtHRs in relation to the 
restitution of land. 180  
                                                 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 J. Gilbert, Indigenous Rights in the Making: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 14 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 207, 228 (2007). 
180 The notable exception here being that the Declaration and so the Article 28 right is presumed non-retroactive 
by some scholars such as Professor Allen. See supra n. 50.  In addition, the IACtHRs judgments that provide for 
the restitution of land are free from Article 46 of the Declaration which has the ability to restrict any rights in the 
UNDRIP. See supra Chapter 4 at Section III(A) (discussing Article 46 as a limitation).     
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C. Dialogical Space as an Indigenization Opportunity: A Right to 
Restitution of Land?  
 
The above points demonstrate the potential for this dialogical space to aid the 
support of both the development of sui generis rights and also the indigenization 
of broader general human rights norms and laws.  A principal debate in 
indigenous advocacy is whether or not a specific category of rights, i.e. sui generis 
rights, are needed to protect Indigenous Peoples or whether or not they can find 
protection in broader general IHRL.181  On one side of the debate, Professors 
Cornastell and Primeau argue that the existing body of IHRL is sufficient to 
address the claims of Indigenous Peoples and so advocacy geared towards the 
development of specific instruments would be counterproductive.  By contrast, 
others argue that there remain rights that cannot be properly addressed by 
broader IHRL such as the aforementioned Professor Benedict Kingsbury who 
offers that aspects of indigenous claims require a sui generis category.  What Dr. 
Gilbert notes though that is of particular interest in this debate is that there has 
been an indigenization of general human rights norms.182  In essence, 
indigenization refers to a process by which general human rights and norms are 
given specific meaning for Indigenous Peoples; in this way serving as a 
confluence of the aforementioned two opposing positions.  Gilbert sees this 
indigenization in the landmark decision of Awas Tingni183 giving the Article 21 
right to property in the American Convention on Human Rights specific 
meaning for Indigenous Peoples; in essence offering an indigenous version of 
the truth.  However, Gilbert is careful to note that this indigenization is based on 
more specific rights of Indigenous Peoples184, namely the ILO Convention 169, 
                                                 
181 The following is debate as summarized by J.Gilbert, supra n. 179, at 209-12 [citations omitted]. 
182 Id. at 210. 
183 See supra ns. 111-17 and accompanying text. 
184 Gilbert, 211. 
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the UN Draft Declaration and the Organization of American States (OAS) 
Proposed Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples185  
 
On the other hand, the case of Saramaka potentially marks an important 
potential shift in the jurisprudence of the IACtHR that explicitly links such 
protection and restitution to broader IHRL; specifically to Article 1 and Article 
27 of the ICCPR which are arguably partially outside of the ambit of the more 
specific rights of Indigenous Peoples.  The history of Article 1 right to self-
determination makes this clear as its original application was to colonial 
populations and it has only gradually been applied to Indigenous Peoples, albeit 
in a restricted manner through and long and painful process.186  Moreover 
Article 27 is explicitly a minority right that has a broader ambit in general IHRL 
though it has come to be applied to Indigenous Peoples.187  In Saramaka the 
court offered:  
 
As will be discussed infra (paras. 97-107), Suriname’s domestic legislation does 
not recognize a right to communal property of members of its tribal 
communities, and it has not ratified ILO Convention 169.  Nevertheless, 
Suriname has ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights.  The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which is the 
body of independent experts that supervises State parties’ implementation of the 
ICESCR, has interpreted common Article 1 of said instruments as being 
applicable to indigenous peoples.  Accordingly, by virtue of the right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination recognized under said Article 1, they 
may “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”, and may 
“freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources” so as not to be “deprived 
of [their] own means of subsistence”.  Pursuant to Article 29(b) of the American 
Convention, this Court may not interpret the provisions of Article 21 of the 
American Convention in a manner that restricts its enjoyment and exercise to a 
lesser degree than what is recognized in said covenants.  This Court considers 
that the same rationale applies to tribal peoples due to the similar social, cultural, 
and economic characteristics they share with indigenous peoples (supra paras. 80-
86). 
 
                                                 
185 Arguably, any interpretation of the Declaration would not actually serve to indigenize rights as a result of the 
last minute inclusion of Article 46. See supra Chapter 4 See supra Chapter 4 at Section III(A) (discussing Article 46 
as a limitation). 
186 See generally Chapter 4. 
187 See generally Chapter 3. 
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Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has analyzed the obligations of State 
Parties to the ICCPR under Article 27 of such instrument, including 
Suriname, and observed that “minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture[, which] may consist in a way of life which is closely associated with 
territory and use of its resources.  This may particularly be true of members 
of indigenous communities constituting a minority”.188 
 
Although the later aspects of these rights in the sense of their connection with 
Indigenous Peoples have been emphasized in Saramaka in its systemic 
interpretation, nonetheless Articles 1 and 27 of ICCPR are broader right that 
those mentioned in the previous decisions of the IACtHRs which focused on 
rights included in documents only applicable to Indigenous Peoples189 indicating 
an incremental step in efforts to indigenize rights in broader IHRL.  
 
Yet, this incremental development should be viewed with caution; indeed it 
seems premature to assert the recognition of a communal right to property that 
can require restitution would have the same success under Article 27 in broader 
IHRL at present because the link with Article 27 is embryonic and fragile.  In its 
most recent pronouncement in June 2012 in Caso Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de 
Sarayaku vs. Ecuador,190 the IACtHR did not explicitly mention Article 27 in 
relation to the communal right to property protected under Article 21 though it 
continued to link this protection with IHRL specific to Indigenous Peoples; 
specifically ILO Convention 169.  However, the significance of such a failure to 
reference Article 27 can be mitigated by distinguishing between these cases.  In 
Sarayaku, although no reference was made to Article 27 in relation to the 
interpretation of Article 21 communal right to property, the discussion centered 
rather on the right consultation flowing from this communal nature.  By 
contrast, in Saramaka, the discussion centered on the interpretation of Article 21 
as a communal right to property that requires restitution.  This interpretation 
                                                 
188 Saramaka, supra n. 144, at paras. 93-4 [citations excluded]. 
189 See surpa n. 144-52 and accompanying text (discussing Saramaka). 
190 Sarayaku, supra n. 144 and accompanying text. 
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suggests that Article 27 does not supply the court with a legal foundation to 
support consultation; in essence consultation does not flow from the right to 
culture protected under Article 27 while restitution does.  However, such a 
reading is contrary to the jurisprudence of Article 27.  If anything, the right to 
consultation rather than restitution is associated with Article 27.  Specifically, in 
Mahuika the HRC noted generally that in relation to Article 27 it  
 
…has emphasised that the acceptability of measures that affect or interfere 
with the culturally significant economic activities of a minority depends on 
whether the members of the minority in question have had the opportunity 
to participate in the decision-making process in relation to these measures 
and whether they will continue to benefit from their traditional economy.191   
 
In this particular case, the HRC concluded  
 
…that the State party has, by engaging itself in the process of broad 
consultation before proceeding to legislate, and by paying specific attention 
to the sustainability of Maori fishing activities, taken the necessary steps to 
ensure that the Fisheries Settlement and its enactment through legislation, 
including the Quota Management System, are compatible with article 27.192   
 
More recently, the HRC reemphasized this connection between Article 27 and 
consultation in a forceful manner suggesting on a broad reading that not even 
consultation is enough; rather participation of indigenous communities to satisfy 
Article 27 should extend to the free prior and informed consent of these 
communities.  In Poma Poma the HRC stated: 
 
In the Committee's view, the admissibility of measures which substantially 
compromise or interfere with the culturally significant economic activities of 
a minority or indigenous community depends on whether the members of 
the community in question have had the opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process in relation to these measures and whether they will 
continue to benefit from their traditional economy.  The Committee 
considers that participation in the decision-making process must be effective, 
which requires not mere consultation but the free, prior and informed 
                                                 
191 Mahuika v New Zealand, Communication No 547/1993,Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993  (27 October 2000) at para. 9.5. 
192 Id. at para. 9.8.  
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consent of the members of the community.  In addition, the measures must 
respect the principle of proportionality so as not to endanger the very 
survival of the community and its members.193 
 
Moreover, the HRC has noted this link between Article 27 and consultation 
explicitly in the context of land in it concluding Observations on Sweden: 
 
The Committee is concerned at the limited extent to which the Sami 
Parliament can have a significant role in the decision-making process on 
issues affecting the traditional lands and economic activities of the indigenous 
Sami people, such as projects in the  of hydroelectricity, mining and forestry, 
as well as the privatization of land…194 
 
Indeed, the aforementioned General Comment 23 on Article 27 highlights this 
relationship between this right and consultation noting that ‘the enjoyment of 
those rights may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to 
ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in 
decisions which affect them.195  Finally, in Saramaka the IACtHRs recognized 
this relationship between Article 27 and consultation196 and linked it with the 
communal right to property protected under Article 21.197  In turn, the failure 
later to mention Article 27 in Sarayaku rather seems to be more likely the result 
of the fact that the IACtHRs did not need to engage in systemic interpretation 
techniques.  Unlike Saramaka, in Sarayaku extension to broader IHRL did not 
require a systemic interpretation because as of May 1999 Ecuador was a party to 
the ILO Convention No. 169, its domestic legislation recognized a right to 
consultation and further it has become a principle of general international law.198  
Therefore, as the IACtHRs could rely on ILO Convention No. 169 alone in 
                                                 
193 Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru, Communication No. 1457/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (2009) at 
para 7.6.  Although outside of the scope of this thesis, this decision in Poma Poma provides fruitful grounds for 
the analysis of the concept of free prior and informed consent in relation to Indigenous Peoples as a concept 
developing under IHRL.  Nonetheless, for the purposes herein, this decision indicates the link between Article 27 
and a right at least to consultation.  
194 Concluding Observations on Sweden (2002) U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE . See also Concluding Observations 
of the Human Rights Committee: Chile, 65th Sess., [para. 22], U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (1999). 
195 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights General Comment No. 23 (50) on Article 27, U.N. 
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994) at para. 7.   
196 Saramaka, supra n. 144, at para. 130. 
197 Id. at paras. 134 and 137. 
198 See Sarayaku, supra n. 153, at paras. 163-164 and 168. 
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understanding Article 21 protection of a communal right to property to require 
consultation without further reference to broader IHRL and courts generally do 
not like to say more than is necessary the failure to mention Article 27 should 
not be viewed as dispositive.  
 
Yet, it remains that Saramaka is the only explicit reference to Article 27 linking it 
with the protection of communal property and restitution and so remains a 
fragile and embryonic development.  Further, this must be coupled with 
recognition of the fact that restitution has never occurred in practice under 
Article 27 and the bulk of the jurisprudence and commentary surrounding this 
article as presently developed in IHRL demonstrates significant limitations for 
any restitution despite in theory the intrinsic nature of remedial measures for the 
right to culture flowing from cultural integrity.199  Indeed the jurisprudence of 
the HRC in the aforementioned case of Jonassen v Norway200 remains particularly 
problematic as it places significant doubt as to whether or not Article 27 could 
address historical injustices requiring restitution.  Perhaps then, the best 
approach is as Dr. Gilbert suggests in offering a third position distinguishing 
himself in the general versus specific rights debate: 
 
…the choice might not be of one versus another.  Rather, an adequate level 
of protection for indigenous peoples might be based on both paths.  On the 
one hand, general human rights norms of non-discrimination and equality are 
flexible enough to include some protection for indigenous peoples, but on 
the other hand, such flexibility relies on a parallel development of a specific 
regime of protection … Hence, the development of jurisprudence from the 
UN human rights treaty bodies such as the Human Rights Committee (HRC), 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) or the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on the 
rights of indigenous peoples does not preclude the development of a specific 
regime.  Quite the opposite; these developments indicate that ‘the evolution 
of the times’ supports the emergence of a specific focus on the protection of 
indigenous peoples.201 
                                                 
199 See generally Chapter 3 at Section IV(A)(i) (discussing these limitations on Article 27).  
200 Mr. Jarle Jonassen v. Norway, Communication No. 942/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/881/1999 (2002). See 
also supra Chapter 3 at ns. 248-254 (discussing Jonassen v. Norway). 
201 Gilbert, 211 
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It would follow that the best approach for indigenous advocacy at the 
international level is to pursue both paths as general human rights norms are 
complemented by a specific legal framework as the development of sui generis 
rights does not preclude the application of existing IHRL for the benefit of 
Indigenous Peoples.202 
 
D. Careful the Caveats: A Note on Dialogical Impacts on Restitution  
 
Regardless of the issue of the indigenization of IHRL, as aforementioned the 
international legal project has acted as an important dialogical space for 
Indigenous Peoples to generate support for their rights, and indeed the 
IACtHRs has provided just such a space in relation to the issue of the restitution 
of land to the benefit of Indigenous Peoples.  This indicates that at the 
international regional level the protection of property and land restitution for 
Indigenous Peoples in the Americas had evolved further than that has been 
previously offered under broader IHRL in Article 27 of the ICCPR especially in 
light of Jonassen.203  Indeed, Professor Scheinin, a then member of the HRC, 
suggested that the reason why the HRC has only found a violation of Article 27 
in Ominayak [as identified by him and prior to the case of Poma Poma in 2009]204 
concerning using land in a way that interferes with the economy and life of 
Indigenous Peoples, stems from the fact that Article 27 lacks any reference to 
the right to property. 
 
[T]he weakness of ICCPR Article 27  as a basis for indigenous land rights lies 
in the absence of any reference to the right of property in Article 27 or 
elsewhere in the ICCPR … Article 27 would give support to indigenous title 
                                                 
202 See infra Post-Script (discussing the future of indigenous advocacy in more detail arguing for a dual approach 
that sees advocacy continue at both the domestic and international level). 
203 See supra Chapter 3 at ns. 248-254 (discussing Jonassen v. Norway). 
204 See supra Chapter 3 at ns. 137-142 and accompanying text (discussing Poma Poma). 
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to land only in cases where it is proven that no other arrangement will meet 
this test.205 
 
Yet, it is important to note a number of things in relation to this dialogical space 
in the IACtHRs and its benefits regarding the concept of restitution in the 
international legal project in general and in particular for the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property.  
 
i. Right to Life 
 
First, the context in which this protection of an indigenous understanding of 
property and restitution was developed was within the context of indigenous 
land rather than cultural property through a right to property rather than culture.  
Indeed indigenous land and cultural property do share many similarities.  As 
Engle notes, indigenous rights to culture and property are often intertwined.206   
Indeed, in addition to cultural property, indigenous land is considered as part of 
the broader concept of heritage.   
 
‘Heritage’ includes all expressions of the relationship between the people, 
their land and the other living beings and spirits which share the land, and is 
the basis for maintaining social, economic and diplomatic relationship—
through sharing—with other peoples.  All of the aspects of heritage are 
interrelated and cannot be separated from the traditional territory of the 
people concerned.207 
 
Therefore, the restitution of traditional land like cultural property is also crucial 
to the protection of indigenous heritage and identity.  
 
                                                 
205 Engle, supra n. 112, at 116 [citations omitted].  As Engle notes, he pins this on what he earlier pointed out as 
the paradox of Article 27.  See supra Chapter 3 at n. 252.  Yet the aforementioned dialogical space would indicate 
that it’s more about the interpretation of the words rather than the words themselves.  Indeed, this demonstrates 
how within the context of the IACtHRs it is interpreting concepts of property differently from traditional 
concepts in a way that the UNDRIP did not manage in relation to cultural property which in part fuelled its 
retrogression and failure to provide for restitution. 
206 Engle, supra n. 112, at 149. 
207 See Erica Irene-Daes, Study on the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous peoples, by Erica-Irene 
Daes, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of 
the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28(1993) at para. 164. 
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The discovery, use and teaching of indigenous peoples’ knowledge, arts and 
cultures is inextricably connected with the traditional lands and territories of 
each people.  Control over traditional territories and resources is essential to 
the continued transmission of indigenous peoples’ heritage to future 
generations and its full protections.208 
 
In turn, like cultural property it is not viewed as a commodity: 
 
For such peoples, the land is not merely a possession and a means of 
production.  The entire relationship between the spiritual life of indigenous 
peoples and Mother Earth, and their land, has a great many deep-seated 
implications.  Their land is not a commodity which can be acquired, but a 
material element to be enjoyed freely.209  
 
Finally, it is also characterized by its collective and intergenerational nature.210  
 
Although this shares many similarities in terms of importance to Indigenous 
Peoples there remain differences between land and cultural property that may 
have influenced the development within the former rather than the later context 
in this dialogical space.  In particular, land unlike cultural property involves 
issues of sovereignty over, and access to, natural resources and in turn is 
frequently linked with the right to life; a link that is not made in relation to 
cultural property.  Indeed, in all of the aforementioned cases in the IACtHRs 
concerning indigenous land the court also found a violation of the right to life in 
Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights with the exception of 
Saramaka which did not raise the issue of the right to life.  For instance, in Yakye 
Axa, the IACtHR found a violation of the right to life linked with the violation 
of the Article 21 communal right to property possessed by Indigenous Peoples 
in relation to their traditional lands.  Discussing the right to life, the court noted 
                                                 
208 Erica Irene-Daes, Preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, submitted in conformity with Sub-
Commission resolution 1993/44 and decision 1994/105 of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.3/1994/31 (1994) at Annex: Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of 
Indigenous Peoples para. 6; Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People: Final Report of the Special 
Rapporteur, [Annex “Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People”  U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26(1995) at para. 6. 
209 Mr. José R. MartíCobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7, (1986), Vol V, para. 197. 
210 See generally Daes, Final Working Paper, supra n. 172, at paras. 12-20. 
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generally that given the importance of the right to life restrictions are not 
admissible as all other rights disappear without it. 211  In interpreting this right, 
the court gave it wide scope noting that it was not simply about the arbitrary 
deprivation of life but also included conditions that “impede or obstruct access 
to a decent existence…”212  In turn, the court noted that the state has positive 
obligations that must be geared towards ensuring a decent life including securing 
minimum living conditions that are compatible with the dignity of human beings 
and not creating conditions that impair this standard; in particular in fulfilling 
this obligation states must pay particular attention to vulnerable and at risk 
persons making their care a high priority.213  Specifically, in the case here, taking 
into account the especially vulnerable nature of the situation the Yakye Axa 
community were placed in as a result of their different way of life which included 
recognition of their different worldview from Western culture and their close 
relationship with the land in particular,214 the court found that the state had 
violated the right to life of the Yakye Axa community as a result of the lack of 
access to land and natural resources.215  The court then linked this violation of 
the right to life with the state’s violation of the communal right to property 
protected in Article 21 as  
 
this fact has had a negative effect on the right of the members of the 
Community to a decent life, because it has deprived them of the possibility of 
access to their traditional means of subsistence, as well as to the use and 
enjoyment of the natural resources necessary to obtain clean water and to 
practice traditional medicine to prevent and cure illnesses.216 
 
In the case of Sawhoymaxa which followed, the court again found a violation of 
the right to life on the grounds of a link with the violation of the right to 
communal property through an understanding of the former as a right not just 
                                                 
211 Yakye Axa, supra n. 118, at para. 161. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at para. 162. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at para. 176. 
216 Id. at para. 168. 
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of negative but positive obligations which require measures that are sensitive to 
vulnerable peoples.  The court again linked the violation of the right to life217 
with that of the violation of the communal right to property offering that   
 
The Court acknowledges the criterion of the State in the sense that it has not 
induced or encouraged the members of the Community to move and settle 
by the side of the road.  However, the Court considers that there were 
powerful reasons for the members of the Community to abandon the estates 
where they lived and worked, due to the extremely hard physical and labor 
conditions they had to endure.  Likewise, this argument is not enough for the 
State to disregard its duty to protect and guarantee the right to life of the 
alleged victims.  It is necessary that the State proves that it carried out all 
necessary actions take the indigenous peoples from the roadside, and in the 
meantime, to adopt all necessary measures to reduce the risk that they were 
facing. 
 
In that respect, the Court notes that the principal means available for the State to get the 
members of the Community out of the side of the road was to give them their traditional 
lands.  However, as it has been shown in the previous chapters, the 
administrative proceedings … did not offer any security of an effective 
resolution and proved to be slow and inefficient.  Hence, the Court 
determined that the State did not guarantee to the members of the 
Sawhoyamaxa Community the right to communal property and did not 
provide either guarantees or judicial protection within a reasonable time.  In 
other words, although the State did not take them to the side of the road, it is 
also true it did not adopt the adequate measures, through a quick and 
efficient administrative proceeding, to take them away and relocate them 
within their ancestral lands, where they could have used and enjoyed their natural 
resources, which resources are directly related to their survival capacity and the preservation 
of their ways of life.218 
 
Moreover, unlike Yakye Axa it also found specific deaths of the members of the 
community solely attributable to the State for further violations of the right to 
life in the more traditional sense of the negative obligation on the part of states 
to not arbitrarily deprive individuals of life.219  Most recently, the IACtHRs again 
found a violation of the right to life of Indigenous Peoples in relation to a 
violation of their right to communal property in Sarayaku noting specifically that 
the State’s failure to provide for the communal property of the Sarayaku Peoples 
by allowing explosives to be placed on their territory resulted in a situation of  
                                                 
217 Sawhoyamaxa, supra n. 106, at para.166. 
218 Id. at paras. 163-164 [citations omitted] [emphasis added].  
219 Id. at paras. 167-178. 
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permanent risk and threat to  the community which is in violation of a broad 
interpretation of the right to life as that which is necessary for a decent standard 
of living.220  Most importantly, even in Saramaka which did not raise the issue of 
the right to life, the court still made the link between indigenous land and 
survival.  Specifically, in Saramaka, as discussed the court recognized that the 
Article 21 right to property is not absolute and could be subject to limitations in 
law221 and therefore should not be read in every case to prevent the “granting 
[of] any type of concession for the exploration and extraction of natural 
resources within Saramaka territory.”222  However it did note that in relation to 
Indigenous Peoples in particular that any restriction in law to the right to use and 
enjoy their traditional lands cannot “deny their survival as tribal people”223 
indicating again a clear link between the issue of land and thereby its restitution 
and the right to life.  
 
In essence, this broad interpretation of the right to life taken by the IACtHRs 
creates the possibility that its violation is not restricted to circumstances where 
individuals die but extends to situations beyond death to include positive 
obligations on the part of the state to provide for a decent standard of living 
core to the dignity of human beings has thereby paved the way to link the right 
to life with that of the right to communal property and its restitution to 
Indigenous Peoples; a link that has not been developed in relation to the 
restitution of cultural property given that it does not involve access to land and 
natural resources .  
 
Indeed, some would argue that this is a mistake and that there should be 
recognition of a link between the right to life and cultural property suggesting 
that the latter is just as integral to the physical survival and well-being of 
                                                 
220 Sarayaku, supra n. 153 at paras. 244-9. 
221 Saramaka, supra n. 144, at paras. 127-8. 
222 Id. at para. 126.   
223 Id. at para. 128. 
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indigenous communities and thereby warrants restitution.  As Professor Diane 
Shelton notes: 
 
… there are more ways to kill a nation, and to destroy a people than with 
physical violence.  A more subtle but equally effective way of doing it is to 
take away everything that makes that nation—its language; its religion; its 
control over education and the tangible expression of the peoples their art; its historic 
and sacred sites; and its land base.224 
 
For example, such an argument could be made in relation to Zuni War Gods 
and the incident of the Afo-A-Kom.  As regards the former, a Native American 
tribe in Southwestern U.S. known as the Zuni believe that the Ahayu:da or War 
                                                 
224 D. Shelton, International Protection of Indigenous peoples’ Culture and Cultural Property in The rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law: Selected Essays on Self-Determination 47 (R. Thompson ed. 1987) (emphasis 
added) reprinted in R. Clements, Misconceptions of Culture: Native Peoples and Cultural Property under Canadian Law, 49 
University of Toronto Faculty Law Review 24 (1991).  This comes close to the argument of “cultural genocide” 
which was explicitly rejected by the UN General Assembly in 1948. See U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 83d mtg., U.N. 
Doc. A/C.6/SR.83 (1948).  R. Lemkin first developed the term genocide in 1945 and argued that as a crime its 
aim was to destroy both the physical and cultural elements of the targeted group.  Although this cultural 
component was acknowledged in the 1946 Genocide Resolution, it was deleted from the text of the final 1948 
Genocide Convention.  Indeed, only Lemkin continued to support this inclusion of “cultural genocide.”  Lemkin 
argued for it on the grounds that “[i]f the diversity of cultures were destroyed, it would be as disastrous for 
civilization as the physical destruction of nations”.  However, other legal experts during the drafting process 
rejected its inclusion on the grounds that it presented an undue extension of the notion of genocide and only 
reconstituted what protections already existed for minorities.  Thus, the present Genocide Convention protects 
the right of a human group to exist as in physical survival. See Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution: 
Ensuring Each Group’s Contribution to Humanity, 22 European Journal of International Law17, 28-32 [citations 
omitted].  Arguably, the opponents of “cultural genocide” on the grounds that it only reconstituted minority 
protection at the time were wrong given that at the time the protection of minorities afforded under IHRL in 
Article 27 of the 1948 UDHR was limited to an individual rather than a collective right to culture and only 
imposed negative and not positive obligations for protection.  Certainly protection from genocide requires 
collective protection and imposes both negative and positive obligations on states.  Regardless, this has not 
meant that the debate has ended; it has re-emerged in the Post-Cold War period in cases concerning individual 
criminal responsibility for genocide before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and in cases regarding state responsibility before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  In Krstic, the ICTY 
found that the definition of genocide in the 1948 Genocide Convention had not evolved to include a cultural 
element though the crime of persecution was broad enough to include acts of cultural destruction.  Regardless, 
the Trial Chamber still used evidence of cultural destruction to prove the specific intent necessary for genocide.  
The ICJ followed suit in The Genocide Case  agreeing that the convention still did not include cultural destruction 
in the definition of genocide though the elimination of all cultural traces of a group may be contrary to ‘other 
legal norms’. See id. at 34-9 (tracing this continued debate over genocide in the Post-Cold War era) [citations 
omitted].  As Vrdoljak notes, these cases regarding genocide “betray[] a disconnect with recent intentional 
initiatives on human rights and cultural heritage protection.” Id. at 38.  Indeed as demonstrated in this thesis, 
both IHRL in the Declaration and Cultural Heritage Studies through the development of Cultural Indigenism, 
have evolved to value cultural property in relation to its importance to people both as a product of their 
endeavors but as well as constitutive of their identity and so its protection and ultimately calls for its restitution 
are rooted in a people-centered approach geared at preserving cultural diversity. See generally supra Chapters 3 & 4.  
Combined with the aforementioned cases in the IACtHRs linking the right to life with the restitution of land, 
arguably the resonance of this argument for the restitution of cultural property as necessary for the survival of 
Indigenous Peoples is increased.  
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Gods, which are small hand crafted figures, must be left in the desert to 
deteriorate. 
 
Each year members of the Bear and Deer clans carve two War Gods to serve 
as guides and guardians to the entire tribe.  The worship of these Gods 
ensures tribal “safety, health and success.”  After the War Gods serve their 
one year tenure as guardians of the tribe, clan members place them in hidden 
shrines where they decay exposed to the elements.  The Zunis believe 
decomposition of the Gods replenishes the earth with their powers.225  
 
If this process of deterioration is not allowed a core belief of the Zuni is that 
devastating consequences will ensue.  “One should not think of the Wars God as 
antiquated Indian “artifacts”; rather they are powerful “animate” entities which 
play an important daily role in the living culture and religious rites of tribal 
members.  In fact, the War Gods are essential for the continued spiritual well-
being of the Zuni Tribe.”226  Moreover, aside from spiritual well-being some 
suggest that they go towards their very survival. 
  
If such deterioration is not complete then disaster will befall the tribe.  The 
Zunis believe that the War Gods possess great powers.  Religious leaders 
convince the “adolescent, mischievous” Gods to use their powers for 
positive purposes.  Sadly, when collectors illicitly remove the War Gods from 
their shrines and take them from Zuni lands, it is believed that the icons will 
wreak havoc with the natural environment.  Their “destructive powers are 
unleashed.”  The removal of a War God can result in “military conflicts, fires, 
earthquakes, floods, tornados, hurricanes and other violent occurrences.”227  
 
In turn, the preservation of the Ahayu:da in any museum and private collection 
goes against beliefs of the Zuni and actually proves harmful.  Indeed it is a 
situation where, “[t]o its maker, proper treatment of the object may be essential 
to life or status; to the culture, the violation may be a spiritual disaster that 
threatens drastic consequences for the group”.228  In turn, by not providing for 
                                                 
225 Adele Merenstein, The Zuni Quest for Repatriation of the War Gods: An Alternative Basis for Claim, 17 American 
Indian Law Review 2, 590 (1992) [citations omitted]. 
226 Id. at 591. 
227 Id. [citations omitted]. 
228 John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical 
Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law 113 (2000).  
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the restitution of the Ahayu:da  the Zuni argue that it affects their ability to 
preserve their way of life if not their very survival.  Similarly, the same argument 
has been made in the case of the Afo-A-Kom.  In the early 1970s, a statue of 
immense spiritual importance to the Kom people of Cameroon went missing 
from a ritual site and appeared on the New York art market.  The First Secretary 
of the Cameroon Embassy in the U.S. described the statue as: 
 
… beyond money, beyond value.  It is the heart of the Kom, what unifies the 
tribe, the spirit of the nation, what holds us together.  It is not an object of 
art for sale and could not be.229  
 
Eventually, the statue was returned to the tribe without any litigation as the 
dealer cooperated with museum officials in its return to the Kom.230  In turn, 
even those most ardently opposed to restitution have noted that in certain cases 
cultural property such as the Afo-A-Kom possess an “essential propinquity” that 
is necessary to fulfil the religious, ceremonial or communal needs of a peoples 
without which the welfare or even the continued existence of the group is in 
jeopardy and so on these grounds have argued for restitution.231   
 
                                                 
229 J.H. Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical Essays on 
Cultural Property, Art and Law 140 (2000). 
230 Id. at 140 n. 59.  
231 Id. at 139-41.  However, Merryman limits restitution in these situations to where two criteria are met: 1. the 
culture that gives significance to the object must be alive and 2.  The object must be actively used for the 
religious, ceremonial or communal purposes for which it was created.  Id. at 141.  This is similar to the 
conclusion that Professor Harding draws in her analysis of determining the intrinsic value of cultural property to 
guide its regulation and restitution. See supra Chapter 4 at n. 240.  As Bauer et al note what is at the core of this 
test is the importance that some objects have for the identity of the group and continuing cultural practices.  
However, at least for them in terms of anthropology the question then becomes whether or not the absence of 
the object would actually effect the end of a culture.  In turn, rather they suggest “that what is at issue in most 
cases is not this loss of cultural identity, not the essentialist cultural designation of a disputed object; rather the 
issue is one of fundamental respect.” Alexander Bauer et al., When Theory, Practice and Policy Collide or why do 
Archaeologists Support Cultural Property Claims? in Archaeology and Capitalism: From Ethics to Politics 49 (Yannis 
Hamilakis and Philip Duke eds., 2007)[citation omitted].  In turn, on their suggestion, it is possible to extrapolate 
that they do not view identity as the best grounds on which to secure a restitution even in light of Merryman’s 
strict test.  Rather for them as they state it is about respect rather than identity and so in this way aligns with what 
some have suggested is the real purpose of NAGPRA which provides for the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples: its purpose lies in allowing Indigenous Peoples to control their identity not in identity itself. 
See supra Chapter 5 at n. 124.  Moreover, it places them then in the camp of anti-essentialists. See supra Chapter 3 
at n. 123.  Regardless, on this test of essential propinquity, the number of objects that should be subject to the 
restitution of cultural property would be much more limited however than what is presently argued for in IHRL 
in a blanket sui generis right to restitution of cultural property for Indigenous Peoples.  
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Regardless, this link with the right to life stemming from the difference between 
cultural property and land remains and it should be kept in mind when assessing 
the impact of the dialogical space that the international legal project has provided 
in relation to the issue of restitution, developed within the context of the latter.  
 
ii. Implementation and  Enforcement Issues 
 
It should be noted that the impacts of this dialogical space of the international 
legal project remain limited due to implementation and enforcement issues.  
Indeed, as Professor Allen notes a major problem in protecting indigenous rights 
is the failure of states to implement law rather than simply the absence of law 
itself, which he refers to as the implementation gap.232  As he notes, this gap is 
not solved by international law but if anything makes it more complicated as it 
has its own implementation gap as  in that it is not typically directly effective in 
municipal legal regimes thereby adding an even further tier of law that will need 
to be confronted only heightening implementation challenges to delivering 
effective reform.233   
 
In addition, even assuming implementation, there remains the issue of 
enforcement.  International judgments by their nature are subsidiary sources of 
law.  As the ICJ provides at Article 38(1) sources of law included 
 
a.  international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b.  international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c.  the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d.  subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law.234  
 
                                                 
232 Allen, supra n. 19, at 253. 
233 Id. 
234 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; 39 AJIL 
Supp. 215 (1945) at Article 38(1) (emphasis added).  
345 
 
As a subsidiary source of law, international judgements such as those of the 
IACtHRs are not sources of law in and of themselves.  Without being a general 
rule of law, these judgments do not bind states other than those to whom the 
judgment is addressed and thereby do not require enforcement more broadly 
amongst states.  Only when subsidiary sources of law are combined with treaty 
and /or customary international law then arguably they implicate broader 
enforcement.  However, at this stage it is uncertain whether or not a right to the 
restitution of land exists in international treaty and /or customary international 
law.  As regards treaty law, at present it does not explicitly include a general right 
to the restitution of land to Indigenous Peoples.  As Dr. Alexandra Xanthaki 
notes, more generally the right to restitution is not well established under 
international law even though compensation is recognized.235  At best, as 
traditional lands in particular, she notes that the ILO Convention No. 169 takes 
a cautious approach at Article 16 (3) offering that “whenever possible” 
Indigenous Peoples “shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, as 
soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist.”  However, it avoids reference 
to the restitution of lands taken from Indigenous Peoples in the past.236  
Professor Anaya argues that this right to restitution for traditional lands has been 
established if Article 16(3) is read in conjunction with Article 14(3) of the same 
Convention which requires “adequate procedures … within the national system 
to resolve land claims” by Indigenous Peoples.237  However, as Dr. Xanthaki 
notes, Article 14 does not completely support this position: “[r]estitution is 
considered with respect to relocation only, rather than dispossession.  In other 
words, the Convention does not go so far as giving indigenous peoples who 
have lost their lands the right to restitution.”238  As regards the status of a 
customary international law, indigenous advocates of course argue that the 
                                                 
235 Xanthaki, supra n. 43, at 264. 
236 Id. at 265.  
237 See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 106-7 (1st ed., 1996) cited in Xanthaki, supra n. 43, 
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restitution of land has achieved this status.  As aforementioned in the 
Introduction, the International Law Association [ILA] in its final report on the 
UNDRIP released in 2012 noted that while on the whole that the Declaration 
cannot be considered a statement of existing customary international law, there 
are certain key provisions that can be considered as such239 including the right to 
the restitution of ancestral lands in order to fulfil the rights of Indigenous 
Peoples to their traditional lands, territories.240  In addition numerous U.N. 
documents suggest that such a right in relation to land exist under customary 
international law.241   
 
However, while it is arguable that it has achieved the status of customary 
international law, the fact remains that enforcement is not guaranteed; even 
where these decisions directly address states.  For instance, in the case of Mary 
and Carrie Dann v. United States242  the IACHR issued a report concluding that the 
U.S. "failed to ensure the Danns' right to property under conditions of equality 
contrary to Articles II [right to equal protection], XVIII [right to fair trial] and 
XXIII [right to property] of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties 
of Man in connection with their claims to property rights in the Western 
Shoshone ancestral lands."243  Based on this the IACHR recommended that the 
U.S.: 
1. Provide Mary and Carrie Dann with an effective remedy, which includes 
adopting the legislative or other measures necessary to ensure respect for the 
Danns’ right to property in accordance with Articles II, XVIII and XXIII of 
the American Declaration in connection with their claims to property rights 
in the Western Shoshone ancestral lands. 
                                                 
239 International Law Association, Conclusions and Recommendation of The Committee on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Resolution No. 5/2012, para. 2 (2012). 
240 Id. at para. 7. 
241 See generally Working Group on the Draft Declaration on November 2005, Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Restitution, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/CRP.4; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, General Recommendation XXIII: Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/51/misc 13/Rev 4 (1997), 
at para. 5.; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Guatemala, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM (27 
August 2001), para. 29 (all suggesting that Indigenous People have the right to restitution of land).   
242 Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 860 (2002) 
243 Id. at para. 5. 
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2. Review its laws, procedures and practices to ensure that the property rights 
of indigenous persons are determined in accordance with the rights 
established in the American Declaration, including Articles II, XVIII and 
XXIII of the Declaration.244  
 
However, the U.S. has refused to comply with these recommendations noting 
that the issues are not fundamentally ones of human rights but rather is an effort 
to reopen land claims that have already been fully litigated in its domestic court 
system and that it has acted “in full compliance with its domestic and 
international legal obligations.  For these reasons, the United States respectfully 
declines to take any further actions to comply with the Commission’s 
recommendations.”245  Annual reports indicate that the U.S. has not complied 
with this decision and that it continues to maintain the position that the present 
matter is closed.  
 
In turn, although this dialogical space and the judgments it has generated in 
relation to the restitution of land are important, perhaps it is best that they are 
not over emphasized in general and in particular in relation to the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property for the aforementioned caveats.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explored what conclusions can be drawn from the three-tiered 
analysis of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under 
IHRL.  The overarching conclusion it offers is that IHRL suffers from a 
structural incapacity as a forum to address in particular indigenous demands to 
secure a sui generis right to the restitution of their cultural property which suggests 
irony in relation to this use of international law.  Ultimately, it offers that such 
incapacity is rooted in the concept of sovereignty in turn highlighting that 
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sovereignty in general creates a paradigm that continues to constrain way of 
thinking by framing issues in a certain way.    
 
However, this chapter has also demonstrated that not all is gloom and doom.  
The international legal project also provides a dialogical space where Indigenous 
Peoples and states can interact and engage in conversation aimed at generating 
normative support for the rights of the later. In essence it is a space for legal 
pluralism at the international level.  As aforementioned in relation to domestic 
level in NAGPRA,246 legal pluralism refers to “different normative systems, legal 
or quasi-legal, [which] co-exist and form a ‘hybrid legal space’ applicable to the 
same social field”247 and typically have been developed in the legal systems of 
states where colonial settlers moved and indigenous peoples still live.248 Ideally, 
the aim of legal pluralism is to place indigenous laws and customs on the same 
footing as common or civil laws within a non-indigenous court system in order 
to “transform the courts in[to] appropriate venues for establishing … indigenous 
rights.”249  However, this dialogical space is simultaneously both broader and 
narrower.  It is broader in that it allows three different legal and quasi-legal 
systems to interact and engage in dialogue to generate this normative support 
including the international, the domestic and indigenous systems.  It is narrower 
in that may not include any enforcement mechanisms.   
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the judgments of international courts can act 
as an important dialogical space to explore the grievances and demands of 
Indigenous Peoples precisely because from the outset these judgments do not 
                                                 
246 See supra Chapter 5 at Section II(A) (discussing legal pluralism in relation to NAGPRA). 
247 Kristin Hausler, Indigenous perspectives in the courtroom, 16 International Journal of Human Rights 51, 52 
(2012). 
248 Id.  
249 Id. at 55. As aforementioned, in Canada no comprehensive legislation exists in relation to cultural property as 
in the U.S. See supra Introduction at ns. 40-1 and accompanying text.  However, Hausler explores how the 
concept of legal pluralism has unfolded in Canada within the context of indigenous land rights through the use of 
the common law court system in a series of cases which have progressively established such rights for Indigenous 
Peoples.  Specifically, since Calder  in 1973 Canadian courts have recognized the existence of indigenous title to 
land and the past forty years have witness through the judicial system the fleshing out of this concept. See generally 
Hausler, supra n. 247. 
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implicate the sovereign will in the same fashion as customary international law 
and treaties, as states do not negotiate, draft and ultimately pen the judgments of 
international courts.  By providing this buffer and thereby not touching on the 
sovereign will, this chapter has shown in particular how the judgments of the 
IACtHRs have acted as such a dialogical space to generate normative support for 
Indigenous Peoples in securing a right to the restitution of their traditional lands.  
This provides a promise, albeit a carefully considered promise (cognizant of the 
caveats), for the future of a right to the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples under IHRL.  Indeed, as Prott notes, “[t]he law only slowly 
follows profound changes in public attitudes, as the making of a new law or the 
revision of an old one requires considerable effort.”250  Perhaps the UN 
Declaration was too soon to realize a right to the restitution of cultural property.  
Perhaps there is hope elsewhere.  
                                                 
250 Prott, supra n. 103, at 105. 
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Post Script 
The Restitution of Cultural Property to Indigenous 
Peoples at The Close of the Second International Decade 
of the World’s Indigenous People and The Dawn of The 
Post-2015 Development Agenda 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The close of the Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous People is 
now upon us.  Now is the time to step back.  Now is the time take-stock of this 
decade.  Now is the time to see what it has offered Indigenous Peoples.  In turn, 
this thesis has situated itself in just such a broader project by examining Article 11 
of the UNDRIP in detail to provide an academic commentary on the issue of the 
restitution of cultural property Indigenous Peoples in IHRL as it presently stands 
and in doing so offering the first specific and in-depth academic commentary of its 
kind regarding Article 11 of the Declaration. 
 
In order to achieve this end, this thesis by way of background initially explored 
the present international framework for the protection of cultural property in 
which the broader repatriation debate is located.  This was to provide the legal 
context in which the issue of the restitution of cultural property to Indigenous 
Peoples also initially found itself situated.  It demonstrated that this framework 
did not offer any meaningful legal claim for Indigenous Peoples for the 
restitution of their cultural property at the center of the repatriation debate as a 
result of both prospective, but in particular retrospective, limitations.  Therefore, 
Indigenous Peoples turned elsewhere to secure the restitution of their traditional 
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cultural property; to IHRL.  In turn, this then itself turned to the exploration of 
the contextualization of this issue within IHRL. 
 
This contextualization explored the theoretical underpinnings to answer what is 
Article 11 through tracing it from its initial incarnation in Draft Article 12 
through the drafting process to its final form and making comparison between 
this final form at Article 11 and Article 27 of the ICCPR.  Ultimately, it revealed 
three things.  Firstly, that Article 11 has its roots principally in cultural rights and 
the norm of cultural integrity as well as in the related concepts of cultural 
identity, cultural diversity and identity politics, all of which can be viewed as a 
wave of emerging rights and/or norms that seek to regulate to a certain extent 
identity.  In turn, Article 11 and the issue of the restitution of cultural property 
to Indigenous Peoples was born into a dialogue that comes down to one not so 
much about ownership but about who controls the presentation of identity.  
Secondly, it revealed that Article 11 experienced a retrogression that allows it to 
step back and fit comfortably within the existing cannon of IHRL and in 
particular cultural rights which, despite their potential to offer change in reality 
offered no real change on the issue of the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples.  This was because the sui generis right to restitution secured 
in Draft Article 12 of the Declaration did not survive the drafting process to 
emerge in Article 11.  Finally, it demonstrated that this outcome is typical of the 
broader experiences of indigenous advocacy suggesting that there are limits to 
IHRL and its efforts to provide for the restitution of cultural property to 
Indigenous Peoples.  
 
 Yet this was not the full story.  The failure of IHRL and so the Declaration to 
provide for a right to the restitution of cultural property by securing its 
retrogression was not simply fuelled by it contextualization as a cultural right and 
all this entails; this retrogression was further underpinned by its specific links 
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with concepts of self-determination and property thereby locking it in a fatal 
triumvirate of concepts that face powerful opposition under IHRL and ensuring 
its failure as a sui generis right.  This thesis then turned to exploring why Article 11 
experienced this retrogression through a micro-level analysis by concentrating 
specifically on one article within the Declaration; Article 11 and its failure to 
secure the demands of Indigenous Peoples in relation to the restitution of 
cultural property.  It demonstrated that the failure to accommodate the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples in Article 11 through this 
retrogression is also underpinned by the continuing concerns on the part of 
states over self-determination and the disruption of property rights which is 
exacerbated by their association with collective rights.  Indeed this locks it in a 
fatal triumvirate of concepts that face powerful opposition under IHRL ensuring 
its failure as a sui generis right.  Ultimately, this retrogression on a narrower micro-
level was revealed to parallel the experience of the Declaration as a whole 
uncovered in a meso-level analysis by Professor Karen Engle in her seminal 
article On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
the Context of Human Rights.1  However, once again this was not the full story.  
This parallel suggested that it was necessary to explore a final level of analysis; a 
macro-level analysis.  
 
In turn, this thesis next offered a macro-level analysis in that it explored what 
explained the retrogression of Article 11 on a broader level in international law, 
concluding that at its root are state concerns with sovereignty.  Worries over 
sovereignty ultimately lie at the heart of opposition to the right to self-
determination and the disruption of third party property rights both of which 
have fuelled the retrogression of Article 11.  The macro-level analysis 
demonstrated this in two ways.  First, it provided direct evidence through state 
comments when drafting the Declaration that such opposition was rooted in 
                                                 
1 Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples in the Context of  Human 
Rights, 22 European Journal of  International Law 141 (2011).  
353 
 
sovereignty.  However, beyond this direct evidence, it provided implicit evidence 
that sovereignty lies at the root of these concerns by examining domestic 
legislation that provides for the restitution of cultural property.  An examination 
of this legislation implicitly demonstrated that sovereignty lies at the heart of the 
failure of the Declaration to address the demands of Indigenous Peoples by 
revealing that it acted as a litmus test: determining the acceptable limits/ 
maximum limits of Article 11 and the restitution of cultural property within the 
Declaration while simultaneously fleshing out the details of Article 11 which 
remain vague and confirming that where decoupled from property concepts that 
restitution is possible;  though as a litmus test this domestic legislation offered 
no guarantee that these limits would be reflected in the Declaration in IHRL.  
Indeed, in light of this legislation it was revealed that the Declaration actually 
suffered a double retrogression by decoupling the concept of restitution and the 
retrospective righting of wrongs.   
 
With this three-tiered analysis complete which ultimately demonstrated that 
Article 11 actually suffered a double retrogression rooted in the very concept of 
restitution itself, and which is undoubtedly a dark side and an unintended 
consequence of the contextualization of the issue of restitution under IHRL, this 
thesis reflected upon what the consequences are and what conclusions can be 
drawn from these analyses.  The overarching conclusion it offers is that IHRL 
suffers from a structural incapacity as a forum to address in particular indigenous 
demands to secure a sui generis right to the restitution of their cultural property 
which suggests irony in relation to this use of international law.  Ultimately, it 
offers that such incapacity is rooted in the concept of sovereignty in turn 
highlighting that sovereignty in general creates a paradigm that continues to 
constrain way of thinking by framing issues in a certain way.  However, this 
thesis also has demonstrated that not all is gloom and doom.  The international 
legal project also provides a dialogical space where Indigenous Peoples and 
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states can interact and engage in conversation aimed at generating normative 
support for the rights of the later.  This is demonstrated by the judgments of 
international courts in relation to the related issue of the restitution of land, as 
precisely from the outset these judgments do not implicate the sovereign will in 
the same fashion as customary international law and treaties, which provides 
promise albeit a carefully considered promise for the future of a right to the 
restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples under IHRL.   
 
In turn, with this promise in mind, this post-script takes a step back and explores 
how Indigenous Peoples should approach advocacy for the restitution of cultural 
property in this Post-2015 Development Agenda ultimately offering a two-
pronged strategy.   
 
I. The Restitution of Cultural Property to Indigenous Peoples at The 
Close of the Second International Decade of the World’s 
Indigenous People 
 
Overall this thesis demonstrates that IHRL in Article 11 has failed to provide a 
sui generis substantive right to the restitution of cultural property in the 
Declaration.  Worryingly, the most recent pronouncement on Indigenous 
Peoples by the U.N. also does not offer much in relation to this issue.  In its 
pronouncement on September 22, 2014 in the Outcome Document of the High-
Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly known as the World Conference 
on Indigenous Peoples,2 the General Assembly offers its typical self-
congratulatory praise regarding its efforts over the past two decades in relation 
to indigenous issues3 and has as its focus addressing issues of double 
discrimination faced by particular groups within indigenous communities 
                                                 
2 Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly known as the World Conference on Indigenous 
Peoples, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 22 September 2014, U.N. Doc A/RES/69/2 (25 
September 2014). 
3 Id. at para. 5. 
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including women, children, those with HIV/AIDs and disabilities.4   Regarding 
the UNDRIP, there is reaffirmed commitment to support and to respect the 
Declaration5 with numerous references to cooperation,6 free, prior and informed 
consent7 and even recognition of the importance of legal pluralism.8  
Encouragingly, it references the importance of issues of repatriation noting: 
 
We affirm and recognize the importance of indigenous peoples’ religious and 
cultural sites and of providing access to and repatriation of their ceremonial 
objects and human remains in accordance with the ends of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  We commit 
ourselves to developing, in conjunction with the indigenous peoples 
concerned, fair, transparent and effective mechanisms for access to and 
repatriation of ceremonial objects and human remains at the national and 
international levels.9 
 
Strikingly however, particularly in light of its specific reference to human 
remains, the document is bereft of any mention of repatriation in relation to 
cultural property.  Similarly, the Compilation of Recommendations, Conclusions 
and Advice from Studies Completed by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples promisingly references restitution of land noting that the 
views of Indigenous Peoples should be prioritized in discussing appropriate 
forms of redress including the return of lands,10 but again this lacks reference to 
cultural property.  Yet at the same time, it pronounces that the Declaration 
“should be the basis on all action, including at the legislative and policy level, on 
the protection and promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights to their languages 
and cultures.”11  Where does this leave us in relation to the issue of the 
                                                 
4 Id. at paras. 10, 13, 17-19. 
5 Id. at paras 4-5. 
6 Id. at paras. 1, 5, 7, 18 and 31-2. 
7 Id. at paras. 3 and 20. 
8 Id. at para. 16. 
9 Id. at para. 27. 
10 Compilation of Recommendations, Conclusions and Advice from Studies Completed by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Human rights council, U.N. Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2013/CRP.1 at Appendix: Advice, 
Recommendations and Conclusion of the Expert Mechanism, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Study on the role of languages and culture in the promotion and protection of the rights and identity of 
indigenous peoples. A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/3 (4 July 2013) at para. 22 p. 26. 
11 Id. at para. 5 p. 24. 
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restitution of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples as we presently enter the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda of the Millennium Development Goals?   
 
The following is a brief post-script for the suggested future of indigenous 
advocacy specifically in relation to securing a sui generis and substantive right to 
the restitution of cultural property in light of this thesis as we enter the Post-
2015 Development Agenda of the Millennium Development Goals.  Two things 
should be noted here.  First, what is suggested below in relation to indigenous 
advocacy concerns the mechanics of what this advocacy should look like in 
relation to securing a sui generis and substantive right to the restitution of cultural 
property as opposed to the substance of this advocacy.  Indeed, this substance 
has been addressed by Professor Karen Engle who notes that indigenous 
advocacy has been essentialist “at times even biologically so, as heritage is seen 
as something that indigenous peoples—and only indigenous peoples—
possess.”12  Ultimately based on her work which this thesis has relied upon, she 
suggests that the substance of the future of indigenous advocacy generally 
should be based on a constructivist understanding of culture as on a 
constructivist understanding inauthenticity is not a critique either for or against 
indigenous rights.13  Rather it is an approach that “self-consciously and 
admittedly connects culture to economic and political issues” and while this 
“might complicate indigenous assertions of cultural identity … it would not 
invalidate them” as “[o]nly then will we begin to understand why legal and 
political victories do not necessarily lead to the major transformations that their 
advocates desire.”14  Rather it offers a more real understanding of culture than is 
presently relied on in the substance of indigenous advocacy at present; an 
advocacy that sees cultural identity as two-dimensional in that things belong to 
                                                 
12 See generally Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy 148 
(2010). See supra Chapter 5 at Section II(F) (discussing this essentialist advocacy as a part of the dark side and 
unintended consequences of cultural heritage). 
13 Engle, supra n. 12, at 277. 
14 Id. 
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and with a people.  In turn, while her approach may be admittedly modest in its 
requests, it “highlights rather than suppresses underlying pathos.”15  In turn, with 
this substance of the approach to advocacy delineated by Professor Engle, this 
post-script rather focuses on the mechanics of approaches to advocacy 
 
Moreover, as noted at the Introduction to this thesis, it does not center itself as 
part of a broader advocacy project.  However, a brief post-script regarding how 
indigenous advocacy should approach its aim of securing a right the restitution 
of cultural property seems appropriate.  One of the overarching conclusions that 
has emerged from this thesis as an academic commentary is the failure of IHRL 
through Article 11 of the UNDRIP to secure a sui generis right to the restitution 
of cultural property to Indigenous Peoples.  In turn, this conclusion is ripe for 
critique by indigenous advocates as it leaves a right to the restitution of cultural 
property aspirational.  Yet, as established in the Introduction, this thesis does not 
engage in such analysis as by its own parameters guided by the confines of space 
it takes only a lex lata and not a lex ferenda approach and as such it does not 
address what the law should look like generally or in particular from an 
indigenous advocacy perspective.  Indeed it is natural given these parameters 
that this thesis would refrain from such a critique.  However, it is also natural 
that such a critique would follow this thesis; especially a critique by indigenous 
advocates as in essence this thesis sets the foundations for such an inquiry with 
its principal conclusion that IHRL at Article 11 has failed to provide a sui generis 
right to the restitution of cultural property in the Declaration.  Therefore, a brief 
concluding suggestion addressing in some measure how indigenous advocacy 
should approach its aim of securing a right to the restitution of cultural property 
seems appropriate to provide the foundation for this next natural step flowing 
from this thesis of critique.  After all, as Professor Joseph Singer notes:  
 
                                                 
15 Id. at 278. 
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Criticism is initially reactive and destructive, rather than constructive.  But 
our mistaken belief that our current ways of doing things are somehow 
natural or necessary hinders us for envisioning radical alternatives to what 
exists … By systematically and constantly criticizing the rationalizations of 
traditional legal reasoning, we can demonstrate, again and again, that a wider 
range of alternatives is available to us.16 
 
With these caveats in mind, this post-script now turns to the proposed approach 
for the future of indigenous advocacy to secure a right to the restitution of 
cultural property in the dawn of the Post-2015 Development Agenda. 
 
II. Indigenous Advocacy in The Dawn of The Post-2015 Development 
Agenda 
 
At first blush, the overarching conclusion of this thesis that IHRL at Article 11 
has failed to provide a sui generis substantive right to the restitution of cultural 
property in the Declaration, and that this ultimately stems from a structural 
incapacity of IHRL as a result of the still powerful concept of sovereignty, 
supports Professor Allen’s argument concerning the international legal project 
popular amongst Indigenous Peoples and their advocates.  As aforementioned, 
Professor Allen describes the essence of the “international legal project” as a 
project amongst international lawyers and scholars where international law and 
its institutions are presented as forces for “good” while states are to be 
understood as “bad” and consequently need to be encouraged and pushed into 
“doing the right thing”.17  In turn, the international legal project is a normative 
project which: 
 
                                                 
16 Joseph William Singer, Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 The Yale Law Journal 1, 58-9 (1984). 
17 Stephen Allen, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Limits of the International Legal Project  in 
Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 226 (S. Allen and A. Xanthaki eds., 
2011) [citation omitted].  
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...[s]eeks to promote the authority of international norms on a wide range of 
issues (especially on human rights) at the expense of the autonomy of 
national legal systems.  The project aims to alter the concept of sovereignty 
so that it reflects cosmopolitan rationality.  Accordingly it challenges the 
primacy of the State, claiming that it is being superseded by a web of 
institution that promote and deliver global governance.18 
 
Allen identifies many facets to achieve the aim of this project and their 
flaws that have been detailed throughout this thesis including the ‘no new 
rights’ discourse, the radicalization of customary international law, the 
functional decline of the state narrative, the resurrection of a natural law 
that never existed and the implementation gap.  In turn, Allen argues that 
overall this international legal project in which the Declaration finds itself 
is only capable of making limited contribution to the realization of 
indigenous aspirations and rather that indigenous advocates should pursue 
national advocacy. 
 
Engaging in the national political process in order to secure legal rights and to 
effect change in political and administrative culture is a more legitimate (and 
productive) strategy than attempts to inflate the rights contained in the 
Declaration and to impose them on affected national communities from the 
outside via international law.  Now that the Declaration has been endorsed by 
the international community it is time for indigenous representative to 
(re)engage in the political processes in affected States to generate the political 
consensus need to secure not only municipal legal rights required to protect 
and promote indigenous identities but also to create the political will to 
ensure that such legal rights are properly implemented.19   
 
On this view, indigenous advocacy should engage with states at the national level 
to effect change rather than to focus on international advocacy.   
 
However as this thesis has also demonstrated, although such advocacy can effect 
change improving the lives of Indigenous Peoples in that particular jurisdiction 
                                                 
18 Id. at 226 [citations omitted].  See also supra Chapter 4 at Section I(D) (discussing Anaya’s argument that the 
beneficiaries of self-determination should include Indigenous Peoples as any argument to the contrary does not 
recognize the realities of a post-Westphalian world where sovereignty no longer wields the same power as it once 
did).  
19 Allen, supra n. 17, at 256. 
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such as in the U.S. through NAGPRA, domestic legislation which is the product 
of engaging in this national political process is no guarantee that such change will 
filter up to effect change at the international level.  In turn, if the goal of 
indigenous advocacy is to secure a sui generis international human right to the 
restitution of cultural property then indigenous advocates cannot completely 
abandon the international legal project for an approach rooted solely in national 
advocacy.  In fact, indigenous advocates should not forsake one for the other.20  
Rather, they should pursue a two-pronged approach to advocacy that engages at 
both international and the national political process.  Although each argument 
has value, neither view alone recognizes the importance of the other to explore 
the grievance and demands of Indigenous Peoples that this thesis has also 
demonstrated through their combination in the dialogical space of the 
international judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to secure 
the restitution of land to Indigenous Peoples.  Even Allen recognizes that there 
can be “considerable normative cross-fertilization for the benefit of Indigenous 
Peoples.”21  Indeed this dialogical space, in essence a space for legal pluralism 
where national and international advocacy interacts, holds much promise for 
Indigenous Peoples and their efforts to securing a sui generis right to the 
restitution of cultural property.  In particular, we have the promise of the 
Organization of American States Proposed American Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples which at present offers a sui generis substantive right to the 
restitution of cultural property.   
 
 
                                                 
20 Indeed, indigenous advocacy needs to continue engaging at the national level as well.  Indigenous activist 
Suzan Shown Harjo noted that following the passage of NAGPRA there might be a tendency to relax advocacy 
in the belief that “other related wrongs will somehow right themselves naturally by virtue of the establishment” 
of a fundamental “human rights principle”” but as she noted advocacy efforts will need to continue “just to keep 
faithful to the agreement reached in NAGPRA.” Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA and the Problem of “Culturally 
Unidentifiable” Remains: The Argument for a Human Rights Framework, 44 Arizona State Law .Journal 809, 842-3 
(2012) citing Suzan Shown Harjo, Native Peoples’ Cultural and Human Rights: An Unfinished Agenda, 24 Arizona State 
Law Journal 321, 326 (1992). 
21 Allen, supra n. 17, at 244. 
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III. The Organization of American States Proposed American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
In 1989, The General Assembly of The Organization of American States (OAS) 
asked the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) to propose a 
legal instrument on the rights of Indigenous Peoples.22  Taking suggestions and 
comments from states, Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Governmental Organizations 
and experts, on 26 February 1997 the IACHR approved The Organization of 
American States Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.23  Regarding the issue of the restitution of cultural property this 
proposed declaration initially provided in Article VII that: 
 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to their cultural integrity, and their historical and 
archaeological heritage, which are important both for their survival as well as 
for the identity of  their members. 
2. Indigenous peoples are entitled to restitution in respect of  the property of  which they 
have been dispossessed, and where that is not possible, compensation on a 
basis not less favourable than the standard of  international law. 
3. The States shall recognize and respect indigenous ways of  life, customs, 
traditions, forms of  social, economic and political organization, institutions, 
practices, beliefs and values, use of  dress, and languages.24  
 
In turn, like the final version of Article 11 in the UN Declaration, the OAS 
Declaration initially offered the restitution of cultural property as a possible 
remedy as a derivative of another right.  However, in this case a derivative of the 
right to cultural integrity whereas in the UN Declaration it is the derivative of the 
right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.25   
 
                                                 
22 See AG/Res. 1022 (XIX-O/89) (2004). 
23 See OAS Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples (1997) available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Indigenas/Indigenas.en.01/Preamble.htm 
24 Id. [emphasis added]. 
25 Although, as noted, Article 11 of the Declaration is clearly embraced by the norm of cultural integrity but 
unlike the OAS proposal it does not explicitly include a right to cultural integrity. See supra Chapter 3 at Section 
III(B). 
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After this initial version, the IACHR turned its work over to the General 
Assembly of the OAS who ordered the Permanent Council to take the work of 
the IACHR on the proposed declaration further and eventually a Working 
Group was set up for this very purpose.26  The Working Group operates on 
consensus27 and has worked primarily through two different venues: Special 
Meetings of the Working Group and Meetings of Negotiations in the Quest for 
Points of Consensus with the former holding six special sessions from 1999 until 
2008 and with the latter, being considered the final phase in negotiations, 
beginning in 2003 and running to the present with fourteen meetings.28   
 
In the initial two Special Meetings of the Working Group, Article VII was closely 
considered with the participation of both states and Indigenous Peoples.  
Indigenous Peoples proposed the most generous changes to Article VII(2) 
offering an upgrade to a right and altogether eliminating alternative possibilities.  
Paulo Celso Oliveira on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in Brazil offered full stop: 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of property which they have been 
dispossessed.”29  Standing alone amongst states, Mexico also proposed 
restitution as a right.  However, it made such a right the only possibility 
eliminating compensation as an alternative and subject to the standards of 
domestic rather than international law.  Specifically, it offered: “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to own their heritage and to restitution if they have been 
dispossessed of it, in keeping with domestic law of states.”30  This came in response 
to the initial proposal by Brazil that this paragraph regarding restitution be 
                                                 
26 See OAS, Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/i
ndigenous/activities/declaration.asp 
27 See OAS, Department of International Law, at http://www.oas.org/dil/indigenous_peoples_preparing_draft_a
merican_declaration.htm 
28 See OAS, Department of International Law, at http://www.oas.org/dil/indigenous_peoples_Negotiations.htm 
29 Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples- Working Document Comparing the 
Original Draft of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Proposals by the States and by the 
Indigenous representatives, as well as the Proposed Draft by the Chair of the Working Group to prepare the 
Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Permanent Council of the Organization of 
American States, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Working Group to Prepare the Draft American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OEA/Ser.K/XVI GT/DADIN/doc.53/02 (9 January 2002) at 
p. 24. 
30 Id. at p. 23.  
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completely removed from the text.  Indeed, amongst states, it received less 
favorable reception.  Aside from Brazil, Columbia also suggested that the entire 
paragraph referencing the restitution of cultural property be removed from the 
text.31  Eventually Brazil changed its position from elimination to include a 
proposal seconded by Argentina that Indigenous Peoples “are entitled to the 
restitution of property of which they have been dispossessed, or, when that is 
not possible, to compensation”32; thereby eliminating any reference to standards 
albeit in domestic or international law to measure this compensation if 
restitution is not possible but still recognizing restitution as a remedy  derivative 
of the right to cultural integrity and not a right on its own. Other states 
suggested the removal of the word restitution altogether and a complete 
revamping of the text.  Unsurprisingly based on the experience in UNDRIP, 
these states included Canada which preferred the word return and the U.S. 
which preferred the word repatriation.  Specifically, Canada offered:  
 
States shall make best efforts to facilitate, in accordance with international 
and domestic law, the return to indigenous peoples of any of their cultural 
property of which historically they have been wrongfully dispossessed.  
[Where this is not possible, indigenous peoples are entitled to compensation 
on a basis no less favourable than the standard recognized by international 
law] indigenous peoples have the right of access to legal procedures for the 
return of their cultural property which is taken from them in violation of the 
law.33 
 
Similarly, the U.S. offered a complete change to the text on restitution not only 
eliminating reference to the word restitution but also not retaining any of the 
original text offering in the alternative: “States should provide an effective legal 
framework for the protection of indigenous culture, including, where 
                                                 
31 Special Meeting of the Working Group to Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Chair, Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Committee 
on Juridical and Political Affairs, Working Group to Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, OEA/Ser.K/XVI GT/DADIN/doc.23/01 rev. 1 (26 July 2001) at p. 28. 
32 Id. at p 28-9. 
33 Comparison Table, supra n. 29, at p. 23 [original text of paragraph 2 that was retained in brackets]. 
364 
 
appropriate, mechanisms for the repatriation of cultural property.”34  Only 
Venezuela proposed that the text should remain untouched.  
 
Taking stock of these proposals in 2002 after the first two sessions of the Special 
Meetings of the Working Group, the Chair of the Working Group proposed that 
Article VII (2) should read: “Indigenous peoples are entitled to the restitution of 
property that is a part of that heritage and of which they have been disposed, or, 
when that is not possible, to fair compensation.”35  In essence, it ignores for calls 
to eliminate reference to the word restitution but it does not suggest for 
restitution to be made a right.  Rather, it keeps restitution as a derivative remedy 
of the right to cultural integrity in the same fashion as the final version of Article 
11 in the UNDRIP but here continues to recognize that where this remedy is 
not possible compensation can be offered as a suitable alternative while not 
referencing either domestic or international law as the standard for this 
compensation.  
 
Subsequently, the following year in May 2003 the Chair of the Working Group 
considered the IACHR’s original proposal for the draft declaration as well as all 
the contributions, comments and proposals submitted by states and Indigenous 
Peoples in the Special Meetings of the Working Group thus far to generate the 
Consolidated Text of the Draft Declaration Prepared by the Chair of the 
Working Group.36  On the matter of the restitution of cultural property, the 2003 
Consolidated Text offered at Section Three on Cultural Identity at Article 
XII(2):  
 
                                                 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at p. 23. 
36 See Consolidated Text of the Draft Declaration Prepared by the Chair of the Working Group, Permanent 
Council of the Organization of American States, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Working Group to 
Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,  OEA/Ser.K/XVI 
GT/DADIN/doc.139/03 (17 June 2003). 
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Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the property that is part of 
that heritage of which they may be dispossessed or, where restitution is not 
possible, to fair and equitable compensation37 
 
This marked a substantial change from the 1997 text proposed by the IACHR as 
well as Article 11 of the UNDRIP in that it makes the restitution of cultural 
property a sui generis right to restitution rather than a derivative remedy to 
another right though continuing to recognize that where this right is not possible 
Indigenous Peoples would receive fair and equitable compensation.  During the 
informal consultations of the Ninth Meeting of Negotiations in the Quest for 
Points of Consensus, an alternative text was proposed: 
 
States shall provide [redress, reparation], including the right of [restitution, return], 
whenever possible, of any cultural heritage of which indigenous peoples have 
been dispossessed without their free, prior and informed consent.  Should 
return not be possible, indigenous peoples shall have the right to fair and 
equitable compensation.  States, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, shall 
establish effective mechanism for that purpose.38 
 
Indeed, in a reflective document in 2011 the Working Group classified 
provisions of the text according to ease in generating consensus and classified 
Article XII(2) amongst the difficult texts.39  Regardless, at its core it continued to 
provide the restitution, also here termed return, of cultural property as a matter 
of right though subject to the notion of whenever possible.  Indeed, this seems 
superfluous given that it also continues to note the caveat that has been standard 
through the OAS text that where restitution is not possible Indigenous Peoples 
have the right to fair and equitable compensation.  Rather perhaps it indicates 
the importance of this passage on compensation as a compromise for the 
                                                 
37 See id. 
38 Report of the Chair on the Ninth Meeting of Negotiations in the Quest for Points of Consensus, Permanent 
Council of the Organization of American States, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Working Group to 
Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OEA/Ser.K/XVI 
GT/DADIN/doc.285/07 rev.1 (27 February 2007) at p. 5.   
39 See Classification of Provisions That Could Facilitate Consensus, Permanent Council of the Organization of 
American States, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Working Group to Prepare the Draft American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OEA/Ser.K/XVI GT/DADIN/doc.329/08 rev. 5 (1 April 
2011). 
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inclusion of the restitution of cultural property as a right; indeed Article 11 of 
the UNDRIP not only does not secure a right to restitution it lacks complete 
reference to any provision on compensation where restitution is not possible.40  
Regardless, whenever possible has been removed from the most recent draft text of 
the OAS. 
 
Again, after taking stock of these proposals a new reference text for the Working 
Group’s consideration was prepared known as the Record of the Current Status 
of the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  At 
present, after the Fourteenth Meeting of Negotiations in the Quest for Points of 
Consensus, Article XII(2) now reads: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to reparations, including the right of restitution, of 
any cultural heritage of which they have been dispossessed without their free, prior, 
and informed consent.  Should restitution not be possible, indigenous peoples shall 
have the right to fair and equitable compensation.41 
 
Like the 2003 Consolidated Text, this marks a substantial change from the initial 
1997 text proposed by the IACHR in that it continues to make the restitution of 
cultural property a sui generis right to restitution rather than a derivative remedy 
                                                 
40 In turn, aside from the reasons documented at length in thesis through its tripartite analysis uncovering why 
the Declaration did not secure a right to the restitution of cultural property, the lack of any provision on 
compensation as an alternative may also explain in part why this failure of the Declaration to secure a right to the 
restitution of cultural property which at present the OAS Draft Declaration secures.  Indeed, providing 
compensation offers states an alternative to restitution while still securing a right in turn balancing a fine line 
between the needs of complaints and states.  It is aided by the fact that compensation in such cases loses its 
punitive stigma and is replaced with a rehabilitative air in line with the ethos of IHRL.  Interestingly, this was also 
the approach taken in International Humanitarian Law [IHL] in the aftermath of the Second World War in the 
scheme put in place for the restitution of cultural property. See generally supra Chapter 6 at ns. 65-74 and 
accompanying text (discussing this scheme in IHL and its usefulness in fleshing out the details of restitution 
schemes left vague in IHRL).  Specifically, this post-war scheme also provided for compensation or restitution in 
kind when restitution was not possible as long as two conditions were met regarding restitution in kind: the 
equivalent object formed part of the cultural heritage of the claimant’s state and only if an object of equivalent 
value to the group could be located. Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution: Ensuring Each Group’s Contribution 
to Humanity, 22 European Journal of International Law 17, 27 [citations omitted].  It comes from the recognition 
that restitution of the object itself is often not possible in cases involving human rights violations. Id. 45 [citations 
omitted]. 
41 Fourteenth Meeting of Negotiations in the Quest for Points of Consensus, Record of the Current Status of the 
Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Permanent Council of the Organization of 
American States, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Working Group to Prepare the Draft American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OEA/Ser.K/XVI GT/DADIN/doc.334/08 rev.7 (2 May 
2012). 
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for the right to cultural integrity though continuing to recognize that where this 
right is not possible Indigenous Peoples would receive fair and equitable 
compensation.  Further, unlike its predecessors  it retains the suggestion of the 
inclusion of the free, prior and informed consent in relation to dispossession 
which brings it to an extent in close alignment with Article 11 of the UNDRIP.  
Yet, the similarity ends here.  Unlike the UNDRIP, this most recent version of 
Article XII(2) of  the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples  as noted provides a sui generis right to the restitution of 
cultural property and offers the possibility of compensation or restitution in kind 
when  restitution is not possible.42  However, as demonstrated in this thesis in its 
overarching conclusion IHRL at Article 11 failed to provide a sui generis right to 
the restitution of cultural property in the Declaration.  In essence, the opposite 
process has occurred; the issue of the restitution of cultural property has 
experienced an upgrading in the OAS Draft Declaration while it experienced a 
downgrading in the UNDRIP.   
 
Ultimately, this demonstrates in particular that Indigenous Peoples are moving 
closer to one of their advocacy goals: to secure a sui generis right to cultural 
property.  It is significant that this again has occurred in the dialogical space of 
the Inter-American system for reasons two-fold.  First, it demonstrates both the 
success of a dual pronged approach to advocacy which a dialogical space allows 
for through interaction.  However beyond this, more broadly it makes a 
comment on the method of international law making.  Specifically, it suggests 
that while even though at the global level great expectations have been placed on 
the universal provision of a right to the restitution of cultural property that such 
expectations have fallen flat; whereas at the regional and national levels real 
progress has been made and unsurprisingly could be made more rapidly as 
common sense would dictate in the absence of as many political players.  Indeed, 
                                                 
42 See supra note 40 [discussing the potential significance of this difference in the texts regarding provision for 
compensation]. 
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in terms of this thesis and the focus on the restitution of cultural property 
perhaps it is unsurprising and indeed more significant and promising that the 
OAS Draft Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples offers a right to the 
restitution of cultural property at present that the UNDRIP could not muster on 
passage.   
 
Conclusion: Eggs in Baskets  
 
Indigenous advocacy does not occur in a vacuum.  It needs to be cognizant of 
both the international and the domestic legal orders.  In turn, indigenous 
advocacy to secure a right to the restitution of cultural property in the dawn of 
the Post-2015 Development Agenda cannot place all of its metaphorical eggs in 
either the basket of IHRL or the basket of domestic law.  Rather, it needs to 
strike a balance between the two.  In doing so, it parallels the balancing act that 
typifies legal pluralism and the choices it makes with regard to the recognition of 
different and even opposing values, norms, customs and laws within a 
jurisdiction albeit it in IHRL as demonstrated in the IACtHRs or domestic law 
as demonstrated in NAGPRA.  In turn, like legal pluralism this suggested 
advocacy approach will neither “win” nor “lose” every contest and in each a loss 
will be masked in a gain and a gain masked in a loss.  However, regardless both 
remain important sites for the struggle to secure a right to the restitution of 
cultural property.  
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